


THE FOURTH COMMENTARIE.


THE ARGUMENT.

 He Visipetes, and Tenchtheri are driuent to seeke new seates in Gallia; they driue the Menapij out of their territories: but in the end are ouerthrowen by Cæsar. That warre being ended, he made a bridge vpon the Rhene, and carried his Army ouer into Germany. He taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri; and giueth libertie to the Vbij: returneth into Gallia, and carrieth his Armie ouer into Britanie, with the occurrences of that warre.

CHAP. I.

The ^{*}Visipetes, and ^{*}Tenchtheri bring great multitudes of peoples, ouer the Rhene into Gallia: the nature of the Sueui:

* Those of Zurphen.
* Of Hassia.

 HE winter following, Pompeie and Crassus being Consuls, the Visipetes and Tenchtheri, two Germane nations, passed ouer the Rhene, with great multitudes of people; not far from the place, where it falleth into the sea. The reason of their sitting, was the ill intreatie, which for many yeares together they had receiued of the Sueui, the greatest and warlikest nation amongst the Germanes. For, these Sueui had one hundred Cantons or shires, which yearely furnished their warres, with 1000. men apiece; and kept as manie at home to maintain both themselves, and their Armies abroad: and these the yeare following were in Armes; and the other staid at home and performed the like dutie; and so by this means, they all continued their experience both of tillage, and matter of war. They liued chiefly vpon castel & milk, & used much hunting: which was the cause (what through the quality of their diet, their continual exercise, and libertie of life, being neuer tyed to anie discipline, nor vrged to any thing against their disposition) that they were strong & of a large stature, vsing skins and hides for their cloathing, which couerea but part of their bodie, the rest being naked. Their horsemen oftentimes, in time of batell, forsooke their horse, and fought on foot; being taught to stand

Cæsar.

still in one place, that when they would they might returne unto them. Neither was there any thing more base, or dishonest in the course of their life, then to use furniture for horses: and would aduenture to charge vpon great troupes of horse, that used Equipage, with a few of their owne quality. They admitted no wine to be brought in vnto them, least it might effeminate their warlike inclination, or make them vnapt for labour. The greatest honour in their opinion, was to haue their bordering Territories lie waste & desolate: for, so it would be thought, that manie States togither, would not resist their conquering valour: and it was reported, that the country lay waste from them one waie 600. miles togither.

THE OBSERVATION.

BY this practice of the Sueui, it appeareth, how little a naked resolution of valour availeth, when it wanteth the ornaments of moral carriage and ciuil discretion, to make vse of that greatnesse which prowels hath obtained: for, notwithstanding that they were a nation both warlike, and of good abilitie, they were so vainly carried on with a conceit of manhood, that it sorted to no other end, then to maintaine barbarisme at home, and desolation abroad; where as true valor is alwaies subordinate to the preservation of Common-weales, and is as the defensiuie Armes of ciuill societie. Which I haue the rather noted, in as much as it resembleth an humor that aboundeth in this age, especially in the particular hauiour of our young Gallants, whose naked valour reuealing it selfe only in the lie and in the stabbe, for want of other assistant vertues to temper the heat of so brittle a metall, lea- deth them into such inconueniences and disordered actions, that it changeth the nature thereof, into giddie headed rashnesse; and in lieu of vertues guerdon, is repaied with irrision.

CHAP. II.

The motiues, inducing the Vspetes to
come ouer the Rhene into
GALLIA.

Caesar.



Ext vnto these Sueui, inhabited the Vbij, a very ample and potent State: and through their entercourse & traffick with marchants, somewhat more ciuill then the rest of the Germans. With these, the Sueui had often waged battell: and albeit they could not expel them out of their counry, for as much as their State was very great and populous; yet by continuall incursions they brought them vnder, and much weakened their estate. In the same case were the Vspetes and Tenchtheri: for, hauing made head against the

Sueui

*Sueni for many yeares together, they were constrained in the end to forsake their possessions; and wandering the space of three yeares through the Continent of Germany, at last they arriued where the * Menapij inhabited the bankes, on both sides the riuer Rhene: but being terrified with the arriuall of such a multitude, they forsooke all their dwellings beyond the riuer, and planted themselues on this side of the water, to hinder the Germans from further passage.*

* Geldres & Cleue.

The Vsiptes with their associates, hauing tried all meanes, and not finding themselues able to passe ouer by force, for want of boats; nor by stealth, by reason of the diligent watch of the Menapij, fained a retrait to their old habitation: & after three daies iourney, their horsemen in one night speedily returned againe, and slewe the Menapij, both vnguarded and vnprouided. For they upon the departure of the Germans, feared not to returne ouer the riuer into their towns & houses. These being slain, and their shipping taken, they got ouer the riuer, before the rest of the Menapij had any notice of their comming: by which meanes they easily dispossessed them of their dwelling places, and liued that winter upon the prouision they found there.

Cesar vnderstanding of these things, and fearing the weaknesse of the Galles, in as much as they are sudden & quick in their resolutions, and withall desirous of noueltie: he durst no waie trust their vnconstancie; for, it was their practice and custome to stay traouellers and passengers, and inquire of them what they either heard or knewe, concerning any thing that had happened; and the common people would flocke about Merchants in faires and markets, and learne of them whence they came, and what newes they brought from thence: and by these rumors and hearesayes they directed the main course of their actions; whereof they could not but repent themselues, being grounded vpon such weake intelligence, as was vsually coined to please the multitude. Which custome being known, Cesar to preuent a greater war, hastened to his Army sooner then he was wont to doe.

OBSERVATION.

Such as haue spent their time in the contemplation of Nature, & haue made diligent search of the temperate & quality of climates and nations, haue all with one consent made choler the Regent of the French complexion; distinguishing the people, with such attributes, as the saide humor vsually breedeth. Neither haue these conditions, which Cesar so long agoe obserued in the ancient Galles, any disresemblance from that which the learned of this age haue deliuered, concerning the nature of the saide inhabitants: but that irresolute constitution, which breeds such nouelties and contrarieties of actions, continueth the same vnto these times, in the inhabitants of that country, notwithstanding the alteration of customes, and people, or what else so long a time hath changed; which argueth the vnresistable power of celestiall influence, establishing an vniformity of nature, according as the site of the place lieth capable of their powerfull aspect.

The cause of the diuersitie in the temperate of nations, which are differen-

ced by North and South, is not without apparant caule, attributed to their propinquitie, or distance from the course of the sun, which distinguisheth by heat and cold the Northren & Southerne climates of the earth; and separateth the inhabirants thereof, by the dominion of their actiue qualities. But the reason why two Nations which are both in the same climate, and vnder the same parallel, receiuing the vertue of the celestiaall bodies, by the same downfall and rebound of their beames, being differenced only by East and West; are so much disunited in nature, and so vnlike in disposition, is not so apparant: whether it be as some haue imagined, forasmuch as the all-inclosing spheare; which remaineth quiet and immouable about the circuit of the first motor, hath his parts diuersly distinguished with variety of properties; which by continuall reference and mutuall aspect, are imprinted in the correspondent quarters of the earth; and so keepe a perpetuall residency of one and the same qualitie, in one and the same place; and make also the variety of fashions in such partes, as otherwise are equall fauorites of the heauens maieftie, by receiuing an equall measure of light, heat and vertue; or whether the saide quarters of the earth are in themselues diuersly noted, with seuerall qualities, which appropriate the selfe same influence to their particular nature, and so alter it into many fashions; or whether there be som other vnkown cause: I wil leaue euery man to satisfie himself with that which seemeth most probable vnto him, and proceed to the discouerie of this cholerick passion. Wherin I will indeuour to shew, how impatiencie, sodaine resolution, and desire of noueltie, are naturall adiuncts of this humor. And if Cæsar made vse of this Philosophy in the managing of that warre; let it not be thought impertinent to the knowledge of a Generall, to enter into the consideration of this learning. Wherein first, I must laie for a maxime, that which long experience hath made authenticall, that the motions of the minde are either quicke or slow, according as the complexion is tempered, either with heat or cold: for, as the flegmaticall humor, is of a moist, colde and heauie nature, begetting weake and grosse spirits, and benumbing the instruments with a liueless disabilitie; so is the motion of the internall faculties, proceeding likewise after a slow manner, according to the quality of the instruments, wherby it moueth: and therefore men of this waterish constitution, are no way apt to receiue an impression, nor to entertaine any sensible apprehension, vnlesse it be beaten into them, with often and strong repetitions: and then also they proceede as slowly in discoursing of the consequence, and linger in the choise of their resolutions. On the contrary part, this *flaua bilis*, being of a hot piercing nature, and resembling the actiue vertue of the fire, doth so purifie the instruments of sense, and quicken the spirits with the viuacity of motion, that they take the first impression as perfectly, as if it had been oftentimes presented vnto them, with many strong circumstances. And thence it happeneth, that inasmuch as the *Species* is so readily receiued, & possesseth the apprehending facultie, with such facility of entrance, that it moueth the other powers of the soule, with as great efficacie at the first conception, as if it had bene brought in with troupes of probabilities, and strengthened with manifest arguments of vndoubted truth: It followeth therefore (by reason of the subtile and

fit disposition of the instruments, which proceedeth frō heate the chiefest qualitye in choler) that the obie&t is at the first moment, so strongly settled, in the first receiuing facultie, that the other powers of the minde, with as great speed manifest their offices, concerning the apprehension; and deliuer a sentence answerable to the strength of the first conception: which maketh them so impatient of delay, and so sodainly to alter their former resolutions, not suffering the discoursive power to examine the substance thereof, by conference of circumstances; nor to giue iudgement according to the course of our intellectuall court. It behoueth therefore euery man, in that vnsteady disposition, especially in matter of moment, to be suspicious of his own credulity, & not to giue place to resolution, before his iudgement be informed, by discourse of the strength or weaknesse of the conceiued opinion.

But to leaue these speculatiue meditations, to Philosophers of learned conceit: for as much as the right vse of passions is either true wisdom, or commeth nearest to the same; I will only touch in a word what degree of choler best befiteth a soldier; or how it auaieth, or disaduantageh in matter of warre. And first it cannot be denyed, that there is almost no passion, that doth more eclipse the light of reason, or sooner corrupteth the sinceritie of a good iudgement, then this of anger, which we now speak of: Neither is there any motion that more pleaseth it selfe in his owne actions, or followeth them with greater heat in the execution. And if the truth chance to shew it selfe, and conuince a false pretended cause, as the authour of that passion, it oftentimes redoubleth the rage euen against truth and innocency. Piso condemned a souldier for returning from forraging, without his companion, being perswaded that he had slain him: but at the instant of the execution, the other that was missing, returned & with great ioy of the whole Army, they were carried to the Generall, thinking to haue much gratified him, with the manifestation of the truth: but he through shame and despiht, being yet in the torture of his wrath, redoubled his anger, and by a subtilty which his passion furnished him withall, he made three culpable for that hee found one innocent; the first, because the sentence of death was past against him, and was not to bee recalled without the breach of lawe: the second, for that he was the cause of the death of his companion: and thirdly, the executioner, for not obeying his commandement.

Concerning matter of warre, as it consisteth of differenced parts; so hath choler diuers effectes. In case of discourse and consultation, when as the powers of the minde ought to bee cleere of all violent affections, it greatly darkeneth the vnderstanding, and troubleth the sinceritie of a good iudgement, as Cæsar noted in his speech to the Senare concerning Cateline: and therefore a Commander, must by al means indeuor to auoid, euen the least motions of so hurtfull a passion; and season his affections, with that grauity and constancy of spirit, that no turbulent disposition may; either hinder his vnderstanding, or with-holde his will from following that course, which reason appointeth, as the best means to a fortunate successe: alwaies remembring that all his actions are presented vpon a stage, and passe the censure of many curious beholders, which applaud graue & patient motions, as the greatest proof of true wisdom;

Salust.

& disallow of passionate, and headstrong affection, as derogating from the sincere carriage of an action, how iust soeuer otherwise it seemeth.

Concerning execution and furie of battaile, I take anger to be a necessarie instrument to set valour on foot, and to ouerwage the difficulties of terror, with a furious resolution: for, considering that the noblest actions of the mind, stand in need of the impulsions of passions, I take anger to be the fittest meanes, to aduance the valiant carriage of a battaile: for, as feare is treacherous and vn-safe, so anger is confident and of an vnquencheable heat. And therefore a Cōmaunder ought by all meanes, to suggest matter of anger against an Enemie, that his men may beholde them with a wrathfull regarde, and thirst after the daie of battell, to satisfie their fury with the bloud of their aduersaries. If any vrge, that it hath been heertofore obserued of the Galles, that in the beginning of a battell they were more then men, and in the later end they were lesse then women; and therefore a choleric disposition is not so fit for seruice, as we seem to make it: I answer, that There is a difference between a disposition to choler, such as was obserued in the Galles, and the passion of anger, wel kindled in the minde: for, the first is subiect to alteration and contrarietie of actions; but the other is furious, inuincible, neuer satisfied but with reuenge. And so that of Aristotle is prooued true, that anger serueth oftentimes as a weapon to vertue; whereunto some answer very pleasantly, saying, it is a weapon of a strange nature: for, we do manage other weapons, and this doth manage vs; our hand guideth not it, but it guideth our hand; it possesseth vs, and not we it, as it happened in the raigne of Tyberius, amongst the mutinous legions at *Vetera*: & therefore a Commander ought to take great heed, whom hee maketh the object of that anger, which kindleth in his Army. For, as it is a passion of terrible execution, and therefore needeth to be wisely directed; so is it dangerous in regarde of obedience, which was the only thing which Cæsar required in his soldiers.

But to leaue this hasty matter, and fall neerer that which we seek after: I may not omit the Prognostication, which Cæsar made of the consequence of this accident, by the naturall disposition of the people; the euent whereof proued the truth of his predictions; which sheweth what aduantage a learned General that hath bin somewhat instructed in the school of Nature, hath gained of him, whom only experience hath taught the actiue rudiments of the war, and thinketh of no further lesson in that art, then that which the office of a Seriant, or Lanceprizado containeth.

Tacit.
1. Annal.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar commeth to his Armie, marcheth towards the Germanes, and by the waie treateth of conditions of Peace.



Cæsar being come to his Army, found that to haue happened which he before suspected: for, some of the States of Gallia had sent messengers vnto the Germans, to leaue the backs of Rhene, and to Come further into the continent, where they should find ready, what soeuer they desired. Whereupon the Germans began to make further incursions, and to waste the land as far as the confines of the * Eburones. The Princes of the Gallies being called together, Cæsar thought it best to dissemble what he had discovered, concerning their reuolt; and confirming their minds with an approbation of their loyalty, he commanded certaine troupes of horse to be leuied, and resolved to make warre vpon the Germans; and hauing made prouision of corne, hee directed his march towards them. From whõ as he was on the way, within a few daies iourney of their Camp, he received this message: The Germans as they were not willing to make warre vpon the Romans, so they would not refuse to make triall of their manhood, if they were iustly prouoked; for, their ancient custome was to answer an Enemy by force, and not by treaty: yet this much they would confesse, that they came thither very unwillingly, being driuen by violence out of their possessions. If the Roman people would accept of their friendship, & either giue them territories to inhabite, or suffer them to keep that which they had got by the lawe of Armes, they might proue profitable friends vnto them. They onely yeilded to the Sueui, to whom the gods in seats of Arms were inferior; any other Nation they would easily conquer.

To this Cæsar answered what he thought fit; but the purport of his speech was, that he could not make any league with them, if they continued in Gallia: neither was it probable, that they that could not keepe their owne, would get possessions out of other mens hands: Gallia had no vacant place to entertain so great a multitude: but if they would they might find a welcome, amongst the * Vbij, whose agents were at that instant in his Camp, complaining of the iniurie of the Sueui, and desiring aide against them; this much he himself would intreat of the Vbij. The messengers went backe with these Mandates, promising within three daies to returne againe to Cæsar: in the meane time, they desired him, not to bring his Army any neerer their quarters; which request Cæsar denied. For, vnderstanding that a fewe dayes before, a great part of their Cavalrie were passed ouer the Mosa, he suspected that this delay imported nothing more then the return of their horsemen.

When Cæsar was come within twelue miles of their Camp, their Ambassadors returned

Cæsar.

* Liege.

* Colonia A-
rippina.

returned; and meeting him on the way, entreated him earnestly to march no further towards them: but being denied of their suit, they besought him to send to those troupes of horse, which marched before the Army, that they should not fight nor make any hostile encounter; and that he would give them leaue to send messengers to the Vbij: of whose entertainment they would willingly accept, if the Princes and Senate would sweare faith and safe continuance vnto their people: Neither would they require more then 3. daies, to negotiate this businesse. Caesar conceiued this intreaty to import nothing else, then the returne of their horsemen that were absent in pillage, whom they expected within three dayes; notwithstanding he promised them to march but foure miles further that day, to a conuenient watering place: in the meane time he sent to the Commanders of the horse that were before, not to prouoke the Enemy to fight; and if they were set upon, to sustaine the charge, vntill he came neerer with the Armie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Rirst, wee may obserue his dissembling of the practice of the Galles with the Germans; and the encouragement which hee gaue them in a faithfull and loyall affection to the people of Rome, when hee himselfe knew they had started from that duty, which both their honour and a good respect of their friends required: for, he well vnderstood, that his presence did take away all scruple of any further motion in that kind; and therefore to haue objected vnto them their errors, had not bin to heale, but to discouer their wound: only he took the waie to cut off their hopes of any practises, which they might attempt against the Romaine people; and held them in the mean time in the apparence of faithfull friends, that they might not be discouraged, by the detection of their reuolt.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

SEcondly, vpon this resolution that there was no league to be made with the Germans, if they continued on this side the Rhene; wee may obserue how he entertained a treaty of peace, with such consents & denials, as might manifest his readinesse to further what he made shew of, & not weaken the meanes of his best aduantage. For as hee was content they should take a quiet farewel of Gallia, & plant themselues in the possessions of the Vbij; so was he loath to yeeld to any condition, which might disaduantage his forcible constraint or weaken his command, if perswasion failed: for, he well knew, that powerfull means to effect that which he required, would further the course of a peaceable conclusion, and carry more authority in a parlee, then any other motiue, how reasonable foeuer.

*Vincitur
haud gratis*

Moreouer wee may obserue, how carefull hee was not to impose vpon the Germanes a necessitie of fighting; but opened a passage (by propounding vn-

to

to them the association of the Vbij) by which they might auoyd the hazard of battell. VVhich thing was alwayes obserued by Commaunders of auncient times, who diligently searching into the nature of things, found that neyther of those noble instruments, whereby man worketh such wonders (I meane the hand and the tongue) had euer brought so many excellent workes to that type of perfection, vnless they had been forced thereunto by necessity: and therefore we are wisely to handle the course of our actions, least while we stand too striēt vpon a violent garde, we giue occasion to the Enemy, by the waie of *Antiperistasis*, to redouble his strength; and so furnish him with that powerfull engine, which Verius Mescius calleth *ultimum* and *maximum telum*, the last and greatest weapon; the force whereof shall better appeare by these examples.

Ugulo qui pronocat hostem.

Some fewe of the Samnites, contrarie to the articles of peace between them and the Romans, hauing made incursions into the territories of the Roman cōfederats; the Senare of that State sent to Rome, to excuse the fact, and to make offer of satisfaction: But beeing reiected, Claudius Pontius Generall of their forces, in an excellent Oration which he made, shewed how the Romans would not harken to peace, but chose rather to be reuenged by war: and therefore necessity constrained them to put on Arms: *Iustum est bellum* (saith he) *quibus necessarium, & pia arma quibus, nisi in Armis, spes est.*

Lin. lib. 9

Caius Manlius, conducting the Roman legions against the Veij, part of the Veian Army had entred the Roman Campe; which Manlius perceiuing, hee hasted with a band of men to keep the breach, and to shut in the Veij: which they no sooner perceiued, but they fought with that rage and fury, that they slew Manlius; and had ouerthrowne the whole Camp, had not a Tribune opened them a passage, by which they fled away.

Lin. lib. 7

In like manner Camillus, the wisest of the Romaine Captaines, being entered into the Cittie of the Veij, that hee might take it with greater facilitie and disarme the Enemy of that terrible weapon of necessitie, hee caused it to bee proclaimed, that no Veian should bee hurt, that was found vnarmed. VVherupon euery man cast away his weapon, and so the towne was taken without bloudshed.

Let a souldier therefore take such holde of occasions, and opportunities that ate offered vnto him, that in time of battell hee may seem to cast necessitie vpon his own cause, and retaine it in his paie: considering how the power therof altereth the works of Nature, and chudgeth their effects into contrary operations: being neuer subiect to anie ordinance or lawe; and yet making that lawfull which proceedeth from it.

CHAP. III.

The Germans, contrary to their owne request made to Cæsar, set upon the Romaine horsemen, and ouerthrew them.

Cæsar.



Notwithstanding the Germans request, concerning the truce, as soon as they saw the Roman horsemen, which were in number 5000. (whereas the Germans had not above 800. horse) they charged upon the Romans, not expecting any hostile encounter, inasmuch as their ambassadours were newly departed from Cæsar, and had obtained that daie of truce: but being set upon, they made what resistance they could. The Germans, according to their vsuall custome, forsooke their horse, and fighting on foote, did easily put the Romans to flight; who neuer looked backe, vntill they came into the sight of the legions: in that battell were slain 74. Roman horsemen. After this battell, Cæsar thought it not safe, either to hearken to any conditions, or to receiue any message from them, that by fraud and deceit had sought for peace, & meant nothing but war: And to attend any longer vntill their horsemen returned, was but to giue them that aduantage against him, especially considering the weakenesse of the Galles, amongst whom the Germans by this battell had gayned great reputation; and therefore he durst not giue them space to thinke vpon it.

OBSERVATION.



His cunning of the Germans offereth occasion to speak somewhat, concerning that maine controuersie of policie, which is, whether the actions of Princes and great Commanders, are alwaies to be attended with integrity, & faithful accomplishment therof. Wherein I will only set down such arguments and grounds of reason, which vertue and morall honestie on the one part, (for we will make it no question to a Christian mind) & the daily practice of States men on the other side, alleage to make good their contrarie assertions.

The great Politicians of the world, that commend vertue in a shew, and not in esse and being, & study to maintaine their states onely with humane reason; not regarding the authority of diuine ordinance, set this down as a *maxime* in their Art; That he, that is to negotiate a matter, and meaneth to bring it to an end sorting to his contentment, must in all respects bee like qualified, both in iudgement and disposition, as the party is, with whom he dealeth: otherwise he cannot be sufficiently prepared, to hold himself strong in the matter, which he vndertaketh. For, a wraстler that commeth with meere strength to incounter an other that hath both strength and cunning, may beshrewe his strength that brought him thither, to be cast by skill, and be laught at, as an vnworthie

Cham-

Champion for terious sports: in like manner, in this vniuersall confusion of infidelity, wherein subtilty flyeth at so high a pitch, he that thinketh with simplicity of spirit to wind through the labyrinths of falshood, and auoid the snares of deceit, shall find himself too weak for so difficult a task, and beshrew his honesty, if he regard his commodity. For, it is the course that euery man taketh, which must bring vs to the place, to which euery man goeth: and he that opposeth himself against the current of the world, may stand alone in his owne conceit, and neuer attain that which the world seeketh after. Forasmuch therefore, as craft & deceit are so generall, it behooueth a man of publicke negotiations; to carry a mind apt & disposed to these qualities. This was signified by that, which ancient writers report of Achilles, who was sent to Chiron the Cētaure, half a man and half a beast, to be instructed in the rudiments of Princely carriage; that of the brutish part, hee might learne to strengthen himselfe, with force and courage; and of the humane shape, so to manage reason, that it might bee a fit instrument to answer or preuent, whatsoeuer mans wit might forge to ouerthrow it. Neither ought a priuate man to wōder at the strangeness of these positions; considering that the government of kingdoms, & Empires is caried with another bias, then that which concerneth particular affaires in a wel ordered State: wherein truth-breakers and faithles dissemblers are worthily condemned, inasmuch as they necessarily enforce the ruine thereof. But these that sit at the helm of government, and are to shape the course of a State, according to the variation of times and fortunes, deriue their conclusions from other principles, whereof inferior subiects are no morre capable, then men are able to vnderstand the works of the Gods: and therefore they are called *arcana imperij*, to be reuerenced rather, then lookt into.

To conclude, the affaires of particular persons are of so short extension, and incircled in so small a compasse, that a meane capacity may easily apprehend the advantages or inconueniences, which may ensue vpon the contract: and therefore it is requisit they should stand to the aduenture, and their iudgement is worthily taxed with the los: but the businesses of the Common-weale are, both subiect to so many casualties of fortune, and rely vpon such vnexpected accidents, that it is impossible for any spirit, how prouident soeuer, to foresee the issue in that variety of chances. Besides that, euery particular subiect is much interessed in the fortune of the euent, and may iustly chalenge an alteration of the intended course, rather then suffer shipwrack through the error of their Pilot: And so the safetrie of the State doth balance out the los of credit in the Governour.

On the other side, such as zealously affect true honour, affirme virtue to bee the same both in Prince & people; neither doth condition of state, or calling, or the qualitie of publicke or priuate businesses, alter the nature and essence of goodnes: for, to deprive the toung of truth and fidelity were to break the bond of ciuill society, which is the basis and ground-plot of all States and Common-weales. They doe not denie but that a wise Prince may so carrie a treatie, that he may seeme to affect that most which he least intendeth; or answer doubtfully concerning the propositions; and that hee may vse with great honour the

practices and stratagems of warre, when the fortune of both parties consisteth vpon their owne industrie: but to breake any couenants agreed vpon, may wel get a kingdome, but neuer honourable reputation.

And thus they contend concerning the means, wherby a State is continued in happy government: whereof this much I dare say by the warrant of this History, that he who falsifieth his word vpon aduanrage, howsoeuer he regardeth his honour, had need to pay them home in regard of his owne safetie: for, if they once recover the losse, and get any aduanrage against those truth-breakers, they will finde as little fauour, as the Germans did with Cæsar.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar marched directly to the Campe of the Germans, and cut them all in peeces, and so ended that warre.

Cæsar.



Vpon these considerations, Cæsar manifesting his resolution to the Legates, and Questor, there happened a very fortunate accident. For, the next daie, very early in the morning, most of the Princes and chiefest of the Germans came vnto Cæsar into his Camp, to excuse their fraudulent practice; and wish- all to continue their petition of truce. Wherof Cæsar was exceedingly gladd, and caused them to be kept in hold; and at the same instant brought his Army out of the Camp, commanding his horsemen to follow the legions, because they had bin daunted with so late an ouerthrow: And making a triple battel, marched speedily eight miles, and so came vpon the Germans, before they had notice what had hapned; & being terrified with our suddain arrival, & the departure of their own leaders, knew not whether it were their best course to bring forth their forces, or defend their Camp, or otherwise to seek their safety by flight. Which tumult & feare was no sooner perceiued by the Romã soldier, but calling to mind their perfidious treacherie, they brake into the Camp, and were at first a little resisted; in the meane time, the women and children fled euery one away: vvhich Cæsar perceiuing, sent his horsemen to pursue them. The Germans, hearing the clamour and shriekings behind their backs, & seeing their friends pursued and slaine, did cast away their weapons, and fledde out of the Campe: and comming to the confluence of the Mase and the Rhene, such as had escaped, cast themselves into the riuier; where, what through feare & weariness, and the force of the water, they were all drowned. In this conflict, the Romans lost not a man. The number of the enemy was 430000, with women and children. To them who he had retained in his Campe, he gaue leaue to depart; but they, fearing the cruelty of the Gallies, desired that they might continue with the Romans: which Cæsar agreed vnto.

OBSERVATION.



His relation affordeth little matter of warre, but onely a seuerer reuenge of hatefull trecherie: notwithstanding, I will hence take occasion, to discouer the offices of the Questor and the Legates; and shew what place they had in the Armie. And first, concerning the Questor, we are to vnderstand, that he was elected by the common voice of the people, in the same Court, which was called to create the Generall. His office was, to take charge of the publique treasure, whether it came out of their *Aerarium*, for the pay of the Armie; or otherwise was taken from the enemy.

Of him the souldiers receiued their stipend, both in corne and money: and what other bootie was taken frō the enemy, he either kept them, or sold them, for the vse of the Common-weale.

The Legates were not chosen by the people, but appointed by the Senate, as Assistants and Coadiutors to the Emperour, for the publique seruice, & vvere altogether directed by the Generall, in whose absence they had the absolute commaund: and their number was for the most part vncertaine; but proportioned according to the number of legions in the Armie.

CHAP. VI.

Cæsar maketh a bridge vpon the Rhene, and
carrieth his Armie ouer into
 Germanie.



HE Germane warre beeing thus ended: Cæsar thought it necessarie, to transport his Armie ouer the Rhene into the Continent of Germanie, for many causes: whereof this was not the least, that seeing the Germans were so easily perswaded, to bring their Colonies, & their vagrant multitudes into Gallia, he thought it good to make known vnto them, that the Romaine people could at their pleasure, carie their forces ouer the Rhene into Germanie. Moreouer, those troupes of horse, which were absent at the late ouerthrowe of the Germanes, vvere fledde into the confines of the Sicambri; to whom, when Cæsar sent Messengers to demaund them to be sent vnto him, they answered, that the Romaine Empire vvas limited by the Rhene: & if the Germanes vvere interdicted Gallia, why should Cæsar challenge anie authoritie in their quarters? Lastlie, the Vbij, who amongst all the rest of the Germanes, had onelie accepted of Cæsars friendshippe, and giuen pledges of their fidelitie, had made earnest sute vnto him, to send them aide against the Sueui; or at the least, to transport his Army ouer the Rhene: for, the name and opinion of the Roman Army was so great, & of such fame, what with Ariouistus ouerthrow, &

this last service, that it sounded honorable amongst the furthest Nations of Germany. For these reasons, Cæsar resolved to passe the Rhene: but to carie his Armie ouer by boate, was neither safe, nor for the maiestie of the people of Rome. And, albeit it seemed a matter of great difficultie, by reason of the breadth, swiftnesse, and depth of the riuer, to make a bridge: yet hee resolved to try what he could doe; otherwise, hee determined not to passe ouer at all: and so hee built a bridge after this manner.

At two foote distance, he placed two trees of a foot and halfe square, sharpened at the lower end, and cut answerable to the depth of the riuer: these hee let downe into the water with engines, and droue them in with commaunders, not perpendicularly, after the fashion of a pile, but gable-wise, and bending with the course of the water: opposite vnto these, he placed two other trees, ioyned together after the same fashion, being fortie foote distant from the former, by the dimension between their lower parts in the bottome of the water, and reclining against the course of the riuer. These two paire of couples thus placed, hee ioyned together with a beame of two foote square, equal to the distance betweene the said couples, and fastened them at each end, on either side of the couples, with braces and pinnes: whereby the strength of the worke, and nature of the frame was such, that the greater the violence of the streame was, and the faster it fell upon the timber work, the stronger the bridge was united in the couplings and ioyns. In like manner, he proceeded with couples, and beames, vntill the work was brought vnto the other side of the riuer: and then hee laid straight planks from beame to beame, and couered them with hurdles; and so hee made a floore to the bridge. Moreouer, on the lower side of the bridge, he droue down supporters, which being fastened to the timber worke, did strengthen the bridge against the force of the water; and on the vpper side of the bridge, at a reasonable distance, he placed piles to hinder the force of trees or boates, or what else the enemy might cast downe to trouble the worke: within tenne daies, that the timber beganne to be cut downe and caried, the worke was ended, and the Army transported. Cæsar, leauing a strong guarizon at either end of the bridge, went into the confines of the Sicambri.

OBSERVATION.

IT shall not be amisse, to enter a little into the consideration of this bridge; as well in regard of the ingenious Architecture thereof, as also that we may somewhat imitate Cæsar: whom wee may obserue to insift with as great plenty of wit and eloquence, in presenting vnto vs the subtiltie of his inuention, in such manner of handy works, as vpon any other part of his actions; as this particular description of the bridge, may sufficiently witness: besides, the fortifications at Alecia, & the intrenchments in Britany, for the safety of his shipping, with many other works, which he might well record, as the greatest designes of an heroick spirit, and the wonderfull effects of magnanimous industrie, that succeeding ages might not boast either of Arte or prowesse, which his vertue had not expressed; or otherwise might wonder

wonder at that worth, which they themselves could not attaine vnto. And to that purpose, he entertained Vitruuius, the Father of Architecture, and as worthily to be imitated in that facultie, as his Maister Cæsar is in seates of Armes. By whose example, a great Commaunder may learne, how much it importeth the eternitie of his fame, to beautifie his greatest designs with Art, and to esteeme of such as are able to intreat the Mathematicall Muses, to shew themselves vnder the shape of a sensible forme; which albeit, through the rudenesse of the matter, fall farre short of the truth of their intellectuall nature, yet their beautie expresseth such a maiestie of Arte, that no time will suffer the memorie thereof to perish.

The workmanship of this bridge consisted chiefly in the oblique situation of the double postes, whereof the first order bending with the streame, and the lower ranke against the streame, when they came to be coupled together with ouerthwart beames, which were fastened in the couplings with braces, which he nameth *Fibulas*; the more violent the streame fell vpon the work, the faster the ioynts of the building were vnited, as may better appeare by a modcell of that making, then can be expressed by any circumstance of words.

I might hence take occasion to speake of the diuersitie of bridges, and of the practices which antiquitie hath deuised, to transport Armies ouer Riuers: but inasmuch as it is a common subiect for all that vndertake this Militarie task, & hath been handled by Lipsius, vpon the occasion of this bridge; I will refer the Reader to that place; and onely note the singular disposition of this action, inasmuch as Cæsar made the meanes correspondent to that end which hee intended. For, considering that the chiefest end of his passage was, to let the Germans vnderstand, that the power of the Romaine Empire, was not bounded with the Rhene; and that a riuer could not so separate their territories, but that they were able to ioyne both the Continents together, and make a common roade way, where it seemed most vnpassable: hee thought it best to passe ouer his Armie by a bridge, that so the Germanes might knowe the power of his forces, and also conceit their Territories, as vnited vnto Gallia; or to be vnited at the pleasure of the Romans, with a firme Isthmus and plaine passage by foote, which in times past had alwaies been separated by a mightie riuer. Neither would a transportation by boat haue wrought that effect, forasmuch as the daily vse thereof was so familiar to the Germanes, that it nothing altered their imagination, of an vnaccessible passage: but when they saw so strange a thing attempted, & so suddainely performed, they would easily vnderstand, that they were not so farre off, but that they might bee ouertaken: and so direct their demeanour accordingly.

Let this suffice therefore to proue, that a passage ouer a riuer by a bridge, is more honourable, safe, and of greater terror to the enemy, then any other way that can be deuised; especially, if the riuer carrie any depth, such as the Rhene is: otherwise, if it haue either shallowes or fordes, whereby men may wade ouer, without any great incombrance, it were but lost labour to stand about a bridge; but rather to thinke of it, as of a place incombred with such hindrances, as men often meet with a march.

*Lib. de
Machi.*

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar taketh reuenge vpon the Sicambri: giueth libertie to the Vbij; and returneth againe into Gallia.

Cæsar.



HE Sicambri, vnderstanding that Cæsar was making a bridge ouer the Rhene, prepared themselues to flie; and at the perswasion of the Vsiptes, forsooke their country, and conuaied themselues and their possessions into woods and solitarie Deserts. Cæsar, continuing a few daies in their quarters, hauing set on fire their villages and houses, and burned vp their Corne and prouision; he came to the Vbij, promising them aide against the Sueui: by whom, he vnderstood, that as soone as the Sueui had intelligence, that hee went about to make a bridge, calling a Councell, according to their manner, they sent vnto all quarters of their State, that they should forsake their townes, and carie their wiues and children, and all that they had, into the woods: and that all that were able to beare Armes, should make head in one place, which they appointed to be the midst of their Country; & there they attended the comming of the Romans, & were resolued in that place to giue the battell. Which when Cæsar vnderstood, hauing ended all those things, in regard vwhereof he came into Germanie, vvhich was chiefly to terrifie the Germans, to be reuenged vpon the Sicambri, to set the Vbij at libertie; hauing spent in all eighteene daies beyond the Rhene, as well in regard of his own honor, as the good of the Common-veale: hee returned into Gallia, and brake vp the bridge.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar thinketh of a voiage into Britanie: hee enquireth of Merchants, concerning the nature of that people.

Cæsar.



Lthough the Sommer was almost spent, & that in those parts the winter hastened on apace, inasmuch as all Gallia inclineth to the North; notwithstanding, hee resolued to goe ouer into Britanie: forasmuch as hee vnderstood, that in all the former warres of Gallia, the Enemy had received most of their supplie from thence. And, although the time of the yeere would not suffer him to finish that warre; yet hee thought it would bee to good purpose, if he went onely to view the Island, to vnderstand the qualitic of the inhabitants,

inhabitants, and to know their Coast, their Ports, & their landing places; whereof the Gallies were altogether ignorant: for, sildome any man but Marchants did trauell vnto them. Neither was there any thing discovered but the Sea-coast, & those Regions which were opposite vnto Gallia. And therefore, calling Marchants together from all quarters, he neither could vnderstand of what quantity the Iland was, what Nations, or of vvhhat power they vvere that inhabited it; vvhhat vse or experience of warre they had; what lawes or customes they vsed; nor what Hauens they had to receiue a Nauie of great shipping.

OBSERVATION.



As the Germans had oftentimes stirred vp motions of rebellion amongst the Gallies, by sending their superfluous multitudes into their kingdome; so the Britaines had vpheld most of their warres, by furnishing them with such supplies, as from time to time they stood in need of. So that if Cæsar, or the Romane people, would rest secure of their quiet and peaceable government in Gallia, as they had chastised the insolencie of the Germans, and sent them backe againe, with greater losse then gaine; so was it necessary to make the Britaines knowe, that their assistance in the warre of Gallia, would draw more businesse vpon them, then they were well able to manage. For, as I haue noted in my former discourses, the causes of an vnpeaceable government, are as well externall and forraigne, as internall, and bred in the bodie; which neede the helpe of a Physician, to continue the body in a perfect state of health, and require as great a diligence to qualifie their malicious operations, as any internall sicknesse whatsoeuer.

In the second Commentarie, I briefly touched the commoditie of good discouerie: but because it is a matter of great consequence, in the fortunate carriage of a warre, I will once againe by this example of Cæsar, remember a Generall not to be negligent in this dutie. Suetonius, in the life of our Cæsar reporteth, that he neuer vndertooke any expedition, but he first receiued true intelligence of the particular site and nature of the Country, as also of the manners and qualitie of the people: and that he would not vndertake the voiage into Britanie, vntill hee had made perfect discouerie by himselfe, of the magnitude and situation of the Iland. Which Suetonius might vnderstand by this first voyage, which Cæsar would needs vndertake in the later end of a Sommer, although it were as he himselfe saith, but to discover.

It is recorded by ancient Writers, that those demi-gods that gouerned the world in their time, gaue great honour to the exercise of hunting, as the perfect image of warre in the resemblance of all parts; and namely, in the discouerie and knowledge of a Country: without which, all enterprises, either of sport in hunting, or earnest in warres, were friuolous and of no effect. And therefore Xenophon in the life of Cyrus, sheweth, that his expedition against the King of Armenia, was nothing but a repetition of such sports, as hee had vsed in hunting. Howsoeuer, if the infinite examples registred in historie, how by the

dexterity of some Leaders it hath gained great victories, and through the negligence of others, irrecouerable ouerthrowes, are not sufficient motiues to perswade them to this duty: let their owne experience in matters of small moment, manifest the weaknes of their proceedings, whē they are ignorant of the chiefest circumstances of the matter they haue in hand. But let this suffice in the second place, to proue the necessity of good discouerie; and let vs learn of Cæsar, what is principally to bee inquired after in the discouery of an vnknown country; as first, the quantity of the land: secondly, what Nations inhabite it: thirdly, their vse of warre: fourthly, their ciuill gouernment: and lastly, what Hauens they had to receiue a Nauie of great shipping. All which circumstances, are such principall Arteries in the bodie of a State, that the discouery of any one of these demands, would haue giuen great light, concerning the motion of the whole body.

CHAP. IX.

Cæsar sendeth C. Volusenus, to discover the coast
of Britanie; and prepareth himselfe for
that voiage.

Cæsar.
Teroanne, or
Monstrell.



*C*ÆSAR sent out Caius Volusenus, with a Galley, to discover what he could concerning these things; and to returne againe vnto him very speedily: hee himselfe marched in the meane time, with all his forces, vnto the Morini; forasmuch as from thence, lay the shortest cut into Britanie. Thither hee commaunded that shippes should be brought from all the maritime Citties of that quarter, and namely that fleet, which hee had built the yeere before for the warre at Vannes. In the meane time, his resolution beeing knowne, and caried into Britanie by Merchants and others, many priuate States of that Iland sent Embassadors vnto him, promising him hostages of their loyalty, and signifying their readinesse to submit themselues to the Romaine Empire. To these he made liberall promises, exhorting them to continue in that obedience; and so sent them backe againe. And with them he sent Comius, whom he had made King of Arras, whose wisdom & vertue he held in good account, and knew it to be of great authoritie in those Regions. To him hee gaue in charge to goe to as many of the States as hee could, and perswade them to accept of the friendship of the Romaine Empire, and that Cæsar himselfe would presentlie follow after.

Volusenus, hauing taken what view of the Country he could (for, he durst not goe on shore to commit himselfe to the barbarisme of the enemy) after five daies returned to Cæsar: and while hee staid in those places, for the furnishing of his fleet, the Morini sent Messengers vnto him, excusing their former faultes, and manifesting their readinesse to obey his mandates.

Cæsar,

Caesar, not willing to leaue any enemie behind him, or to neglect his voyage into Britanie, for such small matters; hee willingly accepted of their submission, hauing first receiued many hostages of them, and hauing made readie eighty ships of burthen, which he thought sufficient to transport two legions, he diuided the Galleies to the Questor, the Legates, and the Commaunders of the horse. There were also eigheteene ships of burthen more, which lay wind-bound at a Port eight miles off, and them he appointed for the horsemen. The rest of the Army, he committed to Q. Titurius Sabinus, and L. Arunculeius Cotta, commaunding them to goe to the confines of Menapij: and appointed P. Sulp. Rufus, a Legate, to keep the Port, with a sufficient guarizon.

CHAP. X.

Caesar faileth into Britanie, and landeth his men.

T*Hese things beeing thus dispatched; hauing a good wind, in the third watch, he put out to Sea, commaunding his horsemen to imbarke themselves at the further Port; which was but slowly performed: He himselfe arriued vpon the coast about the fourth houre of the day, where hee found all the Clifts possessed with the forces of the enemy. The nature of the place was such, that the hills lay so steep ouer the sea, that a weapon might easily be cast, from the higher ground vpon the lower shore: and therefore he thought it no fit landing place; notwithstanding, hee cast anchor untill the rest of the Nauie were come vp vnto him.*

In the meane time, calling a Councell of the Legates and Tribunes, hee declared vnto them what aduertisements he had receiued by Volusenus, and told them what he would haue done; and withall, admonished them, that the course of Militarie affaires, and especially Sea matters, that had so suddaine & vnconstant a motion, required all things to be done at a beck, and in due time. The Councell beeing dismissed, hauing both wind and tide with him, hee waighed anchor, and sailed eight miles from that place, vnto a plaine and open shore.

The Britaines, perceiuing the Romans determination, sent their horse & chariots before, and the rest of their forces followed after, to the place where the Romaines intended to land. Caesar found it exceeding difficult to land his men, for these respects: the shippes were so great, that they could not be brought neere vnto the shore; the souldiers in strange & vnknowne places, hauing their hands laden with great and heauie weapons, were at one instant to goe out of the ship, to withstand the force of the billow, and to fight with the enemy; where-as the Britaines either standing vpon the shore, or making short sallies into the vvater, did bolaly cast their weapons in knowne and frequented places, and managed their horses, as accustomed to such seruices.

Caesar.


The

The Romans beeing terrified with these things, and altogether unskilfull of this kind of fight, did use the same courage as they were wont to doe in land-services. Which whē Caesar perceiued, he caused the Galleies, that were both strange to the Brittaines, and readier for use, to be remoued from the shippes of burthen, and to be rowed up and downe, and laid against the open side of the enemy; that from thence, with slings, engines and arrowes, the Enemy might bee beaten up from the water side; which stood the Romans in good stead: for, the Britains, being troubled with the strangeness of the Gallies, the motion of their Oares, and the vnusuall kind of engines; were somewhat dismaied, and beganne to retire backe, and giue way to the Romans. But the souldiers still lingering, and especially for feare of the depth of the sea, the Eagle-bearer of the tenth legion, desiring the Gods, that it might fall out happily to the legion: If you will, saith hee, forsake your Eagle, O yee souldiers, and betray it to the enemy; for mine owne part, I will doe my dutie, both to the Common-weale, and to my Imperator. And having spoken this with a loud voice, he cast himselfe into the Sea, and caried the Eagle toward the Enemy. The Romaines, exhorting one another, not to suffer such a dishonour to be committed, they all leaped out of the shippe: which when others that were neere at hand perceiued, they followed them with as great alacritie, and pressed towards the enemy to incounter with them.

The fight on both parts was very eager: the Romans (not being able to keepe any order of battell, nor to get any firme footing, nor to follow their Ensignes, forasmuch as euery man kept with those Ensignes which he first met withall) were wonderfully troubled. But the Enemy, acquainted with the flats and shallowes, as they beheld them from the shore to come single out of their shippes, putting spurres to their horse, would set vpon them incombred and vnprepared, & many of them would ouer-lay a few: others, would get the aduantage of the open side, and cast their weapons amongst the thickest troupes of them. Which when Caesar perceiued, he caused the shipboates and smaller vessels to be manned with souldiers: and where he saw need of help, hee sent them to rescue such as were ouercharged.

As soone as the Romaines got footing on the firme land, they made head together, and charged the enemy, and so put them to flight; but they were not able to follow them, nor take the Island at that time, for want of horsemen, which thing was onely wanting to Casars fortune.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

 Pon this circumstance of landing, I may iustly take occasion to handle that controuersie, which hath beene often debated by our English Captaines, which is, whether it be better in question of an inuasion, & in the absence of our shipping, to oppose an enemy at his landing vpon our Coast; or quietly to suffer him to sette his men on shore, and retire our forces into some in-land place, & there attend to giue him battell? It seemeth that such as first set this question on foot, and were of an opini-

on,

on, that we ought not by any means to encounter an enemy at his landing; for, so we might much endanger our selves and our Country; did ground themselves vpon the authority of Monsieur de Langey, not obseruing the difference between an Island and a Continent. For, where he setteth downe that position, he plainly aimeth at such Princes, as border one vpon another in the same Continent: but where their territories are disioyned by so great a bar as the Ocean, and haue not such meanes to surprize one another, it were meere folly to hold good that rule, as shall better appeare by the sequell of this discourse. Wherein I will first lay downe the reasons, that may be vrged to proue it vn safe to oppose an enemy at his landing, not as beeing vrged by that party (for, I neuer heard any probable motiue from them, which might induce any such opinion) but set downe by such as haue looked into the controuersies, both with experience, and good iudgement.

And first, it may be objected, that it is a hard matter to resist an enemy at his landing, as well in regard of the vncertaintie of place, as of time: for, beeing ignorant in what place hee will attempt a landing, wee must either defend all places of access, or our intentions will proue meere friuolous; & to performe that, it is requisite that our defensiuie forces be sufficient, according to the particular qualitie of euery place subiect to danger: which, considering the large extension of our maritime parts, and the many landing places on our Coast, will require a greater number of men, then this Island can afford. And although it could furnish such a competent number, as might seeme in some sort sufficient; yet the vncertaintie of the time of the enemies arriual, would require that they should be lodged, either vpon, or neere the places of danger, many daies at least, if not many weekes, before the instant of their attempt, which would exhaust a greater masse of Treasure, then could bee well afforded by the State.

Secondly, it may be objected, that all our landing places are of such disadvantage for the defendants, that it were no safetie at all to make head against him at the landing: for, inasmuch as such places are open & plaine, they yield no commoditie to shelter the defendants from the furie of the artillerie, wherewith the Enemy will plentifully furnish their long boates and landing vessailes; which beating vpon the beach (for, most of our landing places are of that qualitie) will so scatter them, that no man shall be able to indure the inconuenience thereof.

The third obiection, may arise from the disparitie both of numbers, and condition of the forces of either partie: for the first, it must needs be granted, that the defendants, beeing to guard so many places at once, cannot furnish such numbers to euery particular place for defence, as the assailants may for offence.

Concerning the qualitie of the forces, it is without question, that a great & potent Prince (for, such a one it must be, that vndertaketh to inuade the territories of so absolute and well obeyed a Princeesse as her Maiestie is) would draw out the floure of his soulderie wheresoeuer; besides, the gallant troupes of voluntaries, which doe commonlie attend such seruices. Now, these being thus qualified,

qualified, and drawne into one head, and being to make as it were but one bodie: how can it be reasonably imagined (the time and place of their attempt being vncertaine) that the defendants should equall them with forces of like vertue and experience?

These are the reasons, which may be drawne from the disadvantage, which they haue that goe about to oppose an enemy at his landing: the rest that haue beene vrged, by such as maintaine this opinion, are either impertinent to the question, or taken altogether from false grounds. But before I proceed to the aunswere of these reasons, I will lay this downe for a principle: That it is impossible for any forraigne Prince, how puissant soeuer, to make such a preparation as shall be fitting, to inuade a State so populous, and respectiue of their Soueraigne (notwithstanding the pretences deuised to dissemble the same) but it must of necessitie be discovered, before it can be made able to put any thing in execution: which I might enlarge by particularizing the infinite equipage, which is required for so great a fleet. But I will rest my selfe in the example of the yeere 88, which proueth the discouery of the pretended inuasion, before it could come to execution.

*Answere to
the first ob-
iection.*

Concerning therefore the first obiection: it cannot indeed be denied, but the place of the enemies landing will be doubtfull, and therefore our care must generally extend it selfe to all places of access: but that our defensiuie forces are not sufficient in a competent manner to guard all such places, according as the necessitie of them shall require, that is the point in question.

To proue that our forces are sufficient: we must necessarily enter into particularities, wherein I will take Kent for a president, as not altogether vnacquainted with the state thereof; which, if I deceiue not my selfe, is a shore of as large extension vpon the maritimate parts, as any other within this kingdom. For the breadth thereof enlarging it selfe from the point of Nesse by Lyd, which is the vtermoost skirt vpon the coast of Suffex, vnto Margate, vpon the coast of Effex; is by computation about twentie foure miles: but notwithstanding this large circuit, who knoweth not, that the sixt part thereof is not subiect to the landing of such an enemy as wee speake of: partly, in regard of the hugenessse of the cliffes, which doe inclose a great part of that skirt; & partly in regard that much of that quantitie, which may be landed vpon, hath such eminent and difficult places neere adioyning, as an Armie that should put it selfe there on shore, should find it selfe, being opposed but by a small force, so straitened, as they would not easily find a way out, without apparant ruine of their whole forces.

Further, it cannot be denied, but that generally along the coast of Kent, there are so many rocks, shelues, flats, and other impediments, that a Nauie of great shippes can haue no commoditie to anchor neere the shore: and for the most part, the coast lieth so open to the weather, that the least gale of wind will put them from their Anchor: all which particularities duly considered, it will appeare that this large skirt of Kent, will afford a far lesser part fit for the landing of an Army, then was thought of at the first. And were it that so publique a treatise as this is, would admit with good discretion such an exact relation, as falleth within my knowledge concerning this point, I would vndertake to make

it

it so euident, by the particular description, both of the number, quantitie, and qualitie of the places themselves, as no man of an indifferent iudgement, wold imagine our forces to be insufficient, to afford euery of them such a safe & sure guard, as shal be thought requisite for the same. But forasmuch as it is vnfitting to giue such particular satisfaction in this publique discourse, giue mee leaue, submitting my selfe alwaies to better iudgements, to giue a generall taste of that meanes as wold secure all places, with a competent number of men.

Hauiug shewed you before, the circuit of the maritimate parts of Kent, I wold obserue this order: first, to make a triple diuision of all such forces, as shal be appointed for this seruice; as for example, I will suppose the number to bee twelue thousand, of which I wold lodge three thousand about the point of Nesse, and three thousand about Margate, and sixe thousand about Foulkston, which I take to be as it were the center: for, my greatest care should bee so to dispose of them, as they might not only succour one another in the same shire: but as euery shire bordereth one vpon another; so they should mutually giue helpe one vnto another, as occasion should be offered: as if the enemy should attempt a landing about Nesse, not onely the sixe thousand lodged as before, should march to their succours, but such also of the Suffex forces as were neer vnto that part; & so likewise of the rest. By which you may see, how great a force wold in few houres be assembled, for the renforcing of any of these out-skirts; and the rather, forasmuch as the one halfe of the whole forces, are thus lodged in the center of the Shire, which is neerer to all parts thē any other place whatsoever. There wold also in the quartering of them, an especiall care be had to the places of danger, as might be answerable to the importance thereof: for, my meaning is not to lodge them close together, but to stretch them out along the coast, by regiments and companies, as the Country might afford best opportunity to entertaine them.

Now, concerning the later part of this obiection, which vrgeth the vncertainie of time, when the enemy shall make his approches: I hold it most requisite, that our defensiuē forces should be drawne into a head, before the enemy should be discovered neer our coast, ready to put himselfe on shore: for, it were a grosse absurditie to imagine, that companies could vpon such a suddaine bee assembled, without confusion; and make so long a march, with such expedition, as the necessitie of the occasion wold require. Now, for that husbanding respect of her Maiesties coffers, which is vrged to such extremitie, as it wold be vnsupportable for this State to beare: as I doubt not but good intelligence wold much qualifie that supposed immoderate expence; so I assure my selfe, that men of sound iudgement, will deeme it much out of season to dispute about vnecessary thrift, when the whole kingdome is brought in question of being made subiect to a stranger:

*Vt iugulent homines surgunt de nocte latrones:
Non expergisceris, vt te ipsum serues?*

The enemy (peradventure) hath kept 30000 men in pay 2 months before, to make hauocke of our Country, and to bring vs into perpetuall thraldome;
shall

shall we thinke it much to maintaine sufficient forces vpon our Coast, to assure our selues that no such enemy shall enter into our Country? The extremitie of this charge, would be qualified by our good espial, which would proportion our attendance, with the necessitie which is imposed vpon vs, to be carefull in busineses of this nature. Let this suffice therefore to proue, that our forces are sufficient to keepe the Sea-coast; and that the vncertaintie of time, when the enemy will make his attempts, ought not to hinder vs from performing that dutie, which the care and respect of our Prince and Country, imposeth vpon every good subiect; which is the substance of the first reason, which I set down in the beginning of this discourse.

*The answer
to the second
reason.*

Now, concerning the second reason, which vrgeth the disadvantage of the place, in regard of the furie of the Enemies artillery. True it is, that such places as yeeld the Enemy commoditie of landing, are for the most part plaine and open, and afford naturally no couert at all. What then? shall a souldier take every place as he findeth it, and vse no Arte to qualifie the disadvantages thereof? Or shall a man forgoe the benefite of a place of aduantage, rather then hee will relieue with industry, the discommoditie of some particular circumstance? I make no question, but an ingenious Commaunder, being in seasonable time lodged with conuenient forces vpon any of those places, yea, vpon the beach it selfe, which is vnapt to make defensible, as any place whatsoever, would vse such industrie, as might giue sufficient securitie to his forces, & ouer-weigh the Enemy with aduantage of place; especially, considering that this age hath afforded such plentifull examples of admirable inuentions in that behalfe. But this cannot be done, if our forces do not make head before the instant of the Enemies attempt, that our Commaunders may haue some time to make readie store of Gabions, hand-baskets, with such moueable matter as shal be thought fit for that seruice.

Neither let this trouble any man: for, I dare auouch it, that if our forces are not drawne into a head before the Enemy bee discouered vpon the Coast, although wee neuer meane to oppose their landing, but attend them in some inland place, to giue them battaile; our Commaunders will be farre to seeke of manie important circumstances, which are requisite in a matter of that consequence. And therefore, let vs haue but a reasonable time to bethinke our selues of these necessaries, and wee will easilie overcome all these difficulties, and vse the benefite of the firme land to repell an Enemy, weakened with the Sea, tossed with the billow, troubled with his weapons, with many other hinderances and discouragements, which are presented vnto him both from the Land and the Sea. Hee that saw the landing of our forces in the Iland of Fiall, in the yeere 97, can some-what iudge of the difficultie of that matter: for, what with the working of the Sea, the steepnesse of the Clifles, the troublesomnesse of their Armes, the souldiers were so incombred, that had not the Enemy been more then a coward, he might well with two hundred men, haue kept vs from entering any part of that Iland.

*The answer
to the 3 reason*

Concerning the third Obiection, this briefly shall bee sufficient, that vvee are not so much to regard, that our forces doe equall them in number,

as to see that they bee sufficient for the nature of the place, to make it good against the Enemies landing: for, wee know that in places of aduantage and difficult accessse, a small number is able to oppose a great; and wee doubt not, but all circumstances duely considered, wee shall proportionably equall the Enemy, both in number and qualitie of their forces: alwaies presupposed, that our State shall neuer bee destitute of sufficient forces trayned, and exercised in a competent manner, to defende their Countrey from forraigne Enemies. For, the neglect thereof were to drawe on such as of themselues are but too forward to make a prey of vs; and to make vs vnapt, not onelie to oppose an Enemies landing, but to defende our selues from beeing ouer-runne, as other Nations liuing in securitie, without due regarde thereof, haue beene.

And this much concerning the answer to those three reasons, which seeme to prooue that an Enemy is not to be resisted at his landing. Now if wee doe but looke a little into the discommodities, which follow vpon the landing of an Enemy, we shall easily discouer the dangerousnesse of this opinion: as first, we giue him leave to liue vpon the spoile of our Countrey; which cannot bee prevented by any waisting, spoiling, or retiring of our provisions, in so plentifull a Country as this is, especially considering that we haue no strong townes at all to repose our selues vpon. Wherof we need no further testimonie, then is deliuered vnto vs out of the seuenth booke of these Commentaries, in that warre, which Cæsar had with Vercingetorix.

Secondly obedience, which at other times is willingly giuen to Princes, is greatly, weakned at such times; wherby all necessary means to maintain a war is hardly drawn frõ the subiect. Thirdly, opportunity is giuen to malecontents & ill disposed persons, either to make head themselues, or to flie to the Enemy. Fourthly, the madnesse to aduenture a kingdome vpon one stroke, hauing it in our disposition to do otherwise, with many other disadvantages, which the opportunity of any such occasion would discouer.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He word Imperator, which the Eagle-bearer attributeth to Cæsar, was the greatest title that could be giuen to a Romane Leader: and as Zonaras in his second Tome saith, was neuer giuen but vpon some great exploit, and after a iust victory obtained; and then in the place where the battaile was fought, and the Enemy ouerthrowne, the Generall was saluted by the name of Imperator, with the triumphant shout of the whole Armie; by which acclamation, the souldiers gaue testimonie of his worth; and made it equiualent with the most furtunate Commanders.

This Ceremonie was of great antiquitie in the Roman Empire, as appeareth by manie Histories, and namely by Tacitus, where hee sayth, that Tyberius gaue that honour to Blesus, that hee should bee saluted Imperator by

*Of the name
Imperator.*

3. Annal.

the legions; which hee sheweth to bee an ancient dignitie belonging to great Captaines, after they had foiled the Enemy, with an eminent ouerthrow. For, euerie victorie was not sufficient, whereby they might challenge so great an honour, but there was required (as it seemeth) a certaine number of the Enemies to be slaine. Appian in his second book sayth, that in olde time the name of Imperator was neuertaken, but vpon great and admirable exploit: but in his time 10000. of the Enemy being slaine in one battell, was a sufficient ground of that honour. Cicero sayth, that 2000. slaine in the place, especially of Thracians, Spaniards or Galles, did worthily merit the name of Imperator. Howsoeuer; it seemeth by the same Author, that there was a certaine number of the Enemy required to be slaine, where he sayth, *Se iusta victoria Imperatorem appellatum.*

Phil. 14.

Lib. 2. epist. 9

CHAP. XI.

The Britaines make peace with Cæsar, but breake it againe vpon the losse of the Roman shipping.

Cæsar.



He Britaines being ouerthrowne in this battaile; as soone as they had recouered their safety by flight, they presently dispatched messengers to Cæsar to intreat for peace, promising hostages & obedience, in whatsoeuer he commanded. And with these Ambassadors returned Comius of Arras, whom Cæsar had sent before into Britany. Cæsar complained, that wheras they sent vnto him into Gallia to desire peace, notwithstanding at his comming they made war against him, without any cause or reason at all; but excusing it by their ignorance, hee commanded hostages to be deliuered vnto him: which they presently performed in part; and the rest being to be fet further off, should likewise bee rendered within a short time; in the meane while, they commaunded their people to returne to their possessions, and their Rulers and Princes came out of all quarters to commend themselues and their States to Cæsar. The peace being thus concluded; foure daies after that Cæsar came into Britanie, the 18. ships which were appointed for the horsemen, put out to sea with a gentle wind: and approaching so neere the coast of Britanie, that they were within viewe of the Roman Camp; there arose such a sodaine tempest, that none of them were able to holde their course, but some of them returned to the port from whence they came; other some were cast vpon the lower part of the Iland, which lieth to the West-ward; and there casting anchor tooke in such seas, that they were forced to commit themselues againe to the sea, and direct their course to the coast of Gallia. The same night it happened, that the moone being in the full, the tides were very high in those seas; whereof the Romans beeing altogether ignorant, both the Gallies which were drawne vp vpon the shoare were fild with the tide, and the shippes of burthen that lay at anchour, were shaken with the
tem-

tempest; neither was there any help to be giuen vnto them: so that many of them were rent, and split in peeces; and the rest lost both their anchors, gables and other tackling, and by that meanes became altogether vnseruiceable. Wherat the whole Army was exceedingly troubled; for there was no other shipping to recarry them backe againe: Neither had they any necessaries to new furnish the olde: and every man knew that they must needs winter in Gallia; forasmuch as there was no prouision of corn in those places where they were. Which thing being known to the Princes of Britanie, that were assembled to conferre of such things as Caesar had commanded them to perform; when they vnderstood that the Romans wanted both their horsemen, shipping and prouision of corn, and coniecturing of the paucity of their forces, by the small circuit of their Campe; and that which was more important then all the rest, that Caesar had transported his souldiers without such necessary cariages, as they vsed to take with them: they thought it their best course to rebell, and to keepe the Romans from corne and conuoyes of prouision, and so prolong the matter, vntill winter came on. For, they thought that if these were once ouerthrown and cut off from turning into Gallia, neuer any man would afterward adventure to bring an Army into Britanie: therefore they conspired againe the second time, and conuaid themselves by stealth out of the Camp, and got their men priuily out of the fields, to make head in some conuenient place against the Romans.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Concerning the ebbing and flowing of the sea, and the causes thereof; it hath already been handied in the second book: to which I wil adde this much, as may serue to shew, how the Romans became so ignorant of the spring tides, which happen in the full and newe of the Moone. It is obserued by experience, that the motion of this waterie element is altogether directed by the course of the moon; wherein she exerciseth her regency, according as shee findeth the matter qualified for her influence. And forasmuch as all mediterranean seas, & such gulfs as are inclosed in sinues and bosomes of the earth, are both abridged of the liberty of their course, and through the smallness of their quantity, are not so capable of celestiall power, as the Ocean it selfe: it consequently followeth, that the Tuscan seas, wherewith the Romans were chiefly acquainted, were not so answerable in effect to the operation of the moon, as the main sea, whose bounds are ranged in a more spacious circuit; and through the plentiful abundance of his parts, better answereth the vertue of the Moon. The Ocean therefore being thus obedient to the course of the celestial bodies, taking hir course of flowing frō the North, falleth with such a current between the Orcades, and the maine of Noruegia; that she filleth our channell between England and France, with great swelling tides; & maketh her motion more eminent in these quarters, then in any other parts of the world. And hence it happeneth, that our riuer of Thames, lying with her mouth so ready to receiue the tyde as it commeth, and hauing withall a plaine

levelled belly, and a very smal fresh current, taketh the tide as far into the land, as any other known riuer of Europe. And for this cause the Romans were ignorant of the spring tides in the full of the moon.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Such as either by their own experience, or otherwise by obseruation of that which history recordeth, are acquainted with the government of Common weales, are not ignorant with what difficultie a nation, that either hath long liued in libertie, or bin governd by Cōmanders of their owne choosung, is made subiect to the yোক of bondage, or reduced vnder the obedience of a stranger. For, as we are apt by a naturall inclination to ciuill society; so by the same nature wee desire a free disposition of our selues and possessions, as the chieft end of the saide societie: and therefore in the government of a subdued State, what losse or disadvantage happeneth to the Victor, or how indirectly soeuer it concerneth the bond of their thraldom, the captiue people behold it as a part of their adversaries ouerthrow; and conceiue thereupon such spirits as answer the greatnes of their hope, and sort with the strength of their will, which alwaies maketh that seem easie to be effected which it desireth. And this was the reason that the Britains altered their resolution of peace, vpon the losse which the Romans had receiued in their shipping.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar new trimmeth his late shaken nauie: the Britains set vpon the Romans as they haruested; but were put off by CÆSAR.

Cæsar.



Cæsar although hee had not discovered their determination, yet coniecturing of the euent by the losse of his shipping, and by their delay of giuing vp hostages; hee provided against all chaunces: for, hee brought corne daily out of the fieldes into his Campe; and tooke the hulls of such shippes as were most dismembred, and with the timber and brasse therof he mended the rest that were beaten with the tempest, causing other necessaries to be brought out of Gallia. Which being handled with the great industry and trauell of the Souldiers, he lost onely twelue shippes, and made the other able to abide the Sea.

While these things were in action, the seuenth legion being sent out by course, to fetch in corne, and little suspecting any motion of warre, as part of the souldiers continued in the field, and the rest went and came between them & the Campe; the

the station that watched before the gate of the Camp, gaue aduertisement to Caesar, that the same way which the legion went, there appeared a greater dust then was vsually seen. Caesar suspecting that which indeed was true, that the Britains were entred into som new resolution, he tooke those two cohorts which were in station before the port, commanding other two to take their place, and the rest to arm themselues, and presently to follow him, and went that way, where the dust was descried. And when he had marched some distance from the Camp, he saw his men overcharged with the Enemy, & scarce able to sustaine the assault, the legion thronged together on a heap, & weapons cast from al parts amongst them. For, when they had haruested all other quarters, ther remained one piece of corn, whither the Enemy suspected the Romans would at last come; and in the night time conuaied themselues secretly into the woods, where they continued vntill the Romans were come into the field: and as they sawe them disarmed, dispersed and occupied in reaping; they suddenly set vpon them, and slaying some fewe of them, rowted the rest and incompassed them about with their horsemen, and Chariots. Their manner of fight with Chariots, was first to ride up and down & cast their weapons, as they sawe aduantage; and with the terror of their horses and rattling of their wheeles, to disorder the companies; and when they had wound themselues between any troups of horse, they forsook their Chariots and fought on foot: in the mean time, the guiders of their chariots would driue a little aside, & so place themselues, that if their masters needed any helpe, they might haue an easie passage vnto them. And thus they performed, in al their fights, both the nimble motion of horsemen, and the firme stability of footmen; and were so ready with daily practice, that they could staie in the declinuity of a steep hill, and turne short or moderate their going, as it seemed best vnto them; and run along the beam of the coach and rest vpon the y oak, or harnesse of their horses, and return as speedily again at their pleasure. The Romans being thus troubled, Caesar came to rescue them in very good time: for, at his comming, the Enemy stood still; and the soldiers gathered their spirits vnto them, and began to renew their courage that was almost spent. Caesar taking it an unfit time, either to prouoke the Enemy, or to giue him battel; he continued a while in the same place: and then returned with the legions into the Camp. While these things were a-doing, and the Romans thus busied, the Britains that were in the field, conuaied themselues al a way.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

BY this we plainly find, that there were vsually two cohorts (which according to the rate of 120. in a maniple, amounted to the number of 720. men) which kept the daie watch before the gate of the Camp, & were alwaies in readines vpon any seruice. The commodity whereof appeareth by this accident: for, considering that the aduertisemēt required haste and speedy recourse; it greatly furthered their rescue, to haue so many men ready to march forward at the first motion, that they might giue what helpe they could, vntill the rest of their fellowes came in.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Heir manner of fight with Chariots, is very particularly described by Cæsar, and needeth not to be stood vpon any longer: only I obserue that neither in Gallia, nor any other country of Europ, the vse of Chariots is euer mentioned: but they haue euer beene attributed, as a peculiar fight, vnto the Easterne Countries, as suitable to the plain and leuell situation of the place, whereof we finde often mention in the scripture: which may serue for an argument to Geffrey of Monmouth, to proue the Britaines descent from Troy in Asia, where we likewise finde mention of such Chariots.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Hirdly, wee may obserue the discreet and moderate temper of his valour, and the meanes hee vsed to make his souldiers confident in his directions: for, notwithstanding the Britaines had exceedingly vrged him, to make hazard of a present reuenge; yet finding it an vnfit time, (inasmuch as his men had beene somewhat troubled, with the furie of the Britains) he thought it best to expect some other opportunitie. And againe, to auoid the inconueniences of a tearefull retrait, hee continued a while in the same place, to imbolden his men with the sight of the Enemy. And this manner of proceeding wrought a full perswasion in his soldiers, that his actions were directed with knowledge, and with a careful respect of their safetie: which gaue his men resolution when they were carried vpon seruice; being assured that what seruice soeuer they were imploied vpon, was most diligently to be performed, as a matter much importing the fortunate issue of that warre: whereas if they had perceiued, that headstrong fury (which carrieth men on with a desire of victorie, and neuer looketh into the meanes whereby it may be obtained) had directed the course of their proceedings, they might with reason haue drawn back from such employments, and valued their safety about the issue of such an enterprife. And hence ariseth that confident opinion, which the soldiers haue of a good Generall; which is a matter of great importance in the course of warre.

CHAP. XIII.

The Britaines make head, with their forces; and
are beaten by Cæsar: his returne into
GALLIA.



After this; for manie dayes together, there followed such tempests and foule weather, that both the Romans were constrained to keepe their Campe, and the Britaines were kept from attempting any thing against them: But in the meane time, they sent messengers into all quarters, publishing the smal number of the Roman forces, & amplifying the greatnesse of the booty, & the easie means offered unto them of perpetuall liberty, if they could take the Roman Campe. Shortly, upon this, hauing gathered a great companie, both of horse and foot; they came to the place where the Romans were incamped. Cæsar (although he foresawe the euent by that which before had hapned, that if the Enemy were beaten back, he would auoid the danger by flight) yet hauing som 30. horse, which Comius of Arras had carried with him, at his comming into Britany; he imbattailed his legions before his Camp; & so gaue them battel. The Enemy not being able to beare the assault of the Roman soldiers, turned their backs & fled: the Romans followed them, as far as they could by running on foote; and after a great slaughter, with the burning of their towns farre and neere, they returned to their Camp. The same day the Britains sent messengers to Cæsar, to intreat for peace; whom he commaunded to double their number of hostages, which he commaunded to be carried into Gallia. And forasmuch as the Aequinoctium was at hand; he thought it not safe to put himselfe to the winter sea, with such weake shipping: and therefore hauing got a conuenient time, he hoised saile a little after midnight, and brought all his ships safe vnto the Continent. Two of these ships of burthen, not beeing able to reach the same hauen, put in somewhat lower into the land: the souldiers that were in them being about 300. being set on shore, and marching towardes their Camp; the Morini, with whom Cæsar at his going into Britany had made peace, in hope of a booty, first with a fewe of their men stood about them, commanding them upon paine of death to laie downe their weapons: & as the Romans by casting themselues into an Orbe, began to make defence, at the noise and clamour amongst them, there were suddenly gathered together about 6000. of the Enemy. Which thing being knowen, Cæsar sent out all the horsemen to relieue them: in the meane time the Romans sustained the force of the Enemy, and fought valiantly the space of foure houres; and receiuing themselues some few wounds, they slew many of the Enemy. After the Roman horsemen came in sight, the Enemy cast awaie their weapons and fled, and a great number of them fell by the horsemen.

Cæsar.

OBSERVATION.



OF all the figures which the *Tactici* have chosen to make use of in military affairs; the circle hath ever been taken for the fittest, to be applied in the defensue part, as inclosing with an equall circuit on all parts whatsoever is contained within the circumference of that Area: and therefore Geometrie tearmeth a circumference a simple line, forasmuch as if you alter the site of the parts, and transport one arch into the place of another; the figure notwithstanding will remaine the same, because of the equal bending of the line, throughout the whole circumference. Which propriety, as it proueth an vniformity of strength in the whole circuit, so that it cannot be said that this is the beginning, or this is the end; this is front, or this is flank: So doth that, which Euclide doth demonstrate in the 3. of his Elements, concerning the smal affinity between a right line, and a circle (which being drawn to touch the circumference, doth touch it but in a point only) shew the greatness of this strength in regarde of any other line, by which it may be broken. Which, howsoever they seem, as speculative qualities, conceived rather by intellectuall discourse, then manifested to sensible apprehension; yet forasmuch as experience hath proued the strength of this figure, in a defensue part, aboue any other manner of imbattailing; let vs not neglect the knowledge of these naturall properties, which discouer the causes of this effect: neither let vs neglect this part of militarie knowledge, being so strong a means to maintain valour, & the sinew of al our abilitie: for, order correspondent to circumstances is the whole strength and power of an Army. Neither ought there any action in a well ordered discipline, to be irregular, or voide of order: and therefore the Romans did neither eat nor sleep, without the direction of the Consull, or chief Commander; otherwise their valour might rather have been tearmed fury then vertue: but when their courage was ranged with order, and disposed according to the occurrences of the time; it neuer failed as long as the saide order continued perfect.

It appeareth therefore, how important it is for a Commander to look into the diversity of orders for imbattailing, and to waigh the nature thereof; that he may with knowledge apply them to the quality of any occasion. The Romans tearmed this figure, *Orbis*; which signifieth a round body both with a concaue, and a conuex surface: in resemblance whereof, I vnderstand this Orbe of men imbattailed to be so named; which might peradventure consist of fise, or more, or fewer ranks, inclosing one another after the nature of so many circles, described about one Center: so that either the middest thereof remained voide, or otherwise contained such cariages, and impediments, as they had with them in their march. This form of imbattailing was neuer vied, but in great extremitie: for, as it was the safest of all other; so it gaue suspition to the soldiers of exceeding danger: which abated much of their heat in batel, as will hereafter appeare by the testimony of Cæsar himself, in the first Commentarie, vpon the occasion which happened vnto Sabinus and Cotta.

CHAP. XIII.



He next daie, *Caesar* sent *Titus Labienus* a Legate, with those legions which he had brought out of *Britany*, against the reuolted *Morini*; who hauing no place of refuge because their bogs & fennes were dried vp, where they had sheltered themselves the yeare before; they al sel vnder the power of his mercy. *L. Titurius*, & *A. Cotta* the Legats, who had led the legiōs against the *Menapij*, after they had wasted their fields, cut vp their corn, burned their houses (for, the *Menapij* were all hid in thicke woods) they returned to *Caesar*: these things being thus ended, *Caesar* placed the wintering Camps of al his legions amongst the *Belgæ*, to which place two only of all the Cities in *Britany*, sent hostages vnto him: the rest neglecting it. These wars being thus ended: vpon the relatiō of *Caesars* letters, the senat decreed a supplicatiō for the space of 20. daies.

Caesar.

OBSERVATION.

IN the end of the second Commentary, we read of a supplication granted by the Senat, for 15. daies; which was neuer granted to anie man before that time, since the first building of the Citie: but forasmuch as in this fourth yeare of the wars in *Gallia*, it was augmented from 15. vnto 20. daies, I thought it fit: to refer the handling therof, vnto this place. We are therefore to vnderstand, that whensoever a Roman Generall had carried himself well in the wars, by gaining a victory, or enlarging the boundes of their Empire: that then the Senate did decree a supplication to the gods, in the name of that Captain. And this dignity was much sought after: not onely because it was a matter of great honour, that in their names the Temples of their gods should be opened, and their victories acknowledged, with the concourse & gratulation of the Roman people; but also because a supplication was commonly the forerunner of a triumph, which was the greatest honor in the Roman government: And therefore *Cato* nameth it the prerogatiue of a triumph. And *Liuius* in his 26. book saith, that it was long disputed on in the Senate, how they could deny one that was there present to triumph, whose absence they had honoured, with supplication, & thankgiuing to the gods, for things happily effected: The manner of the Ceremonie was; that after the Magistrate had publikely proclaimed it with this form or stile, *quod bene & feliciter rempublicam administrasset*; the Roman people cloathed in white garments & crowned with garlands, went to all the Temples of the gods, and there offered sacrifices, to gratulate the victory in the name of the General. In which time they were forbidden all other businesses, but that which pertained to this solemnity. It seemeth that this time of supplicatiō, was at first included within one or 2. daies at the most. as appeareth by *Liuius* in his third book, where he saith, that the victorie gained by two severall battells, was spitefully shut vp by the Senat in one daies supplication; the people of their own accord keeping the next day holy, & celebrating it with greater deuotion then the former.

*Li 15. fanz.
Sicero.*

Vpon

Vpon the victory which Camillus had against the Veij, there were granted foure daies of supplication ; to which there was afterward a daie added, which was the vsuall time of supplication vnto the time that Pompei ended the warre, which they called Mithridaticum ; when the vsuall time of siue daies was doubled, and made 10. and in the second of these Commentaries, made 15. and now brought to 20. daies. Which setteth forth the incitements and rewards of wel doing, which the Romans propounded both at home and abroad, to such as in- deuoured to enlarge their Empire, or manage a charge, to the benefit of their Common-wealths. And thus endeth the fourth Commentarie.

THE

