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CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

OF

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

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BOOK IV.

I. THE following winter, being that in which Cn. Pompey and M. Crassus were consuls, the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, German nations, passed the Rhine in a great body, not far from its mouth. The cause of their taking this step was, that being much exposed to the hostilities of the Suevians, they had for many years been harassed with continual wars, and hindered from cultivating their lands.

II. The Suevians are by far the most warlike and considerable of all the German nations. They are said to be composed of a hundred cantons, each of which sends yearly into the field a thousand armed men. The rest, who continue in their several districts, employ themselves in cultivating their lands, that they may furnish a sufficient supply both for themselves and for the army. These again take up arms the following campaign, and are succeeded in the care of the lands by the troops that served the year before. Thus they live in the continual exercise both of agriculture and war. They allow of no such thing as property, or private possession in the distribution of their lands; their residence, for the sake of tillage, being confined to a single year. Corn is not much in use among them, because they prefer a milk or flesh diet, and are greatly addicted to hunting. Thus the quality of their food, their perpetual exercise, and free unconfined manner of life, (because being from their childhood fettered by no rules of duty or education, they acknowledge no law but will and pleasure,) contribute to make them strong, and of an extraordinary stature. They have likewise accustomed

themselves, though inhabiting a climate naturally very cold, to bathe in their rivers, and clothe themselves only with skins, which, as they are very small, leave great part of their body quite uncovered. Merchants indeed resort to them, but rather to purchase their spoils taken in war, than import any goods into the country; for even beasts of carriage, in which the Gauls take so much delight, that they are ready to purchase them at any price, are yet very little valued by the Germans, when brought among them. And though those of their own country are both small and very ill shaped, yet by daily exercise they make them capable of all kinds of service. Their cavalry often dismount in time of action, to fight on foot; and their horses are so trained, that they stir not from the place where they are left, but wait the return of their riders, who betake themselves to them again in case of necessity. Nothing is more dishonourable, in their account, or more opposite to their customs, than the use of horse-furniture; and therefore, however few themselves, they scruple not to attack any number of their enemies whom they see so equipped. They suffer no wine to be imported into their territories, as imagining that it both enervates the mind, and unfits the body for exercise and labour. It is accounted much to the honour of the nation, to have the country for a great way round them waste and uninhabited; for by this they think is intimated, that the united force of many states has been found insufficient to withstand their single valour. And hence it is, that on one side, the

country is said to lie desolate for the space of six hundred miles.

III. On the other side they are bounded by the Ubians, heretofore a flourishing and potent people, and somewhat more civilized than the other German nations; because inhabiting along the banks of the Rhine, they are much resorted to by merchants; and have besides, by bordering upon the states of Gaul, given into many of their customs. The Suevians having tried the strength of this people in many wars, and finding them too numerous and potent to be driven out of their territories, prevailed yet so far as to impose a tribute upon them, and very much reduce and weaken their power.

IV. The Usipetes and Tenchtheri, of whom we have spoken above, were likewise engaged in this quarrel; and after withstanding the power of the Suevians for many years, were nevertheless at length driven from their territories. Having wandered over many regions of Germany during the space of three years, they arrived at last upon the banks of the Rhine, towards those parts inhabited by the Menapians, who had houses, lands, and villages on both sides the river. But alarmed at the approach of so prodigious a multitude, they abandoned all their habitations beyond the Rhine; and having disposed their troops on this side the river, set themselves to oppose the passage of the Germans. These having tried every expedient; and finding they could neither force the passage, because of their want of shipping; nor steal over privately by reason of the guards kept by the Menapians, counterfeited a retreat into their own country, and after three days' march, suddenly turned back; when their cavalry, recovering all this ground in the space of one night, easily overpowered the Menapians, little expecting or prepared for such a visit; for having been apprized by their scouts of the departure of the Germans, they had returned, fearless of danger, to their habitations beyond the Rhine. These being all put to the sword, and their shipping seized before the Menapians on this side had intelligence of their approach, they passed the river; and seizing all their towns and houses, supported themselves the rest of the winter with the provisions there found.

V. Cæsar being informed of these things, and dreading the levity of the Gauls, who are very changeable in their counsels, and fond of novelties; determined to trust nothing to

their resolves. For it is the custom of that people to stop travellers even against their will, and inquire of them what they have heard or know relating to any affair; and in their towns, upon the arrival of a foreign merchant, they gather round him in crowds, and oblige him to tell what country he comes from, and how things stood at his departure. Moved by these reports, they often enter upon the most important deliberations, and concert measures they soon have cause to repent, as being founded wholly on vain rumours, and answers feigned for the most part designedly to please them. Cæsar, who was aware of this custom, fearing the war, if neglected, might become formidable, made all the haste he could to join the army. Upon his arrival he found, that things were fallen out exactly as he had foreseen. Some of the states of Gaul had sent ambassadors to the Germans, inviting them to leave the banks of the Rhine, and assuring them that all their demands should be readily complied with. The Germans, allured by these hopes, were already extending their incursions on all sides, and had penetrated into the territories of the Eburones and Condrusians, both which nations are under the protection of the Treviri. Cæsar having assembled the chiefs of the Gauls, dissembled his knowledge of their secret designs; and endeavouring rather to win them over, and confirm them in their alliance with the people of Rome, demanded a certain number of cavalry of them, and prepared to march against the Germans.

VI. Having provided himself with corn, and drawn together a select body of horse, he began his march towards those parts where he understood the Germans then were. When he was come within a few days' journey of their camp, ambassadors arrived from them, who addressed him to this effect;—"That the Germans had no design of being the first to begin a war with the people of Rome; but neither, if they were attacked, would they decline having recourse to arms: that it was the custom of their nation, handed down to them by their ancestors, rather to oppose the efforts of their enemies, than expect relief from remonstrances; but thus far they were however willing to own, that it was against their inclination they were come into those parts, having been driven from their habitations: that if the Romans were disposed to accept of their friendship, they might become very useful

and serviceable allies, and would rest satisfied either with such lands as they should think proper to assign them, or in the quiet possession of those they had already obtained by force of arms; that they yielded in valour to the Suevians alone, for whom the immortal gods themselves were not an equal match; but knew of no other nation under heaven able to resist the efforts of their bravery." Cæsar made such a reply as best suited his present views, but the conclusion of his speech was to this purpose:—"That he could enter into no treaty of friendship with them so long as they continued in Gaul; that men who had been unable to defend their own territories were not likely to gain countries by force from others; that there were no uncultivated lands in Gaul, sufficient to satisfy so great a multitude, without invading the properties of others; but that, if they pleased, they might incorporate themselves with the Ubians, whose ambassadors were then in his camp, to complain of the injuries of the Suevians, and request his aid against their encroachments; this he promised to obtain for them of the Ubians." The ambassadors replied, they would report this to their countrymen, and in three days return with an answer; requesting in the meantime, that he would not advance with his army. But this Cæsar refused, as knowing, that a few days before they had sent a great body of cavalry over the Meuse, to forage and plunder in the territories of the Ambivariti. He therefore concluded, that they only waited the return of this party, and with that view were for interposing delays.

VII. The Meuse rises in the mountains of Vause, in the territories of the Lingones, and receiving a certain branch of the Rhine, called the Vahal, forms with it the island of the Batavians, about fourscore miles below which it discharges itself into the sea. The Rhine itself takes its rise in the territories of the Lepontians, who inhabit the Alps; and after a long and rapid course through the country of the Nantuates, Helvetians, Sequani, Mediomatrici, Treboci, and Treviri, divides itself, as it approaches nearer the sea, into several channels, and forming a great number of very large islands, inhabited for the most part by fierce and savage nations, some of whom are reported to feed only on fish and the eggs of birds, it at last discharges itself into the ocean by many different mouths.

VIII. Cæsar being now only twelve miles distant from the enemy, was met upon his way by the ambassadors on the day appointed. They were very earnest in their requests that he would advance no farther; but not being able to prevail, entreated, that he would send to the cavalry, who made the advance-guard, to restrain them from beginning the fight; and in the meantime permit them to send ambassadors to the Ubians; from whose senate and magistrates, if they could obtain the conditions offered them by Cæsar, under the sanction of a solemn oath, they declared themselves ready to accept them; requiring only that he would allow them the space of three days to bring matters to a final issue. But Cæsar, imagining all these proffers to have no other tendency than the delay of a few days, until their cavalry should arrive, told them, nevertheless, that he would advance that day only four miles farther, for the sake of water; but desired their chiefs to attend him the day after, that he might know their demands. Meantime he sent orders to the officers of the cavalry, who were gone before, not to attack the enemy; and in case they should be attacked themselves, only to maintain their ground until he should come up with the rest of the army.

IX. But the enemy, upon seeing our horse advance, whose number amounted to five thousand, whereas they themselves did not exceed eight hundred, by reason of the absence of those who had been sent to forage beyond the Meuse; yet falling suddenly upon the Romans, who had no apprehension of their design, because they knew their ambassadors had been with Cæsar a little before, and obtained a day's truce, they easily put them into disorder. And when our men, recovering a little, began to make resistance, they, according to custom, dismounted, and stabbing our horses under the belly, and by that means overthrowing many of the riders, in a very short time put the rest to flight; and so great was the consternation, that they continued driving them before them, until at last they came within sight of the army. In this skirmish we lost seventy four men, and among them Piso of Aquitain, a man of distinguished valour and illustrious descent, whose grandfather had been sovereign magistrate in his own state, and been honoured by the senate of Rome with the title of friend. This brave officer, seeing his brother surround-

ed by the enemy, ran to his assistance, and rescued him: but his own horse being wounded, and he overthrown, the enemy fell upon him, against whom nevertheless he made a brave resistance; till at last, surrounded on all sides, he fell overpowered with wounds. Which his brother perceiving, who was by this time out of danger, and had got to a considerable distance, setting spurs to his horse, he rushed among the thickest of the enemy, and was slain.

X. After this battle, Cæsar resolved neither to give audience to their ambassadors, nor admit them to terms of peace, seeing they had treacherously applied for a truce, and afterwards of their own accord broken it. He likewise considered, that it would be downright madness to delay coming to an action until their army should be augmented, and their cavalry join them; and the more so, because he was perfectly well acquainted with the levity of the Gauls, among whom they had already acquired a considerable reputation by this successful attack, and to whom it therefore behoved him by no means to allow time to enter into measures against him. Upon all these accounts he determined to come to an engagement with the enemy as soon as possible, and communicated his design to his questor and lieutenants. A very lucky accident fell out to bring about Cæsar's purpose; for the day after, in the morning, the Germans, persisting in their treachery and dissimulation, came in great numbers to the camp; all their nobility and princes making part of their embassy. Their design was, as they pretended, to vindicate themselves in regard to what had happened the day before; because, contrary to engagements made and come under at their own request, they had fallen upon our men; but their real motive was to obtain if possible another insidious truce. Cæsar, overjoyed to have them thus in his power, ordered them to be secured, and immediately drew his forces out of the camp. The cavalry, whom he supposed terrified with the late engagement, were commanded to follow in the rear.

XI. Having drawn up his army in three lines, and made a very expeditious march of eight miles, he appeared before the enemy's camp before they had the least apprehension of his design. All things conspiring to throw them into a sudden consternation, which was not a little increased by our unexpected ap-

pearance, and the absence of their own officers; and hardly any time left them either to take counsel, or fly to arms, they were utterly at a loss what course to take, whether to draw out their forces and oppose the enemy, or content themselves with defending the camp, or in fine to seek for safety in flight. As this fear was evident from the tumult and uproar we perceived among them, our soldiers, instigated by the remembrance of their treacherous behaviour the day before, broke into the camp. Such as could first provide themselves with arms made a show of resistance, and for some time maintained the fight amidst the baggage and carriages. But the women and children (for the Germans had brought all their families and effects with them over the Rhine) betook themselves to flight on all sides. Cæsar sent the cavalry in pursuit of them.

XII. The Germans hearing the noise behind them, and seeing their wives and children put to the sword, threw down their arms, abandoned their ensigns, and fled out of the camp. Being arrived at the confluence of the Rhine and the Meuse, and finding it impossible to continue their flight any farther; after a dreadful slaughter of those that pretended to make resistance, the rest threw themselves into the river; where, what with fear, weariness, and the force of the current, they almost all perished. Thus our army, without the loss of a man, and with very few wounded, returned to their camp, having put an end to this formidable war, in which the number of the enemy amounted to four hundred and thirty thousand. Cæsar offered those whom he had detained in his camp liberty to depart; but they, dreading the resentment of the Gauls, whose lands they had laid waste, chose rather to continue with him, and obtained his consent for that purpose.

XIII. The war with the Germans being ended, Cæsar for many reasons resolved to carry his army over the Rhine. But what chiefly swayed with him was, that as he found the Germans were easily prevailed upon to transport their forces into Gaul, he thought it might be of no small service to alarm them upon their own account, by letting them see, that the Romans wanted neither ability nor resolution to pass the Rhine with an army. Add to all this, that the cavalry of the Usipetes

and Tenchtheri, who as we have related above, had passed the Meuse for the sake of forage and plunder, and by that means escaped the disaster of the late fight, upon hearing of the defeat of their countrymen, had repassed the Rhine, retired into the territories of the Sicambrians, and joined their forces to theirs. And upon Cæsar's sending deputies to require, that these troops, which had presumed to make war upon him and the Gauls, might be delivered up, he had received for answer:—"That the Rhine was the boundary of the Roman empire; that if he thought it unjustifiable in the Germans to pass over into Gaul without his leave, upon what pretence could he claim any power or authority beyond the Rhine?"

XIV. But the Ubians, who alone of all the nations beyond the Rhine had sent ambassadors to Cæsar, entered into an alliance with him, and given him hostages, earnestly entreated him to come over to their assistance, they being very hard pressed by the Suevians: Or, if the affairs of the commonwealth would not allow of his being there in person, that he would only order his army to cross the Rhine, which would both be sufficient for their present support, and also secure them for the time to come. Because such was the reputation and opinion conceived of a Roman army, even amongst the remote German nations, from their defeating Ariovistus, and the success of the last battle, that their friendship and name would alone be a sufficient defence. They promised likewise a great number of ships for the transporting of the army."

XV. Cæsar, for all these reasons above-mentioned, determined to cross the Rhine. But to make use of shipping appeared to him neither safe, nor suitable to the dignity of the Roman name. Wherefore, although he understood that the making of a bridge would be attended with very great difficulties, on account of the breadth, depth, and rapidity of the river, yet was he of opinion, that in this manner alone ought he to carry over his army, or lay aside the design altogether. The form therefore and contrivance of the bridge was thus:—two beams, each a foot and a half thick, sharpened a little towards the lower end, and of a length proportioned to the depth of the river, were joined together at the distance of about two feet. These were sunk into the river by engines, and afterwards strongly driven with rammers, not perpendicularly, but inclined

according to the direction of the stream. Directly opposite to these, at the distance of forty feet lower down, were placed two other beams joined together like the former, but sloping against the current of the river. These stakes were kept firm by a large beam, extended from one to the other, and which being two feet in thickness, exactly filled the interval of the two stakes, and was strongly fastened at either end with iron nails, so contrived, that the violence of the stream served only to bind the work faster together. This being continued through the whole breadth of the river, he ordered planks to be laid across, which for the greater convenience of passing, were further covered with hurdles. Towards the lower part of the stream other stakes were sunk in the form of buttresses, which supported the bridge against the violence of the current; and above, at some distance, there were others; that if trunks of trees or vessels should be sent down the river by the enemy, to destroy the work, the shock might be broken by these defences, and the bridge thereby secured from damage.

XVI. The bridge being finished within ten days from the time they began to fetch the materials, Cæsar led over his army; and leaving a strong guard on each side of the river, marched directly into the territories of the Sicambri. Meantime ambassadors arriving from several states to desire peace, and court his alliance, he gave them a very favourable reception, and appointed them to send hostages. The Sicambri, when they understood that the bridge was begun, by advice of the Usipetes and Tenchtheri, who had taken shelter among them, resolved upon a retreat, and having abandoned their territories, and carried off all their effects, withdrew into the neighbouring woods and deserts.

XVII. Cæsar, after a short stay in their country, having burned all their houses and villages, and cut down their corn, marched into the territories of the Ubians. As he had promised these last his assistance against the attempts of the Suevians, he understood from them that the Suevians, being informed by their spies, of the bridge built upon the Rhine had, according to their custom, called a council, and despatched orders into all parts for the people to forsake their towns, and convey their wives, children, and effects into the woods, commanding, at the same time, that all such as were able to bear arms should meet

at the place of general rendezvous, which they had appointed towards the middle of the country, resolving there to wait the arrival of the Romans, and give them battle. Cæsar, upon this intelligence, having accomplished all he intended in carrying his army over the Rhine, by spreading a universal terror among the Germans, taking vengeance of the Sicambri, and setting the Ubians at liberty, after a stay of only eighteen days beyond the Rhine, thinking he had done enough both for his own reputation and the service of the republic, led back his army into Gaul, and broke the bridge.

XVIII. Though but a small part of the summer now remained, for in those regions, Gaul, stretching very much to the north, the winters begin early, Cæsar, nevertheless, resolved to pass over into Britain, having certain intelligence, that in all his wars with the Gauls, the enemies of the commonwealth had ever received assistance from thence. He indeed foresaw, that the season of the year would not permit him to finish the war; yet he thought it would be of no small advantage, if he should but take a view of the island, learn the nature of the inhabitants, and acquaint himself with the coast, harbours, and landing-places, to all which the Gauls were perfect strangers: for almost none but merchants resort to that island, nor have even any knowledge of the country except the sea coast, and the parts opposite to Gaul. Having therefore called together the merchants from all parts, they could neither inform him of the largeness of the island, nor what or how powerful the nations were that inhabited it, nor of their customs, art of war, or the harbours fit to receive large ships. For these reasons, before he embarked himself, he thought proper to send C. Volusenus with a galley, to get some knowledge of these things, commanding him, as soon as he had informed himself in what he wanted to know, to return with all expedition. He himself marched with his whole army into the territories of the Morini, because thence was the nearest passage into Britain. Here he ordered a great many ships from the neighbouring ports to attend him, and the fleet he had made use of the year before in the Venetian war.

XIX. Meanwhile the Britons, having notice of his design, by the merchants that resorted to their island, ambassadors from many of their states came to Cæsar, with an offer of hostages,

and submission to the authority of the people of Rome. To these he gave a favourable audience, and exhorted them to continue in the same mind, sent them back into their own country. Along with them he despatched Comius, whom he had constituted king of the Atrebatians, a man in whose virtue, wisdom, and fidelity he greatly confided, and whose authority in the island was very considerable. To him he gave it in charge, to visit as many states as he could, and persuade them to enter into an alliance with the Romans, letting them know at the same time that Cæsar designed as soon as possible to come over in person to their island. Volusenus having taken a view of the country, as far as was possible for one who had resolved not to quit his ship, or trust himself in the hands of the barbarians, returned on the fifth day, and acquainted Cæsar with his discoveries.

XX. While Cæsar continued in those parts, for the sake of getting ready his fleet, deputies arrived from almost all the cantons of the Morini, to excuse their late war with the people of Rome, as proceeding wholly from a national fierceness, and their ignorance of the Roman customs, promising likewise an entire submission for the future. This fell out very opportunely for Cæsar, who was unwilling to leave any enemies behind him, nor would the season of the year have even allowed him to engage in a war; besides, he judged it by no means proper so far to entangle himself in these trivial affairs, as to be obliged to postpone the expedition into Britain. He therefore ordered them to send him a great number of hostages, and upon their being delivered, received them into his alliance. Having got together about eighty transports, which he thought would be sufficient for the carrying over two legions, he distributed the galleys he had over and above to the questor, lieutenants, and officers of the cavalry. There were, besides, eighteen transports detained by contrary winds at a port about eight miles off, which he appointed to carry over the cavalry. The rest of the army, under the command of Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, were sent against the Menapians, and those cantons of the Morini which had not submitted. P. Sulpicius Rufus had the charge of the harbour where he embarked, with a strong garrison to maintain it.

XXI. Things being in this manner settled,

and the wind springing up fair, he weighed anchor about one in the morning, ordering the cavalry to embark at the other port, and follow him. But as these orders were executed but slowly, he himself, about ten in the morning, reached the coast of Britain, where he saw all the cliffs covered with the enemy's forces. The nature of the place was such, that the sea being bounded by steep mountains, the enemy might easily launch their javelins upon us from above. Not thinking this therefore a convenient landing-place, he resolved to lie by till three in the afternoon, and wait the arrival of the rest of his fleet. Meanwhile, having called the lieutenants and military tribunes together, he informed them of what he had learned from Volusenus, instructed them in the part they were to act, and particularly exhorted them to do every thing with readiness, and at a signal given agreeable to the rules of military discipline, which in sea affairs especially required expedition and despatch, because of all others the most changeable and uncertain. Having dismissed them, and finding both the wind and tide favourable, he made the signal for weighing anchor, and after sailing about eight miles farther, stopped over against a plain and open shore.

XXII. But the barbarians perceiving our design, sent their cavalry and chariots before, which they frequently make use of in battle, and following with the rest of their forces, endeavoured to oppose our landing: and indeed we found the difficulty very great on many accounts; for our ships being large, required a great depth of water; and the soldiers, who were wholly unacquainted with the places, and had their hands embarrassed and laden with a weight of armour, were at the same time to leap from the ships, stand breast high amidst the waves, and encounter the enemy, while they, fighting upon dry ground, or advancing only a little way into the water, having the free use of all their limbs, and in places which they perfectly knew, could boldly cast their darts, and spur on their horses, well inured to that kind of service. All these circumstances serving to spread a terror among our men, who were wholly strangers to this way of fighting, they pushed not the enemy with the same vigour and spirit as was usual for them in combats upon dry ground.

XXIII. Cæsar observing this, ordered some galleys, a kind of shipping less common

with the barbarians, and more easily governed and put in motion, to advance a little from the transports towards the shore, in order to set upon the enemy in flank, and by means of their engines, slings, and arrows, drive them to some distance. This proved of considerable service to our men, for what with the surprise occasioned by the make of our galleys, the motion of the oars, and the playing of the engines, the enemy were forced to halt, and in a little time began to give back. But our men still demurring to leap into the sea, chiefly because of the depth of the water in those parts; the standard-bearer of the tenth legion, having first invoked the gods for success, cried out aloud: "Follow me, fellow-soldiers, unless you will betray the Roman eagle into the hands of the enemy; for my part, I am resolved to discharge my duty to Cæsar and the commonwealth." Upon this he jumped into the sea, and advanced with the eagle against the enemy: whereat, our men exhorting one another to prevent so signal a disgrace, all that were in the ship followed him, which being perceived by those in the nearest vessels, they also did the like, and boldly approached the enemy.

XXIV. The battle was obstinate on both sides; but our men, as being neither able to keep their ranks, nor get firm footing, nor follow their respective standards, because leaping promiscuously from their ships, every one joined the first ensign he met, were thereby thrown into great confusion. The enemy, on the other hand, being well acquainted with the shallows, when they saw our men advancing singly from the ships, spurred on their horses, and attacked them in that perplexity. In one place great numbers would gather round a handful of the Romans; others falling upon them in flank, galled them mightily with their darts, which Cæsar observing, ordered some small boats to be manned, and ply about with recruits. By this means the foremost ranks of our men having got firm footing, were followed by all the rest, when falling upon the enemy briskly, they were soon put to the rout. But as the cavalry were not yet arrived, we could not pursue or advance far into the island, which was the only thing wanting to render the victory complete.

XXV. The enemy being thus vanquished in battle, no sooner got together after their defeat, than they despatched ambassadors to

Cæsar to sue for peace, offering hostages, and an entire submission to his commands. Along with these ambassadors came Comius, the Atrebatian, whom Cæsar, as we have related above, had sent before him into Britain. The natives seized him as soon as he landed, and though he was charged with a commission from Cæsar, threw him into irons. But upon their late defeat, they thought proper to send him back, throwing the blame of what had happened upon the multitude, and begged of Cæsar to excuse a fault proceeding from ignorance. Cæsar, after some complaints of their behaviour, in that having of their own accord sent ambassadors to the continent to sue for peace, they had yet without any reason begun a war against him, told them at last he would forgive their fault, and ordered them to send a certain number of hostages. Part were sent immediately, and the rest, as living at some distance, they promised to deliver in a few days. Meantime they disbanded their troops, and the several chiefs came to Cæsar's camp, to manage their own concerns, and those of the states to which they belonged.

XXVI. A peace being thus concluded four days after Cæsar's arrival in Britain, the eighteen transports appointed to carry the cavalry, of whom we have spoken above, put to sea with a gentle gale. But when they had so near approached the coast as to be even within view of the camp, so violent a storm all on a sudden arose, that being unable to hold on their course, some were obliged to return to the port whence they set out, and others driven to the lower end of the island, westward, not without great danger; there they cast anchor, but the waves rising very high, so as to fill the ships with water, they were again in the night obliged to stand out to sea, and make for the continent of Gaul. That very night it happened to be full moon, when the tides upon the sea coast always rise highest, a thing at that time wholly unknown to the Romans. Thus at the one and the same time, the galleys which Cæsar made use of to transport his men, and which he had ordered to be drawn up on the strand, were filled with the tide, and the tempest fell furiously upon the transports that lay at anchor in the road: nor was it possible for our men to attempt any thing for their preservation. Many of the ships being dashed to pieces, and the rest having lost their anchors, tackle, and rigging, which rendered

them altogether unfit for sailing, a general consternation spread itself through the camp for there were no other ships to carry back the troops, nor any materials to repair those that had been disabled by the tempest. And as it had been all along Cæsar's design to winter in Gaul, he was wholly without corn to subsist the troops in those parts.

XXVII. All this being known to the British chiefs, who after the battle had repaired to Cæsar's camp, to perform the conditions of the treaty, they began to hold conferences among themselves; and as they plainly saw that the Romans were destitute both of cavalry, shipping, and corn, and easily judged, from the smallness of the camp, that the number of their troops was but inconsiderable; in which notion they were the more confirmed, because Cæsar having brought over the legions without baggage, had occasion to inclose but a small spot of ground; they thought this a convenient opportunity for taking up arms, and, by intercepting the Roman convoys, to protract the affair till winter; being confidently persuaded, that by defeating these troops, or cutting off their return, they should effectually put a stop to all future attempts upon Britain. Having therefore entered into a joint confederacy, they by degrees left the camp, and began to draw the islanders together: but Cæsar, though he was not yet apprized of their design, yet guessing in part at their intentions, by the disaster which had befallen his fleet, and the delays formed in relation to the hostages, determined to provide against all events. He therefore had corn daily brought in to his camp, and ordered the timber of the ships that had been most damaged to be made use of in repairing the rest, sending to Gaul for what other materials he wanted. As the soldiers were indefatigable in this service, his fleet was soon in a condition to sail, having lost only twelve ships.

XXVIII. During these transactions, the seventh legion being sent out to forage, according to custom, as part were employed in cutting down the corn, and part in carrying it to the camp, without suspicion of attack, news were brought to Cæsar, that a greater cloud of dust than ordinary was seen on that side where the legion was. Cæsar, suspecting how matters went, marched with the cohorts that were upon guard, ordering two others to succeed in their room, and all the soldiers in the

camp to arm and follow him as soon as possible. When he was advanced a little way from the camp, he saw his men overpowered by the enemy, and with great difficulty able to sustain the fight, being driven into a small compass, and exposed on every side to the darts of their adversaries. For as the harvest was gathered in every where else, and only one field left, the enemy, suspecting that our men would come thither to forage, had hid themselves during the night in the woods, and waiting till our men had quitted their arms, and dispersed themselves to fall a reaping, they suddenly attacked them, killed some, put the rest into disorder, and began to surround them with their horses and chariots.

XXIX. Their way of fighting with their chariots is this: first, they drive their chariots on all sides, and throw their darts, insomuch, that by the very terror of the horses, and noise of the wheels, they often break the ranks of the enemy. When they have forced their way into the midst of the cavalry, they quit their chariots, and fight on foot: meantime the drivers retire a little from the combat, and place themselves in such a manner as to favour the retreat of their countrymen, should they be overpowered by the enemy. Thus in action they perform the part both of nimble horsemen, and stable infantry; and by continual exercise and use have arrived at that expertness, that in the most steep and difficult places they can stop their horses upon a full stretch, turn them which way they please, run along the pole, rest on the harness, and throw themselves back into their chariots with incredible dexterity.

XXX. Our men being astonished and confounded with this new way of fighting, Cæsar came very timely to their relief; for upon his approach the enemy made a stand, and the Romans began to recover from their fear. This satisfied Cæsar for the present, who not thinking it a proper season to provoke the enemy, and bring on a general engagement, stood facing them for some time, and then led back the legions to the camp. The continual rains that followed for some days after, both kept the Romans within their intrenchments, and withheld the enemy from attacking us. Meantime the Britons despatched messengers into all parts, to make known to their countrymen the small number of the Roman troops, and the favourable opportunity they had of making

immense spoils, and freeing their country for ever from all future invasions, by storming the enemy's camp. Having by this means got together a great body of infantry and cavalry, they drew towards our intrenchments.

XXXI. Cæsar, though he foresaw that the enemy, if beaten, would in the same manner as before escape the danger by flight; yet having got about thirty horse, whom Comius, the Atrebatian had brought over with him from Gaul, he drew up the legions in order of battle before the camp; and falling upon the Britons, who were not able to sustain the shock of our men, soon put them to flight. The Romans pursuing them as long as their strength would permit, made a terrible slaughter, and setting fire to their houses and villages a great way round, returned to the camp.

XXXII. The same day ambassadors came from the enemy to Cæsar, to sue for peace. Cæsar doubled the number of hostages he had before imposed upon them, and ordered them to be sent over to him into Gaul, because the equinox coming on, and his ships being leaky, he thought it not prudent to put off his return till winter. A fair wind offering, he set sail a little after midnight, and arrived safe in Gaul. Two of his transports not being able to reach the same port with the rest, were driven into a haven a little lower in the country.

XXXIII. In these two vessels were about three hundred soldiers, who having landed, and being upon their march to the camp, the Morini, who had submitted to Cæsar upon his setting out for Britain, drawn by the hopes of plunder, surrounded them at first with only a few men, and ordered them to lay down their arms under pain of being put to the sword. But they, casting themselves into an orb, stood upon their defence, when all on a sudden six thousand more of the enemy appeared, roused by the noise of the combatants. Cæsar having notice of what passed, sent all his cavalry to the assistance of the Romans: meanwhile our men withstood all the attacks of the enemy, and bravely maintained the fight for upwards of six hours, having slain great numbers of the Morini, while on their side only a few were wounded; but no sooner did our cavalry appear, than the enemy, throwing down their arms, betook themselves to flight, and were almost all slain in the pursuit.

XXXIV. The day after, Cæsar sent T.

Labienuſ with the legions returned out of Britain, againſt the rebellious Morini, who being deprived, by the drought, of the benefit of their marſhes, which had ſerved them for ſhelter the year before, almoſt all fell into his power. Meantime, Q. Titurius, and L. Cotta, who had been ſent againſt the Menapians, having laid waſte their territories with fire and ſword, and plundered their habitations, return-

ed to Cæſar. Not being able to come up with the Menapians themſelves, who had retired into impenetrable foreſts. Cæſar quartered all his troops among the Belgians. Only two of the Britiſh ſtates ſent hoſtages into Gaul, the reſt neglecting to perform the conditions of the treaty. For theſe ſucceſſes a thankſ-giving of twenty days was decreed by the ſenate.