

CÆSAR'S COMMENTARIES

OF

HIS WARS IN GAUL.

BOOK I.

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BOOK I.

THE whole country of Gaul is divided into three parts: of which the Belgians inhabit one; the Aquitains another; and a people called in their own language Celts, in ours Gauls, the third. These all differ from each other in their language, customs, and laws. The Gauls are divided from the Aquitains by the river Garonne, and by the Marne and the Seine from the Belgians. Of all these nations the Belgians are the most warlike; as being farthest removed from the culture and refinements of the province, and but little resorted to by merchants, who furnish the means of luxury and voluptuousness. They are also situated next to the Germans, who inhabit beyond the Rhine, with whom they are continually engaged in war. For this reason likewise the Helvetians are distinguished by their bravery beyond the rest of the Gauls; because they are almost constantly at war with the Germans, either for the defence of their own territories, or acting themselves as the aggressors. One of these divisions, that which we have said was possessed by the Gauls, begins at the river Rhine, and is bounded by the Garonne, the ocean, and the territories of the Belgians. It touches also, towards the Helvetians and Sequani, upon the river Rhine, extending itself northward. The country of the Belgians, commencing from the remotest confines of Gaul, stretches as far as the lower Rhine, running all the way between the north and east. Aquitain extends from the Garonne to the Pyrenean mountains, and that part of the ocean which borders upon Spain. Its situation is north-west.

II. Orgetorix was by far the richest and most illustrious of the Helvetians. This nobleman, in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, prompted by an aspiring ambition, formed a confederacy of the principal men of the state; and persuaded the people to quit their country in a body, representing, "That as they surpassed all the nations around them in valour, it would be easy for them to gain the entire sovereignty of Gaul." He the sooner brought them into this design, because the Helvetians, by the nature of their situation, are every where confined within very narrow territories: on one side by the Rhine, a broad and deep river, which separates their country from that of the Germans; on the other by Mount Jura, a high ridge of hills, which runs between them and the Sequani; lastly, by the Lake Lemanus, and the river Rhone, which is the boundary on the side of the Roman province. By this means it happened, that they could not so easily enlarge their territories, or make conquests on the neighbouring states; which, to men of a warlike spirit, and fond of fighting, was abundant cause of discontent: for being a numerous people, and of great fame for their bravery, they thought themselves much too strained in a country, which was but two hundred and forty miles in length, and about one hundred and eighty in breadth.

III. Urged by these considerations, and still more by the authority and persuasions of Orgetorix, they resolved to provide every thing necessary for an expedition; to buy up a great number of waggons and carriage-horses;

to form large magazines of corn, that they might have sufficient to supply them in their march; to establish peace and amity with the neighbouring states. They imagined two years would be sufficient for these preparations, and obliged themselves by a law to begin their march on the third. The whole management of this design was committed to Orgetorix, who undertook an embassy to the neighbouring states. On this occasion he persuaded Casticus, the son of Catamantales, of the nation of the Sequani, whose father had for many years enjoyed the sovereignty over that people, and been styled friend and ally by the senate of Rome, to possess himself of the supreme authority in his own country, which his father had held before him. He likewise persuaded Dumnorix the Æduan, the brother of Divitiacus, who was at that time the leading man in his own state, and greatly beloved by the people, to attempt the same among the Æduans: and the more to secure him to his interest, gave him his daughter in marriage. He told them, "That they might with the greatest facility accomplish their designs; as he was himself assured of attaining the supreme authority in his own state, which was without dispute the most powerful and considerable of all Gaul; and would then employ his whole interest and forces, to establish them in their respective sovereignties." Moved by these considerations, they reciprocally bound themselves by a solemn oath; not doubting, when they had once attained the chief sway in their several states, with the united forces of three such powerful and mighty nations, to render themselves masters of all Gaul. The Helvetians having notice of this design, obliged Orgetorix, according to the custom of their country, to answer to the charge brought against him in chains: and had he been found guilty, the law condemned him to be burnt alive. On the day appointed for his trial, he assembled all his slaves and domestics, amounting to ten thousand men; and all his clients and debtors, of which the number was very great: by their means he rescued himself out of the hands of his judges. While the people, provoked at this contempt of the laws, were preparing to support their authority by force, and the magistrates had assembled a great number of men for that purpose, Orgetorix

died: nor are the Helvetians without suspicion of his having made away with himself.

IV. After his death, the Helvetians still continued to prosecute, with the same diligence, the design they had formed of quitting their country. When they had completed their preparations, they set fire to all their towns, to the number of twelve; to their boroughs and villages, which amounted to four hundred; and to their other private buildings. They likewise burnt all their corn, except what they had resolved to carry along with them; that, having no hope of returning to their own country, they might be the more disposed to confront all dangers. Each man had orders to carry out with him provisions for three months. The Rauraci, Tulingians, and Latobrigians, neighbouring nations, being persuaded to follow the same counsel, likewise set fire to their towns and villages, and joined with them in the expedition. The Boians too, who had formerly inhabited beyond the Rhine, and passing over into Noricum, had settled in that country, and possessed themselves of Noreia, its capital city, were associated into the design.

V. There were only two ways by which they could march out of their own country. One through the territories of the Sequani, between Mount Jura and the Rhone, narrow and difficult, insomuch that in some places a single file of waggons could hardly pass. The impending mountain was besides very high and steep, so that a handful of men was sufficient to stop them. The other lay through our province, far easier and readier; because the Rhone, which flows between the confines of the Helvetians and Allobrogians, a people lately subjected to the Romans, was in some places fordable; and Geneva, a frontier town of the Allobrogians, adjoining to the territories of the Helvetians, had a bridge belonging to this last people. They therefore doubted not, either of persuading the Allobrogians, who as yet seemed to bear no great affection to the people of Rome, or at least of obliging them by force, to grant them a passage through their territories. Every thing being now ready for the expedition, they appointed a day for their general rendezvous on the banks of the Rhone. The day fixed on was the twenty-eighth of March, in the consulship of L. Piso and A. Gabinius.

VI. Cæsar having notice of these proceedings, and that it was the design of the Helvetians to attempt a passage through the province, hastened his departure from Rome ; and posting by great journeys into farther Gaul, came to Geneva. He began with breaking down the bridge over the Rhone ; and as there was at that time but one Roman legion in Transalpine Gaul, he ordered great levies to be made throughout the whole province. The Helvetians being informed of his arrival, deputed several noblemen of the first rank, with Numenius and Verodoctius at their head, to wait upon him in the name of the state, and represent, "That they meant not to offer the least injury to the Roman province ; that necessity alone had determined them to the design of passing through it, because they had no other way by which to direct their march ; that they therefore entreated they might have his permission for that purpose." But Cæsar, bearing in mind that L. Cassius the consul had been slain, and his army routed, and made to pass under the yoke, by the Helvetians, did not think proper to grant their request. Neither could he persuade himself, that men so ill affected to the people of Rome, if permitted to pass through the province, would abstain from acts of hostility and violence. However, that he might gain time, till the troops he had ordered to be raised could assemble, he told the ambassadors he would consider of their demand ; and that if they returned by the nineteenth of April they should have his final answer. Meanwhile, with the legion he then had, and the soldiers that came in to him from all parts of the province, he ran a wall sixteen feet high, and nineteen miles in length, with a ditch, from the lake Lemanus, into which the Rhone discharges itself, to mount Jura, which divides the territories of the Sequani from the Helvetians. This work finished, he raised redoubts from space to space, and manned them with troops, that if the enemy should attempt to force a passage, he might be in a condition to hinder them. When the day appointed came, and the ambassadors returned for an answer, he told them that he could not, consistent with the usage and behaviour of the people of Rome on the like occasions, grant any troops a passage through the province ; and should they attempt it by

force, he let them see he was prepared to oppose them.

VII. The Helvetians, driven from this hope, endeavoured to force the passage of the river ; some with boats coupled together, or floats, which they had prepared in great numbers : others by the fords of the Rhone, where was the least depth of water ; sometimes by day, but oftener in the night ; but being repulsed by the strength of the works, the concourse of the troops, and the discharge of darts, they at last abandoned the attempt. There was still one way left, through the territories of the Sequani, by which, however, without the consent of the natives, they could not march, because of the narrowness of the pass. As they were not able to prevail by their own application, they sent ambassadors to Dumnorix the Æduan, that through his intercession they might obtain this favour of the Sequani. Dumnorix by his popularity and generosity had great influence with the Sequani, and was also well affected to the Helvetians, because from among them he had married the daughter of Orgetorix. Besides, urged by ambitious views, he was framing to himself schemes of power, and wanted to have as many states as possible bound to him by offices of kindness. He therefore charged himself with the negotiation, obtained for the Helvetians the liberty of passing through the territories of the Sequani, and engaged the two nations mutually to give hostages : the Sequani, not to molest the Helvetians in their march ; and the Helvetians, to pass without offering any insult or injury to the country.

VIII. Cæsar soon had intelligence of their march, and that they now designed to pass through the country of the Sequani and Æduans into the territories of the Santones, which border upon those of the Tolosians, a state that makes part of the Roman province. Should this happen, he foresaw many inconveniences likely to arise, from the neighbourhood of a warlike and disaffected people, in an open and plentiful country. For these reasons he gave the command of the new works he had raised to T. Labienus his lieutenant, and he himself hastened by great journeys into Italy. There he raised two legions, and drew three more, that were cantoned round Aquileia, out of their winter-quar-

ters; and with these five legions, took the nearest way over the Alps into farther Gaul. The Centrones, Graioceli, and Caturigians, seizing the higher ground, endeavoured to oppose his march; but having repulsed them in several encounters, he, in seven days after setting out from Ocelum, a city in the extreme confines of the nearer province, arrived among the Vocontians, whose territories lie within the farther province. Thence he led his army into the country of the Allobrogi; and crossing their territories, entered upon the lands of the Segusians. These are the first on the other side the Rhone, beyond the boundaries of the Roman province.

IX. The Helvetians had by this time marched their forces through the narrow pass of Mount Jura, and the territories of the Sequani; and were come into the country of the Æduans, plundering their lands. The Æduans, unable to defend themselves and possessions from the violence of their enemies, sent ambassadors to Cæsar to request aid. They told him, "That such at all times had been their merit with the people of Rome, that they might challenge greater regard, than to have their lands laid waste, their children led into captivity, and their towns assaulted and taken, almost in the very sight of a Roman army." At the same time also the Ambarri, friends and allies of the Æduans, sent to inform him, "That compelled to abandon the open country, they could hardly defend their towns from the rage of the enemy." The Allobrogi likewise, who had dwellings and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled to him for protection, and assured him, "That there was nothing left them but a naked and desolate country." Whereupon Cæsar, moved by these complaints and remonstrances, resolved not to wait till the fortunes of his allies should be consumed, and the Helvetians arrive in the territories of the Santones.

X. The river Arar flows into the Rhone, through the confines of the Æduans and Sequani, with a current incredibly smooth and gentle, insomuch that it is impossible to distinguish by the eye, which way its waters glide. The Helvetians were at this time employed in passing it on floats and a bridge of boats. When Cæsar was informed, by his spies, that three parts of their forces were got over the river, and that the fourth still remained on this side, he left the camp about midnight with

three legions, and came up with the party of the enemy that had not yet passed. As he found them unprepared, and encumbered with their baggage, he attacked them immediately, and killed a great number on the spot. The rest fled and sheltered themselves in the nearest woods. This was called the Tigurine Canton, being one of the four into which the whole body of the Helvetians are divided. This very canton, in the memory of our fathers, marching out of their own territories, had vanquished and killed the Consul L. Cassius, and obliged his army to pass under the yoke. Thus, whether by chance or the direction of the immortal gods, that part of the Helvetian state which had brought so signal a calamity upon the Roman people, were the first to feel the weight of their resentment. In this Cæsar avenged not only the public, but likewise his own domestic injuries: because in the same battle with Cassius, was slain also L. Piso, his lieutenant, the grandfather of L. Piso, Cæsar's father-in-law.

XI. After this battle, that he might come up with the remaining forces of the Helvetians, he caused a bridge to be made across the Arar, and carried over his army. The Helvetians, dismayed at his sudden approach, as he had spent only one day in passing the river, which they had with the utmost difficulty accomplished in twenty, sent an embassy to him, at the head of which was Divico, who had been general of the Helvetians in the war against Cassius. He addressed Cæsar to this effect: "That if the people of Rome were disposed to conclude a peace with the Helvetians, they would go and settle in whatever country Cæsar should think fit to assign them; but if they persisted in the design of making war, he would do well to call to mind the ancient disgrace of the Roman people, and the valour of the Helvetic nation: that in having surprised one of the cantons, while the others, who had passed the river, could not return to succour it, there was no reason to be much elated on the advantage, nor to despise his enemies: that the Helvetians had learned of their ancestors, to depend more on courage than on cunning and ambushes; and it therefore imported him to beware, not to render the place where they were then posted, famous and memorable with posterity, by a new defeat of the Roman people, and the destruction of their army."

XII. To this Cæsar replied: "That he therefore the less doubted of the issue, as he well knew all the circumstances of the affair to which the Helvetians referred; and resented them the more strongly, as they had happened undeservedly to the Roman people; that had they been conscious of any injury on their side, it would have been easy for them to have kept upon their guard; but herein were they deceived, that neither did they know of any thing which might give them cause of fear, nor could they apprehend they had any thing to fear, without cause: that supposing him inclined to overlook old injuries, could they expect he would also forget their late insults, in attempting, against his will, to force a passage through the province, and laying waste the territories of the Æduans, Ambarri, and Allobrogians? That their boasting so insolently of their victory, and wondering that vengeance had been deferred so long, were a new set of provocations. But they ought to remember, that the immortal gods were sometimes wont to grant long impunity, and a great run of prosperity to men, whom they pursued with the punishment of their crimes, that by the sad reverse of their condition, vengeance might fall the heavier. Though these were just grounds of resentment, yet, if they would satisfy the Æduans and their allies for the ravages committed in their country, as likewise the Allobrogians, and give hostages for the performance of their promises, he was ready to conclude a peace with them." Divico replied, "That such were the Institutions of the Helvetians, derived from their ancestors, that they had been accustomed to receive, not to give hostages; and that nobody knew it better than the Romans." Having returned this answer, he departed.

XIII. The next day they decamped. Cæsar did the same; and ordered all the cavalry, whom, to the number of four thousand, he had raised in the province, and drawn together from the Æduans and their allies, to go before, and observe the enemy's march. But pressing too close upon their rear, they were obliged to engage in a disadvantageous place, and lost a few men. The Helvetians, encouraged by this success, as having, with no more than five hundred horse, repulsed so great a multitude, began to face us more boldly, and sometimes to sally from their rear, and attack our van. Cæsar kept back his men from fight-

ing; thinking it sufficient for the present, to straiten the enemy's forages, and prevent their ravaging and plundering the country. In this manner the armies marched for fifteen days together; insomuch that between our van, and the rear of the Helvetians, the distance did not exceed five or six miles.

XIV. In the meantime Cæsar daily pressed the Æduans for the corn which they had promised in the name of the public. For, by reason of the coldness of the climate, (Gaul, as we have said, lying considerably to the north,) he was so far from finding the corn ripe in the fields, that there was not even sufficient forage for the horses. Neither could he make use of those supplies which came to him by the way of the Arar, because the Helvetians had turned off from the river, and he was determined not to leave them. The Æduans put him off from day to day with fair speeches; sometimes pretending that it was bought up, and ready to be sent; sometimes, that it was actually on the way. But when he saw no end of these delays, and that the day approached for delivering out corn to the army, calling together their chiefs, of whom he had a great number in his camp; among the rest Divitiacus, and Liscus their supreme magistrate, who is styled Vergobret in the language of the country, and created yearly, with a power of life and death; he severely inveighed against them: "That at a time when corn was neither to be procured for money, nor had out of the fields, in so urgent a conjuncture, and while the enemy was so near, they had not taken care to supply him:" adding, "that as he had engaged in that war chiefly at their request, he had the greatest reason to complain of their abandoning him."

XV. Upon this, Liscus, moved by Cæsar's speech, thought proper to declare what he had hitherto concealed: "That there were some among them whose authority with the people was very great; and who, though but private men, had yet more power than the magistrates themselves. That these, by artful and seditious speeches, alarmed the multitude, and persuaded them to keep back their corn; insinuating, that if their own state could not obtain the sovereignty of Gaul, it would be better for them to obey the Helvetians, Gauls like themselves, than the Romans; there not being the least reason to question, but these last, after having subdued the Helvetians, would, along with

the rest of Gaul, deprive the Æduans also of their liberty. That the very same men gave intelligence to the enemy of all the designs of the Romans, and whatsoever was transacted in their camp; his authority not being sufficient to restrain them. Nay, that though compelled by necessity, he had now made a discovery of the whole matter to Cæsar, he was not ignorant of the danger to which he exposed himself by such a conduct; and had, for that reason, chosen to be silent, as long as he thought it consistent with the safety of the state." Cæsar perceived that Dumnorix, the brother of Divitiacus, was pointed at by this speech. But as he was unwilling that these matters should be debated in the presence of so many witnesses, he speedily dismissed the council, retaining only Liscus. He then questioned him apart on what he had just said, and was answered with greater courage and freedom. He put the same questions to others also in private, who all confirmed the truth of what had been told him: That Dumnorix was a man of an enterprising spirit, fond of revolutions, and in great favour with the people, because of his liberality: that he had for many years farmed the customs, and other public revenues of the Æduans, at a very low price; no one daring to bid against him: that by this means he had considerably increased his estate, and was enabled to extend his bounty to all about him; that he constantly kept a great number of horsemen in pay, who attended him wherever he went; that his interest was not confined merely to his own country, but extended likewise to the neighbouring states: that the better to support this interest, he had married his mother to a man of principal rank and authority among the Biturians, had himself taken a wife from among the Helvetians, and matched his sister and the rest of his kindred into other the most powerful states; that he favoured and wished well to the Helvetians, on the score of that alliance, and personally hated Cæsar and the Romans, because by their arrival his power had been diminished, and Divitiacus his brother restored to his former credit and authority: that should the Romans be overthrown he was in great hopes of obtaining the sovereignty, by means of the Helvetians. On the contrary, should they prevail, he must not only give up these hopes, but even all expectation of retaining the influence he had already acquired." Cæsar

likewise found, upon inquiry, that in the last engagement of the horse, Dumnorix, who commanded the Æduan cavalry, was the first that fled, and by that flight struck a terror into the rest of the troops.

XVI. These things appearing, and other undoubted circumstances concurring to heighten his suspicion; that he had procured for the Helvetians a passage through the territories of the Sequani; that he had effected an exchange of hostages between the two nations; that he had done all this not only without permission from him, or his own state, but even without their knowledge and participation; that he was accused by the chief magistrate of the Æduans: they seemed altogether a sufficient ground to Cæsar, why he should either himself take cognizance of the matter, or order the state to proceed against him. One thing, however, still kept him in suspense; the consideration of his brother Divitiacus, a man of singular probity, justice, and moderation; a faithful ally of the Roman people, and on the foot of friendship with Cæsar. That he might not therefore give offence to one for whom he had so great a value; before he took any further step in the affair, he sent for Divitiacus; and having removed the usual interpreters, addressed him by C. Valerius Procillus, a prince of the province of Gaul, his intimate friend, in whom he reposed the greatest confidence. He put him in mind of what had been said of Dumnorix in his own presence in the council of the Gauls, and repeated the fresh complaints made to himself against him in private. He urged, and even requested, that without offence to him, he might either proceed against him himself, or order the state to take the matter under consideration. Divitiacus, embracing Cæsar with many tears, begged him not to take any severe resolution against his brother. "He was sensible," he told him, "of the truth of all that was alleged, and had himself more reason to be dissatisfied than any man: that at a time when his authority was great, both at home and in the other provinces of Gaul, and his brother but little considered on account of his youth, he had used his interest to bring him into credit: that though Dumnorix had made use of that power acquired by his means to diminish his favour with the people, and even to urge on his ruin, he nevertheless still found himself swayed by his affection, and a regard for the esteem of the public: that

should his brother meet with any rigorous treatment from Cæsar, while he himself possessed so large a share of his favour, all men would believe it done with his consent, and the minds of the Gauls be for ever alienated from him." Cæsar observing his concern, took him by the hand, comforted him, desired him to make an end of speaking, assured him, that such was his regard for him, he would for his sake overlook not only his own injuries, but even those of the republic. He then sent for Dumnorix, called him into his brother's presence, declared the subjects of complaint he had against him, mentioned what he himself knew, what was laid to his charge by the state, and admonished him for the future to avoid all cause of suspicion; adding, that he would forgive what was past, for the sake of his brother Divitiacus. He appointed, however, some to have an eye over him, that he might be informed of his behaviour, and of those he conversed with.

XVII. The same day, having learned, by his scouts, that the enemy had posted themselves under a hill about eight miles from his camp, he sent out a party to view the ground, and examine the ascent of the hill. These reporting it to be extremely easy, he detached T. Labienus, his lieutenant, about midnight, with two legions, and the same guides who had examined the ground the day before; and having acquainted him with his design, ordered him to get possession of the top of the hill. He himself set out three hours after, with the rest of the army, by the same route the Helvetians had taken, and sent all the cavalry before. P. Considius, an officer of reputation, who had served in the army of L. Sylla, and afterwards that of M. Crassus, advanced with a small party, to get intelligence.

XVIII. At day-break when Labienus had got possession of the top of the hill, and Cæsar was within a mile and a half of the enemy's camp; while they in the meantime, as he afterwards learnt from his prisoners, knew nothing either of his, or Labienus's approach, Considius came galloping back, and assured Cæsar, that the summit of the mountain was possessed by the enemy, and that he had seen the Gallic arms and ensigns there. Cæsar retired to a neighbouring hill, and drew up his men in order of battle. Labienus, whose instructions were, not to engage the enemy till he saw the rest of the army approaching their

camp, that the attack might be made on all sides at the same time, having gained the top of the hill, waited the arrival of our men, without stirring from his post. At length, when the day was far spent, Cæsar understood by his spies, that Labienus was in possession of the mountain, that the enemy had decamped, and that Considius, blinded by fear, had reported what he never saw. The rest of that day he followed the enemy at the usual distance, and encamped within three miles of them.

XIX. The day after, as the time drew near for delivering out corn to the army, and as he was not above eighteen miles from Bibracte, the capital of the Æduans, where he hoped to find sufficient supplies for the subsistence of his troops, he quitted the pursuit of the Helvetians, and directed his march thither. The enemy, being informed of this motion by some deserters, who had belonged to the troop of L. Emilius, an officer of horse among the Gauls, and either ascribing it to fear in the Romans, the rather, because they had not attacked them the day before, though possessed of the higher ground; or flattering themselves with the hopes of intercepting their provisions, all on a sudden changed their resolution, and instead of continuing their former march, began to pursue and harass our rear. Cæsar observing this, retired to a neighbouring hill, and sent his cavalry to sustain the charge of the enemy. In the meantime he drew up his four veteran legions in three lines towards the middle of the hill; in such a manner, that the two legions newly raised in Cisalpine Gaul, and all the auxiliaries, were posted above them; and the whole mountain was covered with his troops. He ordered all the baggage to be brought into one place, and committed it to the charge of those who stood on the upper part of the hill. The Helvetians following with all their forces, drew their carriages likewise into one place; and having repulsed our cavalry, and formed themselves into a phalanx, advanced in close order to attack our van.

XX. Cæsar having first sent away his own horse, and afterwards those of all his officers, that by making the danger equal, no hope might remain but in victory, encouraged his men, and began the charge. The Romans, who fought with the advantage of the higher ground, pouring their darts upon the enemy from above, easily broke their phalanx; and then fell upon them sword in hand. What

greatly encumbered the Gauls in this fight, was, that their targets being many of them pierced and pinned together by the javelins of the Romans, they could neither draw out the javelins, because forked at the extremity, nor act with agility in the battle, because deprived in a manner of the use of their left arms: so that many, after long tossing their targets to and fro to no purpose to disengage them, chose rather to throw them away, and expose themselves with out defence to the weapons of their enemies. At length, however, being overpowered with wounds, they began to give ground; and observing a mountain at about a mile's distance, gradually retreated thither. Having gained the mountain, and our men pursuing them, the Boians and Tulingians, who, to the number of fifteen thousand, covered their retreat, and served as a guard to their rear, falling upon the Romans in flank as they advanced, began to surround them. This being perceived by the Helvetians, who had retired to the mountain, they again returned upon us, and renewed the fight. The Romans facing about, charged the enemy in three bodies; their first and second line making head against those who had been forced to retreat, and their third sustaining the assault of the Boians and Tulingians. The battle was bloody, and continued for a long time doubtful; but the enemy being at last obliged to give way, one part withdrew towards the hill whither they had before retreated, and the rest sheltered themselves behind the carriages. During this whole action, though it lasted from one o'clock in the afternoon till evening, no man saw the back of an enemy. The fight was renewed with great obstinacy at the carriages, and continued till the night was far spent; for the Gauls making use of their carts by way of a rampart, darted their javelins upon us from above; and some thrusting their lances through the wheels of the waggons, wounded our men. After a long dispute, we at last got possession of their baggage and camp. A son and daughter of Orgetorix were found among the prisoners. Only a hundred and twenty thousand of the enemy survived this defeat; who, retreating all that night, and continuing their march without intermission, arrived on the fourth day in the territories of the Lingones. The Romans meanwhile made no attempt to pursue them; the care of their wounded, and

of burying their dead, obliging them to continue upon the spot three days. Cæsar sent letters and messengers to the Lingones, not to furnish them with corn or other necessaries, if they would avoid drawing upon themselves the same treatment with the fugitives; and after a repose of three days, set forward to pursue them with all his forces.

XXI. The Helvetians, compelled by an extreme want of all things, sent ambassadors to him to treat about a surrender. These meeting him on the way, and throwing themselves at his feet, in suppliant terms, and with many tears, begged for peace. Cæsar gave them no express answer at that time; only ordered the Helvetians to wait for him in the place where they then were, which they did accordingly. Upon his arrival, he demanded hostages, their arms, and the slaves who had deserted to their camp. As the execution of all this took up some time, about four thousand men of the canton called Urbigenus, either fearing punishment, should they deliver up their arms, or induced by the hopes of escaping, because in so great a multitude they fancied their flight might be concealed, nay, perhaps remain altogether unknown, stole out of the camp in the beginning of the night, and took the route of Germany and the Rhine. Cæsar being informed of it, despatched orders to those through whose territories they must pass, to stop and send them back wherever they should be found, if they meant to acquit themselves of favouring their escape. He was obeyed, and the fugitive Urbigenians were treated as enemies. All the rest, upon delivering the hostages that were required of them, their arms, and the deserters, were admitted to a surrender. The Helvetians, Tulingians and Latobrigians had orders to return to their own country, and rebuild the towns and villages they had burnt. And because having lost all their corn, they were utterly without the means of subsisting themselves, he gave it in charge to the Allobrogians to supply them. Cæsar's design in this was, that the lands deserted by the Helvetians might not be left vacant, lest the Germans beyond the Rhine, drawn by the goodness of the soil, should be tempted to seize them, and thereby become neighbours to the Allobrogians, and the Roman province in Gaul. The Boians, at the request of the Æduans, who esteemed them highly on account of their

valour, were permitted to settle in their territories; where they assigned them lands, and by degrees admitted them to all the rights and privileges of natives. A roll was found in the Helvetian camp, written in Greek characters, and brought to Cæsar. It contained a list of all who had set out upon this expedition capable of bearing arms; likewise of the children, women, and old men. By this it appeared, that the number of the Helvetians was two hundred and sixty-three thousand; of the Tulingians, thirty-six thousand; of the Latobrigians, fourteen thousand; of the Rauraci, twenty-three thousand; of the Boians, thirty-two thousand; in all three hundred and sixty-eight thousand, of which ninety-two thousand were fit to bear arms. A review being made, by Cæsar's command, of those that returned to their own country, the number was found to be a hundred and ten thousand.

XXII. The war with the Helvetians being ended, ambassadors from all parts of Gaul, men of principal consideration in their several states, waited upon Cæsar to congratulate his success. They told him: "That though they were sensible the people of Rome, in the war against the Helvetians, meant chiefly to avenge the injuries formerly received from that nation, yet had the event of it been highly advantageous to all Gaul; because in a time of full prosperity, the Helvetians had left their territories with design to make war upon the other states; that having brought them under subjection, they might choose themselves a habitation at pleasure, and render all the rest of the country tributary." They requested, "That they might have his permission to hold, by a day prefixed, a general assembly of all the provinces of Gaul; there being some things they wanted to discuss and propose to him, which concerned the whole nation in common." Leave being granted accordingly, they fixed the day for the assembly, and bound themselves by an oath, not to discover their deliberations to any, unless named for that purpose by general consent.

XXIII. Upon the rising of the council, the same chiefs of the states as before, returned to Cæsar, and begged to be admitted to confer with him, in private, of matters that regarded their own and the common safety. Their desire being granted, they all threw themselves

at his feet, and with tears represented: "That it was of no less importance to them to have their present deliberations kept secret, than to succeed in the request they were going to make; because, should any discovery happen, they were in danger of being exposed to the utmost cruelties." Divitiacus the Æduan spoke in the name of the rest. He told him: "That two factions divided all Gaul; one headed by the Æduans, the other by the Averni; that after a contention of many years between these for the superiority, the Averni and Sequani came at last to a resolution of calling in the Germans: that at first only fifteen thousand had crossed the Rhine; but being a wild and savage people, and greatly liking the customs, manners, and plenteous country of the Gauls, others soon followed; insomuch that at present there were not less than a hundred and twenty thousand of them in Gaul: that the Æduans, and their allies, had frequently tried their strength against them in battle; but by a succession of defeats had lost all their nobility, senate, and cavalry: that broken by these calamities and losses, though formerly they had held the first sway in Gaul, both by their own valour, and the favour and friendship of the people of Rome, yet now they were reduced to the necessity of sending their principal noblemen as hostages to the Sequani, and of obliging themselves by an oath, neither to demand their hostages back, nor implore the assistance of the Roman people, nor refuse a perpetual submission to the dominion and authority of the Sequani: that he alone of all the Æduans had refused to take the oath, or give his children for hostages, and on that account had fled his country, and came to Rome to implore the assistance of the senate; as being the only man in the state, whom neither obligation of oath, nor the restraint of hostages, withheld from such a step: that after all it had fared worse with the victorious Sequani, than with the vanquished Æduans; because Ariovistus, king of the Germans, had seated himself in their territories, had seized a third of their lands, the most fertile in all Gaul, and now ordered them to give up another third in behalf of the Harudes, who had passed the Rhine a few months before, with twenty-four thousand men, and wanted a settlement and habitations: that in a few years all the native Gauls would

be driven from their territories, and all the Germans transplant themselves over the Rhine, the climate being far superior to that of their own country, and the way of living not admitting a comparison: that Ariovistus, ever since the defeat of the Gauls at Amagetobria, had behaved with unheard-of tyranny and haughtiness, demanding the children of the first nobility as hostages, and exercising all manner of cruelties upon them, if his orders were not implicitly followed in every thing: that he was a man of a savage, passionate, and imperious character, whose government was no longer to be borne; and unless some resource was found in Cæsar and the people of Rome, the Gauls must all follow the example of the Helvetians, and like them abandon their country, in order to find some other habitation and settlement, remote from the Germans, wherever fortune should point it out to them; that were these complaints and representations to come to the knowledge of Ariovistus, he made no doubt of his inflicting the severest punishments upon all the hostages in his hands: but that it would be easy for Cæsar, by his own authority, and that of the army he commanded; by the fame of his late victory, and the terror of the Roman name; to hinder any more Germans from passing the Rhine, and to defend Gaul from the insults of Ariovistus."

XXIV. When Divitiacus had made an end of speaking, all who were present, with many tears, began to implore Cæsar's aid. He observed, that the Sequani alone did nothing of all this; but pensive, and with downcast looks, kept their eyes fixed upon the ground. Wondering what might be the cause, he questioned them upon it. Still they made him no answer, but continued silent, as before, with the same air of dejection. When he had interrogated them several times, without being able to obtain one word in return, Divitiacus the Æduan again resumed the discourse, and observed: "That the condition of the Sequani was by so much more deplorable and wretched than that of the rest of the Gauls, as they alone durst not, even in secret, complain of their wrongs, or apply any where for redress; and no less dreaded the cruelty of Ariovistus, when absent, than if actually present before their eyes: that other states had it still in their power to escape by flight; but the Sequani, who had received him into their territories,

and put him in possession of all their towns, were exposed, upon discovery, to every kind of torment." Cæsar being made acquainted with these things, encouraged the Gauls, and promised to have a regard to their complaints. He told them: "That he was in great hopes Ariovistus, induced by his intercession, and the authority of the people of Rome, would put an end to his oppressions." Having returned this answer, he dismissed the assembly.

XXV. Many urgent reasons occurred upon this occasion to Cæsar, why he should consider seriously of the proposals of the Gauls, and redress the injuries of which they complained. He saw the Æduans, friends and allies of the people of Rome, held in subjection and servitude by the Germans, and compelled to give hostages to Ariovistus, and the Sequani; which in the present flourishing state of the Roman affairs, seemed highly dishonourable both to himself and the commonwealth. He saw it likewise of dangerous consequence, to suffer the Germans by little and little to transport themselves over the Rhine, and settle in great multitudes in Gaul. For that fierce and savage people, having once possessed themselves of the whole country of Gaul, were but too likely, after the example of the Teutones and Cimbri, to break into the Roman province, and thence advance to Italy itself; more especially as the Rhone was the only boundary by which the Sequani were divided from the territories of the republic. It therefore appeared necessary to provide without delay against these evils; and the rather, because Ariovistus was become so insolent, and took so much upon him, that his conduct was no longer to be endured.

XXVI. For these reasons he thought proper to send ambassadors to Ariovistus, to desire he would appoint a place for an interview, that they might discourse together about some public affairs of the highest importance to them both. Ariovistus replied: "That if he had wanted any thing of Cæsar, he would himself have waited on him for that purpose; and if Cæsar had any thing to desire of him, he must likewise come in person to demand it: that for his own part, he could neither venture into these provinces of Gaul where Cæsar commanded without an army, nor bring an army into the field without great trouble and expense: that he besides wondered extremely,

what business, either Cæsar, or the people of Rome, could have in his division of Gaul, which belonged to him by right of conquest." This answer being reported to Cæsar, he again sent an embassy to him to this effect: "That since, notwithstanding the great obligations he lay under both to himself and the people of Rome, in having, during his consulship, been declared king and ally by the senate; he yet manifested so little acknowledgment to either, as even to refuse an interview, and decline treating of affairs that regarded the common interest; these were the particulars he required of him: First, not to bring any more Germans over the Rhine into Gaul. Secondly, to restore the hostages he had taken from the Æduans, and permit the Sequani likewise to do the same. Lastly, to forbear all injuries towards the Æduans, and neither make war upon them nor their allies. That his compliance with these conditions would establish a perpetual friendship and amity between him and the people of Rome. But if he refused conditions so just, as the senate had decreed in the consulship of M. Messala and M. Piso, that whoever had the charge of the province of Gaul, should, as far as was consistent with the interest of the commonwealth, defend the Æduans and the other allies of the people of Rome; he thought himself bound not to overlook their just complaints."

XXVII. To this Ariovistus replied: "That by the laws of war, the conquerer had a right to impose what terms he pleased upon the conquered: that in consequence of this, the people of Rome did not govern the vanquished by the prescriptions of another, but according to their own pleasure: that if he did not intermeddle with the Roman conquests, but left them to the free enjoyment of their rights, no more ought they to concern themselves in what regarded him. That the Æduans having tried the fortune of war, had been overcome and rendered tributary; and it would be the highest injustice in Cæsar to offer at diminishing his just revenues: that he was resolved not to part with the hostages the Æduans had put into his hands; but would nevertheless engage, neither to make war upon them nor their allies, provided they observed the treaty he had made with them, and regularly paid the tribute agreed upon; if otherwise, the title of friends and allies of the people of Rome would be found to stand

them but in little stead: that as to Cæsar's menace of not overlooking the complaints of the Æduans, he would have him to know, no one had ever entered into a war with Ariovistus, but to his own destruction: that he might when he pleased bring it to a trial, and would, he doubted not, soon be made sensible what the invincible Germans, trained up from their infancy in the exercise of arms, and who for fourteen years together had never slept under a roof, were capable of achieving.

XXVIII. At the same time that Cæsar received this answer, ambassadors also arrived from the Æduans and Treviri. From the Æduans, to complain: "That the Harudes, who had lately come over into Gaul, were plundering their territories; insomuch, that even by their submissions and hostages they were not able to obtain peace of Ariovistus." From the Treviri, to inform him: "That a hundred cantons of the Suevians, headed by two brothers, Nassua and Cimberius, were arrived upon the banks of the Rhine, with design to cross that river." Cæsar, deeply affected with this intelligence, determined to undertake the war without delay, lest this new band of Suevians, joining the old forces of Ariovistus, should enable him to make a greater resistance. Having therefore with all diligence provided for the subsistence of his army, he advanced towards him by great marches.

XXIX. The third day he was informed that Ariovistus approached with all his forces to take possession of Vesontia, the capital of the Sequani; and that he had already got three days' march beyond his own territories. Cæsar judged it by all means necessary to prevent him in this design, as the town itself was not only full of all sorts of warlike ammunition, but likewise strongly fortified by nature, and commodiously situated for carrying on the war. For the river Doux forming a circle round it, as if described with a pair of compasses, leaves only an interval of six hundred feet, which is also inaccessible by reason of a very high and steep mountain, whose roots are washed on each side by the river. This mountain is shut in with a wall, which, forming a citadel, joins it to the town. Hither Cæsar marched day and night without intermission; and having possessed himself of the place, put a garrison into it.

XXX. While he tarried here a few days,

to settle the order of his convoys and supplies, the curiosity of our men, and the talk of the Gauls, (who proclaimed on all occasions the prodigious stature of the Germans, their invincible courage, and great skill in arms: in-somuch that in the frequent encounters with them they had found it impossible to withstand their very looks,) spread such a sudden terror through the whole army, that they were not a little disturbed by the apprehensions it occasioned. This fear first began amongst the military tribunes, the officers of the allies, and others that had voluntarily followed Cæsar from Rome; who being but a little acquainted with military affairs, lamented the great danger to which they fancied themselves exposed. Some of these, upon various pretences, desired leave to return. Others, out of shame, and unwilling to incur the suspicion of cowardice, continued in the camp. But these last, incapable of putting on a cheerful countenance, and at times even unable to suppress their tears, skulked in their tents, either bemoaning their fate, or discoursing with their companions upon the common danger. Wills were made all over the camp, and the consternation began to seize even those of more experience, the veteran soldiers, the centurions, and the officers of the cavalry. Such among them as affected a greater show of resolution, said it was not the enemy they feared, but the narrow passes and vast forests that lay between them and Ariovistus, and the difficulty there would be in furnishing the army with provisions. Some even told Cæsar, that when he gave orders for marching, the army, attentive to nothing but their fears, would refuse to obey.

XXXI. Cæsar observing the general consternation, called a council of war; and having summoned all the centurions of the army to be present, inveighed against them with great severity; for presuming to inquire, or at all concern themselves, which way, or on what design they were to march. "Ariovistus," he told them, "during his consulship, had earnestly sought the alliance of the Roman people. Why, therefore, should any one imagine, he would so rashly and hastily depart from his engagements? That, on the contrary, he was himself firmly persuaded, that as soon as he came to know his demands, and the equal conditions he was about to propose to him, he would be very far from rejecting either his friendship,

or that of the people of Rome. But if urged on by madness and rage, he was resolved upon war, what, after all, had they to be afraid of? Or why should they distrust either their own bravery, or his care and conduct? That they were to deal with enemies of whom trial had been already made in the memory of their fathers, when, by the victory of C. Marius over the Teutones and Cimbri, the army itself acquired no less glory than the general who commanded it: that trial had likewise been lately made of them in Italy in the servile war, when they had also the advantage of being exercised in the Roman discipline; on which occasion it appeared, how much resolution and constancy were able to effect: since they had vanquished in the end those very enemies, armed and flushed with victory, whom at first they had without cause dreaded even unarmed. In fine, that they were the very same Germans, with whom the Helvetians had so often fought, not only in their own country, but in Germany itself, and for the most part come off victorious, though they had by no means been a match for our army: that if the defeat and flight of the Gauls gave uneasiness to any, these would readily find, upon inquiry, that Ariovistus confining himself many months to his camp and fastnesses, and declining a general action, had thereby tired out the Gauls with the length of the war; who despairing at last of a battle, and beginning to disperse, were thereupon attacked and routed, rather by conduct and craft, than the superior valour of the Germans. But though a stratagem of this kind might take with rude and uncultivated people, yet could not even the German himself hope that it would avail against a Roman army: that as to those who sheltered their cowardice under the pretence of narrow passes, and the difficulty of procuring provisions, he thought it argued no small presumption in them, either to betray such a distrust of their general's conduct, or offer to prescribe to him what he ought to do: that these things fell properly under his care: that the Sequani, Leuci, and Lingones were to furnish him with provisions: that the corn was now ripe in the fields; and that themselves would soon be judges as to what regarded the ways. That the report of the army's refusing to obey him, gave him not the least disturbance; because he very well knew, that no general had ever been so far slighted by his soldiers, whose ill

success, avarice, or other crimes, had not justly drawn that misfortune upon him: that in all these respects he fancied himself secure, as the whole course of his life would witness for his integrity, and his good fortune had shown itself in the war against the Helvetians: that he was therefore resolved to execute without delay, what he otherwise intended to have put off a little longer; and would give orders for decamping the very next night, three hours before day, that he might as soon as possible know, whether honour and a sense of duty, or an ignominious cowardice had the ascendant in his army: nay, that should all the rest of the troops abandon him, he would, nevertheless, march with the tenth legion alone, of whose fidelity and courage he had no manner of doubt, and which would serve him for his Prætorian guard." Cæsar had always principally favoured this legion, and placed his chief confidence in it, on account of its valour.

XXXII. This speech made a wonderful change upon the minds of all, and begot an uncommon alacrity and eagerness for the war. The tenth legion in particular, returned him thanks, by their tribunes, for the favourable opinion he had expressed of them, and assured him of their readiness to follow him. Nor were the other legions less industrious, by their tribunes and principal centurions, to reconcile themselves to Cæsar; protesting they had never either doubted or feared, nor ever imagined that it belonged to them, but to the general, to direct in matters of war. Having accepted of their submission, and informed himself, by means of Divitiacus, in whom of all the Gauls he most confided, that by taking a circuit of above forty miles, he might avoid the narrow passes, and lead his army through an open country, he set forward three hours after midnight, as he had said; and after a march of seven days successively, understood by his scouts, that he was within four and twenty miles of Ariovistus's camp.

XXXIII. Ariovistus being informed of his arrival, sent ambassadors to acquaint him: "That he was now willing to accept of an interview, as they were now come nearer one another, and he believed it might be done without danger." Cæsar did not decline the proposal, imagining he was now disposed to listen to reason, since he offered that of his own accord, which he had before refused at his request: neither was he without hope, that in

regard of the benefits he had received, both from himself and the people of Rome, he would, upon knowing his demands, desist from his obstinacy. The fifth day after was appointed for the interview. Meantime, as ambassadors were continually passing and repassing, Ariovistus, under pretence that he was afraid of an ambuscade, demanded: "That Cæsar should bring no infantry with him to the conference: that they should both come attended by their cavalry only: that otherwise he could not resolve to give him a meeting." Cæsar, unwilling to drop the design of the interview, but neither caring to trust his safety to the Gauls, thought the best way was, to dismount all the Gallic cavalry, and give their horses to the soldiers of the tenth legion, who had the greatest share of his confidence; that, in case of danger, he might have a guard on which he could rely. This being done accordingly, one of the soldiers of that legion said pleasantly enough: "That Cæsar had done even more than he had promised; that he had only given them hopes of becoming his Prætorian guard; and now he had raised them to the rank of horse."

XXXIV. There was a large plain, and in the midst of it a rising ground of considerable height, equally distant from both camps. At this place, by appointment, the conference was held. Cæsar stationed the legionary soldiers, whom he had brought with him, on the horses of the Gauls, two hundred paces from the mount. Ariovistus did the same with the German cavalry. The conversation was on horseback, each being accompanied by ten friends, or principal officers, for so Ariovistus had desired. When they were come to the place, Cæsar began, by putting him in mind of the favours he had received both from himself and the people of Rome: "That he had been styled friend and ally by the senate; that very considerable presents had been sent him; that these honours, conferred by the Romans on very few, and only for signal services to the state, had yet been bestowed on him, not on account of any just claim on his side, but merely by the favour of Cæsar, and the bounty of the senate." He told him likewise, "of the just and ancient alliance between the Romans and the Æduans; of the many honourable decrees of the senate in their favour: that they had always held the first rank and authority in Gaul, even before their alliance with

Rome : that it was the constant maxim of the Roman people, not only to defend their friends and allies in the possession of their just rights, but likewise to study the enlargement of their honour, interest, and dignity ; that it could never therefore be supposed they would submit to see them stripped of those privileges which had belonged to them before they were received into their friendship." In fine, he concluded with repeating the same demands which he had before made by his ambassadors : " That he would not make war upon the Æduans or their allies ; that he would restore their hostages ; that if he could not oblige any of the Germans to repass the Rhine, at least he would suffer no more of them to come into Gaul."

XXXV. Ariovistus spoke little to Cæsar's demands, but enlarged greatly on his own virtues : " That he had crossed the Rhine, not of his own motion, but invited and entreated by the Gauls themselves ; that the great hopes and expectations they had given him had been his only inducement to quit his country and relations ; that he had settlements in Gaul assigned by the Gauls themselves, hostages voluntarily sent, and a tribute in consequence of the rights of war, it being the constant practice of conquerors to impose that mark of subjection on those they had subdued : that he had not made war upon the Gauls, but the Gauls upon him ; that though all their several states had united against him, and brought up their forces with design to crush him, he had yet found means to vanquish and disperse them in one battle ; that if they were again resolved to try the fortune of war, he was ready and prepared to receive them, but if they rather chose peace, it was unjust in them to refuse a tribute which they had hitherto voluntarily paid : that the friendship of the people of Rome ought to be an honour and security to him, not a detriment, nor had he courted it in any other view ; but if by their alliance he must submit to lose his tributes and his right over the people he had subdued, he was no less willing to give it up, than he had been ambitious to obtain it : that he had indeed brought over a multitude of Germans into Gaul, yet not with any design of disturbing the country, but merely for his own security, as appeared by his not coming but at the request of the natives, and his not attacking them, but defending himself : that his arrival in Gaul

was prior to that of the Romans, whose army had never till that time passed the boundaries of their own province. What could they mean by coming into a country that belonged to him ? Or why should they concern themselves with a part of Gaul that was no less his property, than the province itself was that of the people of Rome ? If it would not be allowable in him to make any attempt upon their possessions, neither could they without injustice, disturb him in the enjoyment of his rights. That as to the pretence of alliance between the Romans and Æduans, he was not so much a barbarian, nor so wholly a stranger to the affairs of the world as not to know, that neither had the Æduans assisted the Romans in the late war against the Allobrogiens, nor received any assistance from them in their many conflicts with himself and the Sequani. That he ought to be jealous of Cæsar's pretended regard to the Æduans, and had but too much reason to suspect that the continuance of the Roman army in Gaul could be with no other design than that of oppressing him. That if he did not therefore depart, and withdraw his troops out of those parts, he would no longer look upon him as a friend, but an enemy. That he was well assured, should he even slay him in battle, he should do a pleasure to many of the nobles and great men at Rome, who had explained themselves to him by couriers, and whose favour and friendship he might procure by his death : but that if he would retire, and leave him in the undisturbed possession of Gaul, he would not only amply reward him, but engage, at his own cost and hazard, to put an end to any war Cæsar should think fit to undertake."

XXXVI. Many reasons were offered by Cæsar, in return to this speech, why he could not depart from his first demands : " That neither his own honour, nor that of the people of Rome, would suffer him to abandon allies, who had deserved so well of the commonwealth : that it no way appeared to him, wherein Ariovistus had a juster claim to the possession of Gaul than the Romans : that the Averni and Ruteni had been subdued by Q. Fabius Maximus, who yet contented with their submission, had neither reduced their country into a province, nor subjected it to a tribute ; that if antiquity of title was to decide, the Romans had an undoubted right to the sovereignty of Gaul : if, on the contrary, the

decree of the senate was to take place, Gaul must remain free, and subject only to its own laws."

XXXVII. Whilst these things passed at the interview, Cæsar was informed that Ariovistus's cavalry were drawing nearer the mount, and had even assaulted the Romans with stones and darts. Cæsar immediately broke off the conference, retreated to his own men, and strictly charged them to forbear all acts of hostility towards the enemy. He did not fear the success of an action, with that chosen legion, against the German cavalry; but he was willing to maintain a conduct perfectly clear, and not give the enemy the least handle to assert, that they had been treacherously drawn into an ambuscade by a pretended conference. When it was known in the camp, with what haughtiness Ariovistus had behaved at the interview; that he had ordered the Romans to depart out of Gaul; that his cavalry had fallen upon Cæsar's guard; and that an end had thereby been put to the conference, a much greater alacrity and desire of fighting spread themselves through the whole army.

XXXVIII. Two days after, Ariovistus sent ambassadors, to propose a renewal of the negotiation begun; and that he would either again appoint a day for a conference, or depute some one to bring the treaty to a conclusion. Cæsar saw no reason for granting a second interview; more especially when he considered, that the time before, the Germans could not be restrained from falling upon our men. Neither was he inclined to send any of his principal officers; it seeming too great a venture, to expose them to the perfidy of these barbarians. He therefore cast his eyes upon C. Valerius Procillus, the son of C. Valerius Caburus, a young man of great merit and politeness, whose father had been made free of the city by C. Valerius Flaccus. His singular integrity, and knowledge of the language of the Gauls, which Ariovistus, by reason of long stay in those parts, spoke readily, fitted him in a particular manner for this embassy: and as he was likewise one towards whom it would no way avail the Germans to use any treachery, he thought him less liable to an insult of that kind. M. Mettius was joined in commission with him, who was allied to Ariovistus by the rights of hospitality. Their instructions were, to hear the Germans' proposals, and carry back

a report of them to Cæsar. But no sooner were they arrived in Ariovistus's camp, than in presence of the whole army, calling out to know their business, and whether they were come as spies, he commanded them to be put in irons, without suffering them to make any reply.

XXXIX. The same day he came forward with all his forces, and lodged himself under a hill, about six miles from our camp. The day after he went two miles beyond it, to cut off Cæsar's communication with the Æduans and Sequani, from whom he received all his provisions. Cæsar, for five days continually, drew up his men in order of battle before the camp, that if Ariovistus had a mind, he might not be without an opportunity of coming to an engagement. The Germans kept all that time within their lines; only we had daily skirmishes with their cavalry, whose manner of fighting was this. They had about six thousand horse, who chose a like number out of the foot, each his man, and all remarkable for strength and agility. These continually accompanied them in battle, and served them as a rear-guard, to which, when hard pressed, they might retire; if the action became dangerous, they advanced to their relief: if any horseman was considerably wounded, and fell from his horse, they gathered round to defend him; if speed was required, either for a hasty pursuit, or sudden retreat, they were become so nimble and alert by continual exercise, that laying hold of the manes of their horses, they could run as fast as they.

XL. Cæsar finding that Ariovistus declined a battle, thought it necessary to provide for the freedom of his convoys. With this view he marked out a place for a camp, six hundred paces beyond that of the enemy, whither he marched with his whole army drawn up in three lines. The first and second lines had orders to continue under arms, and the third to employ themselves in fortifying the camp. Ariovistus sent sixteen thousand light-armed foot, and all his horse, to alarm our men, and hinder the work. But Cæsar remained firm to his first design, ordering the two lines that continued under arms to keep off the enemy, and the third to go on with the intrenchments. The work being finished, he left two legions there, with part of the auxiliaries, and carried back the other four to his former camp. The next day he assembled all his troops from

both camps, drew them up according to custom and offered the enemy battle; but they still refusing to come to an engagement, he retired again about noon. Ariovistus then detached part of his forces to attack the lesser camp. A sharp conflict ensued, that lasted till night. At sun-set Ariovistus thought proper to sound a retreat, after many wounds given and received. Cæsar inquiring of the prisoners, why Ariovistus so obstinately refused an engagement, found, that it was the custom among the Germans, for the women to decide, by lots and divination, when it was proper to hazard a battle; and that these had declared, the army could not be victorious, if they fought before the new moon.

XL I. The day after, Cæsar having left a sufficient guard in his two camps, ranged all the auxiliary troops before the lesser camp, placing them directly in view of the enemy for the greater show, because the number of legionary soldiers was but inconsiderable, compared with that of the Germans. Then advancing at the head of all his forces in three lines, he marched quite up to the enemy's camp. Upon this the Germans, compelled by necessity, appeared before the intrenchments, and having distributed their troops by nations, and disposed them at equal distances one from another, the Harudes, Marcomani, Tribocci, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians, and Suevians, encompassed the whole army with a line of carriages, to take away all hopes of safety by flight. The women mounted upon these carriages, weeping and tearing their hair, conjured the soldiers, as they advanced to battle, not to suffer them to become slaves to the Romans. Cæsar having appointed a lieutenant and questor to each legion, to serve as witnesses of every man's courage and behaviour, began the battle in person at the head of the right wing, observing the enemy to be weakest on that side. The signal being given, our men charged so briskly, and the enemy advanced so swiftly and suddenly to meet them, that the Romans not having time to throw their darts, betook themselves immediately to their swords: but the Germans quickly casting themselves into a phalanx, according to the custom of their country, sustained the shock with great firmness. Many of our soldiers leaped upon the phalanx, tore up the bucklers of the enemy with their hands, and wounded those that lay under them. Their left wing was soon routed and put to flight; but on the right they had the advan-

tage, and were like to overpower the Romans by their number. Young Crassus, who commanded the cavalry, and was more at liberty than those immediately engaged in the fight, observing this, made the third line advance to support them. Upon this the battle was renewed, and the enemy every where put to the rout; nor did they cease their flight till they had reached the banks of the Rhine, about fifty miles distant from the place of combat. There only a few escaped, some by swimming, others by boats. Of this last number was Ariovistus, who, embarking in a small vessel he found by the edge of the river, got safe to the other side: all the rest were cut to pieces in the pursuit, by our cavalry. Ariovistus had two wives, one a Suevian, whom he had brought with him from Germany; the other a Norican, sister to King Vocian, whom he had married in Gaul: both perished in this flight. Of his two daughters, one was killed, the other taken prisoner. C. Valerius Procillus, whom his keepers dragged after them in their flight, bound with a triple chain, fell in with Cæsar in person as he was pursuing the German cavalry. Nor was the victory itself more grateful to that general, than his good fortune in recovering out of the hands of the enemy, a man the most distinguished for his probity of the whole province of Gaul, his intimate and familiar friend; and to find the joy and success of that day no way diminished or clouded by the loss of a person he so highly esteemed. Procillus told him, that lots had been thrice drawn in his own presence, to decide, whether he should be burnt alive upon the spot, or reserved for another time, and that the lot, three times favourable, had preserved his life. Mettius was likewise recovered and brought.

XLII. This battle being reported beyond the Rhine, the Suevians, who were advanced as far as the banks of that river, thought proper to return to their own country; but retreating in disorder and confusion, they were attacked by the Ubians, a people bordering upon the Rhine, and many of them cut to pieces. Cæsar having in one campaign put an end to two very considerable wars, went into winter quarters somewhat sooner than the season of the year required. He distributed his army among the Sequani, left Labienus to command in his absence, and set out himself for Cisalpine Gaul, to preside in the assembly of the states.