

OBSERVATIONS VPON
THE THIRD BOOKE OF CAESAR
HIS COMMENTARIES.

THE ARGUMENT.



His Commentarie beginneth with an Accident, which happened in the latter ende of the former Sommer; wherein the Belgæ had so leane a haruest: and then it proceedeth to the warre betweene Cæsar and the Veneti; Crassus and the Aquitani; Titurius Sabinus and the Curiosolitæ; and Titus Labienus, with the Treuri.

CHAP. I.

Sergius Galba, beeing sent to cleere the passage of
*the Alpes, was besieged by the Seduni
and Veragri.*

Caesar.



CÆSAR, taking his iourney into Italie, sent Sergius Galba with the twelfth legion, and part of the horsemen unto the Nantuates, Veragri & Seduni: whose territories are extended from the riuer Rhone, and the lake Lemanus, unto the tops of the highest Alpes. The end of this voyage was chiefe-ly to cleere the Alpes of thieues & robbers, that liued by the spoile of Passengers, that trauailed betweene Italie and Gallia. Galba, hauing order if he found it expedient, to winter in those parts, after some fortunate in-counters, and the taking of some Castles and holds, he concluded a peace, and re-solved to place two cohorts of his legion amongst the Nantuates; and himselfe to winter with the other cohorts, in a towne of the Veragri, named Octodurus. This towne beeing sited in a narrow valley, and incircled about with mighty high hills, was diuided by a riuer into two parts, whereof he gaue one part to the Galles, and the other he chose for his wintering Campe, and fortified it about with a ditch & a rampier. After he had spent many daies of wintering, and giuen order, that corne should be brought thither for prouision; he had intelligence vpon a sudden, that the Galles in the night time, had all left that part of the towne that was al-lotted vnto them; and that the hills which hung ouer the valley, wherein the towne stood, were possess'd with great multitudes of the Seduni, and Veragri. The reasons of this suddaine commotion, vvere chiefly the paucitie of the Romaine forces,

forces, not making a compleat legion; forasmuch as two cohorts wintered amongst the Nantuates: besides many particulars, that were wanting upon necessary occasions. And to make them more contemptible in regard of themselves, the place afforded such advantage, that they were perswaded by reason of the steepe decliuitie of the hill, that the Romaines would not indure the brunt of the first assault: besides this, it grieved them exceedingly to haue their children taken from them, vnder the title of hostages; and the Alpes, which Nature had exempted from habitation, and placed as bounds betweene two large kingdomes, to be seized vpon by the Romaine legions, and vnitid to their Prouince.

Vpon these aduertisements, Galba, not hauing as yet finished the fortification of his Campe, nor made prouision of Corne and forrage for the winter season, in that he litte feared any motion of warre, being secured of their amitie, and obedience, both by hostages and rendry: hee presently called a Councell of warre, to determine what course was best to be taken. In which Councell, the mindes of many were so amazed, with the terrour of so vnexpected a danger, when they beheld the hills pestered with armed souldiers, the passages taken and intercepted by the Enemy, & no hope left of any succour or reliefe, that they could thinke of no other way for their safetie, then leauing behind them their baggage & impediments, to sallie out of their Campe, and so to saue themselves by the same way they came thither: notwithstanding, the greater part concluded, to referre that resolution to the last push; and in the meane time, to attend the fortune of the euent, and defend the Campe.

OBSERVATION.



Hich aduise, although at this time sorted to small effect; yet it better suited the valour of the Romaines, and sauoured more of tempered magnanimitie, then that former hazard, which argued the weakenesse of their minds, by their ouer-hastie and too forward resolution. For, as it imported greater danger, and discovered a more desperate spirit, to breake through the thickest troopes of their enemies, and so by strong hand to saue themselves by the helpe of some other fortune; so it manifested a greater apprehension of terrour, and a stronger impression of feare, which can afford nothing but desperate remedies: for, desperate and inconsiderate rashness, riseth sooner of feare, then of any other passion of the mind. But such as beheld the danger with a lesse troubled eye, and qualified the terrour of death with the life of their spirit, reseruing extremitie of helpe to extremitie of perill, and in the meane time attended what chances of advantage might happen vnto them, vpon any enterprize the enemy should attempt; they I say, so gaue greater scope to Fortune, & enlarged the bounds of changing accidents.

CHAP. II.

The enemy setteth vpon the wintering Camp:
Galba ouerthroweth them.

Caesar.

THE Councell beeing dismissed, they had scarce time to put in execution such things, as were agreed vpon for their defence: but the enemy, at a watch-word giuen, assaulted the Campe on all sides, with stones and darts, & other casting weapons. The Romans, at first, when their strength was fresh, valiantly resisted the brunt of the charge; neither did they spend in vaine any weapon which they cast frō the rampier; but what part soeuer of their Camp seemed to be in greatest danger, & want of help, thither they came with succour and reliefe; but heerein they were over-matched: for, the enemy being spent and wearied with fight, when soeuer any of them gaue place and forsooke the battell, there were alwaies fresh combatants to supply it. But the Romans, by reason of their small number, had no such helpe: for, their extremitie in that point was such, that no man was permitted neither for wearinesse nor wounds, to forsake his station, or abandon his charge. And, hauing thus fought continually the space of six houres, when both strength and weapons wanted, the enemy persisting with greater furie to fill the ditch, and breake downe the rampire, and their hopes relying vpon the last expectation, P. Sex. Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, whom we said to bee so sore wounded in the Neruian battell, and Caius Volusenus, Tribune of the souldiers, a man of singular courage and wisdom, ran speedily to Galba and told him, that the onely way of safety was to breake out vpon the enemy, and to try the last refuge in that extremitie. Whereupon, they called the Centurions, and by them admonished the souldiers to surcease awhile from fighting, and onely to receiue such weapons as were cast into the Campe; and so to rest the selues a little & recover their strength: and then at a watch-word, to sallie out of their Campe, and lay their safetie vpon their verue. Which the souldiers executed with such alacritie and courage of spirit, that breaking out at all the gates of the Camp, they gaue no leisure to the enemy to consider what was done, nor to satisfie his iudgement touching so vnexpected a noueltie. And thus Fortune beeing suddenly changed, they slew more then the third part of thirtie thousand, and put the rest to flight, not suffering them to stay vpon the hills neere about them.

OBSERVATION.

The force of
nouelty, tur-
ning the for-
tune of a bat-
telle.



High strange alteration, liuely describeth the force of noueltie, & the effectuall power of vnexpected aduentures: for, in the first course of their proceeding, vvherein the Romaines defended the Campe, & the Galles charged it by assault, the victory held constant with the Galles, & threatned death & mortality to the Romans.

mans. Neither had they any meanes to recouer hope of better successe, but by trying another way; which so much the more amazed the Gals, in that they had vehemently apprehended an opinion of victory, by a set fight continuing the space of 6. houres, without any likelihood of contrariety, or alteration. Which practice, of frustrating a desaigne intended, by an indirect and contrary answer, serued the Romans oftentimes to great aduantage; as besides this present example, in this Commentary we shall after ward read, how Titurius Sabinus defeated the Vncilos, with the same stratagem; and ouerthrew them by eruption & sallying out, when they expected nothing but a defensiu resistance from the rampier. From whence a Commander may learn, to auoid two contrarie inconueniencies, according as the qualitie of the war shall offer occasion: first (if other things be answerable, which a iudicious eye wil easily discouer) that a sally made out at diuers ports of a hold, wil much mitigate the heat of a charge, and controle the fury of an Enemy. And on the other side, he that besiegeth any place, what aduantage soeuer he hath of the defendant, may much better assure himself of good fortune, if he appoint certain troups in readines to receiue the charge of any eruption, that the rest that are busily imployed in the assault may prouide to answer it, without disorder or confusion. Which order, if the Galls had taken, they had not in likelihood so often been deceiued.

CHAP. III.

Galba returneth into the Prouince: the Vnelligieue occasion of a newe warre.



HE Enemy being thus defeated, Galba was unwilling to trie fortune any further; and the rather for that he wanted both corn & forrage: and therefore hauing burned the towne, the next day he returned towards the Prouince, and without let or resistance brought the legion safe into the Nantuates; and from thence to the *Allobroga, and there be wintered.

After these things were dispatched: Caesar supposing for many reasons, that all Gallia was now in peace, and that there was no further feare of any new war, the Belga being ouerthrowen, the Germans thrust out, and the Seduni amongst the Alps subdued & vanquished; in the beginning of the winter, as he went into Illyricum, hauing a great desire to see those nations: there grewe a sudden tumult and dissension in Gallia upon this occasion. Pub. Crassus wintering with the seauenth legion in Aniou neare vnto the Ocean, and finding scarcity of corn in those parts; he sent out the Prefects of the horsemen, and Tribunes, into the next cities to demand corn, and other prouisions for his legion: of whom Titus Terrasidius was sent vnto the *Venelli, Marcus Trebius to the *Curiosilita, Q. Velanius, & Titus Silius to the *Veneti. These Veneti were of greatest authoritie amongst all the maritimate nations in that coast, by reason of their great store of shipping,

Caesar.

*Sauoions.

*Le Perche
*Cornoaille.
in Bretaine.
*Vannes.

ping, with which they did trafficke in Britanie, and exceeded all their neighbour States in skil and experience of sea-faring matters; hauing the most part of such, as used those seas, tributaries to their State: These Veneti first auentured to retaine Sillius & Velanius, hoping therby to recover their hostages which they had giuen to Crassus. The finitimate Cities induced by their authority & exãple, for the same reason, laide hold vpon Trebius & Terasidius; and sending speedy ambassages one vnto another, coniuured by their princes and chiefest magistrates, to approue their fact by common consent, and to attend all the same euent of fortune; soliciting also other cities and States, rather to maintaine that libertie, which they had receiued of their Ancestors, then to indure the seruile bondage of a stranger.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The weakne
four iudge-
ment in re-
gards of the
knowledge o
future times



He circumstance in this history, which noteth the sudden breaking out of warres, when the course of things made promise of peace: sheweth first, what small assurance our reason hath of her discourse in calculating the natiuitie of *After-chances*; which so seldome answer the iudgement we giue vpon their beginnings, that when we speak of hap-pinesse, we find nothing but miserie: and contrariwise, it goeth often well with that part, which our Art hath condemned to ill fortune. And therefore I do not maruell, if when almost all nations are at ods, and in our best conceits, threaten destructiõ one to another, there happen a sudden motion of peace: or if peace be in speech, soothing the world with pleasing tranquillitie, & through the vn-certaintie of our weak probabilities, promise much rest after many troubles; there follow greater wars in the end, then the former time can truly speak of. Which being well vnderstood, may humble the spirits of our hauty politicians, that think to comprehend the conclusions of future times, vnder the premisses of their weak projects, and predestinate succeeding ages, according to the course of the present motion: when an accident so little thought of, shall break the maine streame of our iudgement, and falsifie the Oracles which our vnder-standing hath vttered. And it may learne them with all, how much it importeth a wise commander, to prevent an euill that may crosse his desaigne, (how vnlikely soeuer it be to happen) by handling it in such maner, as though it were necessarily to confront the same. For then a thing is well done, when it hath in it selfe both the causes of his being; and the direct meanes to resist the repug-nancie of a contrary nature: and so hap what will, it hath great possibilty to continue the same.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



His practice of the Veneti may instruct a circumspect Prince in cases of this nature, to haue a more watchfull ey ouer that Prouince or city, which shall be found most potent and mighty amongst the rest, then

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of any other interiour State of the same nature and condition: for, as example of it selfe is of great authoritie, making improbabilities seem full of reason, especially when the intencion shall sympathize with our will; so when it shall happen to be strengthened with powerfull meanes, and graced with the Act of superiour personages: it must needs be very effectual to stir vp mens minds, to approue that with a strong affection, which their own single iudgement did no way allow of. And therefore equality bringeth this aduantage to a Prince, which differencie cannot afford, that albeit example doe set on foote any rebellious motion, yet no supereminencie shall authorise the same.

The Authority of exāple

CHAP. IIII.

Cæsar hauing aduertisement of these new troubles; hasteth into Gallia, and prepareth for the WARRE.



ALL the maritime States being by this meanes drawn into the same conspiracy, they sent a cōmon ambassage vnto Crassus; that if he would haue his men againe, he must deliuer vp the hostages, which he had taken from them. Whereof Cæsar being certified by Crassus, in as much as hee was then a great way distant from his Army, he commanded Gallies and ships of warre to be built vpon the riuer * Loier, which runneth into the Ocean; and that Gallie-men, Mariners, and Ship-masters should be mustered in the Prouince: which being speedily dispatched, as soone as the time of the yeare would permit him, he came into Gallia. The Veneti and the rest of the confederacie, vnderstanding of Cæsars arriual, and considering how hainous a fact they had committed, in detaining the Ambassadors & casting them into yrons, whose name is held sacred & inuiolable amongst all nations: prepared accordingly to answer so eminent a danger, & especially such necessities, as pertained to shipping & sea-fights.

Cæsar.

* *Ligeris.*

THE OBSERVATION.



From hence I may take occasion, briefly to touch the reuerent opinion, which all nations, how barbarous soeuer, haue generally conceiued of the qualitie & condition of Ambassadors: and what the grounds are of this vniuersall received custome, which in all ages, and times hath held Authentical. And first we are to vnderstand, that all mankind (as indued with the same nature and properties) are so linked together in the strict alliance of humane societie, that, albeit their turbulent and disagreeing passions (which in themselves are vnnaturall, as proceeding from corruption

The grounds of that reuerent opinion which is held of Ambassadors.

ruption and defect) driue them into extream discord, & disunion of spirit, and breake the bonds of ciuil conuersation, which otherwise we do naturally affect: yet without a necessary entercourse and trafficke of societie, we are not able to keepe on foote the very discorde it selfe, in tearmes of reason and orderly proceeding, but all parts will be blended with disordered confusion & go to wrack, for want of these mutuall offices performed by messengers: so streight are the bonds of Nature, and so powerfull are the laws which she enacteth. And therefore if it were for no other end, which might sort to the benefit of either partie, (as there are many good vles thereof) yet to holde vp the quarrell and keepe it frō falling, making war, according to the grounds of reason, the entercourse of messengers is not to be interrupted, nor their persons to be touched with hateful violence: but that which the common reason of nations hath made a lawe, ought as religiously to be obserued, as an Oracle of our owne believe. Secondly, for as much as the end of warre is, or at the least should be, peace: which by treatie of mutuall messengers is principally to be confirmed, to the end that no people may seem so barbarous, as to maintaine a warre; which onely intendeth bloud, and proposeth as the chiefeſt obieſt, the death and mortalitie of mankind, no way respecting peace and ciuill government: such as refuse the entercourse of messengers, as the means of amity and concord, are iustly condemned in the iudgement of all nations, as vnworthy of humane societie. Last of al, it is an iniury of great dishonour, and deserueth the reward of extream infamy, to reuenge the master his quarrell vpon a seruant, and punish Ambassadors for the faults of their State: considering that their chiefeſt duty consisteth in the faithfull relation of such mandates, as they haue receiued: which may as well tend to the aduancement and honour of that Citie, to which they are sent; as to the dishonour and ruine of the same, whereof the messengers take no notice. And therefore whether we desire war or peace; the free libertie, and holy order of Ambassadors, is reuerently to be respected and defended from brutish and vnnaturall violence.

CHAP. V.

The proceedings of either partie, in the enterance of this Warre.

Caſar.



He Veneti conceiued great hope of their enterpriſe, by reaſon of the ſtrength of their ſituation: for as much as all the paſſages by land were broken and cut off, with arms and creekes of the ſea; and on the other ſide, nauigation and entrance by ſea was ſo troubleſome and dangerous, in that the Romans were altogether vnacquainted with the chanelles and ſhelues of the coaſt. Neither did they thinke that the Roman Armie could long continue there without corne, which was not to bee had in thoſe quarters. And

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if it happened, that the course of things were carried contrarie to this probable expectation; yet they themselves were strong in shipping; whereas the Romans had none at all: Neither had they knowledge of the flats and shallows, Ports and Islands of that coast, where they were to fight. And to conclude, they should find the use of Navigation in that narrow sea, to be farre different from that, which they were accustomed unto, in the vast and open Ocean. In this resolution, they fortified their townes, stored them with prouision, & brought all their shipping to Vannes; against whom, Caesar (as it was reported) would begin to make war, taking the Osismi, Lexouij, Nannetes, Ambinarii, Morini, Menapij, Diablintres, as consorts and partakers in this quarrell. Notwithstanding these difficulties, many motives stirred vp Caesar to vndertake this war: as namely, the violent detaining of the Roman knights: their rebellion, after they had yeilded themselves by rendry, and giuen hostages of their loialtie: the conspiracie of so many Cities, which being now neglected, might afterward incite other nations and States to the like insolency. And therefore vnderstanding, that almost all the Galles were inclining to nouelty & alteration, and of their own nature, were quick & ready to vndertake a war; and further, considering that all men by nature desired liberty, and hated the seruile condition of bondage: hee prevented all further insurrections of the other States, with the presence of the Roman forces: and sent Titus Labienus with the Cavalrie, vnto the Treuiri, that bordered vpon the Rhene to him he gaue in charge, to visit the men of Rhemes & the rest of the Belgæ, to keep them in obedience. and to hinder such forces, as might peradventure be transported ouer the riuer by the Germans, to further this rebellious humor of the Galles. He commanded likewise Pub. Crassus, with 12. legionarie cohorts, and a great part of the horse to go into Aquitane, least there might come any aide from those nations. He sent also Q. Titurius Sabinus with three legions, vnto the Lexouij, Curiosolite, Vnelli, to disappoint any practice which rebellious minds might intend. And making D. Brutus chiefe Admirall of the nauie, he gaue him in charge, to make towards Vannes, with what speede he could: and hee himself marched thitherward with the rest of the foot forces.

Lendriguer.
Nisieux.
Vantes.
Aurenche.
Lcondoul.
Cities in lit-
le Britaine.

*Triers.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN the first booke, I obserued the authority which the Roman Leaders had to vndertake a war, without further acquainting the Senat with the consequence thereof: in this place, let vs obserue the care and circumspection, which the Generalls had, not to vndertake a troublesome and dangerous warre vpon a humor, or any other slender motion: but diligently waighing the circumstances thereof, and measuring the perill & hazard of the warre, with the good and consequence of the effect; informed their iudgements of the importance of that action; and so tried whether the benefit would answer their labor. And thus we find the reasons particularly deliuered, that moued Cæsar first to vndertake the Heluetian warre: and then the causes, which drew him on to the quarrell with Ariouistus: then followeth the

necessity of that warre with the Belgæ; and now the motiues which induced him to this with the maritime Citties of Brittain: and so consequently of his passage into Germany, or what other enterprize he attempted: which he laieth downe as the grounds and occasions of those wars, & could not be auoided but with the losse and dishonour of the Roman Empire.

Further, let vs obserue the meanes he vsed to preuent the inclination of the Gallies, & to keep them in subiection and peaceable obedience, by sending his men into diuers quarters of that Continent; & so settling the wauering disposition of the further skirts, with the weight of his Army, and the presence of his legionary soldiers, which hee sent ready to stifle all motions of rebellion in the beginning, that they might not breake out to the preiudice and diminution of the Roman Empire, and the good successe of his proceedings: besides the aduantage, which he gained in the opinion of the Enemy; whom he so little feared concerning the vpshot of that quarrel, that he had dispersed the greatest part of his Army vpon other seruices, the rest being sufficient to end that war.

CHAP. VI.

The manner of their shipping, and their Sea-fight.



Cæsar.

He site of almost all these Cities was such, that being built in points and promontories, they could not at full sea, which happened alwaies twise in 12. houres, be approached by foot-forces, nor yet with shipping neither; for, againe in an ebbe, the vessells were laid on the ground, and so left as a prey to the Enemy. And if the Romans went about to shut out the sea, with mounts which they raised equall to the walls of the towne, and were at the point of entering & taking it: yet the townsmen hauing such store of shipping, would easily conuey both themselues & their cariages, into the next towns, and there helpe themselues with the like aduantage of place. And thus they deluded Cæsar the greatest part of the sommer: for the Roman fleet by reason of continuall windes and foule weather, durst not aduenture to put out of the riuer Loier into so vast a sea, wherein the hauens and roades were fewe, and farre distant one from another, & the tides great. The shipping of the Gallies was thus built and rigged: the keele was somewhat flatter then the Romans shipping, the better to beare the ebbs, and shallowes of that coast: the fore-deck was altogether erect and perpendicular: the poupe was made to beare the hugeness of the billowes, and the force of the tempest. And in a word, they were altogether built for strength: for, the ribbes and seats were made of beams of a foot square, fastned with yron pinnes of an inch thicke: in steade of cables, they vsed chaines of yron; and raw hides and skins for sailes, either for want of linnen or ignorant

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of the use therof, or because sailes of linnen would hardly serue to carrie ships of that burthen.

The meeting and conflict of the Roman navy, with this kind of ships was such, that they only excelled them in celerity and speedy nimbleness with force of oars: but in all other things, either concerning the nature of the place, or the daungers of the foule weather, were far inferiour unto them: for the strength of them was such that they could neither hurt them with their beak-heads, nor cast a weapon to any purpose into them, by reason of their altitude, and high built bulkes. And if anie gust chanced in the meane time to rise, that forced them to commit themselves to the mercy of the weather, their shipping would better beare the rage of the sea; and with greater safety shelter it selfe amongst flats and shallowes, without feare of rockes or any such hazard: of all which chaunces the Roman navy stood continually in danger.

OBSERVATION.



And here, let it not seem impertinent to the argument which we handle, considering the generall vse which we Insulars haue of navigation, briefly to set down the most eminent causes of the flowing and ebbing of the sea, as farre forth as shall seem necessary to the knowledge of a souldier: which, albeit may fall short of the true reasons of this great secret; yet for as much as they stand for true principles of regularitie, and wel approved rules in our Art of navigation, let vs take them for no lesse then they effect, and giue them that credit in our imagination, which tract of time hath gained to those forged circles in the heauens: that albeit their chiefest essence consisteth in conceit and supposal; yet for as much as they serue to direct our knowledge to a certainty, in that variety and seeming inconstancy of motion, we esteem of them as they effect, and not as they are.

Considering then the globe of the world, as it maketh a right spheare (for in that position, the Naturalists chiefly vnderstand celestiall influence to haue operation in this liquid element of the water) it is diuided by the Horizon and Meridian into foure quarters: the first quarter is that, betweene the east horizon and the noone meridian, which they call a flowing quarter: the second from the noon meridian, to the west horizon; which they make an ebbing quarter: the third, from the west horizon to the midnight meridian; which they likewise call a flowing quarter: and again, from the midnight meridian to the east horizon, the second ebbing quarter: And so they make two flowing quarters, and two ebbing quarters of the whole circuit of heauen. The instruments of these sensible qualities, and contrary effectes, are the sunne and the moone, as they are caried through these distinct parts of the heauen. And although experience hath noted the moon to be of greatest power in watrie motions; yet wee may not omit to acknowledge the force, which the sunne yeeldeth in this miracle of nature.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that when the moon or the sunne begin

The causes of the ebbing & flowing of the Sea.

to appeare about the right horizon, & enter into that part of the heauen which I tearmed the first flowing quarter, that then the sea beginneth to swell: and as they mount vp to their meridian altitude; so it increaseth vntill it come to a high floud. And again, as those lights passing the meridian, decline to the west, and run the circuit of the ebbing quarter: so the water decreaseth & returneth again from whence it came. Again, as they set vnder the west horizon, & enter into the second flowing quarter; so the sea beginneth again to flowe, and still encreaseth vntill they come to the point of the night meridian: and then again, it refloweth, according as the sun & moon are carried in the other ebbing quarter from the night meridian, to the west horizon.

Spring-tides.

And hence it happeneth that in coniunction or new of the moon, when the sun & the moon are caried both together in the same flowing, & ebbing quarters; that then the tides and ebs are very great: and likewise in opposition or full of the moon, when these lights are carried in oppolite quarters, which we haue described to bee of the same nature, either ebbing or flowing; that then in like manner the tides are great: forasmuch as both these Planets, through the symbolising quarters wherein they are carried, do ioyne their forces to make perfect this work of Nature in the ebbing and flowing of the Sea. And contrariwise, in a quadrate aspect (as the Astronomers call it) or quarter age of the moone, when as the moon is carried in a flowing quarter; and at the same instant, the sun doth happen to be in an ebbing or decreasing quarter, as the course of Nature dooth necessarily require: then are the tides lessened, as daily experience doth witness.

And for as much as both the right horizon and the meridian also, diuide euerie diurnall circle, which either the sun or the moon maketh in their reuolutions, into equal parts; it followeth that euery tide is continually measured with the quantity of 6. houres: and therefore that which Cæsar here saith, must needs be true, that in the space of 12. houres, there are alwaies 2. high tides. And least any man should imagine, that euery inland City, standing vpon an ebbing and flowing riuer, may take the computation of the tide according to this rule: let him vnderstand, that this which I haue deliuered, is to be conceiued principally of the sea it self; and secondarily of such ports and hauens, as stand either neer or vpon the sea: but where a riuer shall run many miles from the sea, and make many winding Meanders, before it come to the place of calculation; it must needs lose much of this time before mentioned. And thus much I thought conuenient to insert in these discourses touching the ebbing & flowing of the sea, as not impertinent to martiall knowledge.

*The manner
of their shipping.*

Concerning the shipping of the Romans, whereof posteritie hath only receiued the bare names, and some fewe circumstances touching the manner of their Equipage, the Critickes of these times haue laboured to set forth a fleet, answerable to that, which the tearms and title mentioned in history seeme to report: but yet the gaine of their voyage doth not answere their charge. For, many men rest vn-satisfied; first touching the names themselues, wherof we find these kindes.

Names

Names { *Longas.*
Onerarias.
Actuarias.
Triremes.
Quadrirèmes.
Quinquerèmes.

The first we may vnderstand to be Gallies or ships of seruice: the second, ships of burthen: the third, ships that were driuen forward with force of oares, and the rest sounding according to their Names; for, I dare not intitle them with a more particular description. Now whether these Names *Longas* and *Actuarias*, were a seuerall sort of shipping by themselves; or the generall Names of the *Quadrirèmes*, *Triremes*, and *Quinquerèmes*, for as much as euerie kinde of these might be called both *Longas* and *Actuarias*, as it yet remaineth in controuersie: so it is not much materiall to that which wee seeke after. But that which most troubleth our sea Critickes, is, in what sense they may vnderstand these vocabularies, *Triremes*, *Quadrirèmes*, & *Quinquerèmes*, whether they were so tearmed in regard of the number of rowers, or water-men that haled continually at an oare, as the custome of the Gallies is at this daie; or otherwise, because a *Trireme* had three orders of oares on either side, a *Quadrirème* foure, and a *Quinquerème* fise: whereof they tooke their distinction of Names.

Such as hold, that a *Trireme* had on each side three rankes of oares, and so consequently, of a *Quadrirème* and *Quinquerème*; alleage this place of Liuië, to make good their opinion. In the warres between Rome and Carthage, Lælius meeting with Afrubal in the straightls of Gibraltar, each of them had a *Quinquerème*, & seauen or eight *Triremes* apiece: the current in that place was so great that it gaue no place to Art, but carried the vesselles according to the fall of the Billow: in which vncertainty, the *Triremes* of the Carthaginean closed with the *Quinquerème* of Lælius: which either because shee was *pondere tenacior*, as Liuië saith; or otherwise, for that *pluribus remorum ordinibus scindentibus vertices facilius regetur*; in regarde of the pluralitie of bankes of oares, which resisted the billowe and steamed the current, shee sunke two of the *Triremes*, and so got the victorie. From hence they proue, that a *Quinquerème* had *plures remorum ordines*, then a *Trireme* had; and therefore it took the name from the pluralitie of bankes of oares, and not from the number of men that rowed at an oare.

But the contrarie opinion doth interpret *Ordo remorum*, to bee a couple of oares one answering another, on each side of the vessell, which wee call a paire of oares: So that a *Quinquerème* being far greater and longer then a *Trireme*, had more paires of oares then a *Trireme* had, & those oares were handled with fise men at one oare, according to the vse of our Gallies at this daie.

But to leaue this, and come to their manner of sea-fights, wee must vnderstand that the Romans, wanting the vse of Artillerie and managing their ships of warre with force of oares, failed not to make vse of their Art, in their conflicts and incounters by sea: for, all their shippes of seruice, which we tearme

Lib. 27

The manner
of sea-fights.

men

men of warre, carried a strong beake-head of yron, which they called *rostrum*, with which they ranne one against another, with as great violence and furie, as their oares could carrie them. And herein Art gaue great aduantage; for, he that coulde best skill to turne his ship, with greatest celerity, and so frustrate an offer; or with speedy & strong agitation follow an aduantage: commonly got the victory.

Lib. 2. de bello civili.

In the battell which D. Brutus had with the Massilians, we read that two Triremes charging the Admirall wherein Brutus was, one at the one side, and the other at the other; Brutus and his Mariners so cunningly handled the matter, that when they should come to the hurt, they speedily in a trice of time, wound themselves from betweene them, and the two Triremes met with such a carriere one against another, that one brake her beake-head, and the other split with the blowe.

For this skil & fortune withall, Euphranor the Rhodian was of great fame in Cæsars time; although his end found too true the saying of the Historian, that Whom Fortune honoureth with many good haps, she oftentimes referueth to a harder destiny; as other sea-men besides Euphranor, can truly witnesse.

This first brunt being ended: when they came to grapple and boarding one of another, then the art & practices of their land seruices came in vse: for, they erected turrets vpon their decks, and from them they fought with engines and casting-weapons, as slings, arrowes, and piles; and when they entered, they fought with sword and target. Neither did the legionary souldier find any difference when he came to the point, betweene their fight at sea and that at land: sauing that they could not be martialled in troups and bands, in regard wherof the sea seruice was counted more base, and dishonourable; and the rather, in as much as it decided the controuersie, by slings and casting-weapons: which kinde of fight was of lesse honour, then buckling at handy-blowes.

CHAP. VII.

The Battell continueth: and Cæsar ouercommeth.



Cæsar.

HE maner of their fights being this, as I haue described, neither Brutus, nor any Tribune or Centurion in his navy, knew what to do or what course of fight to take: for, the shipping of the Gallies was so strong, that the beake-head of their Quinquereemes could performe no seruice vpon them: & although they shoulde raise turrets according to their vse, yet these would not equall in height the poupe of the Enemies shipping; so that therein also the Gallies had aduantage: neither had they any meanes, whereby they might foile so great a nanie, which amounted to the number of 230. ships of war. One thing

thing there was amongst their provisions which stood them in great stead: for, the Romans had provided great sharp hooks or sickles, which they put upon great & long poles: these they fastned to the tackling which held the main yard to the mast; and then haling away their ship, with force of Oares, they cut the said tackling, & the main yard fell down. Wherby the Gallies, whose only hope consisted in sayling and yare turning of their ships, lost at one instant, both their sailes & the vse of their shipping: And then the controuersie fel within the compass of valour, wherin the Romans exceeded the Galls; and the rather, inasmuch as they fought in the sight of Caesar and the whole Army, no valiant act could bee smothered in secret; for, all the hilles and clifts, which afforded neere prospect into the sea, were couered with the Roman Armie.

Their maine yares being cut downe, and the Romans indeuouring with great fury to boord them failed not to take many of their ships: which the Galls perceiuing, & finding no remedy nor hope of resistance, began al to fly, & turning their ships to a forewind, were upon a sudden so becalmed, that they were able to make no way at all. Which fell out so fitly for the Romans, that of so great a nauy, very few through the helpe of the euening escaped to land, after they had fought the space of 8. houres: with which battell, ended the war with the Veneti, & the rest of the maritime nations. For, al sort of people both young & old, in whom there was either courage, counsell or dignity, were present at this battell, and all their shipping was taken & lost; so that such as remained, knew not whither to go, nor how to defend their towns any longer: and therefore yeilded themselues to Caesar; in whom he used the greater senerity, that he might therby teach al other barbarous people, not to violate the lawe of nations: for, he slew all the Senat with the sword, and solde the people for bondslauers.

THE OBSERVATION.

IN this battell I chiefly obserue the good fortune, which vsually attendeth vpon industry: for amongst other prouisions, which the diligence of the Romans had furnished out to the vse of this war, they had made ready these hookes, not for this intent wherin they were imploied; but at all occasions and chances, that might happen, as seruiceable complements rather then principal instruments: & yet it so fel out, that they proued the only means, to ouerthrow the Gallies. Which proueth true the saying of Caesar, that industrie commaundeth fortune and buyeth good successe, with extraordinary labour: for industrie in action is as importunitie in speech, which forceth an assent beyond the strength of reason; and striueth through continuall pursuit, to make good the motiues, by often inculcations; and at length findeth that disposition, which will easily admit whatsoeuer is required: In like manner, diligence and labour some industrie, by circumspect and heedfull carriage, seldome faile either by hap or cunning, to make good that part wherein the maine point of the matter dependeth. For, euery action is intrangled with many infinite adherents, which are so interessed in the matter, that it succeedeth according as it is carried

*The force of
industrie.*

carried answerable to their natures. Of these adherents, some of them are by wisdom foreseen; and directed to that course which may fortunate the action: the rest being unknown, continue without either direction or prevention, & are all vnder the regiment of fortune; for as much as they are beyond the compass of our wisest reach, and in the waie either to assist or disadvantage: Of these, industrie hath greatest authority; in as much as she armeth her selfe for all chances, whereby she is sayd to command fortune.

CHAP. VIII.

*Sabinus ouerthroweth the * Vnelli, with the manner thereof.*

* *La. Perche*

Caesar.

* *Rhone.*
* *Eureux.*



*Hile these things happened in the state of Vannes, L. Titurius Sabinus entreteth with his forces into the confines of the Vnelli, ouer whom Viridouix was made chiefe Commander, hauing drawne the * Auleri and the * Eburonices with a great number of vagabondes and theeues into the same conspiracie: Sabinus incāping himselfe in a conuenient place, kept his souldiers within the rampier. But, Viridouix, being lodged within lesse then two miles of Sabinus his camp, brought out his forces daily, and putting them in battell gaue him opportunitie to fight if he would: which Sabinus refused in such sort, that he began not onely to be suspected by the Enemy of cowardice, but to be tauted with the reprocheful speeches of his own soldiers; which opinion of feare being once settled in the minds of the Enemy, he used all meanes to increase it, and carried it so well, that the Enemy durst approche the very rampier of the camp. The colour that he pretended was, that he thought it not the part of a Legate, in the absence of the General, to fight with an Enemy of that strength, but vpon some good opportunitie, or in a place of aduantage. In this generall perswasion of feare, Sabinus chose out a subtile witted Gall, whom he perswaded with great rewards, and further promises, to flie to the Enemy, and there to carrie himself, according to the instructions, which he should giue him. This Gal, comming as a reuolter to the Enemy, laid open vnto the the feare of the Romans; the extremity that Caesar was driue into by the Veneti; & that the night before, Sabinus was about to withdraw his forces secretly out of his camp, & to make all the haste he could to relieue Caesar. Vpon which aduertisemēt, they al cried out with one consent, that this opportunity was not to be omitted; but setting apart al other deuises, to go & assault the Roman campe. Many circumstances perswaded the Gals to this resolutiō; as first the lingring & doubt which Sabinus had made, whē he was offred battel: secondly, the intelligēce which this fugitiue had broght: thirdly, the want of victuals wherin they had bin negligent & vnaduisedly carelesse: fourthly, the hope they cōceiued of the war of Vannes; and lastly, for that men willingly belieue that which they would haue com to pass. The force of these motiues was so strong, that they would not suffer Viridouix*

down, nor the rest of the Captaines, to dismisse the Councell, vntill they had permitted them to take Armes, and goe to the Romaine Camp. Which being granted, they gathered rubbish and fagots to fill up the ditch; & with cheerful harts, as though the victorie were already gotten, they marched to the place where Sabinus was incamped; which was the top of a hill, rising gently from a leuell, the quantity of one thousand pases. Hither the Galles hasted with all expedition: & to the intent the Romaines might not haue so much time, as to put on their Armour, the Galles for haste ranne themselues out of breath.

Sabinus, incouraging his souldiers, gaue the signe of battell; and sallying out at two seuerall gates of his Campe, it fell out that through the oportunity of the place, the wearinesse and vncexperience of the Enemy, the valour of the Romane souldier, and their exercise in former battels, that the Galles could not indure the brunt of the first incounter, but presently tooke themselues to flight, of whom, very few escaped. And so it happened, that at one time, Sabinus had newes of the ouerthrow at Sea, and Caesar of Sabinus victory by Land. Vpon these victories, all the Citties and States yielded themselues to Titurius: for, as the Galles are prompt to vndertake a warre; so are they weake in suffering, and impatient of the consequents and calamities thereof.

OBSERVATION.



His practice of a counterfeit feare, was often put in vse by the Romane Leaders, as well to disappoint the expectation of an enemy, as to draw them into an inconuenience, and so to defeate them of their greatest helps in time of battell. Caesar, comming to succour the Campe of Cicero, made such vse of this Art, that he put to rout a great Armie of the Galles, with a handfull of men: which I will referre vnto the place, where it is particularly set downe by Caesar.

The chiefest thing in this place, which brought them to their ouerthrow, was disappointment: for, it is a thing hardly to be digested in busineses of smal consequence, to be frustrated of a settled expectation, when the mind shal dispose herselfe to one onely intent, and in the vp-shot meet with a counterbuffe to crosse her purposes, and so defeat her of that hope which the strength of her reason hath entertained: how much more then in things of such importance, when we shall proceed in a course of victorie, and humour our conceits with that wee wish and would haue to happen; and in the end, meet either with bondage or death, must our best wits bee appalled? hauing neither respite nor meanes, to thinke how the euill may be best preuented. Which the wise Romans well vnderstood, & counted it no dishonour to be reproched with shamefull cowardice, by such as knew not the secrets of wisdom; while they in the meane time foresawe their good fortunes, shrowded vnder the cloak of a pretended distrust.

Let these examples instruct a Leader, so to take the opportunitie of any such fortune, that in the execution, he omit not the chiefest points of order and discipline, as well for the better effecting of the designe, as for his own safety and

The vse which the Romans made of a counterfet feare.

Lib. 5.

the securitie of his Armie. For, order is as the sinewes and strength of martiall discipline, vniting the particular members into the firme composition of a well proportioned bodie: and so it maketh it more powerfull then any number of disunited parts, how able or infinite soeuer.

I might heere alleadge infinite examples to confirme this truth: but let the battell of Drux serue for all; wherein the Protestants, ouercharging the Catholick Armie, followed the retrait so hard, that they quickly became Maisters of the field: and then neglecting martiall discipline, fell in confusedly with the broken multitude, to make the victorie more glorious by slaughter and mortalitie. The Duke of Guise, all this while, bouged not a foot; but in vnexampl'd patience, kept his regiment close together, and would not suffer them to rescue their Generall that was taken, vntill the regiment of the Prince of Condie was likewise dispersed and broken: and then perceiuing no difference of order, betweene the victor Protestant, and the vanquished Catholick, hee dissolued that terrible cloud that had hung so long in suspence; and so changed the fortune of the day, that he tooke the chiefest of their Princes prisoners, with little or no losse of his owne men: so powerfull is order in the deeds of Armes, and of such consequence in obtaining victorie. And thus wee haue first seene the inconueniences, which a counterfet feare well dissembled, may cast vpon a credulous and vnaduisedemie, when pretence and appearance hath brought them into an error, which their owne credulitie doth afterward auouch: and secondly, what strength and safetic consisteth in order; and how powerfull it is to throw downe, and to set vp.

CHAP. IX.

The proceedings of Crassus in Aquitanie.

Caesar.



*T*he same instant of time, it happened also, that Pub. Crassus comming into Aquitania (which both in regard of the large extension of the Country, as also for the multitude of the inhabitants, was named the third part of Gallia) and considering that he was to make war in those parts, where L. Valerius Preconius the Legate was slaine, and the Army ouerthrowne: and where Lucius Manlius was faine to flie, vwith the losse of his cariages; he thought that his affaires required no meane diligence: and therefore, hauing made prouision of Corne, & mustered many Auxiliarie forces, and sent for many valiant and prudent men from Tolouse and Narbone, hee carried his Armie into the confines of the * Sontiates; vwhich was no sooner knowne, but they leuied great forces both of horse and foote, and vwith their horse, charged vpon the Romaines in their march: vwhich being easilie repelled, as they followed the retrait, the infanterie of the Galles, shevved it selfe in a Valley as it lay in Ambush. These, setting vpon the Romaines, renewed the battaile, and there the fight continued hot a long time; the

* Enocati.

Sonti-

Sontiates being animated with the former victories, saw all the hope of Aquitaine relie upon their vertue: and the Romans on the other side, desired to shew what they were able to doe of themselves, without their grand Captaine, and under the conduction of a young souldier. At length, the enemy, overwaged with prowesse, and wearied with wounds, betooke themselves to flight; of whom the Romans slew a great number: and then marched directly to the towne of the *Sontiates*, and laid siege vnto it: the siege grew hot on both sides, the Romans approached the walles, with vines, turrets and mounts. The townesmen defended themselves, sometime by sallying out, sometimes by undermining the mounts and fortifications, wherein the *Aquitani* are very skilfull. But, when they perceiued the industrie of the Romans to exceed all that they were able to do, they intreated *Crassus* to accept their rendry: which being granted, and all the Army intending the deliery of their Armes, *Adcantuanus* their chiefe Magistrate, fledde out in the meane time at another port of the Cittie, with sixe hundred deuoted companions, whom they called *Soldurij*: but as they attempted to escape, the souldiers that kept that part of the fortification, as they signified his enasion by a clamour and shout, the rest betooke themselves to Armes, & so repelled him againe into the towne; where he desired to be taken in the number of the submissiue multitude. *Crassus*, hauing taken hostages of them, went into the confines of the *Voconij*.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Hese skilfull and experienced men, which *Crassus* sent for out of all the Citties in Aquitaine, were those, whom the Romans called *Euocati*: such as were free from warfare, & exempted by their lawes from giuing their names in musters, either by reason of their yeeres, or the magistracie which they had borne, or for some other causes, which gaue them that priuiledge: & in that regard, were sent for by Letters, intreating their assistance in the carriage of that war, as men well acquainted with the nature of such businesse. Their places were nothing inferiour to the Centurions, for aduise and direction, although they had no part in commaund or authoritie.

Euocati.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



IN this fight, we may further obserue, their maner of defence against Mounts, and Cavalieros; which we find chiefly to be Mines. *Iosephus*, in the Iewish warre, saith, that The Romaines hauing raised an exceeding high mount, the Iewes vndermined the same with such Art, that as they digged vnderneath, they supported the Mount with huge props & planks, that it might not shrinke: and watching a time of greatest aduantage, they set all the timber-work, which vnderpropped the mount, on fire,

which taking fire, with the help of Buntone and Pitch, the Mount fell vpon a suddaine, to the great terrour and amazement of the Romans.

Lib. 7. de bello Gall.

At the siege of *Anaricum*, we find how the Galles by vndermining, did take the earth from the Mount, as fast as it was caried vnto it by the Romans; and so kept it from rising, and made it vneffectuall. But if it were for the most part made of wood, or other combustible matter, they sought then by all meanes to burne it; as it happened at the siege of *Massilia*: and oftentimes, when both burning & vndermining failed, they confronted it, with another Mount within the walles, to disappoint the disadvantage by equall contesting of it; and so made it vnprofitable.

Concerning Mines, this much may I say, without preiudice to that Art, that the chiefe points to be respected are these: First, the true distance to a designed place; which is best got by instrument, and helpe of Geometrie, where other marks of certaintie are wanting. Secondly, the direction of the Mine, that we may not erre in our course which the Compasse affordeth. Thirdly, the strengthening of the Mine with timber-work, if need require. Lastly, the countermining and crosse-meeting. All which parts haue very many circumstances, & require a larger discourse, then may be thought pertinent for this place.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



He strange contract betweene these Soldurij, and their Chieftaine, may well deserue a place amongst these obseruations, especially, considering the obligatorie conditions, which either party stood bound to obserue: for, the Captaine was to make his Soldurij partakers of all his happines in this life; in regard whereof, they were to take part of whatsoeuer ill chance or disaster should happen to befall him. If death, which is the last end of all sensuall miserie, took hold of their head, these deuoted, were tied voluntarily to follow him the selfe same way: neither in any memorie was there euer man found, that refused to die, if he to whom he was deuoted, chanced to be slaine. Which bloody league of amitie, as it was repugnant to the course of Nature, multiplying particular destinie to a generall calamitie: so was it dangerous in a well ordered State, if the Ring-leader were either ambitious, or sought to practice any thing contrarie to good government: for, he himselfe would presume much vpon the assistance of his Soldurij; and they, on the other side, must needs wish well to his attempts, that were so interested in his life and death.

CHAP.

CHAP. X.

The Gales raise new forces against Crassus.



He barbarous Gales were much troubled, that a towne of that strength should so soone be taken; and therefore they sent Embassadours into all quarters, coniured one with another, confirmed their couenants with mutuall hostages, and leuied what power they were able to make: sending for aide out of Spaine, and from other States that bordered vpon Aquitaine. At the comming of these forces, they began to make vuarre, with a great power, and with many souldiers of great fame: for, they appointed such Leaders as had seene the experience of Sertorius his warres, and were great in the opinion of men, for their skill and knowledge in the Arte Militarie. These, according to the custome of the people of Rome, beganne to take places of aduantage, to fortifie their Campe, and to intercept the Romaines from free passage of conuoyes, and necessarie intercourses. Which when Crassus perceiued, & considering withall, that his owne forces were so few, that he could not well dismember them vpon any seruice or aduantage, and that the enemy went out at his pleasure, kept the passages, and left notwithstanding, a sufficient guarison in his Campe; by which meanes, their corne and prouision would in time grow scarce, and the enemy waxed euery day stronger: he thought it his best course not to linger any longer, but presently to giue them battell.

Caesar.

The matter beeing referred to a Councell of warre, when he understood that all men were of the same opinion, he appointed the next day to giue them battell; & in the dawning, putting his men in a double battaile, & placing the Auxiliarie forces in the middest, he attended to see what the enemy would doe. The Gales, although they were perswaded, that they might aduenture battell, both in regard of their multitude and ancient prowesse of warre, as also in respect of the paucitie of the Romans; yet they thought it better to block vp the passages, and so cut off all cariages, and conuoyes of corne; and so the victory would follow without bloodshed: and if the Romans for want of Corne, should offer to make a retreat, they would then set vpon them as they marched, wearied with trauell, & heauilie laden with their burthens. This resolution beeing approoued by the whole Councell of the Gales, when the Romaines imbattailed their forces, they kept their men within their Campe.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His Sertorius had followed the faction of Marius and Cinna, and when Sylla had ouerthrowne both the elder & yonger Marius, hee fled into Spaine, and there maintained the quarrell on foote against Pompey and Metellus, and ouerthrew them in many battels: but in

Sertorius.

the end was trecherously slaine by Perpanna at a banquet. He was a man of great spirit, and of admirable dispatch; & vnder him were these Captaines brought vp, which Cæsar commendeth for their skill in Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Two meanes
to atchieue
victorie and
to ouermai-
ster their e-
nemies.



N histories, propounding to our consideration the deedes and monuments of former ages, we may obserue two especial meanes, which the great Commaunders of the world haue entertained to atchieue victorie, and ouermaister their enemies: the first, by cunning and wise cariage of a matter, before it come to triall by blowes: the second by forceable meanes and waging of battaile; the one proceeding from wisdom and the better faculties of the soule; and the other depending vpon the strength and abilitie of the bodie.

Tubalcaine
by war, and
Naamah by
the flood.

Concerning the first, it hath euer beene held more honourable, as better fitting the worth of the spirit, and the diuine essence of our nature, so to direct the course of an action, that the aduerse part may be weakened by wit, and preuented in the projects of their better fortunes, by anticipation of meanes and occasions, and so through aduantages taken from their owne proceedings, to be driuen to that exigent, which may determine of the controuersie before they come to blowes, and conclude the matter by rearmes of Arte, taken from the directions of good prouidence. For, to speake a truth, the action of battell, as it is the last part in that facultie; so it is the worst in regard of Christian dutie, and better fitteth the progeny of Lamech his second wife (which the Diuines doe note to be borne to the ruine and destruction of mankind) then the children of grace; whose ioy consisteth in peace and loue.

Cæsar, in the first of the Ciuill warres, respected the same thing, but from other grounds: for, hauing shutte vp Afranius and Petreius in a place of disadvantage, and might haue cut them off without further trouble; yet, forasmuch as he foresaw the victorie comming towards him without blow or wound, he thus answered his Capraines that were earnest vpon the enemy; *Cur etiam secundo pralio aliquos ex suis amitteret? cur vulnerari pateretur optimè de se meritos milites? cur denique fortunā periclitaretur?* And this course did these Galles take, which vnder Sertorius had learned the Romaine Art, and the Romaine industrie; and were now become so expert, that they had almost beaten the Romaines at their owne weapon.

This first meanes is principally to be imbraced, as the safest way in these vncertaine and casuall euents: for, that which resteth vpon corporall strength, & maketh execution the meanes to a conclusion, is very terrible euen to the better partie, full of hazard and of little certaintie. For, it were a miracle of Fortune neuer heard of yet, so to carrie a battaile vpon what aduantage or meanes whatsoever, that the victor Armie should buy so great a fortune without bloodshed or losse of men; and erect a Trophæe to Honour, at the sole cost of the Enemy, without losse or expence of his owne treasure.

And

And for the vncertaintie in a batraile, who knoweth not what infinite changes and changes may happen in euerie small moment of time, to turne the fortune of the day to this or that partie, and make both sides vnconstant in their affections, by presenting them interchangeably with hope and feare, ioy & sorrow? and therefore Cæsar thought it not best to tempt the weywardnesse of Fortune, when by other meanes he might obtaine his desires.

This, I say, is chiefly to be imbraced, if our means will affoord vs that happinesse: but howsoeuer, I hold it wisdom to entertaine this course of victorie, that wee omitte not the chiefest helps of furtherance, when it commeth to blowes, but to thinke of this conquest by Arte and wit, as necessarie, if our meanes will serue vs to compasse it; and of the other, as necessarie whether we will or no: for, the historie maketh it plaine, that when Brutus found himselfe destitute of meanes, to vndertake that course of victorie, which proceedeth from prouidence and discreet cariage; hee then betooke himselfe necessarilie to the later; and by the helpe of battell, fought to free himselfe from those disadvantages, into which the Galles had brought him.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Obserue further, out of this place, that what course soeuer bee taken, a discreet Leader will not easilie for-goe an advantage without great assurance of a better fortune: nor change the certaintie of a benefit, vpon probabilities of other hopes, vntill it haue paid him the interest of his expectation, and wrought that effect which it promised to performe. For, so hee might forgoe his fortune, by presuming too much vpon the fauour of future chances, which are often seene to crosse our purposes, rather then to further the way which is taken.

*Not to forgoe
an advantage*

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.



Further, I obserue, this double battell to be answerable to the paucity of the Roman forces: for, their vsuall manner was, to make a triple battell, that the first might haue a second, and a third helpe: but where their number would not affoord that commoditie, they then made two battells, that there might be the succour of a second supply. But they neuer fought with one single battell, for ought that may bee gathered by their histories.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

The place
where suspected
forces
are best be-
stowed in
battell.



He last thing which I obserue, is the place, where Crassus bestowed the Auxiliarie forces, in the disposition of his troupes to battaile; which is heere said to bee, in *mediam Aciem*: for, as their Armies were diuided into three battells; so euery battell was diuided into three parts; the two cornets, and the battell, wherein these Auxiliarie forces were in this seruice bestowed: of these he afterward saith, that Inasmuch as he durst not put any confidence in them, hee commaunded them to serue the Romans in time of battell, with stones and weapons; and to cary earth and turfe to the Mount. The reason why suspected troupes are placed in the battell, rather thē in either of the cornets, is, for that the battaile hath not such scope to fling out, or take aduantage of place to doe mischiefe, as the cornets haue: for, wheresoever there haue been set battells fought, the strength of their Armie consisted alwaies in the cornets, as the two principall instruments of the battell: and as long as these stood sound, the victorie went alwaies certain on that part; for, the cornets kept the enemy, both from incompassing about the body of their Armie, and had the aduantage also of charging vpon the open side of their aduersarie.

At the battell of Cannas, Hanniball put the weakest of his forces in the battell, and aduancing them towards the enemy, left the two cornets behind: so that, when the enemy came to charge vpon the battell, they easily beate them backe, and as they followed, the retrait fell in between the two cornets, wherein the strength of the Armie consisted; & being by them incompassed on each side, were defeated and ouerthrowne. And thus we see the aduantage which a Generall hath, when his two cornets stand firme, although the battell shrink in the incounter. Hanniball, in the battell hee had with Scipio in Africk, placed the Strangers in the front, and in the rereward; according peradventure as hee found their number, and the vse of their Armes: which are circumstances to be considered in this case, and depend rather vpon the iudgement of a Generall, then of any prescription that can be giuen in this matter.

CHAP. XI.

Crassus taketh the Camp of the Galles: and
with their ouerthrow endeth that
VVarre.

Caesar.



RASSVS, vnderstanding their drift, and finding his men willing to set vpon their Campe, encouraged his souldiers; & to the contentment of all men, vvent directly to the place where they were lodged: & as some began to fil vp the ditch, and others with casting weapons to beate the Galles from the rampier, hee commaunded the Auxiliarie forces, of whom he

hee had no great assurance, to bring stones and weapons to the souldiers that fought, and to carie earth & turfe to the Mount; that so they might make a shew of fighting. And on the other side, as the enemy beganne valiantly to make resistance, and to cast their weapon from the higher ground, to the great hurt of the Romaine souldier; the horsemen in the meane time, riding about the Campe of the Galles, brought word to Crassus, that the rampier at the Decumane port, was not fortified with such diligence, as they found it in other places, but would admit an easie entrance. Crassus dealt earnestly with the Commaunders of the horse, to encourage their men with great promises and rewards; and instructed them what he would haue done: they, according to their instructions, took foure cohorts that were left in the Campe, and carying them a further way about, that they might not be discovered by the enemy, while all mens eyes and minds were intent upon the fight, they speedily came to the place of the fortifications, which the horsemen had found to be weake; which beeing easilie broken downe, they had entered the Campe before the Enemy could well tell what was done. And then a great clamour and shout beeing heard about that place, the Romaine legions renuing their force, as it falleth out alwaies in hope of victorie, beganne to charge them afresh with great furie. The Galles, beeing circumuented on each side, and despairing of their safetie, casting themselues over the rampier, sought by flight to escape the danger. But forasmuch as the Country was open & champaigne, the horsemen pursued them with that execution, that of fiftie thousand, there scarce remained the fourth part.

OBSERVATION.



From this place Brancatio taketh occasion to dispute, how an Enemy that is strongly incamped, & for some aduantage will not remoue, may be dislodged, whether he will or no. A point of great consequence, in matter of warre; and therefore deserueth due consideration. Concerning which, he laieth this downe for a maxime, that All forts and strong holds are taken by the foot; & that camps and lodgings are taken by the head. By which is meant, that hee who purposeth to winne a fortresse well manned and provided, must first get the foot, and take hold of the ditch, and then seise himselfe vpon the rampier, and so get the place: for, he saith, that mounts and eminent eleuations, are of little vse against fortresses or sconses, vn'esse they ouer-top them: which may be easilie preuented, by raising the parapet of the fortresse in front, and the curtaine in flanke, according as the enemy shall cary his mounts aloft; and so they shall neuer come to ouer topp the holds. But all Camps and lodgings are taken by the head: that is, by mounts and eleuations, which by the aduantage of their height, commaund the champaigne: for, hee holdeth it impossible, to raise a mount within the Campe in so short a time, to contest that, which the enemy shall make without.

This foundation being laid, he proceedeth to discover a way, how to raise a mount, in auge the enemy, which shall dislodge them by force of Artillerie, or
murther

Lib. 3.
Auerisimè
to secundo.

*Lib. de bello
Gallico.*

murder them all within their trenches. And this he taketh from Cæsar, at the siege of Gergobia. The substance of the matter consisteth in a double ditch, running like vnto the line which the Geometricians call *Helicall*. By this double ditch, he maketh his approach to any place of most aduantage, where hee may, in a night, raise a mount high enough for the ordinance to play vpon any quarter of the Campe. The censure of this practice, I referre to our iudicious souldiers, which may, if it please them, take a better view of the particularities of this stratagem in Brancatio himselfe. This much I dare affirme, in the behalfe of these works, that they were of high esteeme amongst the Romans, who daily experience and exigents of hazard had taught to find out the readiest meanes, both for securitie and victorie. And if our souldiers could be brought to taste the commoditie of these works, either by perswasion or impulsion, it were the best part of their warlike practices: but our men had rather flie vpon desperate aduentures, and seeke victorie in the iawes of death, then to cleare all hazard, with paines and diligence.

CHAP. XII.

Cæsar vndertaketh the warre with the *Menapij and Morini.*

*Cæsar.
* Terouine.
* Cleue and
Guedres.*



*A*t the same time also, although the Sommer was almost at an end, yet forasmuch as all Gallia was in peace, and the * *Morini* onely, with the * *Menapij* stood out in *Armes*, and had neuer either sent *Embassadour*, or otherwise treated of *Peace*: Cæsar, thinking that warre might quickly be ended, ledde his *Armie* into their *Country*. At his comming, hee found them to carie the warres farre otherwise, then the rest of the *Galles* had done: for, vnderstanding that the greatest *Nations* of *Gallia*, vvhich had waged battell with the *Romans*, were beaten and ouerthrowne: and hauing vvhole continents of woods and bogs in their territories, they conuaied both themselues and their goods into those quarters. Cæsar, comming to the beginning of the woods, began to fortifie his *Campe*, not discovering any enemy neere about him: but as his men were dispersed in their charges, they suddenly sallied out of the woods, and assaulted the *Romans*; but beeing speedily driuen in againe, with the losse of manie of them, as the *Romans* followed them farre into the woods, had some few of their men slaine.

The time that remained, Cæsar resolued to spend in cutting down the woods: and, least the souldiers might be taken vnawares, while they were busied in that worke, he caused them to place all the trees which they cut downe, on either side of the *Armie*, that they might serue for a defence, against sudden assaults. A great quantitie of ground was thus rid within a few daies, so that their goods & cattell was taken by the *Romans*: but they themselues were fledde into thicker woods.

woods. At which time there happened such a continuall raine, as forced them to leaue off the worke; and the souldiers could no longer indure to lie in Tents of skinnes: and therefore Cæsar, after hee had wasted and spoiled their Country, burned their townes, and their houses; hee caried back his Armie, and placed them in such Citties to winter in, as were subdued by the late warres.

OBSERVATION.

THe Irish rebels, hauing the like commoditie of woods and bogges, do entertaine the like course of war, as the Morini did with Cæsar. The meanes which heyled to disappoint them of that practice, was to cut downe the woods; which if it be thought monstrous in this age, or ridiculous to our men of war; let them consider that the Romaine discipline, wrought greater effects of valour, then can be made credible by the vse of these times. For, besides their exquisite discipline, which of it selfe was able to frame patterns of vnexampl'd magnanimitie, their industrie was admirable in the execution thereof, and caried it with such vncessant trauell, that the souldiers thought it great happinesse when they came to wage battell with the Enemy; and could haue meanes to quit their continuall trauell, with the hazard of their liues.

Neither let it seeme strange, that the Romaines vndertooke to cut down the woods: but rather let vs admire their facilitie in so difficult a taske; for, as the historie witnesseth; *magno spacio paucis diebus confecto, incredibili celeritate*: a great quantitie of ground, was rid in a few daies, with incredible speed. And after the woods were cut downe, they tooke more paines in placing it on each side of the legions, to hinder any suddaine assault, then they did in cutting it downe: which deserueth as great admiration as the former part. There is another place in the sixt booke of these Commentaries, which expresseth more particularly the nature of such warres, and may serue to acquaint vs with that which Cæsar did in these difficulties.

The Eburones, or the men of Liege, had the like commoditie of woods & bogges, and made vse of them in the warre they had with Cæsar. The matter saith hee, required great diligence, not so much in regard of the perill of the whole Armie (for there could no danger come from an enemy that was frighted and disperfed) as the safetie of euerie particular souldier, which in part did pertaine to the welfare of the whole Armie. For, the desire of a bootie, caried many of the souldiers farre from the bodie of the Armie: and the woods being full of vnknowne and secret passages, would not suffer them to goe either thicke together, or close imbattailed. If he desired to haue the warre ended, and the race of those wicked men to be rooted out, hee must of force make manie small companies, & diuide his men into many bodies: but if he would haue the Maniples to keepe at their Ensignes, as the discipline and custome of the Romaine Armie required; then the place was a shelter and defence to the Emie. Neither did they want courage to lay Ambushments, and to circumuent
such

such as they found alone, dragging from their companies. In these difficulties, there was as much done as diligence could doe; providing rather to be wanting in the offensive part (although all mens mindes were sette on fire with reuenge) then to hurt the enimie with the losse of the Romaine souldier. Cæsar sent messengers to the bordering States, to come out and sack the Eburones, & they should haue all the prey for their labour: that the life of the Galles, rather then his legionarie souldiers, might be hazarded in those woods; as also, that with so great a multitude, both the race & name of that people might be quite extinguished.

There are many particularities in this relation, which concerne the true motion of the Irish warres, which may be better obserued by such as knowe those warres by experience, then by my selfe, that vnderstand them onely by relation: and therefore to preuent such exceptions, as my rule shall make of the parallell in these two cases, I will leaue it to bee done by themselves. And thus endeth the third Commentarie.

