

145

PANSA'S CONTINUATION
OF
CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES
OF HIS
WARS IN GAUL.

BOOK VIII.

THE ARGUMENT.

Pansa's Preface.—I. The Gauls form a resolution to renew the war.—II. Cæsar falls unexpectedly upon the Biturigians, and compels them to submit.—IV. He afterwards disperses the Carnutes by the terror of his arms.—V. The Bellovaci prepare for war.—VI. Their designs.—VII. Cæsar endeavours to draw them to an engagement, by inspiring them with a contempt of his small numbers.—VIII. But as they carefully avoid a battle he resolves to fortify his camp.—XI. The Bellovaci intercept the Roman foragers.—XII. Daily skirmishes within view of the two camps.—XIII. The Bellovaci artfully counterfeit a retreat.—XVI. And falling upon the Romans from an ambuscade, after an obstinate fight, are entirely dispersed.—XVII. The Bellovaci and other states submit.—XX. Cæsar divides his army.—XXI. Caninius and Fabius relieve Duracius, besieged by Dum-nacus in Limo.—XXIV. Caninius pursues Drapes and Luterius.—XXV. Fabius obliges the Carnutes and other states to submit.—XXVI. Drapes and Luterius possess themselves of Uxellodunum.—XXVII. Caninius invests the town.—XXVIII. Intercepts a convoy escorted by Luterius.—XXIX. Attacks and carries the camp of Drapes.—XXX. And joining the forces under Fabius, returns to the siege of Uxellodunum.—XXXI. Cæsar repairs to the camp of Caninius.—XXXIII. And depriving the besieged of water, compels the town to surrender.—XXXVII. He sends his army into winter quarters.—XXXVIII. Comius defeated in an engagement of horse, surrenders to Antony.—XLI. The year following, Gaul being in perfect quiet, Cæsar goes into Italy.—XLII. Where he is received with the highest demonstrations of respect.—XLIII. He returns to the army, where he learns the designs formed against him at Rome.—XLVI. And thereupon sets out again for Italy.

A CONTINUATION
OF
CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES
OF
HIS WARS IN GAUL.

BY A. HIRTIUS PANSÆ.

BOOK VIII.

IN consequence of your repeated importunities, Balbus, I have at last been prevailed with to engage in a very delicate work ; fearing lest my daily refusals should be construed rather to flow from idleness, than any sense of the difficulty of the undertaking. I therefore here present you with a continuation of Cæsar's Commentaries of his Wars in Gaul, though not in any respect to be compared with what he himself wrote on the same subject, nor with the Memoirs of the civil war, which he likewise left behind him imperfect, and which I have in the same manner carried down from the transactions at Alexandria, to the end, I will not say of our civil dissensions, which are like to have no end, but of Cæsar's life. I would have all who read these pieces, know with how much reluctance I engaged in this design ; that I may be the more easily acquitted of the charge of arrogance and folly, for presuming to insert my writings among those of Cæsar. It is universally agreed, that the most elaborate compositions of others, fall far short of the elegance of these Commentaries. He indeed intended them only as memoirs for future historians ; but they are every where in such high esteem, as serves rather to discourage other writers, than furnish them for the attempt. This circumstance the more commands our admiration, because while the rest of the world can judge only of the beauty and correctness of the work, we besides know with what ease and despatch it was composed. Cæsar not only

possessed the talent of writing in the highest perfection, but was likewise best able to unfold the reasons of those military operations of which he was himself the contriver and director. On the contrary, it was my misfortune to be present neither in the Alexandrian nor African wars ; and though I had many of the particulars relating to both from his own mouth, yet we give a very different attention to things, when we hear them only through an admiration of their novelty and greatness, and when with a view of transmitting them to posterity. But I forbear any further apologies, lest in enumerating the reasons why my work ought not to be compared with that of Cæsar, I fall under the suspicion of flattering myself, that in the judgment of some, it may not seem altogether unworthy of that honour. Adieu.

I. GAUL being wholly reduced, Cæsar was desirous that his troops might enjoy some repose during the winter, especially after so long and fatiguing a campaign, in which there had been no intermission from the toils of war ; but he soon understood, that several states were meditating a revolt, and contriving all at once to take up arms. The cause assigned for this conduct was not improbable ; for though the Gauls were by this time fully sensible, that it was impossible for them to resist the Roman army entire, by any forces they could bring into the field ; yet still they thought, that if many states revolted together, and set on foot

as many different wars, the Romans would have neither time nor troops to subdue them all; and that though some among them must be sufferers, their lot would be the more supportable, as the delay occasioned by that diversion, might procure the liberty of the whole nation.

II. Cæsar, to stife this opinion in its birth, left M. Antony the questor to command in his winter quarters; and setting out the last of December from Bibracte, with a guard of cavalry, went to the camp of the thirteenth legion, which he had placed among the Biturigians, not far from the territories of the Æduans. To this he joined the eleventh legion, whose quarters lay nearest; and leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, marched with the rest of the army into the most fertile parts of the country of the Biturigians; who having large territories, and abounding in towns, had not been awed by the presence of a single legion, from forming confederacies, and preparing for war.

III. Cæsar by his sudden and unexpected arrival, as was natural to suppose, found them unprepared and dispersed up and down the fields; insomuch that they were easily surprised by the horse, before they could retreat into their towns. For he had expressly forbid setting fire to the houses, the usual sign of an invasion, that he might neither alarm the enemy by the conflagration, nor expose himself to the want of corn and forage, if he should advance far into the country. Having made many thousands of the Biturigians prisoners, such as could escape the first coming of the Romans, fled in great terror to the neighbouring states, relying either upon private friendship, or the ties of a mutual confederacy. But all was to no purpose: for Cæsar, by great marches, soon reached their places of retreat, and making every province anxious for its own safety, left them no time to think of giving shelter to others. This diligence confirmed the well-affected in their duty, and obliged the wavering to hearken to conditions of peace. The like offers were made to the Biturigians; who seeing that Cæsar's clemency left the way still open to his friendship, and that the neighbouring states, upon delivery of hostages, had been pardoned and received into protection, resolved to follow the example. Cæsar, to recompense the fatigue

and labour of his soldiers, who, in the winter season, through difficult ways, and during the most intense colds, had followed him with incredible patience and constancy; promised a reward of two hundred *sesterces* to every private man, and two thousand to every centurion: and having sent back the legions to their winter quarters, returned again to Bibracte, after an absence of forty days.

IV. Whilst he was there employed in the distribution of justice, ambassadors arrived from the Biturigians, to implore his assistance against the Carnutes, who were laying waste their country. Upon this intelligence, though he had not rested above eighteen days, he immediately sent for the sixth and fourteenth legions, which he had quartered along the Arar, for the convenience of provisions, as has been related in the foregoing book. With these two legions he marched against the Carnutes; who hearing of his approach, and dreading the same calamities which others had been made to suffer, abandoned their towns and villages, consisting mostly of little cottages run up in haste, to defend them from the cold, (for most of their cities had been destroyed in the late war,) and fled different ways. Cæsar unwilling to expose his soldiers to the severity of the storms, which commonly rage with the greatest violence at that season, fixed his camp at Genabum; and lodged his men, partly in the huts lately built by the Gauls, partly in the old houses, whose walls were still standing, and which he ordered to be thatched with straw, that they might afford the better shelter to the troops. But he sent the cavalry and the auxiliary foot into all parts where he understood the enemy were retired: nor without success; for they commonly returned loaden with spoil. The Carnutes, distressed by the difficulty of the season, the sense of their danger, (because being driven from their habitations, they durst not continue long in any place for fear of our parties,) and finding no protection in the woods against the extreme severity of the weather; were at length dispersed on all sides with great loss, and scattered among the neighbouring states.

V. Cæsar thinking it sufficient in that difficult season, to have dispersed the troops that began to assemble, and prevented their rekindling the war; and being likewise well assured, as far as human prudence could determine, that it would be impossible for them,

during the ensuing summer, to raise up any very dangerous war; left C. Trebonius, with the two legions he had brought along with him, to winter at Genabum. Meanwhile, understanding by frequent embassies from the Rhemi, that the Bellovaci, the most distinguished for bravery of all the Belgian and Gallic nations, with some of the neighbouring states, under the conduct of Correus, general of the Bellovaci, and Comius the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and drawing their forces to a general rendezvous with design to invade the territories of the Suessiones, a people subject to the jurisdiction of the Rhemi; he thought that both honour and interest required him to undertake the defence of allies, who had deserved so well of the commonwealth. He therefore drew the eleventh legion again out of its winter quarters; wrote to C. Fabius, to march the two legions under his command into the country of the Suessiones; and ordered Labienus to send one of those he was charged with. Thus, as far as the convenience of winter quarters, and the nature of the war would allow, he employed the legions alternately in expeditions, giving himself, meanwhile, no intermission from fatigue.

VI. With these forces he marched against the Bellovaci, and encamping within their territories, dispersed his cavalry on all sides to make prisoners, from whom he might learn the enemy's designs. The horse, in consequence of this commission, brought him back word, that the lands and houses were in a manner quite abandoned, and that the few prisoners they had found, after a most diligent search, were not left to cultivate the ground, but to serve as spies. Cæsar inquiring of these, whither the Bellovaci were retired, and what might be their designs, found: "That all of them capable of bearing arms, had assembled in one place, and been joined by the Ambians, Aulerci, Caletes, Vellocasians, and Atrebatians: that they had chosen for their camp, a rising ground, surrounded with a difficult morass, and disposed of their baggage in remote woods: that a great many of their chiefs were concerned in the war, but the principal authority rested in Correus, because he was known to bear an implacable hatred to the Roman name: that a few days before, Comius had left the camp to solicit aid of the Germans, who were their nearest neighbours, and abounded in troops: that it had been resolved among

the Bellovaci, with consent of all the generals, and at the earnest desire of the people, if Cæsar came at the head of only three legions, as was reported, to offer him battle; lest they should be afterwards obliged to fight upon harder and more unequal terms, when he had got his whole army together: but if he brought greater forces along with him, to continue within their camp, intercept his corn and convoys, and cut off his forage; which in that season of the year was extremely scarce, and very much dispersed."

VII. These things being confirmed by the testimony of all the prisoners, Cæsar who found their designs full of prudence, and remote from the usual testimony of barbarians, resolved by all manner of ways to draw them into a contempt of his numbers, that he might the more easily bring them to an engagement. He had with him the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions, all veterans of approved valour; and though the eleventh was not of equal standing, nor had attained the same reputation of bravery, they were yet chosen youth of great hopes, who had served under him eight campaigns. Calling therefore the army together, he laid before them the advices he had received, and exhorted the soldiers to preserve their wonted courage. At the same time, to draw the enemy to an engagement, by an appearance of only three legions, he so contrived the order of his march, that disposing the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions in front; the baggage, which, as in a hasty expedition, was but moderate, behind them; and the eleventh legion in the rear of all; no more troops were in view, than what the Gauls themselves had determined to hazard an action against. The army, thus drawn up, formed a kind of square, and arrived before the enemy's camp much sooner than expected.

VIII. When the Gauls perceived the legions advancing suddenly against them in order of battle, with a steady pace, they altered the resolution which had been reported to Cæsar; and either fearing the success of the battle, surprised at so sudden an approach, or willing to know our further designs, drew up before their camp, without descending from the higher ground. Cæsar though desirous to come to an engagement, yet surprised at the multitude of the enemy, and reflecting on the advantage of their situation; as being separated from him by a valley, still more consider-

able for its depth than breadth; contented himself for the present to encamp directly over against them. He threw up a rampart twelve feet high, strengthened by a proportionable breast-work; and secured it by two ditches, each fifteen feet deep, with perpendicular sides. He likewise raised several turrets of three stories, and joined them to each other by galleries, having little parapets of osier before, that the works might be defended by a double range of soldiers; one of which fighting from the galleries, and secured by their height, would, with more boldness and advantage, launch their darts against the enemy; the other, though nearer danger, and planted upon the rampart itself, were yet screened by the galleries from the impending darts. All the entrances to the camp were secured by strong gates, over which he placed very high towers.

IX. He had a twofold design in these fortifications; one, by the greatness of the works, to make the enemy believe him afraid, and thereby increase their presumption and confidence; the other, to enable him to defend his camp with a few troops, when it was necessary to go far in quest of corn and forage. Meantime there happened frequent skirmishes between the two camps, carried on for the most part with arrows at a distance, by reason of a morass that separated the combatants; sometimes indeed the auxiliary Gauls and Germans crossed the morass, and pursued the enemy: sometimes again the enemy having the advantage, passed in their turn, and drove back our men. And as we daily sent our parties to forage, who were obliged to disperse, and scatter themselves from house to house over the whole country, it now and then fell out, as was unavoidable in these circumstances, that our foragers were surprised and cut to pieces by their detachments. These losses, though very inconsiderable to us, as being mostly confined to some carriages and servants, yet strangely swelled the hopes of the barbarians; and the more, as Comius, who had gone to fetch the German auxiliaries, was now returned with a body of horse. And though the number was not great, they not making in all above five hundred, the enemy were nevertheless mightily encouraged by this supply.

X. Cæsar, after a stay of many days, finding that the enemy still kept within their camp, which was advantageously situated with a mo-

orass in front: and considering, at the same time, that he could neither force their intrenchments without great loss, nor inclose them with works with so small an army, wrote to Trebonius, to send, with all diligence, for the thirteenth legion, which was quartered among the Biturigians, under the care of T. Sextius; and with that, and the two legions under his own command, make what haste he could to join him. Meanwhile he detached the cavalry of Rheims, of the Lingones, and the other provinces of Gaul, of which he had great numbers in his camp, to guard by turns the foragers, and protect them from the sudden incursions of the enemy.

XI. This was done every day; but custom, by degrees, relaxing their diligence, as frequently happens in things of long continuance; the Bellovaci, who had observed the daily stations of our horse, placed a chosen body of foot in ambush in a wood, and sent their cavalry thither next day, to draw our men into the snare, and then attack them, surrounded on every side. This ill fortune fell upon the cavalry of Rheims, whose turn it was that day to guard the foragers: for these, suddenly discovering the enemy's cavalry, and despising their small numbers, pursued with such eagerness, that they were at length surprised and surrounded by the foot. This threw them into confusion, and obliged them to retreat hastily, with the loss of Vertiscus their general, and the chief man of their state: who, though so far advanced in years that he could hardly sit on horseback, yet, according to the custom of the Gauls, would neither decline the command on account of his age, nor suffer them to fight without him. The enemy were animated and encouraged by this success and the death of the chief and general of the Rhemi: our men on the other hand, were cautioned by their loss, carefully to examine the ground before they took their posts, and pursue a retreating enemy with more reserve.

XII. Meanwhile the daily skirmishes between the two camps, at the fords and passes of the morass, still continued. In one of these, the Germans, whom Cæsar had brought from beyond the Rhine, that they might fight intermingled with the cavalry, boldly passing the morass in a body, put all that made resistance to the sword, and pursued the rest with great vigour. Fear not only seized those who fought hand to hand, or were wounded at a

distance ; but even the more remote parties, who were posted to sustain the others, shamefully betook themselves to flight ; and, being driven from height to height, ceased not to continue the route, until they had reached their very camp ; nay, some, quite confounded by their fear, fled a great way beyond it. Their danger spread so universal a terror among the troops, that it appeared hard to say, whether they were more apt to be elated by a trifling advantage, or depressed by an inconsiderable loss.

XIII. After a stay of many days in this camp ; upon information that C. Trebonius was approaching with the legions, the generals of the Bellovaci, fearing a siege like that of Alesia, sent away by night all whom age or infirmities rendered unfit for service ; and along with them the baggage of the whole army. But before this confused and numerous train could be put in order, (for the Gauls even in their sudden expeditions, are always attended with a vast number of carriages,) daylight appeared ; and the enemy were obliged to draw up before their camp, to hinder the Romans from disturbing the march of their baggage. Cæsar did not think proper to attack them in so advantageous a post, nor was willing to remove his legions to such a distance, as might give them an opportunity of retreating without danger. Observing therefore that the two camps were divided by a very dangerous morass, the difficulty of passing which might greatly retard the pursuit, and that beyond the morass there was an eminence, which in a manner commanded the enemy's camp, and was separated from it only by a small valley, he laid bridges over the morass, passed his legions, and quickly gained the summit of the hill, which was secured on each side by the steepness of the ascent. Thence he marched his legions, in order of battle, to the extremest ridge, and posted them in a place where his engines could play upon the enemy's battalions.

XIV. The Gauls, confiding in the strength of their post, resolved not to decline a battle if the Romans should attack them on the hill ; and not daring to make their troops file off, for fear of being charged when separated and in disorder, continued in the same posture. Cæsar perceiving their obstinacy, kept twenty cohorts already drawn up ; and marking out a camp in the place where he then stood, ordered it to be fortified immediately.

The works being finished, he drew up his legions before the rampart, and assigned the cavalry their several posts, where they were to wait, with their horses ready bridled. The Bellovaci seeing the Romans prepared for the pursuit, and finding it impossible to pass the night, or continue longer in that place without provisions, fell upon the following stratagem to secure their retreat. They collected and placed at the head of their line all the fascines in the camp, of which the number was very great, (for, as has been already observed, the Gauls commonly sit upon these, when drawn up in order of battle,) and towards night, upon a signal given, set fire to them all at once. The flame blazing out on a sudden, with great violence, covered their forces from the view of the Romans ; and the Gauls laying hold of that opportunity retreated with the utmost diligence.

XV. Though Cæsar could not perceive the enemy's departure, because of the flames, yet suspecting that this was only a contrivance to cover their flight, he made the legions advance, and detached the cavalry to pursue them. Meanwhile, apprehending an ambuscade, and that the enemy might perhaps continue in the same post, to draw our men into a place of disadvantage, he took care to follow slowly with the foot. The cavalry not daring to enter that thick column of flame and smoke, or if any had the courage to adventure it, being unable to discern the very heads of their horses, thought proper to retire for fear of a surprise, and left the Bellovaci at full liberty to escape. Thus by a flight, which equally spoke their fear and address, they retreated ten miles without loss, and encamped in a place of great advantage. Thence, by frequent ambuscades of horse and foot, they often attacked and cut to pieces the Roman foragers.

XVI. Cæsar having received many losses of this kind, understood at last by a certain prisoner, that Correus, general of the Bellovaci, had chosen six thousand of his best foot, and a thousand horse, to form an ambuscade in a place abounding in corn, and grass, and where it was therefore presumed the Romans would come to forage. Upon this intelligence, he drew out a greater number of legionaries than usual ; sent the cavalry, who formed the ordinary guard of the foragers, before ; intermixed them with platoons of light-armed foot, and advanced himself as near as possible with

the legions. The enemy, who lay in ambush, having chosen for the place of action a plain of about a mile every way, and environed on all sides with thick woods, or a very deep river, which enclosed it as in a toil, disposed their forces all around. Our men, who knew their design, and advanced armed and resolved for battle, because the legions were behind to sustain them, entered the plain troop by troop. Upon their arrival, Correus thinking that now was the proper time for action, appeared first with a few of his men, and fell upon the nearest squadrons. Our men resolutely sustained the attack, nor flocked together in crowds, as frequently happens among the cavalry on occasion of sudden surprise, when the very number of combatants throws all into confusion. The squadrons fighting thus in good order, and preserving a proper distance, to prevent their being taken in flank; suddenly the rest of the Gauls broke from the woods, and advanced to the aid of those who fought under Correus. The contest was carried on with great heat, and continued for a long time with equal advantage on both sides: when at last the foot advancing slowly in order of battle from the woods, obliged our men to give way. Upon this the light-armed infantry, who, as we have observed, had been sent before the legions, marched up speedily to their assistance; and placing themselves in the intervals of the squadrons, continued the fight. The contest again became equal. At length, as was natural in an encounter of this kind, those who had sustained the first charge of the ambuscade, began for this very reason to have the superiority, because the enemy had gained no advantage over them. Meanwhile the legions approached, and both sides had notice at the same time that Cæsar was advancing with his forces in order of battle. Our troops, animated by this hope, redoubled their efforts; lest by pushing the enemy too slowly, the legions should have time to come in for a share of the victory. The enemy, on the contrary, lost courage, and fled different ways. But in vain: for the very difficulties of the ground, by which they hoped to have insnared the Romans, served now to entangle themselves. Being at last vanquished and repulsed, with the loss of the best part of their men, they fled in great terror whither chance directed; some towards the woods, some towards the river. The Romans urged the pursuit with great keenness, and put many

to the sword. Meanwhile Correus, whose resolution no misfortune could abate, would neither quit the fight, and retire to the woods, nor accept of any offers of quarter from our men; but fighting on to the last with invincible courage, and wounding many of the victorious troops, constrained them at length to transfix him with their javelins.

XVII. After this action, Cæsar coming up just as the battle was ended, and naturally supposing that the enemy, upon intelligence of so considerable a defeat, would immediately abandon their camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the place of slaughter; though he saw his march obstructed by the river, he passed it notwithstanding, and advanced with his forces against them. But the Bellovaci, and the other states in their alliance, hearing of their disaster by some of the runaways, who though wounded, found means to escape under cover of the woods; and finding that every thing was against them, their general slain, their cavalry and the flower of their infantry destroyed, and the Romans doubtless upon the march to attack them; speedily assembling a council by sound of trumpet, demanded, with great cries, that ambassadors and hostages might be sent to Cæsar.

XVIII. This proposal being approved by all, Comius the Atrebatian fled to the Germans, whose assistance he had obtained in the war. The rest immediately despatched ambassadors to Cæsar, and requested; "That he would regard their present sufferings as a sufficient punishment for their revolt; since they were such, as his humanity and clemency would never have suffered him to inflict upon them, had he compelled them to submit entire, and without fighting: that their power was utterly broken by the late defeat of their cavalry; that several thousand of their best infantry were destroyed, scarce enough being left to bring them news of the disaster; that yet in so great a calamity, it was no small advantage to the Bellovaci, that Correus, the author of the war, who had stirred up the multitude to revolt was killed: because while he lived, the headstrong populace would always have had more authority in the state than the senate." Their ambassadors having ended their speech, Cæsar put them in mind; "That the year before, the Bellovaci had, in conjunction with the other states of Gaul, taken up arms against the Romans; that, of all the confederates,

they had persisted with the greatest obstinacy in their revolt, nor been induced by the submission of the rest to hearken to reason; that nothing was easier than to lay the blame of their misconduct upon the dead; but they would find it difficult to make him believe, that a single man could have so much influence, as, in spite of the opposition of the nobility and senate, and the efforts of all good men, to stir up and support a war, by the mere authority of the multitude; that, however, he would be satisfied for the present with the punishment they had brought upon themselves."

XIX. Next night the deputies returned with Cæsar's answer, and hostages were immediately sent to the Roman camp. The deputies of the other states, who only waited the event of this treaty, immediately flocked to Cæsar, gave hostages, and submitted to his commands. Comius alone would not hear of treating, from a particular distrust of the Romans. For the year before, while Cæsar was employed in the affairs of Cisalpine Gaul, Labienus understanding that Comius was soliciting several states to rebel, and join in a confederacy against the Romans, thought it might be allowed him to use perfidy towards the perfidious. And because he expected to be refused, should he send for him to the camp; that he might not by an unsuccessful attempt put him upon his guard, he employed C. Volusenus Quadratus to kill him, under pretence of an interview; furnishing him with some chosen centurions for that purpose. When the interview began, and Volusenus, by way of signal, had taken Comius by the hand; one of the centurions, as if surprised at a step so unusual, attempted to kill him, but Comius's friends hastily interposing, he was prevented; however, the first blow wounded him severely on the head. Both sides immediately drew, not so much with a design to engage, as to retire; our men because they believed Comius mortally wounded; the Gauls, because discovering the intended treachery, they apprehended the danger to be greater than as yet appeared. From that time Comius determined never to be in the same place with any Roman.

XX. Cæsar having thus subdued the most warlike nations of Gaul, and finding no state disposed to take up arms, or make resistance, but that only some few had left their towns and possessions, to avoid present subjection,

resolved to divide his army into several bodies. M. Antony the questor, with the eleventh legion, had orders to continue with him. C. Fabius was sent, at the head of twenty-five cohorts, into the remotest parts of Gaul; because he understood some states were in arms on that side, whom C. Caninus Rebilus, his lieutenant, who commanded in those provinces, was scarcely strong enough to oppose with only two legions. He then sent for T. Labienus, and ordered the twelfth legion, which he commanded, into Gallia Togata, to protect the Roman colonies there, that they might not suffer by the incursions of the barbarians, as had happened the year before to the Tergestini, whose territories had been plundered by a sudden and unexpected invasion. He himself marched to ravage and lay waste the territories of Ambiorix; for finding it impossible to lay hold on that perfidious Gaul, whose fear prompted him to fly continually before him, he thought it behoved him, in regard to his own dignity, so effectually to ruin the country, by destroying his towns, cattle, and subjects, as might render him odious to his followers, if any still remained, and deprive him of all hope of being restored to his possessions. Having spread his legions and auxiliaries over the whole country of Ambiorix, destroyed all with fire and sword, and either killed or made prisoners an infinite number of people, he despatched Labienus, with two legions, against the Treviri; whose country, bordering upon Germany, and exercised in continual wars, differed little from the temper and fierceness of that nation; nor ever submitted to his commands, unless enforced by the presence of an army.

XXI. Meantime C. Caninius, lieutenant-general, understanding by letters and messengers from Duracius, who had always continued faithful to the Romans, even in the defection of many of his own state, that great numbers of the enemy were assembled in the territories of the Pictones; marched towards the town of Limo. Upon his arrival there, having certain information from some prisoners, that Duracius was shut up and besieged in Limo, by a great army of Gauls, under the conduct of Dumnacus, general of the Andes, as he was not strong enough to attack the enemy, he encamped in a place of great advantage. Dumnacus, hearing of his approach, turned all his forces against the legions, and

resolved to invest the Roman camp. But after many days spent in the attack, and the loss of a great number of men, without any impression made upon the intrenchments, he returned again to the siege of Limo.

XXII. At the same time, C. Fabius, having brought over many states to their duty, and confirmed their submission by receiving hostages, upon intelligence sent him by Caninius, of the posture of affairs among the Pictones, marched immediately to the assistance of Duracius. Dumnacus hearing of his arrival, and concluding himself lost, should he at the same time be obliged to make head against an enemy without, and sustain the efforts of the townsmen within, suddenly decamped with all his forces, resolving not to stop till he had got on the other side of the Loire, which, by reason of its largeness, could not be passed without a bridge. Fabius, though he had neither as yet come within sight of the enemy, nor joined forces with Caninius; yet instructed by those who were well acquainted with the country, easily conjectured the rout the Gauls would take. Wherefore directing his march towards the same bridge, he ordered the cavalry to keep before the legions; yet so, that without too much fatiguing their horses, they might return and encamp with them again at night. The cavalry followed the enemy as directed; came up with their rear; and attacking them flying, dismayed and encumbered with their baggage, killed great numbers, gained a considerable booty, and returned in triumph to the camp.

XXIII. The night following, Fabius sent the cavalry before, with orders to engage the enemy, and keep the whole army employed, till he himself should come up with the legions. Q. Atius Varus, a prudent and experienced officer, who had the charge of the detachment, desirous to execute the commands of his general with success, exhorted his men; and coming up with the enemy, disposed some squadrons in the most convenient places, and engaged the Gauls with the rest. The enemy's cavalry made a resolute stand, being supported by their foot, who halting in a body, advanced to the assistance of their own men. The conflict was sharp on both sides. For the Romans, despising enemies whom they had overcome the day before, and remembering that the legions

were coming up to join them; partly ashamed to give way, partly eager to bring the battle to a speedy issue by their own valour alone, fought with great bravery against the enemy's foot. And the Gauls, who had no apprehension of the approach of more forces, because none other had appeared the day before, fancied they had now a favourable opportunity of cutting off our cavalry. As the fight continued with great obstinacy for a considerable time, Dumnacus advanced with the foot, in battle array, to sustain the horse; when suddenly the legions, marching in close order, appeared within view of the enemy. This sight discomposed the Gallic squadrons, and producing a universal confusion through the whole army, which spread even to the baggage and carriages, they with great uproar and tumult betook themselves to a precipitate flight. But our horse, who a little before had fought against an enemy who vigorously opposed them, now elated with the joy of victory, surrounded them with great cries, and urged the slaughter as far as the strength of their horses to pursue, and the vigour of their right hands to destroy, were able to bear them out. Upwards of twelve thousand perished on this occasion, partly in the battle, partly in the pursuit; and the whole baggage was taken.

XXIV. After this rout, Drapes, of the nation of the Senones, (who upon the first revolt of Gaul had drawn together a band of desperate men, invited slaves to join him by the hopes of liberty, assembled all the fugitives he could find, received even public robbers into his service, and with that profligate crew intercepted the Roman convoys and baggage,) having rallied about five thousand runaways, directed his march towards the province; being joined by Luterius of Quercy, who as we have seen in the foregoing book, had attempted an invasion on that side at the first breaking out of the war. Caninius, having notice of this design, marched in pursuit of them with two legions, to prevent any alarm in those parts, and hinder the province from falling a prey to the ravages of a desperate and needy crew.

XXV. Fabius, with the rest of his army, marched against the Carnutes, and other states, whose forces had served under Dumnacus, in the late action: for he made no doubt of finding them humbled by so great a blow;

and was unwilling, by any delay, to give Dumnacus an opportunity of rousing them to a continuance of the war. In this expedition, Fabius had all the success he could desire; the several states submitting immediately upon his approach. For the Carnutes, who though often harassed, had never yet made mention of peace, now surrendered, and gave hostages; and the other states, inhabiting the more remote parts of Gaul, bordering upon the ocean, and known by the name of Armorica, influenced by their authority, and the arrival of Fabius and his legions, readily accepted the terms he offered them. Dumnacus, expelled his territories, and forced to wander and hide himself in lurking holes, at length escaped into the farthest parts of Gaul.

XXVI. But Drapes and Luterius, understanding that Caninius was in pursuit of them with the legions; and sensible that having an army at their heels, they could not, without certain destruction, make an irruption into the province, nor safely indulge themselves in the liberty of plundering and ravaging the country; halted in the territories of the Cadurci. As Luterius, during his prosperity, had borne considerable sway in the state, been always in great reputation with the multitude, as the author of new and enterprising counsels: he seized upon Uxellodunum, a town strongly fortified by nature, which had formerly been under his patronage; and prevailed with the inhabitants to join his and Drapes's forces.

XXVII. Caninius soon arrived before the place, which he found surrounded on every side with steep rocks, so very difficult of access, that it was hardly possible for armed troops to ascend them, even where there were no opposers. But knowing that there was a vast quantity of baggage in the town, which could not be conveyed away so privately as to escape the legions, much less the cavalry, he divided his army into three bodies; and encamping on three remarkable eminences, resolved gradually, and as the number of his troops would allow, to carry a line of circumvallation quite round the town, which the garrison perceiving, began to dread the fate of their countrymen at Alesia, especially Luterius, who had been present at that formidable siege, and therefore advised them to lay in store of corn. Accordingly, they resolved with unanimous consent to leave part of the forces to defend the town, and march out with the rest to fetch

provisions. This resolution being taken, the following night, Luterius and Drapes, leaving two thousand men in the place, marched at the head of all the rest. These, in a few days, drew together a vast quantity of corn in the territories of the Cadurci, who partly stood inclined to assist them in their present exigence, partly were unable to hinder their carrying it off. Sometimes they attacked our posts by night, which made Caninius delay the circumvallation of the town, fearing he would not be able to defend the line, or man it sufficiently in all parts.

XXVIII. Luterius and Drapes having got a great quantity of corn, took up their quarters about ten miles from the town, that they might convey it thither by degrees. Each chose his particular part: Drapes stayed behind with part of the army to guard the camp; Luterius set forward with the convoy. Having disposed parties along the road for the greater security, he began his march towards the town about four in the morning, by narrow ways, through the woods. But our sentinels hearing a noise, and intelligence being brought by the scouts of what was doing, Caninius speedily drew some cohorts together from the nearest posts, and fell upon the convoy about day-break; who, surprised at so unexpected an attack, retreated towards their guard. Our men perceiving this, fell with redoubled fury upon the escort, giving quarter to none. Luterius escaped with a few followers, but returned not to the camp.

XXIX. Caninius having succeeded in this action, understood from the prisoners that Drapes was encamped about ten miles off, with the rest of the army. This being confirmed from many hands; as he supposed it would be easy to overwhelm them, after the terror occasioned by the defeat of one of their leaders, he thought it very fortunate that none of the fugitives had retreated towards the camp, to inform Drapes of the disaster. As there was therefore no hazard in the attempt, he ordered all the cavalry, with the German infantry, who were of remarkable swiftness, to advance before; and having distributed one legion into his three camps, followed them with the other, without baggage. As he drew near the enemy he was informed by his scouts, whom he had sent before, that the Gauls, according to custom, had pitched their camp at the foot of a mountain by the river-side, and that the Ger-

man foot, and cavalry, coming suddenly and unexpectedly upon them, had begun the fight. Upon this intelligence, he brought forward the legion in order of battle, and giving the signal of onset, soon possessed himself of the higher ground. The Germans, and cavalry, encouraged by the ensigns of the legions, redoubled their efforts. The cohorts threw themselves in crowds upon the enemy, and having either slain or made them all prisoners, obtained a considerable booty. Drapes himself was taken in the battle.

XXX. Caninius, after so fortunate an action, in which scarce any of his soldiers had been wounded, returned to the siege of Uxellodunum. Having got rid of the enemy without, who had obliged him to augment his garrisons, and postpone the works about the place, he now resumed them with great diligence, and was the next day joined by Fabius and his forces, who undertook one side of the town.

XXXI. Meantime Cæsar, leaving M. Antony the questor, with fifteen cohorts, in the country of the Bellovaci, to prevent any new insurrections among the Belgians; marched himself into other states, to enjoin hostages, and allay their fears. When he arrived among the Carnutes, by whom the war was first begun, as Cæsar has mentioned in the preceding book; observing that they in a particular manner dreaded his resentment, from a consciousness of their guilt; that he might the sooner free them from their fears, he desired them to deliver up to justice Guturvatus, the prime mover and incendiary of that war; who, though he hid himself even from his own countrymen, yet being diligently sought after by a whole people, was soon brought to Cæsar's camp. Cæsar, contrary to his natural clemency, was constrained to give him up to punishment by his soldiers, who imputed to Guturvatus all the losses they had sustained, and all the dangers they had been exposed to during the war. Accordingly he was scourged and beheaded.

XXXII. Here he was informed, by frequent advices from Caninius, of the defeat of Drapes and Luterius, and the resolution taken by the garrison of Uxellodunum. Though he despised them on account of the smallness of their number, he yet thought their obstinacy deserved the severest chastisement: that Gaul might not run into a persuasion, that not

strength, but constancy, had been wanting, to enable them to resist the Romans; which might perhaps induce other states, who had the advantage of strong towns, to assert their liberty; it being universally known in Gaul, that only one year of his government remained; during which, if they could hold but out, they had no further danger to apprehend. Leaving therefore the two legions he had then with him to the care of Q. Calenus his lieutenant, with orders to follow him by easy marches; he himself, at the head of all the cavalry, hastened to Uxellodunum, to forward the siege begun by Caninius.

XXXIII. He arrived before the town, unexpected either by his own troops, or those of the enemy; saw the circumvallation completed; and that there was no quitting the siege without dishonour; but understanding from the deserters, that the place was well stored with provisions, he resolved, if possible, to cut off their water. Uxellodunum stood upon a steep rock, surrounded almost on every side by a very deep valley, through which ran a river. There was no possible way of turning the course of this stream; because it flowed by the foot of the rock in so low a channel, that ditches could not be sunk deep enough to receive it. But the descent was so difficult and steep, that the townsmen, in coming to and returning from it, lay greatly exposed to our troops, who might wound and kill them at pleasure. This being known to Cæsar, he posted his archers and slingers, with some engines, over against the places of easiest access, and thereby hindered their approach to the river. This obliged the whole multitude to water at one place, close under the walls of the town, whence issued a very plentiful fountain on the side where the river intermitted its circuit, and left an opening of about three hundred feet. The whole army were desirous to deprive the besieged of this resource; but Cæsar alone discovered the means of affecting it. He brought forward his galleries, and began a terrace over against the mountain, with much danger to the soldiers, incredible fatigue, and a continued series of fighting. For the garrison rushing furiously upon us from the higher ground, charged without danger, and wounded great numbers of our men, as they advanced obstinately to the combat; yet without deterring them from bringing forward their machines, and by their works and assiduity

surmounting the difficulties of the ground. At the same time they carried on their mines, from the terrace and galleries, quite to the fountain; a kind of work in which they proceeded without danger or suspicion. A terrace was raised sixty feet high, and a tower of ten stories placed upon it; not indeed to equal the height of the walls, for which no works were sufficient; but to command the top of the spring. From this tower we were continually playing our engines upon all the accesses to the fountain, which made it extremely dangerous to water at the place; insomuch that not only cattle and beasts of carriage, but great numbers of people perished by thirst.

XXXIV. The enemy, terrified at this disaster, filled several barrels with tallow, pitch, and dry wood; and having set them on fire, rolled them down upon the works. At the same time they charged the Romans with great fury, that the anxiety and danger of the battle might hinder them from extinguishing the flames. The conflagration soon became general; for whatever was rolled down from above, being stopped by the machines and terrace, communicated the flame to that part. But our soldiers, though engaged in a dangerous kind of fight, because of the inequality of the ground, yet bore all with great firmness and resolution. For the action was in a conspicuous place, within view of our army, and great shouts were raised on both sides. Thus every one was the more ardent to signalize himself, and brave the flames and darts of the enemy, as his bravery would be better known, and have the testimony of many witnesses.

XXXV. Cæsar seeing many of his soldiers wounded, ordered the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, as if preparing to scale the walls, raise a mighty shout. This alarmed the inhabitants, who not knowing what passed in other parts, recalled their troops from the attack, and disposed them along the walls. Thus our men, being relieved from the battle, soon found means to extinguish or put a stop to the flames. But as the besieged still continued to defend themselves with great obstinacy, and notwithstanding the loss of the greatest part of their number by thirst, persisted in their first resolution; Cæsar at last contrived to drain or avert the spring by mines. Upon this the fountain suddenly becoming dry, so effectually deprived

the besieged of all hopes of safety, that they imagined it an event brought about, not by human counsels, but by the will of the gods; and therefore, compelled by necessity, immediately surrendered themselves.

XXXVI. Cæsar conscious that his clemency was known to all, and no way fearing that his severity on this occasion would be imputed to any cruelty of nature; as he perceived there would be no end of the war, if other states, in different parts of Gaul, should, in like manner, form the design of a revolt; resolved, by a signal example of punishment, to deter them from all such projects. He therefore cut off the hands of all whom he found in arms; granting them their lives, that their punishment might be the more conspicuous. Drapes who, as we have said, had been made prisoner by Caninius; either out of indignation at finding himself a captive, or dreading a severer fate, put an end to his life, by abstaining from food. At the same time, Luterius, who had escaped out of the battle, falling into the hands of Epasnactus of Auvergne, (for, by continually moving from place to place, he was obliged to confide in many, because he could stay no where long without danger, and knew the little reason he had to expect favour from Cæsar,) was, by him, a great favourer of the Roman people, delivered, without hesitation, bound to Cæsar.

XXXVII. In the meantime Labienus engaged the cavalry of the Treviri with success; and having killed a considerable number on the spot, as likewise many Germans, who were always ready to join against the Romans, made the greatest part of their chiefs prisoners; and, among the rest, Surus the Æduan, a nobleman of distinguished birth and valour, and the only one of that nation, who had continued until then in arms. Upon notice of this victory, Cæsar, who saw his affairs in a flourishing condition in Gaul, and that his last campaigns had completed the subjection of the whole country; resolved upon a journey to Aquitain, where he had never yet been in person, though P. Crassus had in part reduced it to his obedience. He therefore set out for that country with two legions, designing to spend there the rest of the campaign. This expedition was attended with the desired success; for all the states of Aquitain sent ambassadors to him, and delivered hostages. He then went with a guard of cavalry to Nar-

bonne, and distributed his army into winter quarters, under the care of his lieutenants. M. Antony, C. Trebonius, P. Vatinius, and Q. Tullius, were quartered in Belgium, with four legions. Two were sent into the country of the Æduans, whom he knew to be the most powerful people in Gaul; two into that of the Turones, bordering upon the Carnutes, to hold the maritime states in awe: and the remaining two were stationed among the Lemovices, not far from Auvergne, that none of the provinces of Gaul might be destitute of troops. He remained some days at Narbonne, held all the usual assemblies of the province, decided the differences subsisting among the people, recompensed those who had distinguished themselves by their faithful services; (for he had a wonderful faculty of discerning how men stood affected in the general revolt of Gaul, which he had been able to sustain, merely by the fidelity and assistance of the province;) and having despatched all these affairs, repaired to the legions in Belgium, and took up his winter quarters at Nemetocenna.

XXXVIII. Here he was informed that Comius of Arras had had an engagement with his cavalry. For, after the arrival of Antony in his winter quarters, as the Atrebatians, awed by his presence, continued in their duty to Cæsar; Comius, who, ever since the wound above-mentioned, had kept a watchful eye upon all the motions of his countrymen, that, in case of war, he might be ready to offer them his counsel and assistance; finding that the state now submitted quietly to the Romans, applied his troops to support himself and his followers by plunder; and often carried off the convoys that were going to the Roman winter quarters.

XXXIX. Among those who commanded under Antony, in his winter quarters, was C. Volusenus Quadratus, an officer of the first rank among the horse. Him Antony sent in pursuit of the enemy's cavalry. Volusenus, to his natural bravery, which he possessed in an eminent degree, added a particular hatred of Comius, which induced him the more readily to accept of this commission. Accordingly, having planted his ambuscades, he found means frequently to engage the enemy, and always came off victorious. At last, a very warm dispute ensuing; and Volusenus, through an eager desire of making Comius prisoner, urging the chase with only a few at-

tendants, while Comius, by a hasty retreat, drew him a considerable way from his party suddenly, the latter, invoking the assistance of his followers, called upon them to revenge the wound he had treacherously received from the Romans; and turning short upon our detachment, advanced without precaution towards Volusenus. All his cavalry did the same, and soon put our small party to flight. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse, ran furiously against Quadratus, and drove his lance through his thigh. Our men, seeing their commander wounded, instantly faced about, and forced the enemy to give ground. In this last attack, the Gauls, after a considerable slaughter, were entirely routed by the vigorous charge of our cavalry. Some were trodden to death in the pursuit, others made prisoners; but Comius escaped by the swiftness of his horse. Volusenus being dangerously wounded, almost beyond hope of recovery, was carried back to the camp. Comius, either satisfied with the revenge he had taken, or apprehensive he must at last be ruined, as he continually lost some of his men, sent a deputation to Antony, offering to retire wherever he should order him, to submit to whatever should be imposed on him, and to give hostages for the performance of these conditions: he only requested, that so much regard might be shown to his just fears, as not to have it insisted on that he should appear before any Roman. Antony, conscious that his apprehensions were but too well grounded, excused him, took hostages, and granted him peace.

Cæsar, I know, assigns a distinct book to each of his several campaigns. But I have not judged it necessary to pursue this method; because the ensuing year, under the consulship of L. Paulus, and C. Marcellus, furnishes nothing memorable transacted in Gaul. However, that none may be ignorant where Cæsar and his army were during this time, I have subjoined a short account to the present commentary.

XL. Cæsar, during the time of his winter quarters in Belgium, made it his whole study to ingratiate himself with the Gauls, and deprive them of all pretence or colour for a revolt. For there was nothing he more earnestly desired, than to leave Gaul peaceably disposed at his departure; lest, when he was about to withdraw his army, any sparks of rebellion should remain, which would infallibly rekindle

into a war, were the Roman troops once removed. Wherefore, by treating the several states with respect, liberally rewarding their chiefs, and abstaining from the imposition of new burdens, he easily prevailed with the Gauls, wearied and exhausted by long unsuccessful wars, to embrace the ease and quiet attendant on their present submission.

XLII. The winter being over, contrary to his custom, he posted, by long journeys, into Italy, to visit the municipal towns and colonies of Cisalpine Gaul, and engage their interest in favour of M. Antony, his questor, who was then a candidate for the priesthood. He the more warmly interested himself in this affair, not only as it was in behalf of a man united to him by the strictest ties of friendship, but as it likewise gave him an opportunity of opposing a small faction, who aimed to diminish Cæsar's credit, by repulsing Antony. Although he heard upon the road, before he reached Italy, that Antony had been made augur, he still thought it incumbent upon him to visit the municipal towns and colonies of the province; in order to thank them for the zeal they had shown in behalf of his friend, and to recommend them his own petition for the consulship of the ensuing year. For his enemies every where boasted, that L. Lentulus and C. Marcellus had been chosen consuls, in the view of despoiling him of all his honours and dignities; and that Sergius Galba had been excluded, though much the strongest in the number of votes, because of his known intimacy with Cæsar, and having served under him as lieutenant.

XLII. He was received every where with incredible honours, and the warmest testimonies of the people's affection. For this was the first time he had appeared among them since the total reduction of Gaul. Nothing was omitted that could contribute to the ornament of the gates, ways, and places through which he was to pass. The people, with their children, came out to meet him; sacrifices were offered in all parts; tables, richly spread, were placed in the public squares and temples: and so great was the magnificence displayed by the rich, such the eagerness of the poor to express their satisfaction, that every thing wore the face of a most splendid triumph.

XLIII. Cæsar, having visited the several provinces of Cisalpine Gaul, returned, in all haste, to the army at Nemetocenna; and or-

dering the legions to quit their winter quarters, and rendezvous in the territories of the Treviri, went thither and reviewed them in person. He gave the government of Cisalpine Gaul to Labienus, the better to reconcile him to his demand of the consulship; and marched the army from place to place, that by the motion and change of air, he might prevent any sickness getting among the troops. Although he often heard, that Labienus was strongly solicited by his enemies; and was, for certain, informed, that some were labouring, by means of the senate's authority, to deprive him of part of his army; yet neither did he credit any reports to Labienus's disadvantage, nor could be induced to set himself in opposition to the authority of the senate. For he made no doubt of obtaining his demand by the free suffrages of the fathers: and the rather, because C. Curio, tribune of the people, having undertaken the defence of Cæsar's cause and dignity, had often proposed in the senate: "That if Cæsar's army gave umbrage to any, as Pompey was no less formidable to the true friends of liberty, both should be ordered to dismiss their troops, and return to a private condition, which would entirely free the commonwealth from all apprehensions of danger." Nor did he only propose this, but even began to put it to the vote. But the consuls and Pompey's friends interposed, which hindered the senate from coming to any resolution.

XLIV. This was an authentic testimony from the whole senate, and agreeable to what had passed on a former occasion. For when Marcellus, who strove to render himself considerable by opposing Cæsar, had proposed, the year before, contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to recall Cæsar before his commission was expired, the overture was rejected by a very full house. But this, instead of discouraging Cæsar's enemies, only pushed them on to new attempts, that they might, at length, bring the senate into their measures.

XLV. A *Senatus Consultum* soon after passed, that one legion from Pompey, and another from Cæsar, should be sent to the Parthian war. But it was visibly their design to take both legions from Cæsar alone. For Pompey offered the first legion for that service, which he had lent some time before to Cæsar, having raised it in his province. But Cæsar, though now fully satisfied of the ill designs of his enemies, readily sent back Pom-

pey's legion; and in compliance with the decree of the senate, ordered the fifteenth, one of his own number, which was then in hither Gaul, to be delivered to their commissioners; and sent the thirteenth into Italy to replace it, and supply the garrison whence it had been drawn. He then put his army into winter quarters. C. Trebonius, with four legions, was ordered into the country of the Belgians; and C. Fabius, with the like number, was placed among the Æduans. For thus he thought Gaul was most likely to be kept in subjection; if the Belgæ, the most renowned for their valour, and the Æduans, the most

considerable for their authority, were awed by the presence of two armies.

XLVI. After this he returned into Italy, where he understood, that the two legions he had sent, in conformity to the decree of the senate, to be employed in the Parthian War, had been delivered, by the Consul Marcellus, to Pompey, and were by him still detained in Italy. Although by this it was abundantly evident, that they were preparing to take up arms against him, he yet resolved to suffer any thing, while any hope remained of adjusting their differences by the methods of peace, rather than those of violence and war.