

CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

ON

THE GALLIC WAR,

Literally Translated.

1. ALL Gaul is divided into three parts, of which the Belgæ inhabit one, the Aquitani another; those who in their own language are called Celtæ, in ours, Gauls, a third. All those differ among themselves in language, institutions, laws. The river Garumna separates the Gauls from the Aquitani, the Matrona and Sequana (*supply* "dividunt," *i.e.* separate them) from the Belgæ. Of all these the Belgæ are the bravest, because that they are farthest removed from the civilization and refinement of the province, and traders least frequently resort to them, and import those things which tend to effeminate their minds, and (*supply* "because") they are nearest to the Germans who dwell beyond the Rhine, with whom they are incessantly waging war. From which cause the Helvetii also excel the rest of the Gauls in valour, because they engage in almost daily encounters with the Germans, inasmuch as (*cum*) they are either continually repelling them from their own territories, or else they themselves carry on war in the territories of the latter (*eorum*). One of these (*scil.* "divisions"), which it has been said that the Gauls possess, commences from the river Rhone, is bounded by the river Garumna, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgæ; it touches also the river Rhine, ¹on the side of the Sequani, and Helvetii; it stretches towards the north. The Belgæ are sprung from the farthest limits of Gaul; they extend to the lower division of the river Rhine; they look towards the north and the rising sun. Aquitania extends from the river

¹ *Ab Sequanis, &c., i.e.* "in the quarter of the Sequani." The English idiom is the reverse of the Latin. We say "AT the Sequani," the Latins, "FROM the Sequanis." This point should be remarked by the young student in translation and composition.

Garumna, to the Pyrenæan mountains and that part of the ocean, which is next to Spain; it looks between the setting of the sun and the north.

2. Among the Helvetii, Orgetorix was by far the noblest and the wealthiest. He, in the consulship of Marcus Massala and Marcus Piso, led on by a strong desire (*cupiditate*) of sovereign power, formed a confederacy of the chieftainry, and prevailed upon his own state (*i. e.* "people") that they accompanied by (*cum*) all their numbers, should go forth from their territories; (*supply* "urging" *scil.* "persaudens," taken out of "persuasit,") that it was very easy, inasmuch as (*cum*) they surpassed all in valour, to possess themselves of the sovereignty of all Gaul. ¹He persuaded them to this, the more easily on this account, that on every side the Helvetii are hemmed in by the nature of their situation. On one side by the river Rhine, being of extreme breadth and depth, which separates the Helvetian territories from the Germans; in a second direction, by Jura, a mountain of the greatest elevation, which is situated (*est*) between the Sequani and the Helvetii; on a third side by Lake Lemane and the river Rhone, which separates our Province from the Helvetii. From these causes it happened, both that they could roam less ²widely, and could less easily ³wage aggressive war on neighbouring states: from which cause, these people, so fond of warfare, ⁴were filled with great dissatisfaction. They thought besides that in proportion to (*pro*) the number of their people, and considering (*pro*) their reputation for war and valour, they possessed but narrow territories, which extended in length two hundred and forty thousand paces; in breadth, one hundred and eighty.

3. Induced by these facts, and moved thereto by the influence of Orgetorix, they resolved to provide such things as (*ea quæ*) might be requisite for their departure. To buy up the greatest quantity possible of beasts of burden and waggon; to make as extensive sowings as possible, ⁵that they

¹ *Id hoc facilius, &c.*, lit. he persuaded this to them the more easily for this reason, "hoc."

² *Minus late, &c.* "less widely," *i. e.* than they wished.

³ *Bellum inferre, &c.* "wage aggressive war;" *bellum gerere*, "to wage war, aggressive or defensive."

⁴ *Magno dolore, &c.* lit. "were affected with great discontent."

⁵ *Ut in itinere, &c.* lit. "that a supply of corn might be afforded them on their route."

might have an abundant supply of corn on their route; to establish peace and alliances with the nearest states. To accomplish these objects, they consider that a period of two years would be sufficient for them; they fix by a law their departure for the third year. Orgetorix is chosen to carry these things into execution. He takes upon himself an embassy to the (*different*) states. Whilst on that journey he persuades Casticus, the son of Catamentalides, a Sequanian, whose father had for many years held sovereign power among the Sequani, and had been titled "friend" by the senate of the Roman people, to seize upon (*ut occuparet*) the sovereign authority in his own state, which his father had held before him. In like manner he persuades Dumnorix, the Æduan, brother of Divitiacus, who at that time was holding the chief authority in the state, and was in the highest degree (*maxime*) popular with the commonalty, to make the same attempt (lit. "that he should attempt the same thing"), and to him he gives his own daughter in marriage. He proves to them that to accomplish their designs, was a thing very easy to be done, because that (*propterea quod*) he himself was sure to gain absolute command over his own state; that it was not doubtful but that of all Gaul the Helvetii were the most powerful (lit. "could do the most.") He solemnly engages (*confirmat*) that by means of his own resources and his own army, he would gain for them sovereignty in their respective states (*regna*, "plural"). Led on by this speech, they mutually (*inter se*) give a solemn promise (*fidem*) and oath, and they hope that, after having seized on the sovereign authority (*regno occupato*, "abl. abs.") they could by means of its three most powerful and valiant communities make themselves masters of all Gaul.

4. When this design (*ea res*) was made known to the Helvetii by secret information (*per indicium*) they, in accordance with their usages (*moribus suis*) compelled Orgetorix to plead his cause in chains (lit. "out of chains.")¹ It behoved that the punishment of being burnt by fire should overtake him if condemned. On the day appointed for the pleading of his case, Orgetorix assembled from every quarter to the trial, all his own household, to the number of ten thousand men; and

¹ *Damnatum pœnam, &c.*, literally, "it behoved that the punishment, viz., that he should be consumed to ashes by fire should follow him if condemned."

brought together to the same place all his dependents and debtors. By these means he rescued himself from pleading his cause; (lit. "so that he should not," etc.); while the state, aroused on account of that event, (*ob eam rem*) was taking measures (*conaretur*) to enforce its own authority by arms, and the magistrates were compelling the attendance (*cogerent*) of a great number of men from the country, Orgetorix died; ¹nor is the suspicion wanting, as the Helvetii think, that he inflicted death upon himself.

5. After his death, the Helvetii, nevertheless, make efforts to carry into execution (*facere*) what (*id quod* "the thing which") they had determined on, viz.: to take their departure from their own territories. When they thought that they were now prepared for that undertaking (*ad eam rem*) they set fire to all their towns in number up to twelve, their villages, to the number of forty, and the remainder of their private buildings. They burn in heaps all the corn except that which they intended to carry with them, in order that (*ut*) hope of a return home having been taken away, they might be the more ready to encounter all dangers. They order them to carry away, each person for himself, from his home, ground provisions for three months. They prevail upon the Rauraci, and the Tulingi, and the Latobrigi, neighbouring people, that having adopted the same design, their towns and villages having been burnt down, they should set out together with them; and the Boii, who had been living beyond the Rhine, and had crossed over into the Noric country, and had laid seige to Norcia, ²they receive and unite to themselves as confederates.

6. There were on the whole two routes ³by which they could depart from their native state (*domo*): one through *the country* of the Sequani, narrow and difficult, between Mount Jura and the river Rhone, by which waggons could scarcely

¹ *Neque abest suspicio*, &c. lit. "nor is the suspicion absent, as the Helvetii suppose, but that he himself determined on death against himself."

² *Receptos ad se*, &c., lit. "received to themselves they attach to themselves as confederates." Observe, that when a verb governs the accusative case of a participle, both are to be translated as two verbs, with the connective conjunction, e.g. *comprehensos Volscos Roman duxere*—"they arrested the Volsci AND led them to Rome," lit. "they led the arrested Volsci to Rome."

³ *Quibus itineribus*, &c. The noun, to which the relative refers, is not unfrequently repeated; there are two other instances of it in this chapter, viz., "*dicunt diem qua die*," and "*is dies erat ante diem quintum*."

be conducted in single file—a mountain, moreover, (*autem*) of extreme height overhung it, so that very few men could easily prevent them: The second, through our Province, much easier and readier, because between the territories of the Helvetii and those of the Allobroges, who had lately been reduced to peace, the Rhone flows, and it in several places is crossed by a ford. The last town of the Allobroges, and nearest our Province, is Geneva; from this town a bridge extends across to the Helvetii. They were of opinion, that they would either prevail upon the Allobroges, because they did not yet seem to be of a friendly disposition towards the Roman people, or that they would compel them by force, to suffer them to pass through their territories. All things having been provided for their departure, they appoint a day on which they were to assemble at the bank of the Rhone. That day was the fifth before the kalends of April, in the consulship of Lucius Piso and Aulus Gabinius.

7. When information had been given to Cæsar, that they were attempting to effect a passage through our Province, he hastens to set out from the city, and by as long journeys as possible, he advances into farther Gaul, and arrives at Geneva. ¹He orders the greatest number of soldiers possible from the whole Province, (there was but a single legion in all, in farther Gaul). He orders the bridge which was near (*ad*) Geneva to be destroyed. When the Helvetii were informed of his arrival, they send as ambassadors to him, the noblest of their state, of which embassy Nameius and Verudoctius held the chief place, to say, “that it was their intention, without doing any harm, to take their way through the Province, inasmuch as they had no other route; that they begged of him, it might be permitted them to do so with his consent.” Cæsar, because he kept it in his recollection, that Lucius Casius the consul had been slain, and his army routed by the Helvetii, and sent under the yoke, did not think that the request ought to be granted (*concedendum non putabat*) neither was he of opinion that men of a hostile feeling, if permission were given them of marching through the Province, would refrain from injury and outrage. However, that some time might intervene, until the soldiers whom he had ordered might assemble, he replies to the ambassadors that he would take time to consider; if

¹ *Provinciæ totæ*, lit. He commands to the whole province, &c.

they should desire anything, they might return on the day before the Ides' of April.

8. Meantime, by the aid of that legion, which he usually kept (*habebat*) with himself, and with the soldiers who had assembled from the Province, he draws a wall nineteen thousand paces *in length*, and in height sixteen feet, also a trench, from Lake Lemane, which flows into the river Rhone, to Mount Jura, which separates the territories of the Sequani from the Helvetii. This work having been completed, he stations garrisons at intervals (*disponit præsidia*); he fortifies *detached* forts, in order that he might the more easily prevent them, if they should attempt to cross against his will. When the day which he had appointed with the ambassadors arrived, and the ambassadors returned to him, he declares, that he cannot, consistently with the usage and example of the Roman people, allow a passage to any one through the Province; and if they should attempt to try force, he plainly shows them that he would prevent them. The Helvetii,¹ disappointed in this hope, some by means of boats fastened together, others by ²numerous constructed rafts, some by the fords of the Rhone, where the depth of the river was least; sometimes during the day, more frequently during the night, having essayed if they could force a passage, being driven back by the strength of the work, and the rushing together of the soldiers, and by the missiles, desisted from that attempt.

9. There remained one way through the Sequani, by which,³ if the Sequani were unwilling, they could not proceed on account of the defiles. When they could not persuade these of themselves (*sua sponte*) they send ambassadors to Dumnorix, the Æduan, in order that by his intercession (lit. he being the intercessor) they might obtain their request from the Sequani. Dumnorix, by his interest and liberality, possessed the greatest influence (lit. "could do the most") among the Sequani. He was also a friend to the Helvetii, because he had taken in marriage (lit. "led into marriage") the daughter of Orgetorix from that state, and being led on by a strong desire for sovereign power, he was aiming at a revolution (lit. "was desirous of new things"), and was anxious to have as many states as possible bound to him by his own acts of

¹ *Ea spe dejecti*, lit. "cast down from that expectation."

² *Ratibusque*, &c. i. e., by numerous rafts which they had constructed.

³ *Sequanis invitis*, lit. "the Sequani being unwilling."

kindness (*suo beneficio*). Accordingly he undertakes the affair, and obtains from the Sequani, that they would suffer the Helvetii to pass through their territories. He effects that they should mutually give hostages—the Sequani, that they would not hinder the Helvetii on their march, the Helvetii, that they would pass without injury or outrage.

10. Word is brought back to Cæsar, that it was the intention of the Helvetii to effect a passage through the country of the Sequani and Ædui into the territories of the Santones, who are not far distant from the territories of the Tolosates, which state is in the Province. Should this be done, he saw that it would be attended with great danger to the Province, that it should have for neighbours, a warlike race, enemies of the Roman people, in open and most abundantly corn-producing districts. For those reasons he set Titus Labienus, his Lieutenant, over that fortification which he had constructed. He himself proceeds into Italy, by forced marches, and there enrolls two legions, and leads forth from their winter quarters, three which were wintering around Aquileia, and with these five legions proceeds to march, where the route was nearest, over the Alps, into farther Gaul. There the Centrones, and the Graioceli, and Caturiges, ¹having seized upon the higher grounds, attempt to impede the army on its march. These having been routed in several encounters, he arrives on the seventh day from Ocelum, which is the remotest town of the higher Province, at the territories of the Vicontii of the farther Province; from thence to the territories of the Allobroges, from the Allobroges he leads his army into the Segusiani—these are the first beyond the Rhone, outside the Province.

11. The Helvetii had already led their forces across the defiles and territories of the Sequani, and had come into the territories of the Ædui, ²and were in the act of devastating their lands. When the Ædui could not defend themselves and their property from these, they send ambassadors to Cæsar to beg assistance, “that they on every occasion had so deserved from the Roman people—that almost within sight of our army, their lands ought not to be devastated, their children carried off into slavery, and their towns taken by storm.” At the same time the Ædui Ambarri, the friends and relations

¹ Lit. “The higher grounds having been seized on.”

² *Populabantur*—mark the force of the imperfect.

of the Ædui, inform Cæsar, that they, ¹in the event of their lands being laid waste, could not easily repel the attack of the enemy from their towns. In like manner the Allobroges, who had villages and possessions beyond the Rhone, betake themselves in flight to Cæsar, and inform him that nothing was left to them beyond the soil of their land. Influenced by which facts, Cæsar resolved not to wait until all the resources of the allies having been destroyed, the Helvetii should come into the country of the Santones.

12. There is a river Arar, which passing through (*per*) the territories of the Ædui and Sequani, flows into the Rhone, of a smoothness of current surpassing belief, so that it cannot be determined by the eye in which direction it flows. This, the Helvetii by means of rafts and boats fastened together, were now in the act of crossing (*transibant*; mark the force of the imperf.). When Cæsar was informed, through his scouts, that the Helvetii had already conveyed three parts of their forces across this river, but that a fourth part remained at this side the river Arar; having set out at the third watch with three legions from the camp, he came to that part which had not as yet crossed the river; having attacked these, encumbered and not expecting him, he cut down a great portion of them—the rest gave themselves up to flight, and betook themselves for concealment into the nearest woods. This was called the Tigurine canton, for all the Helvetian state is divided into four cantons. This particular canton, after it had taken its departure from its native state, had within the recollection of our fathers, slain Lucius Cassius, the consul, and sent his army under the yoke. Thus, either by accident, or by the providence of the immortal gods, that division of the Helvetian state which had inflicted a signal disaster on the Roman people, was the first to suffer punishment. In which affair Cæsar avenged, not only public, but also private injuries, because in the same battle in which the Tigurini had slain Cassius, they had also slain Lucius Piso, his lieutenant, the grandfather of Lucius Piso, his (*scil.* “Cæsar’s”) father-in-law.

13. This battle having been fought, in order that he might be able to overtake the remaining forces of the Helvetii, he takes measures for a bridge to be made on the Arar, and in this way conveys his army across. The Helvetii being alarmed

¹ Lit. “Their lands having been laid waste.”

at his sudden arrival, when they perceived that he had effected in a single day what they themselves had, with the greatest difficulty, accomplished in twenty days, viz.: ¹the crossing of the river, send ambassadors to him: of which embassy Divico was chief, who had been leader of the Helvetii in the Cassian war. He treats with Cæsar in the following manner—"If the Roman people would make peace with the Helvetii, that the Helvetii would go into that quarter, and would remain there where Cæsar might settle them, and wish them to be; but if he should continue to assail them with war, he should remember the old disaster of the Roman people, and the pristine valour of the Helvetii. As to his having surprised one canton, when those who had crossed the river could not bring assistance to their own people, he should not on that account ascribe anything too highly to his own valour, or despise them—that they had so learned from their fathers and ancestors, as to trust more in valour than in stratagem or ambuscades—for which reason he ought not to run the risk, that that place where they had taken their position, should derive a name from the calamity of the Roman people, and the destruction of its army, or hand down such a tradition.

14. To these Cæsar answers as follows (*ita*) "that less hesitation was caused him on this account, because he held in his recollection those circumstances, which the Helvetian ambassadors had stated; ²and that he felt the more indignant in proportion as, (*eo, quo*) they had happened less in accordance with the desert of the Roman people; ³for if they had been conscious to themselves of any injury, that it would not be difficult for them to be on their guard; but that they had been misled by this, that they were neither aware that anything had been done by them, on account of which they should fear, nor could they think that ⁴they had any thing to fear without cause. But if, however (*quod si*) he should be disposed (*vellet*) to forget their former insult, ⁵whether could he

¹ Lit. "that they should cross the river."

² *Atque eo gravius ferre, quo, &c.* lit. "and that he bore them the more heavily" *eo quo* "in proportion as."

³ *Qui si, &c.* The antecedent to *qui* is *populus Romanus* understood; lit. "who if, &c."

⁴ *Neque sine causa, &c.* lit. "that it was to be feared by them."

⁵ *Num etiam, &c.* The order is *num etiam posse deponere*; supply *putandum* or some such word, "whether was it to be thought that he could lay aside, &c."

also lay aside the recollection of recent injuries, in that, in his despite (*eo invito*) they had attempted by force a passage through the Province, in that, they had assailed the Ædui, the Ambarri, and the Allobroges. ¹As to their boasting so insolently of their victory, and as to their wondering that they had so long carried off those injuries with impunity, that these tended to the same effect; for that the immortal Gods, in order that men might feel the heavier afflictions, from a change of circumstances, sometimes were accustomed to grant prosperous fortunes, and a longer term of impunity to those whom they purposed punishing for their crimes. Although these things were so, still, if hostages would be given to him by them, in order that he might know, that they would do those things which they promised, and if they would make compensation to the Ædui for the injuries, which they had inflicted on them and on their allies, ²if in like manner, to the Allobroges, that he would make peace with them. Divico answers, that the Helvetii had been so instructed by their ancestors, that they were accustomed to receive hostages, not to give them—that the Roman people were a proof of that fact. This answer having been given, he departed.

15. On the following day they move their camp from that place: Cæsar does the same; and all the cavalry, which he held assembled from all the Province and the Ædui and their allies, he sends forward ³to see in what direction the enemy might direct their march (*iter faciant*). These (lit. “who”) having pursued the rearmost division too eagerly, join battle with the cavalry of the Helvetii in a disadvantageous place, and a few of our men fall. The Helvetii, elated by which engagement, because with five hundred cavalry, they had repulsed so large a body of horse, began to make a bolder stand, sometimes from their rearmost body to ⁴provoke our men to battle. Cæsar restrained his own men from battle, and considered it sufficient for the present, to keep the enemy from rapine, foraging, and laying waste the country. In this manner they marched for about fifteen days, so that between the rearmost body of the enemy and the foremost of our

¹ *Quod sua, &c.*, construction is *ad id quod*, lit. “as to the fact that.”

² *Item si*; supply *satisfaciant* before Æduis, &c.

³ *Qui videant, &c.* The relative in this construction, *i.e.*, with potential after the indicative, is to be translated by the infinitive in English.

⁴ *Prælio lacessere, &c.*, or “harass our men by attack.”

troops, there intervened no more than five or six thousand paces.

16. Meantime Cæsar continued daily to importune (*quotidie flagitare*) the Ædui for the corn which they had promised in the name of the state; for, on account of the cold, because Gaul, as has been said above, is situated under the north, not only was the corn not ripe in the fields, ¹but not even of fodder was there a sufficiently large supply at hand. Besides (*autem*) he was not able to make use of the corn which he had brought up the river Arar in vessels, because the Helvetii, from whom he was unwilling to depart, had diverted their line of march from the Arar. Day after day the Helvetii procrastinated; said it was being collected,—was being brought in,—was at hand. When he perceived that he was put off too long, and that the day was at hand on which it would be necessary to measure out the corn to the soldiers, their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in the camp, having been summoned together, among them Divitiacus, and Liscus, who presided over the chief magistracy (whom the Ædui style Vergobretus, who is appointed annually, and holds the power of life and death over his own people), he severely censures them, because when it (*scil.* the corn) could neither be purchased nor obtained from the country, on an occasion so urgent, the enemy being so near, he was not relieved by them, especially since, induced in a great degree by their prayers, he had undertaken the war. He complains also much more severely of his having been deserted by them (*lit.* “that he had been, &c.”)

17. Then, at length, Liscus being moved thereto, (*adductus*) by the speech of Cæsar, openly states what he had previously concealed—“That there were several persons whose influence had the greatest weight (*plurimum valeat*) with the common people,—who, though private individuals could do more than they themselves, though magistrates; that these, by seditious and wicked language, deterred the people, ²from contributing the corn which they were bound to supply (*lit.* “ought to supply”), *adding*, that if they (the Ædui) could not any longer (*jam*) hold the sovereignty of Gaul, that it was better to bear the dominion of Gauls than of Romans, and

¹ *Sed ne pabuli quidem, &c.*, *lit.* “not only was not the corn ripe in the fields, but not even of fodder did a sufficiently large quantity supply itself.”

² *Ne conferant*, *lit.* “lest they should contribute.”

that they ought not to doubt but that if the Romans should conquer the Helvetii, they would wrest liberty from the Ædui¹ together with the rest of Gaul. That by the same parties (*ab iisdem*) our plans and whatever things were being done in the camp were told to the enemy,—that these could not be restrained by himself. Moreover, as to his having disclosed the affair to Cæsar, being compelled by necessity, that he knew well at how great a risk he did it, and that, for that reason, he had been silent as long as he could.

18. Cæsar felt that by this speech of Liscus, Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus was pointed at; but, because he was unwilling that these matters should be discussed in the presence of so many (lit. “more persons than was fitting, (*pluribus*) being present.”) He hastily dismisses the council, and detains Liscus; he enquires from him in private, about those things, of which he had spoken in the assembly. He (*i.e.* Liscus) speaks more freely and more boldly. He enquires about the same things from others in private; he discovers that they were true. “That Dumnorix himself was a man of the greatest daring,—of great influence among the common people on account of his liberality; that he was desirous of a revolution; that for many years he had farmed (*redemta habere*) the customs and all the other public revenues of the Ædui at a low rate, because when he bid (*eo licente*) no one dared to bid against him. By these means that he had both increased his own private fortune, and also had amassed extensive resources for the purposes of bribery (*ad largiendum*)—that he constantly maintained and kept about him a large body of cavalry at his own expense: nor that it was only in his own state, but that it was also among neighbouring states he exercised a powerful influence. And that for the sake of this power, he had given in marriage (*collocasse*) his mother among the Bituriges to a man of the highest rank and greatest power there; that he himself had a wife from the Helvetii; that he had given in marriage his sister, by his mother’s side, and his female relatives among the other states; that he favoured and wished well to the Helvetii on account of that alliance; that he hated also on his own account, Cæsar and the Romans, because by their arrival his power was lessened, and his brother Divitiacus was restored to his former position of

¹ *Cum reliqua*, &c. i. e., “as well as from the rest of Gaul.”

influence and consideration. ¹If any disaster should happen to the Romans, that he entertained the highest expectations (*summam in spem venire*) of obtaining the kingdom through the aid of the Helvetii; that under the sway of the Roman people he despaired not only of sovereign power but even of that influence which he already possessed." ²By enquiring also into the unsuccessful engagement of the horse, which was fought a few days before Cæsar discovered ³that the flight began on the part of Dumnorix and his cavalry (for Dumnorix commanded the cavalry which the Ædui had sent as assistance to Cæsar) that by their flight the rest of the cavalry was terrified.

19. Which things having been known; when to these suspicions the most undoubted facts were added, viz., that he had conducted the Helvetii across the territories of the Sequani; that (*quod*) he had taken measures for the giving of hostages between them; that he had done all these things, not only without his own (Cæsar's) orders and those of his (Dumnorix's) state, but even without their knowledge; that he was accused by the chief magistrate of the Ædui; he considered there was sufficient ground, why either he himself should inflict punishment upon him, or order his state to punish him. To all these considerations (lit. things) there was one obstacle (*unum repugnabat*), namely, that he had proved his brother Divitiacus' most ardent zeal towards the Roman people, his most ardent affection towards himself (mark the repetition of the adjective, *summum studium, summam voluntatem*); his singular good faith, justice, and moderation, for he feared lest by the punishment of him he might hurt the feelings of Divitiacus. Accordingly, before he would attempt anything he orders Divitiacus to be summoned to him, and the usual (lit. "daily") interpreters having been removed, he confers with him through Caius Valerius Proculus, a leading personage of the province of Gaul, his own personal friend, in whom he was accustomed to place (*habebat*,

¹ *Si quid accidat*, a euphemism, lit. "if anything should happen," meaning "if anything terrible;" same way in Greek *ἔι τι γένοίτο*.

² *Reperiebat etiam*, &c. lit. "by inquiring also into the unsuccessful engagement of the horse (supply *prælio equestri adverso*) which unsuccessful engagement of the horse" (*quod prælium equestre adversum*,) &c.

³ *Initium fugæ*, &c. lit. "that the commencement of the flight took place on the part of," &c.

imperf.) the highest confidence in all things. At the same time he reminds him, of what had been said of Dumnorix, in his own presence in the council of the Gauls, and shows him, what each one had separately said privately to himself concerning him. He begs and advises, that without any offence to his feelings, his case having been examined, either he himself might sentence him, or order the state to sentence him.

20. Divitiacus having embraced Cæsar, began with many tears to entreat him, "that he would not determine anything too severely against his brother; that he was conscious, that those things were true, nor that any one felt more sorrow ¹in consequence than himself, for this reason, because when he himself, by means of his popularity, possessed the highest influence, (lit. "could do the most") in his own state and in the rest of Gaul, and he the other the very least, by reason of his youth, he ("that other") had become powerful through his aid; which resources and power, he was now employing not only for the purpose of lessening his influence, but almost to effect (*ad*) his ruin; nevertheless, that he was deeply moved both by fraternal affection and public opinion. And if anything too severe should befall him at the hands of Cæsar, while he himself held ²so high a place in his esteem, that no one would believe that it had not occurred at his desire; from which circumstance, that it would come to pass, that the affections of all Gaul would be estranged from himself." Whilst he in tears was making these entreaties of Cæsar with many words, Cæsar grasps his right hand; having consoled him, he begs him to cease 'entreaties (lit. "make an end of entreating") he declares that his influence with him is so great, that at his desire and prayers he would pardon both the injury to the republic and the affront offered to himself. He summons Dumnorix to himself; he brings forward his brother; he plainly shows what he had to censure in him; he lays before him, what he knew himself, what things the state had to complain of; he cautions him, to avoid all grounds of suspicion for the future; he declares that he pardons the past for the sake of his brother, Divitiacus (lit. "pardons the past to his brother.") He places spies over Dumnorix, in order that, he might be able to learn what he would do, and with whom he would speak.

¹ *Ex eo*, &c. lit. "From that."

² *Eum locum*, &c. lit. "such a place;" *apud eum* "in his esteem."

21. On the same day having been informed by scouts, that the enemy had taken up a position at the foot of a mountain 8,000 paces from his own camp; he sent persons to ascertain of what kind the nature of the mountain might be, and what kind the ascent by a circuitous route. Report was brought back, that it was easy. At the third watch he ordered Tit. Labienus, his lieutenant with prætorian powers, accompanied by *(cum)* two legions, and those as guides who had explored the way, to ascend the highest ridge of the mountain; he shows him what his design is. He himself at the fourth watch, by the same way by which the enemy had proceeded, advances against them and sends before him all the cavalry. Publius Considius, who was considered most skilled in military science, and who had been in the army of Lucius Sulla, and afterwards in that of Marcus Crassus, is sent forward with the scouts.

22. At the first light, while the summit of the mountain was in the act of being taken possession of by Titus Labienus, and when he himself (Cæsar) was not farther distant from the camp of the enemy than 1,500 paces, and when, as he learned subsequently from prisoners, neither his own approach nor that of Labienus was known, Considius, with his horse at full speed, gallops up to him; he says that the mountain which he desired to be seized by Labienus, was occupied by the enemy; that he discovered that from the Gallic arms and standards. Cæsar leads up his forces towards the nearest hill, and draws out his line of battle. Labienus, as he had been instructed by Cæsar (lit. as it had been directed him) not to join battle unless his own forces were seen near the camp of the enemy, in order that at the same time an attack from every quarter might be made upon the enemy, the mountain having been taken possession of, waited for our men and refrained from battle. At length much of the day having passed, Cæsar learned through his scouts both that the mountain was occupied by his own troops, and that the Helvetii had moved their camp; and that Considius, terrified by a panic, had reported to him as seen what he had not seen. On that day he pursues the enemy with the usual interval (lit. "with which he was accustomed") and pitches his camp 3,000 paces distant from their camp.

23. On the day following, because there remained in all but two days from the time when *(cum)* it would be necessary

for him to measure out the corn to the army, and because he was not more than 18,000 paces distant from Bibracte, by far the largest and wealthiest town of the Ædui, he considers that provision should be made for a supply of corn, he diverts his march from the Helvetii and proceeds to march for Bibracte. This fact is made known to the enemy by some ¹refugees of Lucius Æmilius, a decurion of the Gallic horse. The Helvetii, either because they thought that the Romans overcome by fear (lit. "terrified by fear") were departing from them, the rather for this reason that they had not urged on the attack (lit. "roused the battle") on the previous day, ²though the higher grounds had been taken possession of by them, or because (*eo quod*) they trusted that they (*i. e.* "the Romans") could be intercepted from a supply of corn; their design being changed, and their line of march being wheeled round, they began (*i. e.* the Helvetii) to pursue and attack our troops of the rearmost division (see Anthon's note).

24. As soon as he perceives this, Cæsar draws off his forces to the nearest hill, and sent the horse to sustain the attack of the enemy. He himself, meantime, drew up on the middle of the hill a triple line of four veteran legions, in such a manner, as to post above him on the summit of the hill, the two legions which he had recently (*proxime*) levied in hither Gaul, and all the auxiliaries; and he ordered the entire mountain to be filled with men, and in the meantime the baggage to be collected into one place, and that it be guarded by those who stood posted in the upper line. The Helvetii, having followed with all their waggons, brought their baggage into one place; they themselves in the closest array, our horse having been driven back, advanced, a phalanx having been formed, close up (*sub*) to our first line.

25. Cæsar, his own (*i. e.* equo) in the first place, next the horses of all having been removed out of sight, in order that, the danger of all having been made equal, he might take away the hope of escape, having exhorted his men, joined battle. The soldiers easily broke through the phalanx of the enemy, their javelins having been discharged from higher ground. This having been thrown into disorder, they made a charge upon them with drawn swords. ³It proved a great

¹ *Fugitivos*, not deserters, which would be *transfugæ*.

² Lit. "the higher grounds having been taken possession of."

³ Lit. "it was for a great impediment to the Gauls."

impediment to the Gauls as respected the fight (*ad pugnam*) that several of their shields having been transfixed and fastened together by a single blow of the javelins, they could not, when the iron point (*ferrum*) had bent itself, either pull them forth, nor their left hand being thus embarrassed, fight with sufficient advantage; so that many, after tossing their arms to and fro for a long time, (lit. "their arm," *i. e.* "their left having been tossed") preferred to cast their shields from their hand, and fight with their persons unprotected. At length, wearied out with wounds, they began both to give ground (*referre pedem*, lit. "carry back the foot") and because there was a mountain about a mile near them (*suberat*, was near) to withdraw themselves to it. The mountain having been occupied, and our men advancing up, the Boii and the Tulingi who, to the number of (*circiter*, lit. "about") 15,000 men, closed the enemy's line of march, and were the guard of the rear (lit. "for a guard to the rearmost"), having assailed our troops in their advance (*ex itinere*) on their exposed flank, surrounded them; and the Helvetii, who had withdrawn themselves to the mountain, having obtained a view of this (*id conspicati*) began again to press forward, and renew the battle. ¹The Romans faced round their squadrons and advanced in two divisions, the first and second line that it might resist those that were beaten and driven off; the third, that it might receive the attack of (*exciperet*) those advancing up.

26. Thus in a divided conflict they fought (lit. "it was fought by them") long and resolutely. When they could not any longer sustain the repeated assaults (*impetus*, pl.) of our men, the one party withdrew themselves as at first (*ut ceperunt*), lit. "as they had begun to do") to the mountain, the others betook themselves to their baggage and their waggons. For, although during the entire of this battle they fought from the seventh hour until the evening, no one could see the back of an enemy (lit. "an enemy turned away.") Even at the baggage the contest was maintained until late at night, because they had opposed their waggons as a rampart, and kept hurling (*conjiciebant*, mark the force of the imperf.) their spears from a higher ground, against our men as they advanced up; and also some kept plying from beneath (*subjiciebant*) lances and javelins, between the waggons and wheels, and

¹ See note 2, chapter 5, ante.

wounded our men. After they had fought for a considerable time, our men became masters of the baggage and camp; there the daughter of Orgetorix and one of his sons were made prisoners. From that battle there survived about 130,000 men; and during the entire of that night they marched without a halt (*continenter*). On the fourth day they reached the territories of the Lingones, their march having been discontinued during no part of the night, whereas our men, having delayed for a space of three days, both on account of the wounds of the soldiers and the burying of the slain, could not pursue them. Cæsar despatched a letter and messengers to the Lingones to the effect, that they should not (*ne*) assist them with corn or anything else; for if they (such is the force of *qui* here) should aid them, he would hold them in the same estimation as the Helvetii. He himself, a space of three days having intervened, commenced to follow them with all his forces.

27. The Helvetii, forced by a want of all things, sent ambassadors to him concerning a surrender. Who when they had met him on the march, and had cast themselves at his feet, and having addressed him in a suppliant manner, had with tears sued for peace, and (when) he had ordered them (*i. e.* the Helvetii, not the ambassadors, see Anthon's note), to await his arrival in the place where they then might be, they obeyed. After Cæsar had come there, he demanded hostages, arms, and the slaves who had deserted to them. Whilst these things are being sought out and collected together, night having intervened, about six thousand men of that canton which is called Verbigenus, either terrified by fear least after their arms having been given up, they should be visited with punishment, or, induced by the hope of safety, because they supposed that in so large a number of persons about to surrender (lit. "in the state or condition of surrendering"), their own flight could be either concealed or be altogether unknown, at the beginning of the night having gone forth from the camp of the Helvetii, directed their course to the Rhine and the confines of the Germans.

28. Which when Cæsar discovered, he ordered those across whose territories they had marched, to seek them out and bring them back, if they wished to be free from blame in his eyes (*sibi*); he treated them, when brought back, as enemies (lit. "held them in the number of"), all the rest he admitted to a surrender, hostages, arms, and deserters having been given

up. The Helvetii, the Tulingi, and the Latobroges, he ordered to return into their own territories, whence they had set out; and because all the produce of the ground having been lost, there was nothing at home by means of which they could avert starvation (lit. "bear hunger"), he commanded the Allobroges to procure for them a supply of corn, and ordered themselves to rebuild the towns and villages which they had burned. This he did principally for this reason, because he was unwilling that the country from which the Helvetii had departed, should be unoccupied, lest the Germans, who dwell beyond the Rhine, should in consequence of the fertility of the lands, cross over from their own territories into the territories of the Helvetii, and should be neighbours to the province of Gaul and the Allobroges. To the Ædui preferring the request that they might settle the Boii in their country, inasmuch as they were known to be of distinguished valour, he granted the petition (*concessit*); to whom they assigned lands, and whom afterwards they admitted to the like condition of civil rights (*juris*) and liberty as they themselves enjoyed (lit. "were in").

29. In the camp of the Helvetii tablets were found wrought out in Greek characters, and were brought to Cæsar, in which tablets a nominal return (lit. "a return by name") was made out, as to what number had gone forth from home of those who could bear arms, and in like manner, boys, old men, and women, separately. Of all which lists (*rerum*) the total amount was 263,000 souls of the Helvetii; of the Tulingi, 36,000; of the Latobrogi, fourteen, of the Rauraci, twenty-three, and of the Boii, thirty-two (supply, *millia*, after the last three numbers); of these, those who were capable of bearing arms (*amounted*) to ninety-two thousand. The total amount of all was up to three hundred and sixty-eight thousand. An estimate having been made, as Cæsar had ordered, of those who returned home, the number was found to be 110,000.

30. The war of the Helvetii having been terminated, deputies from almost all Gaul, chiefs of states, assembled together to Cæsar, to congratulate him (*adding*), that although on account of the former injuries inflicted on the Roman people by the Helvetii (*populi Romani* is the genitive of *Helvetiorum*, lit. the injuries of the Helvetii on the Roman people. The student will mark this instance of the union of the active and passive genitive), he had taken vengeance upon them in

war (lit. "sought back punishment from them") still that they were sensible that that thing had happened no less to the advantage of the land of Gaul than of the Roman people, for this reason, that the Helvetii had left their own homes, their circumstances being most flourishing, with this design, that they might make war on all Gaul and become masters of the sovereign power; and that out of a great number they might select for a settlement, the place which they might judge to be the most convenient and fruitful in all Gaul (lit. "out of all Gaul"), and hold the remaining states tributaries. They petitioned, that it would be allowed them to summon an assembly of all Gaul against a certain day, and to do this, with Cæsar's permission; that they had certain matters which, in accordance with general consent, they wished to ask of him. This request (lit. thing) being granted, they appointed a day for the assembly, and made it binding among themselves by an oath, that no one save those to whom it should be committed by general consent, should disclose their deliberations (*enunciaret*).

31. That assembly having been dismissed, the same chiefs of the states who, on a former occasion (*ante*) had been with Cæsar, returned and petitioned that it might be permitted them to treat with himself secretly concerning their own safety and that of all. That request (lit. thing) having been obtained, they all cast themselves in tears at the feet of Cæsar, (saying) that they strove and laboured no less anxiously (*non minus*) for this object, that the things which they might say should not be divulged, than that they might obtain the things which they wished, for this reason, because if it should be made known, they saw that they would meet with (lit. "come into") the cruelest torture. In behalf of these, Divitiacus, the Æduan, spoke:—"That there were two parties in all Gaul; of one of these, that the Ædui held the leading place, the Averni, of the other. When these were, for many years, violently disputing among themselves for the chief authority, that it came to pass, that the Germans were invited for hire by the Averni and Sequani. That at first, about 15,000 of them passed across the Rhine; after that these savage and barbarous people had become enamoured of the lands, and mode of life, and wealth of the Gauls, that more were brought over; that now there was up to the number of 120,000 of them in Gaul; that the Ædui and their dependants had re-

peatedly (lit. "*once and again*") disputed with them in arms; that being defeated, they had sustained a heavy calamity, and had lost all their nobility, all their senate, and all their cavalry. That broken down by which battles and disasters, they who had before, both by their own valour and the hospitality and friendship of the Roman people possessed the greatest influence (lit. "could do the most") in Gaul, were compelled to give as hostages to the Sequani, the noblest of their state, and to bind the state by an oath, that they would neither demand back the hostages, nor implore assistance from the Roman people, nor refuse to be perpetually (lit. "so as that they should not be," &c.) under their power and authority. That he alone of the whole state of the Ædui could not be brought to take the oath, or give his children as hostages (lit. "so as to take the oath," &c.). That for this cause he had fled from his country, and had come to Rome to the Senate to beg assistance, because he alone was bound neither by an oath nor hostages. But that worse had befallen the victorious Sequani than the conquered Ædui, because that Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had settled in their territories, and had seized possession of the third portion of the Sequanian country, which is the best of all Gaul, and was now commanding (*juberet*, imperf.) the Sequani to depart from another third part, because a few months before 24,000 of the Harudes had come to him, for whom a habitation and settlements should be provided. That in a few years it would come to pass, that all would be expelled from the territories of Gaul, and all the Germans would cross the Rhine, for that the Gallic was not to be compared with the soil of the Germans, nor the mode of life here (*hanc*) to be ¹compared with that there (*illa*)—[consult Anthon's note—*hanc* means here in Gaul, *illa* in Germany.] That Ariovistus, moreover (*autem*, here, inchoative), when once he had conquered the forces of the Gauls in battle, which battle had been fought near Magetobria, domineered in an insolent and cruel manner, that he demanded the children of all the noblest (*nobilissimi cujusque*, so, *doctissimus quisque*, "all the most learned,") as hostages, and inflicted on them ²every species of cruelty, if each thing was

¹ *Comparandam*, i. e. "placed on an equality with."

² *Omnia exempla*, &c. translate as in the text, or *exempla* may signify "punishment," i. e. all kinds of punishments and tortures.

not done according to his will and pleasure; that he was a savage, passionate, headstrong man; that his commands could no longer be endured. Unless there was some assistance in Cæsar and the Roman people, that the same thing should be done by all the Gauls that the Helvetii had done, namely, emigrate from home (lit. "that they should emigrate," &c.), seek another dwelling-place, other settlements far remote from the Germans, and make trial of whatever fortune may befall them (lit. "make trial of fortune, whatever it may be, that would befall them.") If these things should be divulged to Ariovistus, he did not doubt but that he would inflict the heaviest punishment on all the hostages that might be with him. That Cæsar, either by his own authority and that of his army, or by his recent victory, or the name of the Roman people, could deter him (supply, *eum*); that a greater number of Germans might not be brought across the Rhine; and that he possessed the power (*posse*) of defending all Gaul from the rapine of Ariovistus.

32. This speech having been delivered by Divitiacus, all who were present began, with great weeping, to entreat assistance from Cæsar. Cæsar observed that of all, the Sequani alone did none of those things which the others had done, but that with heads hung down, full of sorrow, they kept their eyes on the ground. Wondering what might be the cause of this, he enquired of themselves. The Sequani made no reply but continued silent in the same sorrowful mood (*tristitia*). After he had repeatedly enquired of them, and could not extort any word whatever, the same Divitiacus, the Æduan, replied: That the fortune of the Sequani was more afflicting and grievous than that of the rest (*præ*, lit. "beyond," or "in comparison with," &c.), for this reason, that they alone dared not, even in private, complain, nor implore assistance, and shuddered at the cruelty of Ariovistus even though absent, as if he were present before them; because that the means of flight at least, were afforded the rest; but that by the Sequani, who had admitted Ariovistus within their territories, and all whose towns were in his power, all manner of cruelties were to be endured.

33. These things having been made known, Cæsar cheered by his words the spirits of the Gauls, and promised that that affair would be a care to him; that he entertained a strong hope that Ariovistus, induced as well by his own kindness to

him, as also by his influence (mark, *et, et*), would put an end to his outrages. This speech having been delivered, he dismissed the assembly; and, besides these things (*i. e.* "statements"), many circumstances urged him to think (lit. "why he should think") that this affair ought to be considered and undertaken by him; in the first place, because he saw that the Ædui, who had repeatedly been styled brothers and kinsmen by the senate, were held in serfdom and in subjection by the Germans (lit. "in the serfdom, &c. of the Germans") and because (supply, *quod*) he was aware that their hostages were in the hands of (*apud*) Ariovistus and the Sequani, a thing which (*quod*) considering the vast empire (*in tanto imperio*) of the Roman people, he considered to be most disgraceful to himself and to the republic. For the Germans, moreover, to become gradually accustomed to cross the Rhine, and for a great body of them to come into Gaul, he considered dangerous to the Roman people; nor did he think that these fierce and barbarous people, after they had seized possession of all Gaul, would restrain themselves ¹from marching forth into the province, and from thence advancing into Italy, as the Cimbri and Teutoni had done in former times (*ante*), especially as the Rhone *alone* separated the Sequani from our province. Which event he considered should ²be met and prevented (*occurrendum*) as speedily as possible. Besides (*autem*) Ariovistus himself had assumed such insolence and so much arrogance, that he did not seem to be endurable.

34. Wherefore he determined to send ambassadors to Ariovistus, to desire of him to appoint some intervening space for a conference on the part of each (*utriusque* is to be construed with *colloquio*); that he was anxious to treat with him concerning the republic (in some editions, *re, publica*, an affair of state) and about matters of the greatest consequence to both. To this embassy Ariovistus replies: "If he himself had need of anything from Cæsar that he would have come to him; if he, the other (*ille*) wished for anything from him, that he must come to him. Besides, that he neither dared

¹ *Quin exirent*, lit. "but that they would march forth," or "so as that they would not;" *quin* being resolvable into *quî*, abl. *quo, qua, quo*, vel. *quî*, and *non*.

² *Occurrendum*, translate as in the text; *occurrere* means to anticipate and prevent.

come without an army into those parts of Gaul which Cæsar held possession of; nor that he could draw together an army into one place, without great expenditure of means (*com-
meatu*) and trouble; but that it seemed astonishing to him, what business either Cæsar, or in any case the Roman people, could have in his Gaul, which he had conquered in war."

35. These replies having been brought to Cæsar (more correctly "this reply"), Cæsar, a second time, sends ambassadors to him with ¹these instructions: "That whereas after being treated with so much kindness by himself and the Roman people (more lit. "on his own part and that of the Roman people") [since in his own consulship he had been titled king and friend by the senate], he was making such a return as this (*hanc gratiam*) to himself and the Roman people, as that he should, when invited to come to a conference, make a difficulty about it, and think that it was not incumbent on him to discuss and inform himself (*dicendum et cognoscendum sibi*) about an affair of common interest; ²that these were the things which he had to demand (*postularet*) from him: in the first place, that he should not anymore bring any number of men across the Rhine into Gaul; in the next place, that he should restore the hostages which he held from the Ædui, and ³grant permission to the Sequani to restore, with his consent, those which they held; and that he should not provoke the Ædui by outrage, nor make aggressive war (*inferret bellum*) on them nor on their allies. If in this he would act in this way, ⁴that there would be lasting friendship and amity with him, himself, and the Roman people; if he should not obtain his request, that he (inasmuch as in the consulship of Marcus Messala and Marcus Piso, the senate had decreed, that whoever might hold Gaul as a province, should, as far as he was able, consistently with the interest of the republic, protect the

¹ *His mandatis*, "instructions to the following effect."

² *Hæc esse*, is the apodosis to the sentence from "*quoniam*—" *postularet* "had to demand." The student will mark the force of the subjunctive imperfect.

³ *Permitteret Sequanis ut liceret*, literally, "grant to the Sequani so that it might be allowable for them," &c.

⁴ *Sibi populoque*, &c. lit. "That there would be to himself and the Roman people, with him, lasting friendship," &c. Translate, "That the Roman people and himself, would maintain with him lasting friendship," &c.

Ædui and the other allies of the Roman people)—that he would not overlook the injuries done to the Ædui.

36. To this Ariovistus replies, that it was the right of war, that those who had conquered should govern those whom they had conquered, in whatever manner they might choose: in like manner that the Roman people were accustomed to rule the conquered, not according to the dictation of another, but according to their own pleasure. If he himself would not dictate to the Roman people, as to the manner in which they ought to exercise their own rights, that he ought not to be coerced by the Roman people, in the exercise of ¹his rights. That the Ædui had been made tributaries to him, inasmuch as they had tried the fortune of war, and had encountered him in arms, and had been vanquished. That Cæsar was doing a great wrong, since by his arrival ²he was making the revenues less valuable to him. That he would not restore the hostages to the Ædui, nor make war on them, nor on their allies without cause, if they would continue in the performance of that (*in eo*), which had been agreed upon, and pay tribute yearly. If they would not do that, that the ³name of brothers, given them by the Roman people, would be far from availing them. ⁴As to the threat which Cæsar held out to him, that he would not overlook the injuries done to the Ædui; that no one had contended with him, without destruction to himself. He might engage when he pleased; that he would discover, what the invincible Germans, skilled beyond all men (*exercitatissimi*) in the use of arms (*in armis*), who, during fourteen years, had not gone under a roof, could accomplish (*possent*) by their valour.

37. At one and the same time, this answer was being brought to Cæsar, and ambassadors were in the act of arriving from the Ædui and Treviri. The Ædui, to complain that the Harudes, who had lately been transported into Gaul, were ravaging their territories; that they, hostages even having been given, could not purchase peace from Ariovistus: but

¹ *In suo jure*, more lit. "in the case of his own rights."

² *Qui faceret*, "since he was making." This is the force of the relative with the subjunctive, being equivalent to *quum faceret*. See Zumpt.

³ *Nomen fraternum*, lit. "the fraternal name of the Roman people."

⁴ *Quod denunciaret*, lit. "as to the fact that Cæsar threatened;" the construction is *ad id, quod, i.e.* "as to this, that."

the Treviri (supply, "came to inform him," (*veniebant nuntiatum*) that a hundred cantons of the Suevi had encamped at the bank of the Rhine,¹ who were attempting (as they said) to cross the Rhine; that the brothers Vasua and Cimberius commanded them. By which events Cæsar being violently exasperated, considered that ² despatch should be used by him, lest if this new body of the Suevi, should join itself with the old forces of Ariovistus, it could be less easily resisted; accordingly a supply of corn having been provided as speedily as he could, he advanced by long marches against Ariovistus.

38. When he had marched for three days, intelligence was brought to him, that Ariovistus with all his forces was advancing to seize possession of Visontio, which is the most considerable town of the Sequani, and that he had accomplished a three days' march from his own territories. To prevent this from occurring (*ne id accideret*, lit., "lest this should happen") Cæsar considered that precaution should be very carefully (*magno opere*) taken, for in that town, there was the most ample supply of all things, that were requisite for war; and it was defended by the nature of its situation, in such a manner, as³ to afford great facility for protracting the war; because (*propterea quod*) the river Dubis, as if traced round it by a compass, surrounds almost the entire town. The remaining space, which is not more than six hundred feet, where the river breaks off its course (*intermittit*), a mountain of great height fills up, in such a manner, that (*ita ut*) the bases of the mountain in each direction touch the ⁴ bank of the river. A wall drawn round makes a citadel of this, and connects it with the town. Hither Cæsar hastened by forced marches (*longis itineribus*) night and day, and the town having been taken possession of, he stations a garrison there.

39. Whilst he delays for a few days at Vesontio, for the sake of a supply of corn and provisions, from the enquiries of our men, and the statement of the Gauls and traders, who assured them that the Germans were of a vast stature of body, of a valour and experience in arms surpassing belief,

¹ *Conarentur*. The imperfect subj. is used, as referring to the statements of those who speak, not to those of the writer.

² *Maturandum*, lit., "it was to be hastened by him."

³ *Ut daret*, lit., "so as that it could afford great means."

⁴ *Ripæ*—consult Anthon's note.

that they themselves having frequently encountered them, could not endure even their look, and the fierce expression (*aciem*) of their eyes, suddenly so violent a panic seized on all the army, as in no measured degree (*mediocriter*) to disturb the minds and spirits of all. This first took rise among the military tribunes, the prefects, and others, who having attended Cæsar from the city for friendship's sake, possessed no great experience in the business of war (*re militari*), of whom one alleging one excuse, and another, another, which they declared, made ¹it necessary for them to depart, they petitioned, that it might be permitted them to withdraw with his consent. Some, influenced by shame, in order that they might avoid the imputation of cowardice, remained behind; these could neither assume a feigned countenance, nor at times restrain their tears. Concealed in their tents, they either complained of their own destiny, or, among their intimate friends, bewailed the common danger. As a general matter (*vulgo*) throughout the entire camp wills were being signed. By the expressions and fear of those, gradually even those who had great experience in camps, soldiers and centurions, and those who commanded the cavalry, were becoming alarmed, (mark the force of the imperf. *perturbabantur*). Such of them (*qui ex his*) as were anxious to be considered less timid, said that they did not dread the enemy, but that they feared the defiles of the route, and the vastness of the woods, that lay between themselves and Ariovistus, or else a supply of corn, ² lest it could not be brought up with sufficient readiness. Some also reported to Cæsar, that when he would order the camp to be struck, and the standards to be borne onwards, the soldiers would not be obedient to the command, and that they would not advance the standards in consequence of their fear.

40. When he had observed these things, a council of war having been called, and the centurions of all ranks having been summoned to that council, he severely reprimanded them: "In the first place ³ for thinking, that it was for them to enquire or deliberate, either in what direction or with what

¹ *Necessariam*, seems here to be active; *i. e.*, "made it imperative."

² *Ut satis*, &c. *Ut*, after verbs of fearing, is equivalent to *ne-non*.

³ *Primum quod*, &c. lit. "because they thought that it was to be enquired into and deliberated upon by them."

design they were to be led. That Ariovistus during his own consulship, had most ardently courted the friendship of the Roman people; why then (*cur*) should any one hastily (*temere*) deem him likely to swerve (*discessurum*) from his duty? ¹ That for himself at any rate (*quidem*), he was persuaded, that he, when his demands were understood, and the fairness of his proposals examined into, would reject neither his own friendship, nor that of the Roman people. But if, impelled by frenzy and madness he should make ² war aggressively, what pray (*tandem*) had they to dread? or why should they despair of their own valour, or his activity. That trial had been made of this enemy, within the recollection of our fathers, when, upon the defeat of the Cimbri and Teutoni by C. Marius, the army appeared to have merited no less praise than the general himself; that it (supply *periculum*) also had lately been made in Italy, during the ³insurrection of the slaves, whom yet, the experience and discipline which they had received from us, had in some degree assisted. From whence it could be judged, what great advantage firmness of purpose (*constantia*) possessed; because, those whom when unarmed they had for a long time causelessly dreaded, they afterwards vanquished, when armed and victorious. In fine, that these were the same people, with whom the Helvetii having repeatedly engaged, had frequently conquered, not only in their own territories (*i. e.* "of the Helvetii") but also in those of the others (*illorum*) who yet could not be equal to our army. ⁴ If there were any whom the unsuccessful battle and flight of the Gauls alarmed, that these, if they would enquire, could discover that Ariovistus, the Gauls having been wearied out by the long continuance of the war, after he had for many months kept himself within his camp and among the fens, and had not afforded an opportunity of approaching him, having suddenly attacked them, by this time giving up all expectation (*desperantes*) of an engagement, and dispersed, had conquered them, more by artifice and plan

¹ *Sibi quidem*, &c. The construction is, *sibi quidem hoc perusuaderi*.

² *Bellum intulisset*, *inferre bellum*, is to make war offensively; *gerere bellum*, to carry on war either offensive or defensive.

³ *Servili tumultu*—consult Anthon's note.

⁴ *Si quos*, &c., construction is *si sint ii quos*, or *quos* is equal *aliquos*.

than valour. ¹ For which artifice, though (supply *si*) there might have been an opportunity against barbarous and unskilful people, (*yet*) that even he himself did not expect that our armies could be ensnared by it. That they who ascribed their alarm to a pretence about a supply of corn, and to the defiles of the roads, acted presumptuously, inasmuch as (*cum*) they appeared either to have no confidence in (*desperare*) the official ability of their commander, or to dictate to him. That these things were his care—that the Sequani, the Leuci, and the Lingonæ were to supply corn—and that already the crops were ripe in the fields. Concerning the line of march, that they themselves could form an opinion in a short time. ² As to the soldiers being reported as not likely to obey the word of command (*dicto*), nor willing to carry forward (*laturi*) the standards, that he was in no way disturbed by that circumstance, for he knew that those under whom (lit. “with whom”) an army would not be obedient to command, either fortune had deserted, on ³account of the unskilful conduct of some enterprise, or that in consequence of the discovery of some crime, the charge of avarice (*avaritiam*) had been fastened on them. That his own integrity had been demonstrated throughout his entire life—and his good fortune in the war with the Helvetii. That therefore (*itaque*) he would perform immediately, what he had intended to defer to a more distant day, and that on the next night, at the fourth watch, he would break up his camp, in order that he might as soon as possible, learn whether a sense of shame and duty, or fear, prevailed with them. But if, moreover, no one else (*nemo*) would follow him, nevertheless that he would march, accompanied by (*cum*) the tenth legion alone, of which he could have no doubt, and that it would be his body guard. This legion, Cæsar had both particularly indulged, and on account of its valour used to ⁴place the greatest confidence in.

¹ *Cui rationi*, &c., lit. “that even he himself did not expect that our armies could be ensnared by that artifice (*hac scilicet ratione*) for which artifice (*cui rationi*) there might have been,” &c.

² *Quod non fore*, &c. construc. *ad id quod*, lit. “as to this that the soldiers were said not likely to be (*non fore*) obedient.

³ *Male re gesta*, lit. “some affair having been badly conducted,” *aliquo facinore*, &c., “some crime having been discovered.”

⁴ *Confidebat*, mark the force of the imperf.

41. This speech having been delivered, the minds of all were changed in a wonderful degree (*modum*), and the greatest activity and desire to prosecute the war sprung up; and first of all, the tenth legion returned him thanks, for his entertaining the very highest opinion of them (lit. "because he had entertained"), and assured him, that they were most ready to prosecute the war. Then the remaining legions, through the tribunes of the soldiers and the centurions of the first ranks, endeavoured to excuse themselves to Cæsar, (alleging) that they neither at any time hesitated nor felt alarm, nor had thought, that a decision concerning the conduct of the war appertained to them (*suum*, i. e. *esse*), but that it was the province of the commander (*imperatoris esse*). Their excuse having been admitted, and the route reconnoitered by Divitiacus, because of all others he felt the greatest confidence in him (*and found to be such*), that by a circuit of more than fifty miles, it would lead his army through an open country, he set out at the fourth watch, as he had said. On the seventh day, during which (*cum*) he did not stop the march, he was informed by scouts, that the forces of Ariovistus were distant from our soldiers, four and twenty thousand paces.

42. Cæsar's approach having been learned, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to him, (*stating*) ¹ that as to his previous demand respecting a conference, this might now be carried into effect, through his own means, since he had come nearer, and that he thought, that he himself could accomplish it without danger. Cæsar did not reject the proposal, and ² was beginning to think, that at length (*jam*) he was coming back to a just way of thinking (*sanitatem*), inasmuch as he voluntarily promised what (*id quod*), he had before denied to his solicitation, (lit. "to him soliciting,") and he was beginning to entertain a strong hope (lit. "was coming into," &c.) that in return for the ³ great benefits conferred upon him, by himself and the Roman people, it would come to pass, ⁴ after his proposals

¹ *Quod antea*, &c. lit. "as to what he had formerly demanded respecting a conference."

² *Arbitratur*, imperf. "was beginning to think."

³ *Pro tantis*, &c. lit. "in return for his own and the Roman people's so great benefits to him."

⁴ *Cognitis*, lit. "abl. abs."

were considered, that he would desist from his obstinacy. A day was named for a conference, the fifth from that day. In the meantime, whilst messengers were being frequently dispatched to and fro between them, Ariovistus demanded, that Cæsar should not bring, any foot soldiers to the conference; that he was afraid, that he might by means of an ambuscade, be surrounded by them, and that each should come with cavalry; that he would not come, on any other terms. Cæsar, because he neither wished the conference to be prevented, by¹ the interposing of any pretext, nor dared to entrust his own safety to the cavalry of the Gauls, deemed it most expedient, all the horses having been taken from the Gallic cavalry, to mount on them, the legionary soldiers of the tenth legion, in which he most especially confided, in order that if, there should be any occasion, he might have the most attached guard, that was possible, when which was being done (*quod fieret*, imperf.), one of the soldiers of the tenth legion, not without some humour, observed, that Cæsar was doing for them (*ei*, i. e. *legioni*), more than he had promised; that he had promised that he would have the tenth legion in place of a Prætorian cohort, now that he was transferring them to the cavalry.

43. There was an extensive plain, and on it a rising ground of considerable height; this place was distant from either camp, by nearly the same space. Hither, as has been said, they came to a conference. Cæsar stationed the legion, which he had brought on horseback, two hundred paces from that hillock. In like manner the cavalry of Ariovistus, halted at an equal distance. Ariovistus demanded, that they should carry on the conference (*colloquerentur*) on horseback, and that besides themselves, they should bring ten each (*denos*) to the conference. When they had come there, Cæsar, in the beginning of his address, recounted the benefits, conferred on him, by himself and the Senate (lit. "his own and the Senate's benefits to him"); "that he had been styled king by the Senate—that (*he had been styled*) friend, that the most munificent presents, had been sent him, which distinction (*rem*) he informed him, had both fallen to the lot of few (*contigisse*, &c.), and was usually conferred, (lit. "was accustomed to be," &c.) in return for important services, on the part of individuals. That he, although he possessed neither the

¹ *Interpositâ*, lit. any "pretext having been interposed."

means of deserving them, (*aditum*, see note in Anthon), nor any just ground for asking them, had obtained these honours through his own and the Senate's beneficence and liberality. He moreover informed him, what ancient and just causes of alliance existed between themselves (*i. e.* the Romans) and the Ædui, what decrees of the Senate, how often, and how honorary, were passed in their favour (*in eos*). How during all time, the Ædui had held the leading place in all Gaul, even before they had courted our alliance. That this was the custom of the Roman people, to be desirous (lit. "that they should wish") that their allies and friends not only should lose nothing of their own, but that they should be advanced in interest, dignity, and honour (*auctiores esse*, lit. "more increased"). Who then could endure, that that should be wrested from them which they had brought to the friendship of the Roman people. He then made the same demands which he had commissioned his ambassadors to make, (lit. "he demanded the same things which he had given instructions to his ambassadors, *i. e.* *postulare*) that he should not make war either on the Ædui or on their allies; that he should restore the hostages; if he could send back no part of the Germans home, at least he should not suffer any to cross the Rhine any more.

44. Ariovistus replied briefly to the demands of Cæsar, and spoke largely of his own virtues: "that he had crossed the Rhine, not of his own accord, but having been solicited and invited by the Gauls; that he had left his home and relations, not without great expectation, and great rewards; that he held his settlements in Gaul, by grants from (*concessas*, lit. "being conceded by") themselves; that the hostages had been given at their own desire; that by right of war he took tribute, which the conquerors were wont to impose on the conquered; that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls on him; that all the states of Gaul, had come to attack him, and had formed a camp against him; that all these forces had been routed, and vanquished by him, in a single battle; if they wished to make the trial a second time, that he a second time, was prepared to fight them; if they were desirous of enjoying peace, that it was unjust to refuse the tribute, which of their own free will, they had paid up to that time. That the friendship of the Roman people, ought to be a distinction and protection to him, not a loss,

and that he had sought it with this expectation. If by means of the Roman people, the tribute was to be remitted, and those who had surrendered, withdrawn from their allegiance (*subtrahantur*), that he would reject the friendship of the Roman people, no less readily than he had sought it. ¹As to his bringing over, a multitude of Germans into Gaul, that he did that, for the purpose of protecting himself, not of attacking Gaul; that a proof of this fact was, that he did not come, except after being invited, and that he did not make aggressive war, but had ²acted on the defensive (lit. *averted it*). That he had come into Gaul before the Roman people; what did ³they want? Why should they come into his possessions? That this part of Gaul was his province, as the other was ours. As it ought not to be allowed him, if he were to make an attack upon our territories, so in like manner, that we were unjust, in seeking to impede him, in the exercise of his right, (*in suo jure*, lit. "in the case of his right"). As to his saying (*i. e. ad id. quod diceret*, lit. as to this, which he said) that the Ædui were styled, brothers by the Senate, that he was not ⁴so much a barbarian, nor so unacquainted with events, as not to know, that neither in the last war with the Allobroges, had the Ædui carried assistance to the Romans, nor that they themselves, in those quarrels which they (the Ædui) had among themselves, and with the Sequani, had experienced the assistance of the Roman people. That he ought to suspect, that Cæsar, by a pretended friendship, inasmuch as he was keeping an army in Gaul, kept it, for the purpose of crushing him; ⁵and unless he would depart, and lead off his army, from these countries, that he would consider him, not as a friend, but as an enemy: and if (*quod si*) he could slay him, that he would do an agreeable thing, to many of the nobles, and leading men of the Roman people; that he had that as a thing discovered from themselves, through their messengers; the interest and friendship of all whom, he could purchase by his (Cæsar's) death. But if he would depart, and deliver up, the free possession of Gaul to him, that he

¹ *Quod transducat*, lit. "as to this that he brought."

² *Defenderet*, "supply, *bellum*."

³ *Quod vellet*, the nominative is "*Populus Romanus*" understood.

⁴ *Tam barbarum*, i. e. "so much a foreigner."

⁵ *Qui nisi*, lit. "who if he would not," &c.

would recompense him, by a great reward; and that whatever wars, he might wish to be carried on, that he would finish, without any trouble and hazard on his part.

45. Many things were said by Cæsar, to this effect (*in eam sententiam*) to prove why he could not desist from his purpose; and "that neither his own custom nor that of the Roman people permitted him, to abandon (lit. that he should abandon) allies who had done the greatest services, (lit. "best deserving allies"), nor that he considered Gaul to belong rather to Ariovistus than to the Roman people. That the Arverni and Ruteni, had been subdued by Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom (i. e. *Arverni*, &c.) the Roman people had pardoned, and had not reduced to a province, nor imposed tribute on them. But if the most distant period ought to be regarded, that the dominion of the Roman people in Gaul, was best founded: if the decision of the Senate ought to be considered, that Gaul ought to be free, since they had willed that it, though conquered, should enjoy its own laws (lit. "which when conquered, they," &c.)

46. Whilst these things are being carried on in the conference, word was brought to Cæsar, that the cavalry of Ariovistus, were approaching nearer to the hillock, and were riding up to our soldiers, and casting stones and darts at our men; Cæsar makes an end of speaking, and betakes himself to his own troops, and commanded his men, not to fling back any weapon whatever, against the enemy. For although he saw, that an engagement of a chosen legion with cavalry, would be without hazard, nevertheless he did not think, that he ¹ought to act in such a manner; that (*ut*, equal, *ita ut*) it could be said, after the ²enemy was defeated, that they had been drawn, into a snare by him, at a conference, by means of plighted faith. After it was rumoured among the common soldiers, what insolence Ariovistus had shown at the conference, and had interdicted the Romans from all Gaul, and that his cavalry, had made an attack on our men, and how that circumstance, had broken up the conference, much greater alacrity, and greater eagerness for fighting, was infused into our men.

47. Two days after, Ariovistus sends ambassadors to Cæsar, (*to say*) "that he was desirous to treat with him, concerning

¹ *Comittendum*, lit. "ought to be acted by him, so that," &c.

² *Hostibus*, &c. lit. "the enemy having been," &c.

those things, which began to be treated between them, and had not been brought to a conclusion; that he should a second time, either appoint a day for a conference, or if he did not approve of this, that he would send, ¹some one of his ambassadors to him." There did not appear to Cæsar, to be any occasion for a conference, and the more especially for this reason, that on the day before this, the Germans could not be restrained, ²from throwing weapons against our men. He considered, that he would send with great hazard, an ambassador, from among his own friends to him, and that he would be exposing him to savage people. It seemed most expedient, to send to him Caius Valerius Procillus, the son of Caius Valerius Caburus, a young man of the highest virtue, and refinement, (whose father had been presented, with a gift of citizenship, by Caius Valerius Flaccus,) both on account of his trustworthiness (*fidem*), and on account of his knowledge, of the Gallic language, which now from long habit, Ariovistus frequently employed; and because there ³could have existed, no motive for the Germans, to commit an outrage in his case; and also Marcus Mettius, who had enjoyed the hospitality of Ariovistus. He gave instructions to these, that they should learn, what Ariovistus might have to say, and report to him; whom, when Ariovistus beheld in his power⁴ (*apud se*) in the camp, he called out aloud, in the presence of his army, "Why had they come to him? was it with the object of spying?" He stopped them attempting to speak, and cast them into chains.

48. On the same day he pushed forward his camp, and took up a position at the foot of the mountain, six hundred paces from the camp of Cæsar. On the day following that, he led his forces past the camp of Cæsar, and pitched his camp two thousand paces beyond him, with this design, that he might cut off Cæsar from the corn and provisions, which were being brought up from the Sequani and Ædui. For five successive days after that day, Cæsar led forth his forces in front of the camp, and kept his army in order of battle, so that if Ariovistus should desire to engage in battle, the opportunity might not be wanting to him. Ariovistus during all

¹ *Ex suis*—"see Anthon's note."

² *Quin conjicerent*, &c. "so as that they should not throw."

³ *Quod in eo peccandi*, &c. lit. "and because there could not be a cause to the Germans of committing an outrage in his case."

⁴ *Apud se*, or "arrived to him."

these days, kept his army within the camp; he fought daily in some cavalry encounter. The mode of fighting in which the Germans had practiced themselves was this—(*hoc*) there were six thousand horsemen, ¹the same number of the fleetest and bravest foot soldiers, whom they had selected from the whole army, each horseman, one, for his own protection; accompanied by (*cum*) these, they used to engage in battle, to these the horse retreated: these, if anything disastrous occurred, rushed in a body to assist (*concurrabant*); if any one, upon receiving a more than usually severe wound, had fallen from his horse, they stood around to defend (*circumsistebant*). If it was necessary to advance farther than usual, or to retire with greater speed than ordinary, such was their activity, from constant practice, that supported by the manes of the horses, they could equal their speed.

49. When Cæsar perceived, that he was keeping within his camp, that he might not any longer be shut out from provisions, he selected ground suited for a camp, beyond that place, in which the Germans had encamped, about six hundred paces from them, and a triple order of battle having been drawn up, he came to the place. He ordered the first and second line to be in arms, the third to fortify the camp. This place was distant from the enemy, as has been said, about six hundred paces. Hither Ariovistus despatched about sixteen thousand light-armed troops, with all his cavalry, which forces were to strike terror into our men, and to prevent them from the fortification of the camp (*munitione*). Cæsar, nevertheless, as he had before appointed, ordered two lines to repel the enemy, the third to execute the work. The camp having been fortified, he left there two legions and part of the auxiliaries, the remaining four he led back into the larger camp.

50. On the next day, according to his custom, Cæsar led forth his forces from both camps, and having advanced a little from the larger one, he drew out his line of battle, and gave the enemy an opportunity of coming to an engagement. When he perceived, that they did not come forth even then, about mid-day he led back his army into the camp. Then at length Ariovistus despatched a part of his forces, to storm the lesser camp; the fight was maintained vigorously on both sides,

¹ *Totidem numero*, &c. lit. "the fleetest and bravest foot soldiers, as many in number."

until evening. With the setting of the sun, Ariovistus after many wounds were given and received, led back his forces into his camp. When Cæsar enquired of the prisoners, for what reason, Ariovistus would not fight in a general engagement, he discovered this to be the cause—that among the Germans this custom prevailed, that the matrons should declare from lots and auguries, whether the battle could be advantageously fought or not; that they had thus pronounced; —“that it was not the will of heaven that the Germans should conquer, if they engaged in battle before the new moon.”

51. On the day after that day, Cæsar left as a guard for both camps, what seemed sufficient. He stationed all the auxiliaries in sight of the enemy, before the smaller camp, in order, that (*ut*) he might employ the auxiliaries for appearance sake, because, considering the force of the enemy, he was insufficiently strong in the number of legionary soldiers. He himself, a triple line of battle having been drawn out, advanced up to the camp of the enemy. Then at length the Germans, through necessity, led out their forces from their camp, and posted them by tribes, and at equal distances—the Harudes, the Marcomanni, the Tuboici, the Vangiones, the Nametes, the Seducii, the Suevi—and surrounded their entire battle array, with chariots and waggons, that there might be no hope left in flight. On these they placed the women, who with disshevelled hair, weeping, implored the soldiers going out to battle, not to deliver them to the Romans for slavery.

52. Cæsar placed a lieutenant and quæstor, over each legion, that every one might have these as witnesses of his valour. He himself began the battle on the right wing, because he perceived that post of the enemy to be the least strong. So fiercely did our men on the signal being given, make the attack upon the enemy, and so suddenly and rapidly, did the enemy charge forward, that time for throwing the spears against the enemy was not given. Their javelins being flung away, they fought hand to hand with the swords. But the Germans, a phalanx having been rapidly formed, according to their custom, awaited the attack of the swords; many of our soldiers were found to ¹leap upon the phalanxes, and tear away the

¹ *Qui insilirent*—equivalent to the infinitive in Engl. See Book ii. ch. 2, note 1.

shields with their hands, and wounded (*the enemy*) from above; while the line of the enemy was beaten on the left wing, and turned to flight, on the right wing they sorely pressed our line, by the superior number of their (*troops*); when Publius Crassus, a young man who commanded the cavalry, observed this, because he was more unoccupied than those, who were engaged among the line of combatants (*inter aciem*), he sent the third line, as an assistance to our men in distress.

53. Thus the battle was restored, and all the enemy turned their backs, nor did they cease to flee, until they came to the river Rhine, about five thousand paces from that place. Then a very few, either trusting to their strength, attempted to swim over, or boats having been discovered, found safety for themselves. Among these was Ariovistus, who, having found a small boat moored to the bank, escaped in it. Our cavalry having overtaken all the rest, slew them. There were two wives of Ariovistus, one of the Suevian nation, whom he had brought with him from home; the other a Norican, the sister of king Vocio; whom, having been sent by her brother, he had married in Gaul: both perished in that rout. Their two daughters; one was slain, the other taken prisoner. Caius Valerius Proculus, whilst he was being dragged along by his guards in the flight, bound by a triple chain, fell in with Cæsar himself, pursuing the enemy with his cavalry, which circumstance truly gave Cæsar no less pleasure, than the victory itself; because he saw the most honourable man of the province of Gaul, his own intimate friend and guest, rescued from the hands of the enemy, and restored to him, nor had fortune, by the suffering of such a man, taken anything away, from such great joy and rejoicing. He, in his presence said, that three times, the lots were consulted concerning him, as to whether he should be immediately put to death by fire, or reserved for some other occasion; that he was saved by the the favour of the lots. Marcus Mettius was also found, and brought back to him.

54. The news of this battle having been carried beyond the Rhine, the Suevi, who had arrived at the bank of the Rhine, began to return home; whom the Ubii, who dwell next the Rhine, having overtaken, terror stricken, slew a great number of them. Cæsar—two most important wars having been terminated in one summer, a little sooner than the sea-

son of the year required it—led back his army into winter quarters to the Sequani. He set Labienus over the winter quarters; he himself set out for hither Gaul to hold the assizes.

END OF BOOK I.