

CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

OF

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

BOOK III.

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BOOK III.

I. CÆSAR, upon his departure for Italy, sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the cavalry, against the Nantuates, Veragrians and Seduni, whose territories extended from the confines of the Allobrogians, the Lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, all the way to the top of the Alps. His design in this expedition was to open a free passage over those mountains to the Roman merchants, who had hitherto travelled them with great danger, and subject to many grievous exactions. Galba, whose orders also were to put the legion into winter quarters in those parts, if he saw it necessary, after some successful encounters, and making himself master of several forts, was addressed by ambassadors from all nations round. Having settled the terms of peace, and received hostages for their fidelity, he resolved to quarter two cohorts among the Nantuates, and himself, with the other cohorts, to winter in a town of the Veragrians, called Octodurus. This town, which is situated in the midst of a valley, upon a plain of no great extent, is bounded on all sides by very high mountains. As it was divided into two parts by a river, he left one part to the Gauls, and assigned the other to his legion for their winter-quarters, commanding it to be fortified with a ditch and rampart.

II. After many days spent here, and that orders had been given for the bringing in of corn to supply the camp, he was suddenly informed by his spies, that the Gauls had abandoned in the night that part of the city allotted to them, and that the impending

mountains were covered with great multitudes of the Veragrians and Seduni. Many reasons conspired to induce the Gauls to this sudden resolution of renewing the war, and falling upon our men. First, the small number of the Roman troops, who were therefore despised by the enemy, as not amounting in all to one legion; two entire cohorts having been detached, and even of those that remained with Galba, many being gone out in quest of provisions; and then their persuasion, that by reason of the inequality of the ground, where it would be easy for them to pour upon us from the top of the mountains, and overwhelm us with their darts, our men would not be able to stand the very first assault. Add to all this, their inward regret at seeing their children torn from them under the name of hostages, and that they firmly believed it to be the design of the Romans, in seizing the summits of the mountains, not only to open a free passage over the Alps, but to secure to themselves the perpetual possession of those parts, and annex them to the adjoining province.

III. Upon this intelligence, Galba, who had neither completed the fortifications of his camp, nor laid in sufficient stores of corn and other provisions, as little apprehending an insurrection of this kind, among a people that had submitted and given hostages, having speedily assembled a council of war, began to ask their advice in the present exigence. As the danger which threatened them was sudden and unexpected, and as they saw the mountains on every side covered with multi-

tudes of armed soldiers, insomuch that there was no room to hope, either for succours, or any convoys of provision, because the enemy were in possession of all the avenues to the camp; some believing the case to be altogether desperate, proposed to abandon the baggage, and attempt by a sally the recovery of their old quarters. But the greater number were for reserving this expedient to the last extremity, and in the meantime to wait the decision of fortune, and in the best manner they were able, defend the camp.

IV. After a short space, and even before there was sufficient time for the putting in execution what had been resolved on, the enemy, at a signal given, came rushing upon us from all parts, and began the assault by a shower of stones and darts. Our men at first made a brave and vigorous resistance, plying them with their javelins from the ramparts, whence not a single weapon was discharged in vain; and as any part of the camp appeared hard pressed for want of men to defend it, thither they ran, and made head against the assailants. But in this the Gauls had greatly the advantage, that when fatigued with the length of the fight, they found themselves under a necessity to retire, fresh men succeeded in their place, whereas on our side, by reason of the small number of troops, no resource of this kind was left; so that not only such as were wearied with fighting were yet obliged to continue in their posts, but we could not even permit the wounded to retire, or for a moment to abandon the charge.

V. The battle had now lasted upwards of six hours without intermission, insomuch, that the Romans not only found their strength greatly exhausted, but even began to be in want of weapons, wherewith to annoy the enemy. The Gauls, on the other hand, urged the combat with greater fury than ever, and meeting with but a faint resistance, fell to demolishing the rampart and filling up the ditch. All was giving way before them, when P. Sextius Baculus, a centurion of the first rank, the same, who, as we have related above, received so many wounds in the battle against the Nervians; as likewise C. Volusenus, a military tribune, one equally distinguished for his conduct and bravery, came to Galba, and represented: That the only refuge now left, was by a sudden sally, to put all upon the issue of a bold attack. Accordingly, Galba, calling

the centurions together, by them gave immediate notice to the soldiers to keep for some time only on the defensive, and having provided themselves with the weapons thrown at them by the enemy, and a little recovered their strength, upon a signal given, to sally out of the camp, and place all their hopes of safety in their valour. These orders were exactly followed: and the Romans rushing furiously upon the enemy from all parts, neither gave them time to comprehend the meaning of so unexpected an attack, nor to recover out of the confusion into which it had thrown them. Thus fortune changing sides, they every where surrounded and put to the sword the Gauls, who had so lately entertained hopes of mastering our camp. Of thirty thousand armed troops, which number, as appeared afterwards, were present in this assault, more than ten thousand perished in the field. The rest fled in great terror and confusion, and were even forced to abandon the summits of the mountains. The Romans seeing the enemy entirely dispersed, and obliged every where to throw down their arms, quitted the pursuit, and retired within their intrenchments.

VI. After this battle, Galba, unwilling a second time to expose himself to the inconstancy of fortune, and besides, considering that he had met with an opposition he little expected, when he first resolved to winter in these parts; above all, finding himself in great want of corn and forage, the next day set fire to the town, and began his march back into the province. As there was no enemy in the field to disturb or oppose him in his retreat, he brought the legion safe into the country of the Nantuates, and thence into the territories of the Allobrogians, where he put them into winter quarters.

VII. The insurrection being thus entirely quelled, Cæsar, for many reasons, believed that Gaul was now restored to a state of tranquillity. The Belgians had been overcome, the Germans expelled, and the Seduni, and other inhabitants of the Alps, forced to submit. He therefore, in the beginning of winter, ventured upon a progress into Illyricum, from a desire he had to visit those nations, and acquaint himself with the country, when all on a sudden a new war broke out in Gaul. The occasion of it was as follows: the seventh legion, commanded by young Crassus, was quartered among the Andes, a people bordering

upon the ocean. As there was great scarcity of corn in these parts, Crassus sent some officers of the cavalry and military tribunes to solicit a supply from the neighbouring states. Of this number were T. Terrasidius, sent to the Eusubians, M. Trebius Gallus, to the Curiosolitæ, and Q. Velanius, and T. Silius, to the Venetians.

VIII. This last state is by far the most powerful and considerable of all the nations inhabiting along the sea coast; and that not only on account of their vast shipping, wherewith they drive a mighty traffic to Britain, and their skill and experience in naval affairs, in which they greatly surpass the other maritime states; but because lying upon a large and open coast, against which the sea rages with great violence, and where the havens, being few in number, are all subject to their jurisdiction; they have most of the nations that trade in those seas tributaries to their state. Among them the revolt began, by detaining Silius and Velanius, as by this means they hoped to recover the hostages they had put into the hands of Crassus. The neighbouring states, moved by their authority and example, as the Gauls are in general very sudden and forward in their resolves, detained for the same reason Trebius and Terrasidius, and speedily despatching ambassadors from one to another, they, by their princes, entered into a confederacy of acting in all things with common consent, and alike exposing themselves to the same issue of fortune, earnestly soliciting at the same time the other provinces, rather to stand up in defence of that liberty they had received of their ancestors, than tamely submit to the ignominious yoke of the Romans. All the nations upon the sea coast coming readily into this alliance, they jointly sent ambassadors to Crassus, to acquaint him: "That if he expected to have his officers restored, he must first send them back their hostages."

IX. Cæsar having intelligence of these things from Crassus, and being then at a great distance from Gaul, ordered in the meantime, that a number of galleys should be built upon the Loire, a river which runs into the ocean; and that mariners, rowers, and pilots should be drawn together from the province. These orders being executed with great despatch, he himself, as soon as the season of the year permitted, came to the army. The Venetians, and other states in alliance with them, having no-

tice of his arrival, and reflecting at the same time upon the greatness of their crime, in detaining and loading with irons ambassadors, a name ever looked upon amongst all nations as sacred and inviolable, began to make preparations proportioned to the danger that threatened them, more especially to provide themselves with all kinds of warlike stores, and that with so much the greater alacrity and confidence, as the nature and situation of the country gave them good hopes of being able to defend themselves. They knew that the passes by land were everywhere cut asunder, by the many friths and arms of the ocean that run up in those parts; and that the approach by sea was not less difficult, on account of the small number of harbours and the little knowledge the Romans had of the coast. Neither did they imagine it possible for our army to continue long in that country, by reason of the great scarcity of corn; and should even all these expectations deceive them, they had still a mighty confidence in the strength and number of their shipping. The Romans, they were sensible, had but a very inconsiderable fleet; and were besides perfect strangers to the ports, islands, and shallows of the coast, where the chief weight of the war was like to fall. At the time they foresaw that our pilots, accustomed only to the navigation of the Mediterranean, a sea bounded and shut in on all sides by the continent, must needs find themselves greatly at a loss, when they came to enter the vast and open spaces of the wide Atlantic ocean. In consequence of these reflections, and the resolutions formed upon them, they set about fortifying their towns, and conveying all their corn into places of strength, ordering as many ships as could be got together to rendezvous in the Venetian ports; it appearing, that Cæsar intended to begin the war by attacking that state. They likewise brought over to their alliance the Osismians, Lexovians, Nannetes, Ambiani, Morini, Diablintes, and Menapians, and despatched ambassadors into Britain, which lies over against their coast, to solicit assistance from thence.

X. All these difficulties before mentioned attended the prosecution of this war: but Cæsar was urged by many considerations to undertake and carry it on with vigour: the insult offered to the commonwealth in detaining the Roman knights; a revolt and insurrection,

after submission, and hostages given ; the confederacy of so many states : above all his fear, lest by neglecting to oppose these first commotions, he should give encouragement to the other provinces of Gaul to follow the example. Reflecting, therefore, upon the genius and temper of the Gauls, fond of revolutions, and ever forward and ready to engage in new wars, and considering at the same time, that it was the natural bent and disposition of mankind to aspire after liberty, and abhor the yoke of servitude, he determined, before the infection should spread wider, to divide his army, and distribute it into the several provinces of Gaul.

XI. Pursuant to this design, T. Labienus, his lieutenant, was sent with the cavalry to Treves, whose territory extends along the banks of the Rhine. To him he gave it in charge, to take a progress to Rheims, and the other Belgian states, in order to retain them in obedience, as likewise to oppose the Germans, should they attempt by force the passage of the river ; a report then prevailing, that they had been invited over by the Belgians. P. Crassus, with twelve legionary cohorts, and a great body of horse, had orders to march into Aquitain, to prevent the arrival of any supplies from that quarter, and the junction of the forces of so many powerful nations. Q. Titurius Sabinus, at the head of three legions, entered the country of the Unellians, Curiosolitæ, and Lexovians, to find employment for the troops that had been drawn together in those parts. To young Brutus he gave the command of the fleet, and of all the vessels from Gaul, which he had ordered to be fitted out by the Santones, Pictones and other provinces that continued in obedience, strongly recommending to him at the same time, to use the greatest despatch, and sail with all expedition for the Venetian coast. He himself, at the head of the land army, set out upon his march thither.

XII. The situation of most of the towns in those parts is such, that standing upon the edges of promontories, or upon points of land that run out into the sea, there is no approaching them with an army at high water, which happens always twice in twelve hours. Neither is it possible for a fleet to draw near ; because, upon the recess of the tide, the ships would be in danger of being dashed against the shallows and banks of sand. Both these

reasons therefore concurred to secure their towns from assault ; and if at any time, by the greatness of the works carried on against them, and huge artificial mounts, that served to prevent the ingress of the sea, and were raised to a height nearly equalling their walls, they saw themselves reduced to an extremity, then, by bringing up their ships, of which they had always a great number in readiness, they easily found means to carry off their effects, and withdraw into the nearest towns, where they again defended themselves by the same advantages of situation as before. In this manner did they elude all Cæsar's attempts during a great part of the summer, and that with so much the more success, because our fleet was kept back by tempests, and found the navigation extremely dangerous in that vast and boundless ocean, where the tides are great, and the havens both few in number, and at a considerable distance one from another.

XIII. For the Venetian ships were built and fitted out in this manner : Their bottoms were somewhat flatter than ours, the better to adapt themselves to the shallows, and sustain without danger the regress of the tides. Their prows were very high and erect, as likewise their sterns, to bear the hugeness of the billows, and the violence of tempests. The body of the vessel was entirely of oak, to stand the shocks and assaults of that tempestuous ocean. The benches of the rowers were made of strong beams of about a foot in breadth, and fastened with iron nails an inch thick. Instead of cables, they secured their anchors with chains of iron ; and made use of skins, and a sort of thin pliant leather, by way of sails, either because they wanted canvas, and were ignorant of the art of making sail-cloth, or, which is more probable, because they imagined that canvas sails were not so proper to bear the violence of tempests, the rage and fury of the winds, and to govern ships of that bulk and burthen. Between our fleet, and vessels of such a make, the nature of the encounter was this ; that in agility, and a ready command of oars, we had indeed the advantage, but in other respects, regarding the situation of the coast, and the assaults of storms, all things ran very much in their favour ; for neither could our ships injure them with their beaks, so great was their strength and firmness ; nor could we easily

throw in our darts, because of their height above us; which also was the reason, that we found it extremely difficult to grapple the enemy, and bring them to close fight. Add to all this, that when the sea began to rage, and they were forced to submit to the pleasure of the winds, they could both weather the storm better, and more securely trust themselves among the shallows, as fearing nothing from the rocks and cliffs upon the recess of the tide. The Romans, on the other hand, had reason to be under a continual dread of these and such like accidents.

XIV. Cæsar having taken many of their towns, and finding that he only fatigued his army to no purpose, because he could neither prevent the retreat of the enemy, nor force their garrisons to a surrender, resolved to wait the arrival of his fleet; which being accordingly come up, was no sooner descried by the Venetians, than about two hundred and twenty of their best ships, well equipped for service, and furnished with all kind of weapons, stood out to sea, and drew up in order of battle, against us. Neither Brutus, who commanded the fleet, nor the centurions and military tribunes who had the charge of particular vessels, knew what course to take, or in what manner to conduct the fight: for they were no strangers to the strength and firmness of the Venetian shipping, which rendered them proof against our beaks; and when they had even raised turrets upon the decks, yet being still overtopped by the lofty sterns of the enemy, the Romans could not with any advantage throw in their darts; whereas those sent by the Gauls, coming from above, descended with great violence on our men. In this exigence, a particular kind of instrument, used by the mariners, proved of signal service, in giving a favourable issue to the combat. They had provided themselves with long poles, armed at one end with long scythes, not unlike those made use of in attacking the walls of towns. With these they laid hold of the enemy's tackle, and drawing off the galley by the extreme force of oars, cut asunder the ropes that fastened the sail-yards to the mast. These giving way, the sail-yards necessarily came down; insomuch, that as all the hopes and expectations of the Gauls depended entirely on their sails and rigging, by depriving them of this resource, we at the same time rendered their vessels wholly unserviceable. The rest

depended altogether upon the valour of the troops, in which the Romans had greatly the advantage; and the rather, because they fought within view of Cæsar and the whole army, so that not a single act of bravery could pass unobserved; for all the adjoining hills and eminences which afforded a near prospect of the sea, were covered with our men.

XV. The enemy's sail-yards being, as we have said, cut down, and many of their ships singly surrounded by two or three of ours at a time, the Romans used their utmost endeavours to board them: which the Venetians observing, and that we had already made ourselves masters of a great part of their fleet, as they could fall upon no expedient to prevent so great a misfortune, they began to think of providing for their safety by flight. Accordingly they tacked about, in order to have the advantage of the wind, when all of a sudden so dead a calm ensued, that not a vessel could stir out of its place: nor could any thing have fallen out more opportunely towards putting at once a final period to the war; for the Romans attacking their ships one after another, took them with ease, insomuch, that of all that vast number that came out against us, but a very few, under favour of the night, escaped to land, after a conflict that continued from nine in the morning till sun-set.

XVI. This battle put an end to the war with the Venetians, and all the nations upon the sea coast. For as the entire body of their youth, and all those also of more advanced age, who were capable of serving their country by their credit and counsels, were present in the action, and as they had likewise drawn together their whole naval strength: such as survived this defeat, having neither any place of refuge whereunto to retire, nor means left of defending their towns, surrendered themselves and their all to Cæsar's mercy. But he thought it necessary to proceed against them with the greater severity, that he might impress upon the mind of the Gauls for the future, a more inviolable regard to the sacred character of ambassadors. Having therefore caused all their senators to be put to death, he ordered the rest to be sold for slaves.

XVII. During these transactions against the Venetians, Q. Titurius Sabinus entered the territories of the Unellians, at the head of the troops put under his command by Cæsar. Viridovix was invested with the supreme au-

thority in these parts, and had been appointed general in chief by all the states concerned in the revolt; out of which he had drawn together a very numerous and powerful army. Nay, but a very few days before, the Auleri, Ebuovices, and Lexovians, having massacred their senate, because they refused to engage in the war, had shut their gates against the Romans, and joined themselves to Viridovix. Besides all this, he had very much strengthened his army by the great numbers that flocked to him from all parts of Gaul; men of desperate fortunes, or accustomed to live by robbery, whom the hopes of plunder, and love of war had drawn off from the daily labours of their calling and the cares of agriculture.

XVIII. Sabinus kept close within his camp, which was situated in a manner every way advantageous, while Viridovix, who had posted himself at the distance of about two miles, daily drew out his men, and offered him battle. This behaviour of the Roman general not only drew upon him the contempt of the enemy, but occasioned also some murmuring among his own troops, and filled the Gauls with so high a conceit of his fear, that they even adventured to come up to his very trenches. The reason of his acting in this manner was, that he thought it not justifiable in a lieutenant, in the absence of the commander in chief, to hazard a battle with so superior an army, unless upon terms of evident advantage.

XIX. Having confirmed them in this belief, that his reserve was the effect of fear, he made choice of a certain Gaul from among the auxiliaries, a man of address, and every way qualified for carrying on his design. Him he persuaded, by great rewards, and still greater promises, to go over to the enemy, instructing him at the same time in the part he was to act. This Gaul, coming to their camp as a deserter, laid before them the fear of the Romans, and the extremities to which Cæsar was reduced in the war against the Venetians; nor did he fail to insinuate, that there was great reason to believe Sabinus intended the next night privately to draw off his army, and march to Cæsar's assistance. No sooner was this heard by the Gauls, than they all cried out with one voice, that they ought not to lose so fair an occasion of success, but to go and attack the Roman camp. Many reasons concurred to fix them in this resolution. The reserve of Sabinus for some days past: the in-

telligence from the deserter, confirming their belief of his fear; the want of provisions, of which they had taken no great care to lay in a sufficient stock; the hopes conceived from the Venetian war; and, in fine, that readiness with which men are apt to believe what falls in with their expectations and wishes. Urged by these considerations, they would not suffer Viridovix and the rest of the general officers to dismiss the council before they had obtained their consent for the taking up of arms, and falling upon the Roman camp. The proposal being at last agreed to, they provided themselves with fascines and hurdles, to fill up the ditch, and joyfully began their march, as to a certain victory.

XX. The Roman camp stood upon an eminence, which rose with a gentle ascent, for the space of about a mile. Hither the Gauls advanced with so much haste, in order to come upon our troops unprepared, that by that time they were arrived, they had run themselves quite out of breath. Sabinus having encouraged his men, whom he saw eager to engage, gave the word of onset. As the enemy were very much encumbered with the loads of fascines they had brought to fill up the ditch, he ordered a sudden sally from the two several gates of the camp, and so well did it succeed, by reason of the advantage of the ground, the inexperience and weariness of the Gauls, the bravery of the Roman troops, and their ability acquired in former battles, that the enemy could not sustain the very first charge of our men, but immediately betook themselves to flight. The Romans, who were fresh and vigorous, pursuing them under all these disadvantages, put great numbers to the sword, and the rest being followed by the cavalry, very few escaped the slaughter. Thus at one and the same time, Sabinus had an account of the defeat of the Venetians by sea, and Cæsar of the victory obtained by Sabinus' at land. All the several states in those parts readily submitted to Titurius: for as the Gauls are very prompt and forward to undertake a war, so are they of a disposition that easily relents, and gives way to the strokes of adversity.

XXI. Much about the same time P. Crassus arrived in Aquitain, a country, which as we have before observed, for extent of territory, and number of inhabitants, is deservedly counted a third part of Gaul. This general understanding that he was to conduct a war

in those parts, where but a few years before L. Valerius Præconinus had been slain, and his army put to the rout, and whence L. Manilius, the proconsul, had been driven with the loss of his baggage, soon became sensible that he must act with more than ordinary circumspection and vigour. Having therefore made provision of corn, assembled his auxiliary troops and cavalry, and strengthened his army with a choice body of volunteers, drawn together by name from Toulouse, Carcaso, and Narbonne, which states make up that part of the Roman province that lies the nearest to Aquitain, he advanced with all his forces into the territories of the Sotiates. These, upon the first notice of his arrival, having levied a great army, and attacking him in his march with the whole body of their cavalry, in which their chief strength consisted, were nevertheless repulsed and pursued by our men. But all on a sudden their infantry appearing in a valley, where they had been designedly placed in ambush, fell furiously upon the Romans, disordered with the pursuit, and renewed the fight.

XXII. The battle was long and obstinate. For the Sotiates, proud of their former victories, imagined that the fate of all Aquitain depended singly on their bravery. The Romans, on the other hand, were ambitious of showing what they could achieve under a young leader, in the absence of their general, and unsupported by the rest of the legions. At length, however, the enemy, overpowered with wounds, betook themselves to flight, and a great slaughter ensuing, Crassus marched immediately and invested their capital, where meeting with a brave resistance, he was forced to make his approaches by towers and mantelets. The enemy sometimes sallying out, sometimes carrying on their mines to our very works, (in which kind of service the Aquitains are particularly skilful, as inhabiting a country that abounds in veins of copper,) when they saw that the diligence of the Romans enabled them to surmount all these difficulties, sent ambassadors to Crassus, and requested they might be admitted to a surrender: which being accordingly agreed to, they, in obedience to his desire, delivered up their arms.

XXIII. But while the Romans were wholly intent upon the execution of the treaty, Adiatomus, who commanded in chief, endeavoured to escape on the other side of the town, with a body of six hundred sworn friends, who,

in the language of the country, are called Suldurians. Their condition and manner of life is this: To live in a perfect community of goods with those to whom they have engaged themselves in friendship; if any misfortune befalls them, to share in it, or make away with themselves: nor is there a single instance of any one upon record, who, upon the death of him to whom he had vowed a friendship, refused to submit to the same fate. Adiatomus, as we have said, endeavouring to make his escape with his body of friends, and the alarm being given on that side of the works, the soldiers immediately ran to arms, when a furious combat ensued, in which he was at last repulsed, and driven back into the town. He obtained, however, from Crassus, the same conditions of surrender as had been granted to the rest of the inhabitants.

XXIV. Crassus having received their arms and hostages, led his troops into the territories of the Vocatians and Tarusatians. But now, the Gauls, roused by the unexpected progress of the Romans, who had in a few days after their arrival made themselves masters of a town strongly fortified both by art and nature, began to send ambassadors into all parts, to join in a mutual league, to ratify their engagements by an exchange of hostages, and to levy troops. Ambassadors were likewise despatched to all the states of hither Spain that bordered upon Aquitain, to solicit a supply of troops and leaders: upon whose arrival, they immediately took the field with great confidence, and a numerous and well appointed army. None were suffered to command but such as had served under Sertorius, and were therefore accounted men of consummate ability and experience in the art of war. These, according to the custom of the Romans, made it their study to choose a camp to advantage, to secure themselves by lines and intrenchments, and to intercept our convoys. Crassus, perceiving their design, as his own army was not strong enough to admit of sending out detachments, and as the Gauls could upon all occasions employ numerous parties, possess themselves of the passes, and at the same time have a sufficient number of troops to guard the camp, by which means he foresaw he must soon be reduced to great straits for want of provisions, while the enemy would be every day growing more powerful, he, for all these reasons, resolved not to delay coming to an

engagement. Having laid his design before a council of war, and finding them unanimous in their approbation of it, he appointed the next day for the engagement.

XXV. Early in the morning he drew all his forces out of the camp, and disposing them in two lines, with the auxiliary troops in the centre, stood expecting what resolution the enemy would take. But the Gauls, though they believed they might safely hazard a battle, on account of their numbers, their former renown in war, and the handful of men they were to oppose; yet thought it would be still better, by seizing the passes, and intercepting our convoys, to secure the victory without expense of blood: and should the want of provisions at length force the Romans to think of a retreat, they might then fall upon them, embarrassed in their march, encumbered with their baggage, and dejected by their misfortunes. This resolution being approved by all their leaders, they kept within their camp, though our men appeared before them in order of battle.

XXVI. Crassus, perceiving their design, and that this delay served rather to abate the courage of the enemy, and add fresh spirits to his own men, among whom a universal cry arose, that he ought no longer to put off the engagement, but march directly to their camp; having encouraged his troops, he resolved to give way to their present ardour, and accordingly led them to the assault. There some were employed in filling up the ditch, others in driving the enemy with their darts from the works; while the auxiliaries, in whom Crassus had no great confidence, yet that they might appear to have some share at least in the engagement, were appointed to carry stones and darts to them that fought, and to supply materials for raising the mount. At the same time the enemy fought with great constancy and resolution, and made no small havoc with their darts, which came upon us from above. During this warmth of opposition, the cavalry, having taken a compass round the camp, came and told Crassus that the intrenchments were not fortified with the same care in all parts, and that it would be easy to force an entrance by the postern gate.

XXVII. Crassus, having exhorted the officers of the cavalry to encourage their men by great rewards and promises, instructed

them in the part they were to act. They, in consequence of the orders they had received, drawing out four cohorts, which, having been left to guard the camp, were quite fresh and fit for action, and fetching with them a large compass, that they might not be seen from the enemy's camp; while the eyes and minds of all were intent upon the combat, fell suddenly upon that part of the intrenchments of which we have spoken above; and having forced their way through, were actually got within the camp before they were so much as seen by the enemy, or any apprehension entertained of what they were about. Upon this, a great uproar being heard on that side, our men redoubled their efforts, and, as always happens to troops animated with the hopes of victory, began to push the Gauls with greater fury than ever. The enemy, thus surrounded on all sides, and without hopes of retrieving their affairs, endeavoured to make their escape over the rampart, and save themselves by flight. But being pursued by the cavalry, who soon came up with them in these open and level plains; of fifty thousand men that had been drawn together out of Spain and Aquitain, scarce a fourth part escaped; nor did the horse return to the camp until very late in the evening, after they had quite tired themselves with the slaughter.

XXVIII. Upon the report of this defeat, the greatest part of Aquitain immediately submitted to Crassus, and of their own accord sent him hostages. Of this number were the Tarbelli, Bigerriones, Preciani, Vocates, Tarusates, Elusates, Garites, Ausci, Garumni, Siburzates, and Cocasates. Only a few nations, and those the most remote, relying on the season of the year, because the winter was at hand, neglected to take this step.

XXIX. Much about the same time Cæsar, though the summer was now almost spent, yet because all the rest of Gaul being subdued, the Morini and Menapians were still in arms, and had not sent ambassadors to treat about a peace, resolved to lead his army against them, hoping he should soon be able to put an end to that war. Their manner of opposing him was very different from that of the other Gauls. For, understanding that the most powerful nations, when it came to a battle, had always been overthrown and put to rout; and inhabiting themselves in a

country that abounded in woods and marshes, they retired thither with all their effects. Cæsar coming to the entrance of the wood, began to intrench himself: and although no enemy in the meantime appeared, yet no sooner had our men dispersed themselves in order to set about fortifying the camp, than on a sudden they came pouring upon us from all parts of the wood, and charged with great briskness. The Romans immediately flew to their arms, and drove them back with considerable slaughter; but adventuring a little too far into the wood lost some men.

XXX. Cæsar spent the remaining days in cutting down the wood; and to screen his men from any sudden and unexpected attack, ordered the trees that had been felled

to be placed on each side the army, that they might serve as a barricade against the attempts of the enemy. Having with incredible despatch advanced a great way into the wood in a few days, insomuch that all their cattle and baggage fell into our hands, they themselves retired into the thicker and more covered spaces of the forest. The season growing bad, we were forced to intermit the work; and the rains soon became so violent and continual, that the soldiers could no longer endure to lie in their tents. Wherefore Cæsar, having laid waste their lands, and set fire to their towns and houses, led back his army, and disposed it into winter quarters among the Aulerici, Lexovians, and other states, whom he had last subdued.