THE SECOND COMMENTARIE OF THE WARS IN GALLIA.

THE ARGVMENT.

LIke as when a heauy body lieth vpon the skirt of a larger continued quantitie, although it couer but a ſmal parcell of the whole ſurface; yet the other quarters are burthened & kept vnder with a proportionable meaſure of that waight; and through the vnion and continuation which bindeth all the parts into one Totality, feele the ſame ſuppreſſion which hath really ſeiſed but vpon their fellow part: In like maner the Belgæ, inhabiting the furtheſt skirt of that triple Continent, ſeemed to repine at that heauy burthen, which the Romane Empire had laid vpō the Prouince, the Hedui, & other States of that kingdome. And leaſt it might in time be further remoued, and laide directly vpon their ſhoulders, they thought it expedient whil'ſt they felt it but by participiation, to gather their ſeuerall forces into one head, and try whether they could free their neighbour Nations from ſo greeuous a yoake; or at the leaſt keep it from comming any neerer vnto themſelues. And this is the Argument of this ſecond booke; which diuideth it ſelfe into two parts: the firſt containing the warres betweene Cæſar and all the States of Belgia vnited togither; the ſecond recording the battailes which he made with ſome of the States thereof in particular, as time and occaſion gaue him meanes to effect it.

CHAP. I.

Cæſar haſteth to his Armie, marcheth towards the *Confines of the Belgæ, and taketh in the men of Rheimes.*

THE report of this confederacie beeing brought vnto Cæſar, whileſt he wintered beyond the Alpes, as well by Letters from Labienus, as by the common heareſay of the world: he leuied two new legions in Lumbardie, and ſent them by Q. Pedius into Gallia: and aſſoone as there was any forrage in the fieldes, he himſelfe came to the Army. At his arriuall, vnderſtanding the Sebones and the reſt of *Cæſar.*

the Galles that bordered vpon the Belgæ (to whome hee gaue in charge to learne what was done amongst them) that there was nothing in Belgia but mustering of soldiers, and gathering their forces into one head: he thought it not safe to make any further delay; but hauing made prouision of corne, hee drew out his Armie from their wintering campes, and within fifteene daies he came to the borders of the Belgæ. Assoone as he was come thither, which was much sooner then was looked for; the men of Rheimes being the vttermost of the Belgæ, next adioyning to the Celtæ, thought it best to entertaine a peaceable resolution, and sent Iccius & Antebrogius, two of the chiefe mẽ of their State, vnto Cæsar, to submit thẽselues and all that they had, to the mercy of the Romane Empire; affirming that they were innocent both of the counsell of the Belgæ, and of their conspiracie against the Romanes. For proofe whereof they were ready to giue hostages, to receiue them into their townes, & to furnish them with corne or what other thing they stood in need of. That the rest of the Belgæ were all in Armes, and the Germains on the other side of the Rhene had promised to send them succor: yea their madness was so great, that they themselues were not able to hold backe the Suessones from that attempt, being their brethren & kinsmen in blood, and vsing the same lawes and customes as they did, hauing both one magistrate and one forme of gouernment; but they would needs support the same quarrell which the rest of the Belgæ had vndertaken.

OBSERVATION.

Might heere take occasion to speak somwhat of a particular reuolte in a generall cause; and howe a confederate State may in regard of their owne safetie forsake a common quarrell, or whatsoeuer the vniuersall societie hath enacted preiudiciall to their common weale; but that I onely intend to discouer warlike practises, leauing these questions of lawe and policie to men of greater iudgement and better experience. Onely I obserue in the behalfe of the Romaine gouernment, that such cities as yeelded to the Empire, and became tributarie to their treasurie (howsoeuer they were otherwise combined by confederacie) seldome or neuer repented them of their facte, in regard of the noble patronage which they found in that State, and of the due respect obserued towards them.

CHAP. II.

The power of the Belgæ, and their preparation for this warre.

Cæsar.

Cæsar inquiring of the Embassadors which came from Rheimes what the States were that had taken Armes, and what they were able to doe in matter of Warre: found the Belgæ to be descended frõ the Germaines; who passing ouer the Rhene, time of out mind, droue away the Galles and seated themselues in their possessions: and that these only of all the Galles kept the Cimbri & Teutoni frõ entering into their

their country: and in that regard they chalenged to themselues great authoritie, and vaunted much in their feats of Armes. Concerning their number, they had these aduertisemēts; the [a] Bellouaci exceeded al the Belgæ in prowesse, authority, and number of men, and promised 60000. men: and in that regard they demanded the administration of the whole warre. The [b] Suessones inhabiting a large and fertile countrey, and hauing 12 walled townes, promised to set out 50000. The [c] Neruij as many; the [d] Attrebatij 15000. the [e] Ambiani 10000. the Velloca ssij and [f] Veromandui as many; the [g] Morini 25000. the Menapij 7000. the Caletani 10000. the Catuaci 19000. the [h] Eburones, Condrusones, and others 40000. Cæsar incouraging the mē of Rheimes to persist in their faithfulnes to the Romane Empire, propounded vnto them great offers and liberall promises of recompence, and commaunded all their senate to come before him, and bring with them their Noble mens Sonnes to be giuen vp for hostages: which they diligently performed by a day appointed. And hauing receiued two especiall aduertisemēts from the men of Rheimes, the one concerning the multitude of the enemie; and the other touching the singular opinion which was generally held of their manhood: he prouided for the first by perswading Diuitiacus the Heduan, that it much imported the whole course of those businesses, to keepe asunder the powre of the enemie; and to withhold their forces from making a head, that so he might auoid the danger of encountering so great a power at one instant. Which might easily be brought to passe, if the Hedui would enter with a strong power into the Marches of the Bellouaci, and sacke their Territories with sword and confusion: which Diuitiacus promised to performe, and to that purpose he speedily returned into his country. Vpon the second aduertisement, which presented vnto him the great valour and manhood of his enemies, hee resolued not to bee too hastie in giuing them battell, but first to proue by skirmishing with his horsemen what his enemies by their prowesse could doe, and what his owne men durst doe.

[a] *The country about Beauuois.*
[b] *The country about Soissons*
[c] *The people about Turnai*
[d] *Arras*
[e] *Amyens.*
[f] *Vermandois.*
[g] *Terwene*
[h] *Liege.*
296000. in all.

OBSERVATION.

THis rule of making trial of the worth of an enemy, hath alwaies been obserued by prudent & graue commanders, as the surest principle wheron the true iudgement of the euent may be groūded. For, if the doctrine of the old Philosophers, which teacheth that the worde *non putabā* was neuer heard out of a wise mans mouth, haue any place in the course of humane actions; it ought especially to be regarded in managing these maine points, wheron the State of Kingdomes and Empires dependeth. For, vnlesse we be persuaded that blind Chance directeth the course of this world with an vncertaine confusion, and that no foresight can sway the ballance of our hap into either part of our fortune; I see no reason why we should not by al meanes indeuor to ground our knowledge vpon true causes, and leuel our procedings to that certainty whith riseth from the things themselues. And this is the rather to be vrged, inasmuch as our leaders are oftentimes deceiued whē they look no further then to match an enemie with equalitie of number, referring their valour to bee tried in the battell; not considering that the eye of it selfe cannot

discerne the difference betweene two champions of like presence and outward cariage, vnles it see their strength compared together and weighed as it were in the scale of triall: which Cæsar omitted not diligently to obserue, before he would aduenture the hazard of battell. For, besides his owne satisfaction, it gaue great encouragement to his men, when they saw themselues able to countermatch an enemie, & knew their task to be subiect to their strength: Neither did hee obserue it onely at this instant, but throughout the whole course of his actions; for, we finde that he neuer incountered any enemie, but with sufficient power, either in number or in valour, to make head against them: which equalitie of strength, being first laid as a sure foundation, he vsed his owne industrie and skill, and the discipline wherein his men were trained, as aduantages to ouersway his aduersarie: and so drew victorie maugre fortune vnto himselfe, and seldome failed in any of his battels.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar passeth his Armie ouer the riuer * Axona, *leauing Titurius Sabinus incamped on the* other side with sixe cohorts.

**La disne.*

Cæsar.

ASSOONE as Cæsar vnderstood, as well by his discouerers, as from the men of Rheimes, that all the power of Belgæ was assembled together into one place, and was now making towards him no great distance off; he made all the haste he could to passe his Armie ouer the Riuer Axona, which diuided the men of Rheimes from the other Belgæ. Whereby he brought to passe, that no enemy could come on the backe of him to work any disaduantage: and that corne might be brought vnto him from Rheimes, and other citties without danger. And further, that hee might command the passage backe againe, as occasion should serue to his best aduantage, hee fortified a bridge which he found on the riuer, with a strong guarrison of men, and caused Titurius Sabinus a Legate, to incampe himselfe on the other side of the riuer with sixe cohorts, cõmanding him to fortifie his campe with a rampier of 12 foote in altitude, and a trench of 18 foote in breadth.

OBSERVATION.

IF it be demaunded, why Cæsar did passe his Armie ouer the riuer, leauing it on his backe, and did not rather attend the enemy on the other side, and so take the aduantage of hindring him, if hee should attempt to passe ouer: I will set downe the reasons in the sequell of this warre, as the occurrences shal fall out to make them more euident. In the meane time, let vs enter into the particularitie of these sixe cohortes, that we may the better iudge of such troupes which were imploied in the seruices of this warre: but that wee may the better coniecture what number of souldiers these

these fixe cohortes did containe; it seemeth expedient, a little to discourse of the companies and regiments, which the Romans vsed in their Armies.

And first we are to vnderstand, that the greatest and chiefest regiment in a Roman Armie, was tearmed by the name of Legio: as Varro saith, *quòd leguntur milites in delectu:* or as Plutarch speaketh, *quòd lecti ex omnibus essent militares;* so that it taketh the name Legio, of the choise & selecting of the soldiers. Romulus is said to be the first author & founder of these legions, making euery legion to containe 3000. soldiers: but shortly after they were augmented, as Festus recordeth, vnto 4000: and afterward againe from 4000, to 4200. And that number was the common rate of a legion vntill Hannibal came into Italy, and then it was augmented to 5000: but that proportion continued onely for that time. And againe, whē Scipio went into Africke, the legions were increased to 6200 footmen, and 300 horse. And shortly after the Macedonian warre, the legions that continued in Macedonie to keepe the Prouince from rebellion, consisted of 6000 footmen and 300. horse. Out of Cæsar it cannot be gathered, that a legion in his time did exceede the number of 5000 men, but oftentimes is was short of that number: for he himselfe saith that in this warre in Gallia his soldiers were so wasted, that he had scarce 7000 men in two legions. And if we examine that place out of the 3. of the ciuill warre, where he saith, that in Pompei his Armie were 110 cohorts, which amoūted to the number of 55000 men: and being manifest as well by these number of cohorts, as by the testimony of diuers authors that Pompei his Armie consisted of 11 legions; if wee deuide 55000 into 11. parts, we shall find a legion to cōsist of 5000 men. Which number or thereabout, being generally knowne to be the vsual rate of a legion, the Romans alwaies expressed the strength of their Armie by the number of legions that were therein: as in this warre it is said, that Cæsar had eight legions: which by this account might arise to 40000 men, besides associates, & such as necessarily attended the Armie. Further, we are to vnderstand, that euery legion had his peculiar name, by which it was knowne and distinguished from the rest: & that it tooke either from their order of muster, or inrolement; as that legion, which was first inrolled, was called the first legion; and that which was second in the choice, the second legion; and so consequently of the rest; and so we reade in this historie, the seuenth, the eighth, the ninth, the tenth, the eleuenth and twelfth legion: or otherwise from the place of their warfare, and so we read of *legiones Germanicæ, Panonicæ, Britannicæ*, and such others: and some time of their Generall, as *Augusta, Claudia, Vitellianæ legiones*, and so forth. Or to conclude, from some accident of qualitie, as *Rapax, Victrix, Fulminifera* & such like. And thus much of the name and number of a legion: which I must necessarily distinguish into diuers kindes of soldiers, according to the first institution of the old Romans, and the continuall obseruation thereof vnto the decay of the Empire, before I come to the description of these smaller parts whereof a legion was compounded.

A legion what it was. Lib. 4. De vita Romuli.

Liv. lib. 22.

Tacitus 3. hist.

First therefore we are to vnderstand, that after the Consuls had made a generall choise and sworne the souldiers, the Tribunes chose out the youngest and poorest of all the rest, and called them by the name of Velites. Their place in

Velites.

in regard of the other soldiers was both base & dishonorable: not only because thy fought a far off, and were lightly armed; but also in regard they were commonly exposed to the enemy, as our forlorne hopes are. Hauing chosen out a competent number for this kinde, they proceeded to the choise of them which they called Hastati, a degree aboue the Velites, both in age and wealth; and tearmed them by the name of Hastati; forasmuch as at their first institution they fought with a kind of Iauelin, which the Romanes called Hasta: but before Polybius his time they vsed Piles; notwithstãding their ancient name continued vnto the later time of the Empire. The third choise which they made, was of the strongest and lustiest bodied men, who for the prime of their age were called Principes: the rest that remain'd were named Triarii, as Varro saith; *Quòd tertiò ordine extremis subsidio deponũtur:* These were alwaies the eldest and best experienced men, and were placed in the third diuision of the battell, as the last help and refuge in all extreamitie. Polybius saith, that in his time the Velites, Hastati, and Principes, did consist of 1200 men a peece; and the Triarii neuer exceeded the number of 600. although the generall number of a legiõ were augmented: wherof Lypsius alledgeth these reasons; First bicause these Triarii consisted of the best of the soldiors, and so might counteruaile a greater number in good worth and valour. Secondly, it seldome came to buckle with the enemie, but when the controuersie grew very doubtfull. Lastly, wee may well coniecture that the voluntaries and extraordinary followers, ranged themselues amongst these Triaries, & so made the third battel equal to either of the former: but howsoeuer, they neuer exceeded the number of 600. And by this it appeareth, that in Polybius his time the common rate of a legion was 4200.

Hastati.

Principes.

Lib. 6.

Lib. 1. de mil. Rom.

In this diuision of their men, consisted the ground of that well ordered discipline; for, in that they distinguished them according to their yeeres and ability, they reduced their whole strength into seuerall classes; and so disposed of these different parts, that in the generall composition of their whole body, euerie part might be fitted with place & office, according as his worth was answerable to the same: and so they made not only a number in grosse, but a number distinct by parts and properties; that from euery accident which met with any part of the Army, the iudgment might determine how much or how little it imported the whole bodie: besides the great vse which they made of this distinction in their degrees of honour and preferment; a matter of no small consequence, in the excellencie of their gouernment.

The vse of this diuision.

The souldiers, at their inrolement beeing thus diuided according to their yeeres and abilitie, they then reduced them into smaller companies, to make them fitter for command and fight: and so they diuided the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii, each of them into 10 companies, making of those three sorts of soldiours 30 small regiments, which they called Manipuli: And againe, they subdiuided euery maniple into two equal parts, and called them Ordo, which was the least company in a legion; and according to the rate set down by Polybius, contained 60 soldiours. In euery Ordo there was a Centurion, or Captaine, and a Lieutenant, whom they named Optio or Tergiductor. The maniples of the Triarii were much lesser thẽ the maniples of either the Hastati or the Principes;

The distinction of their companies.

Manipuli.

Ordo.

cipes; for as much as their whole band consisted but of 600. men. The Velites were put into no such companies, but were equally distributed amongst the other Maniples; and therefore the Hastati, Principes, and Triarii were called *subsignani milites*, to make a difference betweene them & the Velites, which were not diuided into bands; and so consequently had no ensigne of their own, but were distributed amongst the other companies: so that euery Maniple had 40. Velites attending vpon it. And now I come to the description of a cohort; which the history heere mentioneth.

The worde *Cohors* in latine doth signifie that part of ground which is commonly inclosed before the gate of a house; which from the same word wee call a court and Varro giueth this reason of the metaphor. As in a farme house, saith he, many out-buildings ioyned together make one inclosure; so a cohort consisteth of seuerall maniples ioined together in one body. This cohort consisted of three maniples; for euerie legion had ten cohorts, which must necessarilie comprehend those thirty maniples: but these three maniples were not al of one and the same kind of soldiers, as three maniples of the Hastati, 3 of the Principes, and 3. of the Triarii, as Patricius in his Paralleli seemeth to affirme; for so there would haue remained an odde maniple in euery kind, that could not haue beene brought into any cohort: But a cohort contained a maniple of the Hastati, a maniple of the Principes, and a maniple of the Triarii; and so all the 30. maniples were included into 10. cohorts; and euery cohort was as a little legion; forasmuch as it consisted of all those sorts of souldiours that were in a legion. So that making a legion to containe 5000. men; a cohort had 500. and so these 6. cohorts, which he incamped on the other side of the riuer, vnder the command of Titurius Sabinus, contained 3000 soldiers: but if you make a legion to consist but of 4200 which was the more vsuall rate, there were 2520 soldiers in these sixe cohorts.

Cohors. Lib. 3. de re rust.

By this therefore it may appeare, that a legion consisted of foure sorts of soldiours, which were reduced into ten cohorts; and euery cohort contained 3. maniples; and euery maniple 2 orders; and euery order had his Centurion marching in the head of the troupe; and euery Centurion had his optionem, or Lieutanant, that stood in the taile of the troupe.

When a legion stood ranged in battell ready to confront the enemie, the least body or squadron that it contained was a maniple; wherein the two orders were ioined together, making iointly ten in front, and twelue in file: and so euerie fiue files had their Centurion in front, & Lieutenant in the rereward, to direct them in all aduentures. In the time of the Emperours, their battailions consisted of a cohort, and neuer exceeded that number how great soeuer the Armie were.

A legion ranged in battell.

Polybius distinguishing a maniple into two centuries or orders, saith, that the Centurion first chosen by the Tribunes, commanded the right order, which was that order which stood on the right hand, knowne by the name of *Primus ordo*: and the Centurion elected in the second course, commanded the left order; and in the absence of either of them, hee that was present of them two, commanded the whole maniple. And so we finde that the Centurion of the first

The first order.

3 *De bello ciuili.*

first place was called *Prior Centurio*: in which sense Cæsar is to be vnderstood, where he saith that all the Centurions of the first cohorte were slaine, *Præter principem priorem*. From whence we gather two specialities: first, the priority betweene the Centurions of the same Maniple: for, a cohorte consisting of 3. Maniples, whereof the first Maniple were Triarii, the second Principes, and the third Hastati; and euery Maniple containing two orders; and euery order a Centurion: he saith, that al the Centurious of this cohort were slaine; sauing the first or vpper Centurion of the Principes. The second thing which I obserue, is the title of the first cohort: for these 10. cohortes, whereof a Legion consisted, were distinguished by degrees of worthinesse; and that which was held the worthiest in the censure of the Electors, tooke the prioritie both of place and name, and was called the first cohort: the next, the second cohort; and so consequently vnto the tenth and last.

Prima cohors.

Neither did the Legions want their degrees of preheminence, both in imbattailing and in incamping, according either to the senioritie of their inrolement, or the fauor of their Generall, or their owne vertue: And so we reade that in these wars in Gallia, the tenth Legion had the first place in Cæsars Armie. And thus much concerning the diuisions, and seuerall companies of a Legion, and the degrees of honour which they held in the same.

The benefit of this discipline.

Vpon this description it shal not be amisse, briefely to lay open the most apparant commodities depending vpon this discipline; the excellencie whereof more plainely appeareth, being compared to that order, which Nature hath obserued in the frame of her worthiest creatures: for it is euident, that such workes of Nature come neerest to perfect excellēcy, whose materiall substāce is most particularly distinguished into parts, and hath euery part indued with that propertie, which best agreeth to his peculiar seruice. For, being thus furnished with diuersitie of instruments, and these directed with fitting abilities; the creature must needs expresse many admirable effectes, and discouer the worth of an excellent nature: whereas those other bodies, that are but slenderly laboured, and find lesse fauour in Natures forge, being as abortiues, or barbarously composed, wanting the diuersitie both of parts and faculties; are no way capable of such excellent vses, nor fit for such distinct seruices, as the former that are directed with so many properties, & inabled with the power of so wel distinguisht faculties. Which better workes of Nature the Romans imitated in the Architecture of their Army, diuiding it into such necessary & seruiceable parts, as were best fitting al vses & imploiments: as first Legions, and legions into cohorts, and cohorts into maniples, and maniples into centuries or orders, and these into files; wherein euery man knew his place, and kept the same without exchange or confusion: and thus the vniuersal multitude was by order disposed into parts, vntill it came vnto a vnitie. For it cannot be denied, but that these centuries were in themselues so sensiblie distinguished, that euery souldiour carried in his minde the particular Mappe of his whole centurie: for in imbattailing, euery centurie was disposed into 5. files, containing twelue in a file; whereof the leaders were alwaies certaine, and neuer changed but by death or some other speciall occasion: and euerie

leader

leader knew his follower, and euery second knew the third man, and so consequently vnto the last.

Vpon these particularities it plainely appeareth, how easie a matter it was, to reduce their troupes into any order of a march or a battell, to make the front the flanke, or flanke front, when they were broken and distrankt to rallie them into any forme, when euery man knew both his owne and his fellowes station. If any companies were to be imploied vpon sudden seruice, the general Idea of the Armie being so deeply imprinted in the mind of the commanders, would not suffer them to erre in taking out such cõuenient troupes, both for number and qualitie, as might best agree with the safety of the Armie, or nature of the action. At all occasions and opportunities, these principles of aduantage offered thẽselues, as ready meanes, to put in execution any dessigne, or stratagem whatsoeuer: the proiect was no sooner resolued of, but euerie man could readily point out the companies that were fit to execute the intention. And which is more important, in regard of the life and spirit of euery such part, their sodalitie was sweetned, or rather strengthned with the mutuall acquaintance, and friendship one of another; the captaine marching alwaies in the head of the troupe, the ensigne in the middest, and the lieutenant in the rereward, and euery man accompanied with his neighbour and his friend: which bred a true and vnfained courage, both in regard of themselues, and of their followers. Besides these specialities, the places of title and dignity depending vpon this order, were no smal meanes to cut off all matter of ciuill discorde, and intestine dissension: for, here euery man knew his place in the File, and euerie File knew his place in the Centurie, and euery Centurie in the Maniple, and euery Maniple in the Cohort, and euery Cohort in the Legion, and euery Legion in the Armie; and so euery souldier had his place, according to his vertue; and euery place gaue honour to the man, according as their discipline had determined thereof.

The want of this discipline hath dishonoured the martiall gouernment of this age, with bloudshed and mutthers; whereof France is too true a witness, as well in regard of the French themselues, as of our English forces that haue beene sent thither to appease their tumults: for, through defect of this order, which allotteth to euery man his due place, the controuersie grew betweene Sir William Drurie & Sir Iohn Bowrowes; the issue wherof is too well known to the world: wherein as our commanders in France haue beene negligent, so I may not forget to giue due commendation to the care which is had of this point amõgst the English troupes, in the seruice of the States in the vnited prouinces; where they are very curious in appointing euerie man his place in the File, and euery File in the troupe, and find much benefit thereby, besides the honour of reuiuing the Roman discipline.

To conclude this point, I will onely touch in a word the benefite, which the Romans found in their small battailions, & the disaduantage, which we haue in making great squadrons. And first it cannot be denied, but that such troups stand best appointed for disposition & array of battell, which standing strong to receiue a shocke, bring most men to fight with the enemy: for, the principal things

The benefit of small battailions: and the disaduantage of great squadrons.

things which are required in setting of a battel, are so to order the troupes, that the depth in flanke may serue conueniently to withstād the assault, taking vp no more men then may well serue for that purpose; and giuing meanes to the rest to fight with the enemie: and in these two points, were both their defensiue and offensiue considerations comprehended. But smaller troupes and battailions afforde this conueniencie better then great squadrons: which drowne vp manie able men in the depth of their flankes, and neuer suffer them to appeare, but when the breaking of the squadron doth present them to the butchery of the enemie. The Macedonian Phalanx, as I haue noted in the first booke, neuer caried aboue 16. in flanke, & brought 500 to fight in front. And these little battailions (considering them as they stood in battel ray) made as great a front or greater, then that of the Phalanx, keeping a depth answerable to the same; besides the 2 and 3 battell, which alwaies were to succour thē, which the Phalanx wanted: neither would their thicke and close imbattailing admit any such succour behind them. Now if we compare the aduantages and discommodities, which by place and accident were incident to either of these, we shall find great odds betweene them. These great squadrons are not faisable, but in plaine and open places, where they may either stand immoueable, or make easy & slow motions without shaking or disordering their body: but the lesser are a scantling for all places, champion or wooddie, leuell or vneuen, or of what site or qualitie soeuer. And to conclude, if two or three ranks of these great battailions chance to be broken and disordered, the whole body is as much interessed in the disorder, as the said rankes are; and hath lesse meanes to rally it selfe, then any other lesser company: but if any violence chance to rout a Maniple, it proceedeth no further in the Army, then that part which it taketh: Neither can the disranking of any one part, betray the safety of the Armie to disorder & confusion; for as much as their distinction serued to cut off such inconueniences, & yet no waie hindered the generall vniting of their strength into one body. More maie bee said concerning this matter: but I onely point at it, and leaue the due consideration thereof, to the iudgement of our commanders, & returne to our history.

CHAP. IIII.

The Belgæ attempt the surprise of * Bibrax:

Cæsar sendeth succour vnto it.

* *Bray in the county of Retell.*

THERE was a towne called Bibrax, belonging to the state of Rheimes, about eight miles from Cæsars Campe; which the Belgæ thought to haue surprised, as they came along to meete with Cæsar; and suddenly assaulted it with such furie, that the townesmen could hardly holde out the first day. The Celtæ and Belgæ vse one and the same manner, in assaulting a towne: for, hauing beset the whole compasse of the wall with rankes

rankes of souldiers, they neuer cease slinging of stones vntill they finde the wall naked of defendants; and then casting themselues into a Testudo, they approche to the gate & vndermine the walls. Assoone as the night had made an end of the assault, Iccius of Rheimes, a man of great birth and authoritie in his countrey, who at that time was gouernour of the towne, and had beene before with Cæsar, to treat and conclude a Peace: sent him worde by messengers, that if there came not preset succour, he was not able to hold out any lōger. The same day about midnight (vsing the same messengers for guides) he sent both Numidian and Cretian Archers, & Slingers of the Iles of Baleares, to relieue the towne; by meanes whereof, the townesmen were put in good hope to make their partie strong, and the enemie made hopeless of winning the towne: and therefore after a smal stay, hauing populated their fields, and burned their villages and out-buildings, they marched with all their power towards Cæsars Campe; and within lesse then two miles of the Armie, they incamped their whole hoast: which, as was gathered by the smoke and fire, occupied more ground then eight miles in breadth.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the description of their assault, we are to obserue two circumstances: The first is, the manner they vsed in a sudden surprise: The second is, the forme and qualitie of a Testudo. Although Cæsar seemeth to attribute this manner of assaulting a towne, as peculiar, to the Galles; yet wee may not thinke but that the Romans vsed it, as often as they had occasion to surprise any cittie: but because the Galles knew no other meanes to take a towne but this, therefore he setteth it downe as peculiar vnto them. The Romans called this manner of assault *Corona*; and so we read oftentimes this phrase, *Cingere vrbem corona*: forasmuch as the soldiers inclosed the towne with a circle, and so resembled a crowne or garland. Ammianus speaketh of a triple crowne of souldiers, which incompassed a towne: And Iosephus telleth of Iotapatam, which the Romans besieged *duplici peditum corona*: and besides these, there was a third circle of horsemen vtmost of al. There is no further matter to be obserued but this; that in surprising a towne, they incircled it round about with thicke continued rankes of men, and where they found the wall weakest, there they entered as they could.

To take a towne by surprise.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THE Testudo requireth a larger discourse, and is liuely described in Liuie, after this manner. In the Amphitheater, where the people did often assemble to see strange sightes and publike shewes, were brought in (saith he) 60 lusty young men, who after some motion, & seemely march, cast themselues into a square troupe, and roofing their heades close with their targets, the first ranke which made the front of the Testudo, stood vpright on their feete; the second ranke bowed it selfe somewhat lower; the

A Testudo described. Lib. 44.

the third and fourth rankes did more incline themselues, and so consequentlie vnto the last ranke, which kneeled on the ground: and so they made a bodie resembling halfe the side of an house, which they called Testudo. Vnto this squadron so strongly combined togither, came two souldiers running some fiftie foot off; and threatning each other with their weapons, ran nimbly vp the side of the roofe; & sometimes making as though they would defend it against an enemie, that would haue entred vpon it; somtimes againe incountering each other in the midst of it, leaped vp and downe as steadily as if they had been vpon firme ground. And which is more strange, the front of a Testudo being applied to the side of a wal, there ascended many armed men vpon the said Testudo, and fought in an equall height with other souldiers, that stood vpon the said wall to defend it. The dissimilitude in the composition was this, that the soldiers that were in front, and in the sides of the square, caried not their Targets ouer their heads, as the other did; and couered their bodies with them: & so no weapons either cast from the wall, or otherwise throwne against it, could any waie hurt them; and whatsoeuer waight fell vpon the Testudo, it quickly glyded downe by the decliuitie of the roofe, without any hurt or annoyaunce at all.

Thus far Liuie goeth; neither doe I know what to say further of it: the chiefest vse thereof was in a surprise or suddaine attempt against a towne, before the townes men were throughly prepared to defend the same. This inuention serued them to approach the wall with safetie, and so either to vndermine it, or to clime vp: and to that end they oftentimes erected one Testudo vpon another. Tacitus saith, that the souldiers climed vpon the wall, *super iteratam testudinem*, by one Testudo made vpon another; and this was the ancient forme and vse of a Testudo in a suddaine assault or surprise.

Lib. 49 Dio Cassius, in the actes of Antonie, saieth, that beeing galled with the Parthian Archers, he commanded his whole Armie to put it selfe into a Testudo: which was so strange a sight to the Parthians, that they thought the Romaines hadde sunke downe for wearinesse and faintnesse; and so forsaking their horse, drewe their swordes to haue made execution: and then the Romanes, at a watch-worde giuen, rose againe with such a furie, that they put them all to sworde and flight. Dio describeth the saide Testudo after this manner: They placed, saith hee, their baggage, their light armed men and their horsemen, in the middest; and those heauie armed footemen that caried long gutter-tiled Targettes, were in the vtmost circles next vnto the Enemie: The reste (which bare large Ouall Targettes) were thronged togither throughout the whole troupe; and so couered with their Targets both themselues and their fellowes, that there was nothing discerned by the Enemy but a roofe of Targets: which were so tiled togither, that men might safely goe vpon them.

Further, wee oftentimes reade, that the Romaines cast themselues into a Testudo, to breake through an Enemy, or to route and disranke a troupe. And this vse the Romaines had of a Testudo in field seruices, and only by the benefit of their Target. It was called a Testudo, in regard of the strength, for that it

couered

couered and sheltred, as a shell couereth a fish. And let this suffice concerning a Testudo.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THirdly, we may obserue, how carefully Cæsar prouided for the safetie of such succours as he sent vnto Bibrax: for, hee commanded the same messengers to direct them that came from the towne, as the best & surest guides in that iourney; least peraduenture through ignorance of the way, they might fall into inconueniences or dangers. A matter of no small consequence in managing a war; but deseruetb an extraordinary importunitie, to perswade the necessitie of this diligence: for, a Generall, that hath perfectlie discouered the nature of the country, through which he is to march, & knoweth the true distances of places, the qualitie of the waies, the compendiousnes of turnings, the nature of the hils, & the course of the riuers, hath all these particularities, as maine aduantages, to giue meanes of so many seuerall attempts vpon an enemy. And in this point, Haniball had a singular dexteritie, and excelled all the Commaunders of his time, in making vse of the way, by which he was to passe. But, he that leadeth an Army, by an vnknowne and vndiscouered way, and marcheth blindfold vpon vncertaine aduentures, is subiect to as many casualties and disaduantages, as the other hath opportunitie of good fortune. Let euery man therefore perswade himselfe, that good Discouerers are as the eyes of an Armie, and serue for lights in the darknesse of ignorance, to direct the resolutions of good prouidence, and make the path of safety so manifest, that we need not stumble vpon casualties. Cæsar, in his iourney to Ariouistus, vsed the help of Diuitiacus the Heduan, in whō amongst all the Galles, he reposed greatest confidence, to discouer the way, and acquaint him with the passages: and before he would vndertake his voyage vnto * Britanie, hee vvell enformed himselfe by Marchants and trauailers, of the quantitie of the Iland, the qualitie of the people, their vse of war, and the opportunitie of their hauens. Neither was he satisfied with their relations, but he sent Caius Volusenus in a ship of war, to see what he could further discouer, concerning these points. Suetonius addeth moreouer, that he neuer caried his Army, *per insidiosa itinera*, vnlesse he had first well discouered the places.

The necessity of good discouerie.

** Now England.*

Concerning the order, which skilfull Leaders haue obserued in discoueries, we are to knowe that this point consisteth of two partes: the one, in vnderstanding the perfect description of the country; and the second, in obseruing the motions of the enemy. Touching the first, wee find as well by this as other histories, that the Romans vsed the inhabitants of the country for Guides, as best acquainted with their natiue places, that they might not erre in so important a matter; prouided alwaies, that their owne scoutes were euer abroad to vnderstand what they could of themselues, that they might not altogether relie vpon a strangers direction. The motions of the Enemy were obserued by the horsemen: and these for the most part were Veterani, well experienced in the matter

The order which is to be obserued in discouery.

of warre, and so the Generall receiued sound aduertisements: & yet they were not too forward vpon any new motion, vnlesse they found it confirmed by diuers waies: for, some Espials may erre, either through passion or affection, as it happened in the Heluetian war. If therefore the vse and benefit, which prudent and wise Commaunders made of this diligence, or the misfortune which the want of this knowledge brought vpon the ignorant, haue any authoritie to perswade a circumspect care heerein, this little that hath been spoken, may be sufficient for this point.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

Slingers with their arte & vse.

THe souldiers vvhich Cæsar sent to relieue Bibrax, were Archers of Creta and Numidia, & Slingers of the Iles Baleares, which are now called Maiorica, and Minorica: which kinde of weapon, because it seemeth ridiculous to the souldiers of these times, whose conceites are held vp with the furie of these fierie engines; I will in briefe discouer the nature and vse of this weapon.

The Latines, saith Isodore, called this weapon *funda: quòd ex ea fundantur lapides.* Plinie attributeth the inuention therof to the Insulairs, called Baleares. Florus, in his 3 booke and 8 chap. saith, that these Baleares vsed 3 sorts of slings and no other weapon besides: for, a boy had neuer any meate giuen him, before hee had first strooke it with a sling. Strabo distinguisheth these three sorts of slings, which the Baleares vsed; and saith, that they had one sling with long raines, which they vsed when they would cast a far off: and another with short raines, which they vsed neere at hand: & the third, with raines of a meane sise, to cast a reasonable distance. Lipsius saith, that in *Columna Antonina* at Rome, he obserued that the Balearean was made with one sling about his head, another about his belly, and the third in his hand; which might bee their ordinarie manner of carying them. The matter whereof they were made, was threefold: the first was hempe or cotton, the second haire, and the third sinewes: for, of either of these stuffes, they commonly made them: the forme and fashion of a sling, resembled a platted rope, somewhat broad in the middest, with an Ouall compasse; and so by little & little, decreasing into two thongs or raines. Their manner of slinging, was to whirle it twice or thrice about their head, and so to cast out the bullet. Virgill speaking of Mezentius, saith;

Ipse ter adducta circum caput egit habena.

But Vegetius preferreth that skill, which cast the bullet with once turning it about the head. In Suidas wee find, that these Baleares did cõmonly cast a stone of a pound waight: which agreeth to these names in Cæsar, *fũdas, librales.* The leaden bullets are mentioned by Salust, in the war with Iugurth; and by Liuie, where he saith, that the Consull prouided great store of arrowes, of bullets, and of small stones to be cast with slings. This weapon was in request amongst diuers nations, as well in regard of the readinesse, & easy reiterating of the blowe, as also for that the bullet fledde very farre, with great violence: the distance which

which they could easily reach with their sling, is expressed in this verse,

Fundum Varro vocat, quem possis mittere funda. *Lib. 2.*

Which Vegetius interpreteth to be 600 foote: their violence was such, as the same author affirmeth in his first booke & 16 chap. that neither helmet, gaberdine, nor corselet could beare out the blowe; but hee that was hit with a sling, was slaine *sine inuidia sanguinis*, as he saith in the same place. Lucrece, Ouid, and Lucan, 3 of the Latine Poets, say, that a bullet skilfully cast out of a sling, went with such violence, that it melted as it flew: whereof Seneca giueth this reason: Motion, saith he, doth extenuate the ayre, and that extenuation or subtiltie doth inflame: and so a bullet cast out of a sling, melteth as it flieth. But howsoeuer; Diodorus Siculus affirmeth, that these Baleatean slingers, brake both target, head-piece, or any other armour whatsoeuer. *Lib. 2. natur. questions.*

There are also two other sorts of slings, the one mentioned by Liuie, and the other by Vegetius. That in Liuie is called *Cestrophendo*, which cast a short arrow with a long thick head: the other in Vegetius, is called *fustibalus*: which was a sling made of a corde and a staffe. But let this suffice for slings & slingers, which were reckoned amongst their light-armed souldiers, and vsed chiefelie in assaulting, and defending townes & fortresses, where the heauie armed souldiers could not come to buckle: and present the place of our Hargebusiers, which in their proper nature, are *leuis armaturæ milites*, although more terrible then those of ancient times.

CHAP. V.

Cæsar confronted the Belgæ in forme of battell, *but without any blowe giuen: the Belgæ attempt the passing of the riuer Axona; but in vaine, and to their* losse: they consult of breaking vp the vvarre.

CAESAR at the first resolued not to giue thē battell, as well in regard of their multitude, as the generall fame & opinion conceiued of their valour: notwithstanding hee daily made triall by light skirmishes with his horsemen, what the enemie could do, & what his owne men durst do. And whē he found that his owne men were nothing inferiour to the Belgæ, hee chose a conuenient place before his camp, and put his Army in battell: the banke where he was incamped rising somwhat from a plaine leuell, vvas no larger then would suffice the front of the battell; the two sides were steep, and the front rose aslope by litle & litle, vntil it came again to a plain, where the legions were imbattailed. And least the enemy abounding in multitude, shold circumuēt his men & charge thē in the flank as they were fighting, he drew an ouerthwart dich behind, his Army frō one side of the hil to the other, 600 pases in length; the ends wherof *Cæsar.*

hee fortified with bulwarkes, and placed therein store of engines: and leauing in his Campe the two legions which he had last inrolled in Lombardie, that they might be ready to be drawne forth when there should need any succour, he imbattailed his other sixe legions in the front of the hill, before his Campe. The Belgæ also bringing forth their power, confronted the Romans in order of battell. There lay, betweene both the Armies a small Marish: ouer which the enemie expected that Cæsar should haue passed; and Cæsar on the other side, attended to see if the Belgæ woulde come ouer, that his men might haue charged them in that troublesome passage. In the mean time the Caualry on both sides incountered between the two battels, and after long expectation on either side, neither party aduenturing to passe ouer; Cæsar hauing got the better in the skirmish betweene the horsmen, thought it sufficient for that time, both for the encouraging of his owne mē, & the contesting of so great an Army; and therefore hee conuaied all his men againe into their Campe. From that place the enemy immediatly tooke his way to the Riuer Axona, which lay behind the Romans Campe: and there finding foords, they attempted to passe ouer part of their forces, to the end they might either take the fortresse which Q. Titurius kept, or to breake downe the bridge, or to spoile the territories of the State of Rheimes, & cut off the Romans from prouision of corne. Cæsar, hauing aduertisement thereof from Titurius, transported ouer the riuer by the bridge all his horsemen and light armed Numidians, with his Slingers and Archers, and marched with them himselfe. The conflict was hot in that place: the Romans charging their enemies as they were troubled in the water, slew a great number of them; the rest like desperate persons, aduenturing to pass ouer vpon the dead carkases of their fellowes, were beaten backe by force of weapons: and the horsemen incompassed such as had first got ouer the water, and slew euemen of them.

When the Belgæ perceiued themselues frustrated of their hopes, of winning Bibrax, of passing the Riuer, and of drawing the Romans into places of disaduantage, and that their owne prouisions began to faile them: they called a counsell of warre, wherein they resolued, that it was best for the State in generall, and for euery man in particular, to breake vp their Camp, & to returne home vnto their own houses: and in whose confines or territories socuer, the Romans shoulde first enter, to depopulate & waste them in hostile maner, that thither they should hastē from all parts, and there to giue them battell; to the ende they might rather try the matter in their own country, then abroad in a strange & vnknowne place; & haue their own houshold prouision alwaies at hand to maintaine them. And this the rather was concluded, for as much as they had intelligence, that Diuitiacus with a great power of the Hedui, approached neere to the borders of the Bellouaci; who, in that regard, made haste homeward to defend their country.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

FIRST we may obserue the Art, which he vsed to counteruaile the strength of so great a multitude, by choosing out so conuenient a place, which was no broader in front thē would suffice the front of his battell; and hauing both the sides of the hill so steepe, that the enemie

enemie could not ascend nor clime vp, but to their owne ouerthrow; he made the back part of the hill strong by Art, & so placed his souldiers as it were in the gate of a fortresse, where they might either issue out, or retire at their pleasure. Whereby it appeareth, how much he preferred securitie and saletie before the vaine opinion of foole-hardy resolution; which sauoureth of Barbarisme rather then of true wisedome: for he euer thought it great gaine, to loose nothing: and the day brought alwaies good fortune, that deliuered vp the Army safe vnto the euening; attending, vntill aduantage had laid sure principles of victory: and yet Cæsar was neuer thought a coward.

And now it appeareth, what vse hee made by passing his Armie ouer the riuer, and attending the enemie on the further side, rather then on the side of the state of Rheimes: for, by that meanes he brought to passe, that whatsoeuer the enemie should attempt in any part or quarter of the land, his forces were readie to trouble their proceedings; as it happened in their attempt of Bibrax: and yet notwithstanding, hee lost not the opportunitie of making slaughter of them, as they passed ouer the riuer. For, by the benefit of the bridge which he had fortified, he transported what forces hee would, to make head against them, as they passed ouer; and so hee tooke what aduantage either side of the riuer could affoord him.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

And heere the Reader may not maruel, if when the hils are in labor, they bring forth but a mouse; for how soon is the cõrage of this huge Army abated? or what did it attempt worthy such a multitude? or answerable to the report which was bruted of their valour? but being hastily caried together by the violence of passion, were as quickly dispersed vppon the sight of an enemie: which is no strange effect of a suddaine humour. For, as in Nature all violent motions are of short continuance, & the durabilitie, or lasting qualitie of all actions, proceedeth from a slow and temperate progression; so the resolutions of the minds that are caried with an vntemperate violence, and sauour so much of heat and passion, do vanish away euen with the smoake therof, & bring forth nothing but leasurable repentance: and therefore it were no ill counsell for men of such natures, to qualifie their hastie resolutions, with a mistrustfull lingering; that when their iudgement is well informed of the cause, they may proceed to a speedie execution.

But that which most bewraieth their indiscreet intemperãce, in the hote pursuit of this enterprise, is, that before they had scarce seene the enemie, or hadde opportunity to contest him in open field, their victual began to faile them: for, their minds were so caried away with the conceit of warre, that they had no leisure to prouide such necessaries, as are the strength and sinewe of the warre. It was sufficient for euery particular man, to be knowne for a souldier in so honorable an action, referring other matters to the care of the State. The States

in like manner thought it enough to furnish out fortie or fiftie thousand men apeece, to discharge their oath, and to saue their hostages, committing other requisites to the generall care of the confederacie: which, being directed by as vnskilfull gouernors, neuer looked further then the present multitude; which seemed sufficient to ouerthrow the Romaine Empire. And thus each man relied vpon an others care, and satisfied himselfe with the present garbe; So many men of all sorts and qualities, so many helmets and plumed crests, such strife and emulation, what state should seeme in greatest forwardness; were motiues sufficient to induce euery man to go, without further inquiry, how they should goe. And herein the care of a Generall ought especially to bee seene, considering the weakenesse of particular iudgements, that hauing the liues of so many men depending altogither vpon his prouidence, and engaged in the defence of their state & country, he do not faile in these maine points of discipline, which are the pillars of all warlike designes. To conclude this point, let vs learne by their errour, so to carrie a matter (especially of that consequence) that we make it not much worse by ill handling it, then it was before we first tooke it to our charge; as it heere happened to the Belgæ. For their tumultuous armes sorted to no other end, then to giue Cæsar iust occasion to make warre vpon them, with such assurance of victorie, that he made small account of that which was to follow, in regard of that which had already happened: considering that he should not in all likelihood, meete with the like strength againe, in the continuance of that warre. And this was not onely *grauius bellum successori tradere*, as it often falleth out in the course of a long continued warre; but to draw a dangerous warre vpon their heads, that otherwise might haue liued in peace.

CHAP. VI.

The Belgæ brake vp their Campe; and as they *returne home, are chased and slaughtered* by the Romaines.

Cæsar.

THIS generall resolution beeing entertained by the consent of the whole Councell of warre; they departed out of their Campe with a great noise and tumult, without any order (as it seemed) or gouernment, euerie man pressing to bee formost on his iourney: in such a turbulent manner, that they seemed all to run away. Whereof Cæsar hauing notice by his spies, and mistrusting some practise, not as yet perceiuing the reason of their departure, he kept his Army within his Campe. In the dawning of the day, vpon certaine intelligence of their departure, he sent first his horsemen to stay the rereward, commaunding Labienus to follow after with three legions: these ouertaking the Belgæ, and chasing them many miles, slew a great number of them. And while the rereward staied, and valiantly receiued the charge of the Romaines, the vantguard beeing out of danger, and vnder no gouernment,

assoone

assoone as they heard the alarum behind them, brake out of their ranks & betook themselues to flight; & so the Romaines slew them as long as the sunne gaue them light to pursue them: and then sounding a retrait, they returned to their Campe.

OBSERVATION.

IT hath beene an old rule amongst souldiers, that A great and negligent errour cõmitted by an enemy, is to be suspected as a pretence to trecherie. Wee reade of Fuluius a Legate in the Romaine Armie, lying in Tuscanie, the Consul being gon to Rome to performe some publike dutie; the Tuscanes tooke occasion by his absence to trie whether they could draw the Romaines into any inconuenience; and placing an ambuscado neere vnto their campe, sent certaine souldiers, attired like shepheards, with droues of cattell to passe in view of the Romaine Army: who handled the matter so, that they came euen to the rampier of the campe. Whereat the Legate wondering as at a thing void of reason, kept himselfe quiet vntill he had discouered their treacherie, and so made frustrate their intent: In like manner, Cæsar not perswaded that men should bee so heedless, to carry a retrait in that disorderly and tumultuous manner, would not discampe his men to take the opportunity of that aduantage, vntill hee had found that to be true, which in all reason was vnlikely. And thus 296000. Belgæ were chased and slaughtered by three legions of the Romaines, for want of gouernment and order in their departure.

CHAP. VII.

Cæsar followeth after the Belgæ into the Countrey of the Suessones; and there besiegeth * Nouiodunum.

** Noyon.*

*THE next day after their departure, before they could recouer themselues of their feare and flight; or had time to put themselves againe in breath: Cæsar, as it were continuing still the chase and victorie, ledde his Armie into the country of the *Suessones, the next borderers vnto the men of Rheimes: and after a long iourney came vnto Nouiodunum a towne of good importance, which hee attempted to take by surprise, as hee passed along by it. For, hee vnderstoode, that it was altogether vnfurnished of defensiue prouision, hauing no forces within to defende it: but in regard of the breadth of the ditch and height of the wall, hee was for that time disappointed of his purpose: and therefore hauing fortified his campe, hee began to make preparatiõ for a siege. The night following, the whole multitude of the Suessones, that had escaped by flight, were receiued into the towne: howbeit when the Vineæ were with great expedition brought vnto the wall, the mount raised, & the turrets built; the Galles being amazed at the highnes of the workes, such as they had neuer*

Cæsar.

** Soyssons.*

neuer seene nor heard of before, and the speede which was made in the dispatch thereof, sent ambassadours to Cæsar, to treate of giuing vp the towne; and by the mediation of the men of Rheimes obtained their suite.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN this relation, we may obserue the industrious art, which the Romans vsed in assaulting, and taking holdes and townes; wherein we find three sorts of engines described, Vinea, Agger, and Turres.

*Lib. 4. A vinea or vine described.

Vinea is thus described by Vigetius: a little strong-built house or houell, made of light wood, that it might be remoued with greatest ease; the roofe was supported with diuers pillars of a foote square, whereof the formost were 8. foot high, and the hindmost 6. and betweene euerie one of these pillars, there was 5 foot distance: it was alwaies made with a double roofe; the first or lower roofe was of thick plankes, and the vpper roofe of hurdles, to breake the force of a waight without further shaking or disioyning the building: the sides were likewise walled with hurdles, the better to defend the souldiers that were vnder it: the whole length was about 16 foote, and the breadth 7: the vpper roofe was commonly couered with greene or raw hides, to keepe it from burning. Many of these houels were ioyned together in ranke, when they went about to vndermine a wal: the higher end was put next vnto the wal, that all the waights which were throwen vpon it might easily tumble down, without any great hurt to the engine: the foure sides and groundsils, had in euery corner a wheele, & by them they were driuen to any place as occasion serued. the chiefest vse of them was to couer and defend the souldiers, as they vndermined or ouerthrew a wall. This engine was called Vinea, which signifieth a Vine, for it sheltered such as were vnder the roofe thereof, as a Vine couereth the place where it groweth.

Agger or mount.

Agger, which we call a mount, is described in diuers histories to be a hill or eleuation made of earth & other substance, which by little and little was raised forward, vntil it approched neere vnto the place, against which it was built; that vpon this mount they might erect fortresses and turrets, and so fight with an aduantage of height. The matter of this mount, was earth and stones, fagots, and timber. Iosephus saith, that at the siege of Ierusalem, the Romans cut downe all the trees within 11 mile compasse, for matter and stuffe to make a mount. The sides of this Agger were of Timber, to keepe in the loose matter; the forepart which was towards the place of seruice, was open without any timber work: for on that part they stil raised it & brought it neerer the wals. That which was built at Massilia was 80 foot high, and that at Auaricum 80. foote high and 30. foot broad. Iosephus and Egesippus writ, that there was a fortresse in Iudea, 300. cubites high: which Sulla purposing to win by assault, raised a mount 200. cubites high; and vpon it he built a castle of stone 50. cubites high, and 50. cubites broad; and vpon the said castell hee erected a turret of 60 cubites in height, & so took the fortresse. The Romans oftentimes raised these mounts in the mouth of a hauen, commonly to ouer-toppe a towne, that so they might fight and with much aduantage.

Amongst

CÆSARS march where in euery Legion had his Cariadges in

CÆSARS *march where the Enemy was neerer at hand.*

Amongst other engines, in vse amongst the Romans, their moueable Turrets were verie famous: for, they were built in some safe place out of danger; & with wheels put vnder them, were driuen to the walles of the towne. These turrets were of two sorts, either great or little: the lesser sort are described, by Vitruuius, to be sixtie cubits high, and the square side seauenteene cubites: the breadth at the top, was a fift part of the breadth at the base; and so they stood sure without any danger of falling. The corner pillars, were at the base nine inches square, and 6 inches at the top: there were commonly 10 stories in these little turrets, and windowes in euerie storie. The greater sort of towers were 120 cubits high, and the square side was 24 cubites: the breadth at the top was a fift part of the base; and in euery one of these, were commonly 200 stories. There was not one & the same distance kept between the stories; for the lowest commonlie was 7 cubites, and 12 inches high: the highest storie 5 cubites, and the rest 4 cubites, and a third. In euerie one of these stories, were souldiers and engines, ladders and casting bridges, by which they got vpon the wall and entered the towne. The forepart of these turrets were couered with yron, and wet couerings, to saue them from fire. The souldiours that remooued the tower to and fro, were alwaies within the square thereof, and so they stood out of danger. The new water-worke by Broken-wharfe in London, much resembleth one of these towers.

Towers or Turrets described.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

Pon the building of these mightie engines, it was no maruell if the Suessones submitted themselues to such powerfull industrie. For, whatsoeuer is strange and vnusuall, doth much affright the spirits of an enemie, and breed a motion of distrust and diffidencie, when as they find themselues ignorant of such warlike practices: for, noueltie alwaies breedeth wonder; in as much as the true reasons and causes beeing vnknowne, we apprehend it, as diuers from the vsuall course of things, and so stand gazing at the strangenesse thereof: and wonder, as it addeth worth to the noueltie; so it inferreth diffidencie, and so consequently feare, the vtter enemie of martiall valour.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar carieth his Armie to the Territories of the Bellouaci, Ambiani and the Neruij.

AESAR, taking for pledges the chiefest of their Cittie, vpon the deliuerie of all their Armes, receiued the Suessones to mercy: and from thence led his Army against the Bellouaci; who, hauing conuaied both themselues and their goods into the towne, called Bratispantium, and vnderstanding that Cæsar was come within fiue mile of the place, all the elder sort came foorth to meete him, signifying their submission,

Cæsar.

The Bellouaci taken to mercie.

missions, by their lamentable demeanour. For these, Diuitiacus became a mediator: who, after the Belgæ had broken vp their campe, had dismissed his Heduan forces and was returned to Cæsar. The Hedui, saith he, haue alwaies found in the Bellouaci, a faithfull and friendly disposition to their State: and if they had not beene betraied by their nobilitie (who made them beleiue, that the Hedui vvere brought in bondage by the Romaines, & suffered all villanie & despight at their hands) they had neuer withdrawne themselues from the Hedui, nor consented to conspire against the Romaines. The authors of this counsell, perceiuing into what great misery they had brought their country, were fled into Britanie: wherfore, not only the Bellouaci, but the Hedui also in their behalfe, besought him to vse his clemencie towards them. Cæsar, in regard of the Hedui and Diuitiacus, promised to receiue them to mercy; but forasmuch as the State was very great and populous, he demaunded six hundred hostages: which, beeing deliuered and their armour brought out of the towne, he marched frō thence into the coast of the Ambiani: who, without further lingering, gaue both themselues & all that they had into his power. Vpon these bordered the Neruij; of whom Cæsar found this much by inquirie, that there was no recourse of Marchants vnto them, neither did they suffer any wine, or what thing else might tend to riot, to bee brought into their country: for, they were perswaded, that by such things their courage was much abated, and their vertue weakened. Further, he learned, that these Neruij were a sauage people, and of great valour; often accusing the rest of the Belgæ, for yielding their necks to the Romaine yoake, openly affirming, that they would neither send Embassadors, nor take peace vpon any condition.

The Ambiani yeeld vp themselues.

*Cæsar, hauing marched 2 daies iourney in their country, hee vnderstood that the riuer * Sabis was not past ten miles from his campe; and that on the further side of this riuer, all the Neruij were assembled together, and there attended the comming of the Romaines. With them were ioyned the Attrebatij, and Veromandui, whom they had perswaded to abide the same fortune of war with them. Besides, they expected a power from the Aduatici: the women, and such as were vnmeet for the field, they bestowed in a place vnaccessible for any Armie, by reason of fens and bogs, and marishes. Vpon this intelligence, Cæsar sent his discouerers and Centurions before, to chuse out a fit place to incampe in.*

The Neruij.
** Sābre neer Namours.*

Now, whereas many of the surrendred Belgæ, and other Galles, were continually in the Romaine Army, certaine of these (as it was afterward known by the captiues) obseruing the order which the Romaines vsed in marching, came by night to the Neruij, and told them, that between euery legion went a great sort of cariages; and that it was no matter of difficulty, as soone as the first legion was come into the camp, & the other legions yet a great way off, to set vpon them vpon a suddaine, before they were disburdened of their cariages, and so to ouerthrow them: vvhich legion beeing cut off, and their stuffe taken, the rest vvould haue small courage to stand against them. It much furthered this aduice, that, forasmuch as the Neruij were not able to make any power of horse, that they might the better resist the caualry of their borderers, whensoeuer they made any rode into their marches: their maner was to cut young trees halfe asunder, and bowing the tops down to the ground, plashed the boughes in breadth, and vvith thornes and briers planted between them, they made them so thick, that it vvas

impossible to see through them, so hard it was to enter or passe through them; so that, when by this occasion, the passage of the Romaine Army must needs be hindred, the Neruij thought the foresaid counsell not to be neglected.

The place which the Romaines chose to incamp in, was a hill, of like leuell from the top to the bottome, at the foot wherof ran the riuer Sabis: & with the like leuel, on the other side, rose another hill directly against this, to the quantity of 200 pases; the bottom whereof was plaine and open, and the vpper part so thick with wood, that it could not easily be looked into. Within these woods the Neruians kept themselues close: and in the open ground, by the riuer side, were onely seene a few troupes of horse, and the riuer in that place, was about three foote deepe.

Cæsar, sending his horsmen before, followed after with all his power; but the maner of his march differed frō the report which was brought to the Neruij: for, inasmuch as the enemy was at hand, Cæsar (as his custome was) led six legions alwaies in a readiness, without burthen or cariage of any thing, but their Armes: after them he placed the impediments of the vvhole Armie. And the two legions which were last inrolled, were a rereward to the Army, & guarded the stuffe.

OBSERVATION.

His trecherous practice of the surrendred Belgæ, hath fortunatly discouered the maner of Cæsars march, as well in safe passages, as in dangerous and suspected places: which is a point of no small consequence in martiall discipline, being subiect to so many inconueniences, & capable of the greatest art that may be shewed in managing a war. Cōcerning the discreet cariage of a march, by this circumstance it may be gathered, that Cæsar principally respected safety: and secondly conueniencie. If the place afforded a secure passage, and gaue no suspicion of hostilitie, he was content in regard of conueniency, to suffer euery legion to haue the ouersight of their particular cariages, & to insert them among the troupes, that euery man might haue at hand such necessaries as were requisite, either for their priuate vse or publique discipline. But if he were in danger of any suddaine attempt, or or stood in hazard to be impeached by an enemy, he then omitted conuenient disposition, in regard of particular vse, as disaduantageous to their safety; & caried his legions in that readines, that if they chanced to be ingaged by an enemy, they might without any alteration of their march, or incumbrance of their cariages receiue the charge, in that forme of battell, as was best approoued by their militarie rules, and the ancient practice of their fortunate progenitors.

The maner of the Romaine march.

The two respects which Cæsar had in ordering a march.
1 Safety.
2 Conueniēcy

The old Romans obserued likewise the same respects: for, in vnsafe & suspected places, they caried their troupes *agmine quadrato*, which as Liuie seemeth to note, was free frō all cariage & impediments, which might hinder thē in any sodaine alarum. Neither doth that of * Hirtius any way cōtradict this interpretation, where he saith, that Cæsar so disposed his troupes against the Bellouaci, that 3 legions marched in front, and after them came all the cariages, to which the 10 legion serued as a rereward; & so they marched, *pene agmine quadrato.* * Seneca in like maner noteth the safety of *agmē quadratū*, where he saith, that where an enemy is expected, wee ought to march *agmine quadrato*, readie to fight.

Agmen quadratum.

** Lib. 8. de bel. Gall.*

** 60. Epistle.*

fight. The most materiall consequence of these places alleadged, is, that as oft as they suspected any onset or charge, their order in a march little or nothing differed from their vsuall maner of imbattailing; and therefore it was called *agmen quadratũ*, or a square march, inasmuch as it kept the same disposition of parts, as were obserued *in quadrata Acie*. For, that triple forme of imbattailing which the Romans generally obserued in their fights, hauing respect to the distances between each battell, contained almost an equall dimension of front and file: & so it made *Aciem quadratã*; and when it marched, *Agmen quadratum*.

Lib. 6. Polybius expresseth the same in effect, as often as the place required circumspection; but altereth it somewhat in regard of the cariages: for, he saith, that in time of danger, especially where the country was plaine and champaine, and gaue space and free scope to cleere themselues, vpon any accident, the Romans marched in a triple battell, of equall distance one behind another, euery battell hauing his seuerall cariages in front. And if they were by chance attacked by an enemy, they turned themselues according to the oportunity of the place, either to the right or left hand: and so placing their cariages on the one side of their Armie, they stood imbattailed, ready to receiue the charge.

Agmẽ longũ The contrary forme of marching, where the place afforded more securitie, and gaue scope to conueniencie, they named *agmen longum*; when almost euerie maniple or order, had their seueral cariages attending vpon them, and stroue to keep that way which they found most easie, both for themselues, & their impediments. Which order of march, as it was more commodious then the former, in regard of particularity, so was it vnsafe and dangerous, where the Enemy was expected: and therefore Cæsar much blamed Sabinus and Cotta, for marching, whẽ they were deluded by Ambiorix, *longissimo agmine*; as though they had receiued their aduertisements from a friend, & not from an enemy.

Lib. 5. de bel. Gallico.

The vse that may bee made of this, in our modern wars And albeit our moderne wars are far different, in qualitie, from them of ancient times; yet in this point of discipline, they cannot haue a more perfect direction, then that which the Romaines obserued, as the two poles of their motions, Safety and Conueniencie: whereof the first dependeth chiefely vpon the prouident disposition of the Leaders; and the other will easily follow on, as the commoditie of euery particular shall giue occasion.

Concerning safety in place of danger, what better course can be taken then that maner of imbattailing, which shall be thought most conuenient, if an enemy were present to confront them? for, a well ordered march, must either carie the perfect forme of a battell, or containe the distinct principles and elements therof, that with little alteration it may receiue that perfection of strẽgth, which the fittest disposition can affoord it. First therefore, a prudent and circumspect Leader, that desireth to frame a strong and orderly march, is diligentlie to obserue the nature and vse of each weapon in his Army, how they may be placed for greatest vse and aduantage, both in respect of their different and concurring qualities, as also in regard of the place wherein they are managed: and this knowledge will consequentlie inferre the best and exactest disposition of imbattailing, as the said forces are capable of; which, if it may be obserued in a march, is no way to be altered. But, if this exactnes of imbattailing will not admit

mit conuenient carriage of ſuch neceſſarie adiuncts, as pertain to an Army; the inconuenience is to be releeued, with as little alteration from that rule, as in a wary iudgement ſhall be found expedient: that albeit the forme bee ſomewhat changed; yet the principles and ground wherein their ſtrength and ſafety conſiſteth, may ſtill be retained.

Neither can anie man well deſcend to more particular precepts in this point: he may exemplifie the practices of manie great and experienced commanders; what ſort of weapon marched in front, and what in the rereward, in what part of the Armie the Munition marched, and where the reſt of the carriage was beſtowed, according as their ſeuerall iudgements thought moſt expedient, in the particular nature of their occurrences. But the iſſue of all wil fall out thus; that he that obſerued this rule before preſcribed, did ſeldom miſcarrie through an vnſafe march. Let a good Martialliſt well know their proper vſe in that diuerſity of weapons in his Army; how they are ſeruiceable or diſaduantageous, in this or that place, againſt ſuch or ſuch an Enemie: and he will ſpeedily order his battell, diſpoſe of his march, and beſtowe his catiages, as ſhall beſt fall out both for his ſafety, and conueniency.

Cæſars cuſtome was, to ſend his Caualrie and light armed footmen, before the body of his Armie, both to diſcouer and impeach an Enemie; for theſe troupes were nimble in motion and fit for ſuch ſeruices: but if the danger were greater in the rereward then in the front, the horſemen marched in the tayle of the Army, and gaue ſecuritie where there was moſt cauſe of feare. But if it happened that they were found vnfit to make good the ſeruice in that place, as oftentimes it fell out, and eſpecially in Africa againſt the Numidians: hee then remoued them, as he beſt found it conuenient, and brought his legionarie ſoldiers, which were the ſinewes and ſtrength of his forces, and marched continually in the bulke of the Armie, to make good that which his horſemen could not perform. And thus he altred the antique preſcription, and vniformitie of cuſtome, according as he found himſelfe beſt able to diſaduantage an Enemie, or make waie to victorie.

CHAP. IX.

The Romans begin to fortifie their campe: but are *interrupted by the Neruij. Cæſar maketh haſte* to prepare his forces to battell.

THe Roman horſemen, with the ſlingers and archers, paſſed ouer the riuer, and incountred the Caualry of the Enemy: who at firſt retired backe to their companies in the wood, & from thence ſallied out againe vpon them: but the Romans durſt not purſue them further then the plaine and open ground: in the meane time the ſixe legions that were in front, hauing Cæſar.

 their

their work measured out vnto them, began to fortifie their camp. But assoon as the Neruij perceiued their former cariages to be come in sight, which was the time appointed amongst them to giue the charge, as they stood imbattailed within the thicket, so they rushed out with all their forces, and assaulted the Roman horsemen; which being easily beaten backe, the Neruij ranne downe to the riuer, with such an incredible swiftnes, that they seemed at the same instant of time to be in the woods at the riuer, & charging the legions on the other side: For with the same violēce, hauing passed the riuer, they ran vp the hil to the Roman Camp, where the souldiers were busied in their intrenchment. Cæsar had all parts to plaie at one instant: the flagge to be hung out, by which they gaue the souldiers warning to take Arms, the battell to be proclaimed by sound of trumpet, the soldiers to be recalled from their worke, and such as were gone far off to get turf & matter for the rampier, to be sent for; the battell to be ordered, his men to be incouraged, and the signe of battell to be giuen: the most of which were cut off by shortnesse of time, and the sudden assault of the Enemie.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The description of the Roman camp with all the parts belonging vnto it.

AS the Romans excelled all other nations in many good customes; so especially in their camp-discipline, they stroue to be singular: for, it seemed rather an Academie, or a Citie of ciuil gouernment, then a camp of soldiers; so careful were they both for the safety, & skilful experience of their men at Arms. For, touching the first, they neuer suffered their souldiers to lodge one night without a campe; wherein they were inclosed with ditch and rampier, as in a walled towne: neither was it any new inuention or late found out custom in their State, but in vse amongst the auncient Romans, and in the time of their kings; their manner of incamping was included within these circumstances.

The Centurions made choise of the place.

The Centurions, that went before to choose out a conuenient place, hauing found a fit situation for their camp, first assigned the standing for the Emperors pauilion, which was commonly in the most eminent place of the camp; from whence he might easily ouerview all the other parts, or any allarum or *signum pugnæ*, might from thence bee discouered to all quarters.

The Prætorium.

This pauilion was known by the name of *Prætorium*, for as much as amongst the ancient Romans the Generall of their Army was called Prætor: in this place where the *Prætorium* was to be erected, they stuck vp a white ensign, and from it they measured euery way 100. foot, & so they made a square containing 200. foot in euerie side; the Area, or content whereof, was almost an acre of ground: the forme of the *Prætorium* was round & high, being as eminent among the other tents, as a Temple is amongst the priuate buildings of a Cittie: and therfore Iosepus compareth it to a Church. In this *Prætorium* was their Tribunal or chair of the estate, and the place of diuination, which they called *Augurale*, with other appendices of maiestie and authority.

The lodging of the legions.

The Generals tent being thus placed, they considered which side of the pa-

THE ROM





Principia

Quintanā



Porta


MPE
Principia
Quintana

pauilion laie most commodious for forrage and water, and on that side they lodged the legions, euery legion diuided one from another by a streete or lane of 50. foot in breadth; and according to the degree of honour, that euery legion had in the Armie, so were they lodged in the campe, either in the midst which was counted most honorable, or towards the sides, which was of meaner reputation. And againe, according to the place of euery cohort in his legion, so was it lodged neerer the pauilion of the Emperour, towardes the heart of the camp; and so consequently euery maniple tooke place in the cohort, distinguishing their preheminence, by lodging them either toward the middle or to the outsideward; according as they distinguished the place of their legions: there went a street of fiftie in breadth ouerthwart the middest of all the legions, which was called Quintana; for that it diuided the fift cohort of euery legion from the sixt. *Quintana.*

Betweene the tents of the first maniples in euerie legion and the *Prætorium*, there went a waie of 100. foote in breadth throughout the whole camp; which was called Principia; in this place the Tribunes sate to heare matters of iustice; the souldiers exercised themselues at their weapons, and the leaders and chiefe commanders frequented it as a publick place of meeting; and it was held for a reuerent and sacred place, and so kept with a correspondent decency. On either side the Emperours pauilion, in a direct line to make euen & straight the vpper side of the Principia, the Tribunes had their Tents pitched, euerie Tribune confronting the head of the legion wherof hee was Tribune: aboue them, towards the head of the campe, were the Legates and Treasurer: the vpper part of the camp was strengthened with some select cohorts and troupes of horse, according to the number of legions that were in the Armie. *Principia.* *The tentes of the Tribunes.*

Polybius describing the manner of incamping, which the Romans vsed in his time, when as they had commonly but two legions in their Armie, with as manie associates, placeth the *Ablecti* and *extraordinarij*, which were select bandes & companies, in the vpper part of the camp; and the associates on the outside of the legions.

The ditch and the rampier, that compassed the whole camp about, was 200 foote distant from any tent: whereof Polybius giueth these reasons; first, that the soldiers marching into the camp in battell array, might there dissolue themselues into maniples, centuries and decuries, without tumult or confusion: for, order was the thing which they principally respected, as the life and strength of their martiall body. And again, if occasion were offered to sallie out vpon an Enemie, they might very conueniently in that spacious roome, put themselues into companies and troupes: and if they were assaulted in the night, the dartes and fire workes, which the Enemie should cast into their campe, would little indammage them, by reason of the distance betweene the rampier and the tents. *The space betweene the tents and the rampier.*

Their tents were all of skins and hides, held vp with props, and fastened with ropes: there were 11. souldiers, as Vegetius saith, in euerie tent, and that societie was called *Contubernium*, of whom the chiefest was named *Decanus*, or *Caput Contuberniij*. *Contubernium.*

he ditch & the rampier.

The ditch and the rampire were made by the legions, euery maniple hauing his part measured out, and euery Centurion ouerseeing his Centurie; the approbation of the whole work belonged to the Tribunes. Their manner of intrenching was this: the soldiers being girt with their swords & daggers, digged the ditch about the camp, which was alwaies 8. foot in breadth at the least, and as much in depth, casting the earth thereof inward; but if the enemy were not far off, the ditch was alwaies 11. or 15. or 18. foot in latitude, & altitude; according to the discretion of the General: but what scantling soeuer was kept, the ditch was made *directis lateribus*, that is, as broad in the bottom as at the top. The rampier from the brim of the ditch, was three foote in height, and sometimes foure, made after the manner of a wall, with green turfes cut all to one measure, halfe a foot in thicknesse, a foot in breadth, and a foote and a halfe in length. But if the place, wherein they were incamped, would afford no such turfe; they then strengthened the loose earth, which was cast out of the ditch, with boughes & fagots, that it might be strong and well fastened. The rampier they properly called *Agger*: the outside whereof, which hung ouer the ditch, they vsed to stick with thicke and sharp stakes, fastened deep in the mound, that they might be firm; and these for the most part were forked stakes: which made the rampier very strong, and not to be assaulted but with great difficulty. Varro saith, that the front of the rampier thus stuck with stakes, was called *vallum*, a *varicando*, for that no man could stride or get ouer it.

Agger.

Vallum.

Prætoria porta.

The campe had foure gates: the first was called *prætoria porta*, which was alwaies behind the Emperours tent: and this gate did vsually looke either toward the east, or to the Enemie, or that waie that the Army was to march. The gate on the other side of the camp opposit to this, was called *Porta Decumana à decimis cohortibus*; for the tenth or last Cohort of euery legion, was lodged to confront this gate: by this gate the soldiers went out to fetch their wood, their water, and their forrage, and this waie their offendours were carried to execution. The other two gates were called *Portæ principales*, forasmuch as they stood opposite to either end of that so much respected place, which they called *principia*, only distinguished by these titles, *læua*, *principalis*, and *dextra*: all these gates were shut with doores, & in standing Camps fortified with Turrets, vpon which were planted Engins of defence, as Balistæ, Catapultæ, Tolenones and such like.

Porta Decumana.

Portæ principales.
Læua.
Dextra.

The Romanes had their summer Camps, which they tearmed *Aestiua*, and their winter Camps, which they called *Hiberna*, or *Hibernacula*: their summer campes were in like manner differenced, according to the time, which they continued in them. For, if they remained in a place but a night or two, they called them *Castra* or *Mansiones*; but if they continued in them any long time, they called them *Aestiuas* or *Sedes*: And these were more absolute, aswell in regard of their tents, as of their fortificatiõ, then the former, wherin they staied but one night. The other which they called *Hiberna*, had great labor & cost bestowed vpon them, that they might the better defend them from the winter season. Of these we read, that the tents were either thatched with straw, or roofed with boards, & that they had their armory, hospital, & other publike houses.

Castra.
Aestiua.

Hiberna

These

These camps haue bin the beginning of many famous towns, especially when they continued long in a place, as oftentimes they did, vpon the bankes of Euphrates, Danow, and the Rhene. The order which they alwaies obserued in laying out their Campe, was so vniforme, and well knowen to the Romanes, that when the Centurions had limitted out euerie part, and marked it with different ensignes and colours, the Souldiers entered into it, as into a knowen and familiar Citie: wherein euery societie or small contubernie, knewe the place of his lodging: and which is more, euerie particular man could assigne the proper station of euerie company, throughout the whole Armie.

The vse and commoditie of this incamping, I briefly touched in my first booke: But if I were worthy any waie to commend the excellencie thereof to our moderne Souldiers, or able by perswasion to restablish the vse of incamping in our warres; I woulde spare no paines to atchieue so great a good, and vaunt more in the conquest of negligence, than if my selfe had compassed a new found out meanes: and yet reason would deeme it a matter of small difficultie, to gaine a point of such worth, in the opinion of our men, especially when my discourse shall present securitie to our forces, and honour to our leaders, maiestie to our Armies, & terrour to our enemies, wonderment to strangers, and victorie to our nation. But sloth hath such interest in this age, that it commendeth vaine glory and foole-hardinesse, contempt of vertue, and derision of good discipline, to repugne the designes of honour, and so far to ouermaister reason, that it suffereth not former harmes to beare witnesse against errour, nor correct the ill atchieuements of ill directions: and therefore ceasing to vrge this point any further, I will leaue it to the carefull respect of the wise.

The commodity of this incamping.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe fury of the Enemy, and their sodain assault, so disturbed the ceremonies which the Romane discipline obserued, to make the Soldiers truely apprehend the waight and importance of that action, which might cast vpon their state either soueraignty or bondage; that they were all for the most part omitted; notwithstanding they are here noted vnder these titles; the first was *vexillum proponendũ, quod erat insigne cum ad Arma concurri oporteret*: for when the General had determined to fight, he caused a skarlet coate or red flag to be hung out vpon the top of his tent, that by it the Soldiors might be warned, to prepare themselues for the battell; and this was the first warning they had: which by a silent aspect presented blood and execution to their eyes, as the onely meanes to worke out their owne safety, and purchase eternal honour. The second was *Signum tuba dandum*, this warning was a noise of manie trumpets, which they tearmed by the name of *classicum a calando*, which signifieth calling: for after the eye was filled with *species* sutable to the matter intended; they then hasted to possesse the eare, and by the sense of hearing to stir vp warlike motions, & fill them with resolute thoughts, that no diffident or base conceites might take hold of their mindes. The third

The ceremonies which they vsed in their preparation to battell.

was, *milites cohortandi*: for it was thought conuenient to confirme this valor, with motiues of reason, which is the strength and perfection of all such motions. The vse and benefit wherof I somwhat inlarged in the Heluetian war; and could affoord much more labour to demonstrate the commodity of this part, if my speech might carrie credit in the opinion of our souldiers, or bee thought worthie regard to men so much addicted to their owne fashions. The last was *signum dandum*; which, as some think, was nothing but a word, by which they might distinguish & know themselues from their enemies. Hirtius in the war of Afrike saith, that Cæsar gaue the word *Felicitie*; Brutus and Cassius gaue *Libertie*; others haue giuen *Virtus*, *Deus nobiscum*, *Triumphus Imperatoris*, & such like words, as might be ominous to a good successe. Besides these particularities, the manner of their deliuerie gaue a great grace to the matter. And that was distinguished by times, and cues: whereof Cæsar now complaineth; that all these were to be done at one instant of time: for without all controuersie, there is no matter of such consequence in it selfe, but may be much graced with ceremonies & complements, which like officers or attendants adde much respect and maiestie to the action; which otherwise being but barely presented, appeareth far meaner and of lesse regarde.

CHAP. X.

The battell betweene Cæsar and the Neruij.

Cæsar.

IN these difficulties, two things were a help to the Romans; the one was the knowledge & experiēce of the soldiers: for by reason of their practice in former battels, they could as wel prescribe vnto themselues, what was to be done, as any other commaunder could teach them. The other was, that notwithstanding Cæsar gad giuen commandment to euery Legate, not to leaue the worke or forsake the legions, vntill the fortifications were perfited; yet when they sawe extreamitie of danger, they atttended no countermand from Cæsar: but ordered all things as it seemed best to their owne discretion. Cæsar hauing commanded such things as he thought necessarie, ranne hastily to incourage his souldiers, and by fortune came to the tenth legion; where he vsed no further speech, then that they should remember their ancient valour, and valiantly withstand the brunt of their enemies. And for as much as the enemie was no further off, then a weapon might be cast to incounter them, hee gaue them the signe of battell: and hastening from thence to another quarter, he found them already closed and at the incounter. For the time was so short & the enemy so violent, that they wanted leisure to put on their head peeces, or to vncase their targets: & what part they lighted into from their work, or what ensigne they first met withall, there they staied; least in seeking out their owne

And therefore I rather take it to bee something els then a word.

owne companies, they should lose that time as was to be spent in fighting. The Army being imbattailed rather according to the nature of the place, the decliuity of the hill, & the breuity of time, then according to the rules of art; as the legions incountred the Enemie in diuers places at once, the perfect view of the battell being hindred by those thicke hedges before spoken of, there could no succors be placed any where; neither could any man see what was needfull to be done: & therefore in so great vncertainty of things, there happened diuers casualties of fortune.

The soldiers of the 9. & 10. legion, as they stood in the left part of the Army, casting their piles, with the aduantage of the hil, did driue the Attrebatij, breathless with rũning & wounded in the incoũter, down into the riuer; & as they passed ouer the water, slew many of them with their swords: Neither did they stick to follow after them ouer the riuer, & aduẽture into a place of disaduantage, where the battell being renued againe by the Enemy, they put them to flight the second time. In like manner two other legions, the 11. & the 8. hauing put the Veromãdui frõ the vpper ground, fought with them vpon the banks of the riuer; and so the front & the left part of the camp was well neere left naked. For in the right cornẽt were the 12. & the 7. legions, where as all the Neruij, vnder the cõduct of Boduognatus, were heaped together; & som of them began to assault the legions on the opẽ side, & other som to possess themselues of the highest part of the camp.

At the same time the Roman horsemen, & the light armed footmen that were intermingled amongst them, & were at first al put to flight by the Enemy, as they were entering into the camp, met with their enimies in the face, & so were driuen to flie out another waie. In like manner, the pages & souldiers boies, that frõ the Decumane port & top of the hill, had seen the tenth legion follow their enemies in pursuit ouer the riuer, and were gone out to gather pillage, when they looked behind them, and saw the enemy in their camp; betook them to their heels as fast as they could. Which accident so terrified the horsemen of the Treuiri (who for their prowesse were reputed singular amongst the Galls, and were sent thither by their State, to aid the Romanes) first when they perceiued the Roman camp to be possest, by a great multitude of the Enemy, the legions to be ouercharged & almost inclosed about, the horsemen, slingers, and Numidians to be dispersed and fled, that without anie further expectation they took their waie homeward, & reported to their State, that the Romans were vtterly ouerthrowen.

Cæsar departing from the tenth legiõ, to the right cornet, found his men exceedingly ouercharged, the ensignes crowded together into one place, & the soldiers of the 12. legiõ so thick thronged on a heap, that they hindred one another; all the Centurions of the fourth cohort being slain, the ensign bearer kild and the ensign taken, and the Centurions of the other cohorts either slain, or sore wounded; amongst whõ Pub. Sextus Baculus, the Primipile of that legion, a valiant man, so grieuously woũded, that he could scarce stand vpon his feet; the rest not very forward, but many of the hindmost turning taile & forsaking the field; the Enemy on the other side, giuing no respite in front, although he fought against the hil, nor yet sparing the open side, and the matter brought to a narrow issue, without any means or succor, to relieue thẽ: he took a target from one of the hindmost soldiers

(for he himself was come thither without one) & pressing to the front of the battell, called the Centurions by name, and incouraging the rest, commaunded the ensignes to be aduaunced toward the enemie, and the Maniples to bee inlarged, that they might with greater facilitie and readinesse vse their swords.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The place and office of a primipile.

HIs Publius Sextus Baculus was the chiefest Centurion of the 12. legion, beeing the first Centurion of that Maniple of the Triarij, that was of the first Cohort in that legion; for that place was the greatest dignitie that could happen to a Centurion; and therefore he was called by the name of *Centurio primipili*, or simply *Primipilus*, and somtimes *Primopilus*, or *Primus Centurio*. By him were commonly published, the mandates and edicts of the Emperour, and Tribunes: and therefore the rest of the Centurions, at all times had an eie vnto him; and the rather for that the eagle, which was the peculiar ensigne of euery legion, was committed to his charge and carried in his Maniple: Neither was this dignitie, without speciall commoditie, as may be gathered out of diuers authours. We read further, that it was no disparagement for a Tribune, after his Tribunalitie was expired, to be a Primipile in a legion; notwithstanding, there was a lawe made, I know not vpon what occasion, that no Tribune should afterward be Primipile. But let this suffice concerning the office and title of P. S. Baculus.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The Target described.

AND heere I may not omit to giue the Target anie honour I may: and therefore I will take occasion to describe it in Cæsars hand, as in the place of greatest dignitie, and much honouring the excellency therof. Polybius maketh the Target to containe two foot and an halfe in breadth, ouerthwart the conuex surface thereof; and the length foure foot, of what form or fashion soeuer they were of: for the Romans had two sorts of Tragets amongst their legionarie; the first carried the proportion of that figure, which the Geometricians call Oual, a figure of an vnequal latitude, broadest in the midst, and narrow at both the ends like vnto an egge, described in *Plano*: the other sort was of an equall latitude, and resembled the fashion of a gutter-tile; and thereupon was called *Scutum imbricatum*. The matter whereof a target was made, was a double board, one fastened vpon another, with lint and Buls glewe; and couered with an Oxe hide, or som other stiffe leather; the vpper and lower part of the target were bound about with a plate of iron, to keepe it from cleauing; and in the middest there was a bosse of iron or brasse, which they called *Vmbo*. Romulus brought them in first among the Romanes, taking the vse of them from the Sabines. The wood whereof they were made, was for the most part either sallow, alder or figtree: whereof Plinie giueth this reason, for as much as

Lib.16.c.40.

as these trees are colde and waterish, and therefore any blow or thrust that was made vpon the wood, was presently contracted and shut vp againe. But for as much as the Target was of such reputation amongst the Roman Armes, and challenged such interest in the greatest of their Empire, let vs enter a little into the consideration of the vse and commoditie thereof; which cannot be better vnderstood, then by that conference, which Polybius hath made betweene the weapons of the Romans and the Macedonians: and therefore I haue thought it good to insert it in these discourses. And thus it followeth.

Of the difference of the Roman and Macedonian WEAPONS.

I Promised in my sixt booke that I would make a comparison, betweene the weapons of the Romans, and Macedonians. And that I woulde likewise write of the disposition of either of their Armies; how they do differ one from another: and in what regarde, the one, or the other, were either inferiour, or superiour: which promise I will now with diligence endeuour to perform. And for as much as the Armies of the Macedonians haue giuen so good testimonies of themselues by their actions, by ouercomming the Armies as well of those of Asia, as of Greece; and that the battailes of the Romans haue conquered, as well those of Africa, as all the esterne countries of Europ: It shall not be amisse, but very profitable, to search out the differene of either; especially seeing that these our times haue not once, but many times seene triall, both of their battailes & forces; that knowing the reason why the Romans do ouercome, and in their battailes cary away the better, wee doe not as vaine men were wont to do, attribute the same to fortune, and esteem them without reason happy victors; but rather looking into the true causes, we giue thē their due praises, according to the direction of reason, and sound iudgement. Concerning the battails between Hanniball and the Romans; and concerning the Romans their losses, there is no need that I speak much. For their losses are neither to bee imputed to the defect of their Armes, or disposition of their Armies; but to the dexteritie and industrie of Hanniball: but wee haue entreated thereof when wee made mention of the battels themselues; and the end it selfe of that warre, doth especially confirme this our opinion: for when they had gotten a Captaine equall with Hanniball, euen consequentlie with all his victories vanished. And hee had no sooner ouercome the Romans, but by and by, reiecting his owne weapons, he trayned his Armie to their weapons: and so taking them vp in the beginning, hee continued them on vnto the end.

And Pyrrhus in his war against the Romans, did vse both their weapons and order, and made as it were a medlie both of the cohort, and phalanx: but notwithstanding, it serued him not to get the victory; but alwaies the euent by some meanes or other, made the same doubtful: concerning whom it were not vnfit, that

that I ſhould ſay ſomething, leaſt in being altogether ſilent, it might ſeeme to preiudice this mine opinion. But notwithſtanding I wil haſten to my purpoſed compariſon.

Now touching the phalanx, if it haue the diſpoſition, and forces proper to it, nothing is able to oppoſe it ſelfe againſt it, or to ſuſtaine the violence thereof; as may eaſily by many documents be approued. For when an armed man doth ſtand firme in the ſpace of three foote in ſo thicke an arraie of battell, and the length of their pikes being according to the firſt baſis, or ſcantling ſixteene foote; but according to the true and right conueniency of them, 14. cubits, out of which are taken foure allowed for the ſpace betweene the left hand, which ſupporteth the ſame, and the butte end thereof, whiles hee ſtands in a readineſſe to attend the incounter: being thus ordered, I ſaie, it is manifeſt that the length of tenne cubites dooth extend it ſelfe before the bodie of euerie armed man, where with both his hands he doth aduance it ready to charge the Enemie. By which meanes it followeth, that ſome of the pikes doe not onely extend themſelues before the ſecond, third, and fourth ranke, but ſome before the formoſt, if the phalanx haue his proper and due thickeneſſe, according to his naturall diſpoſition, both on the ſides and behinde: as Homer maketh mention when he ſaith, that one target doth encloſe and fortifie another; one head-piece is ioined to another, that they may ſtand vnited and cloſe together.

Theſe circumſtances being rightly and truely ſet downe, it muſt follow, that the pikes of euerie former ranke in the phalanx, doe extend themſelues two cubites before each other, which proportion of difference they haue betweene themſelues: by which may euidently be ſeene the aſſault, and impreſſion of the whole phalanx, what it is, and what force it hath, conſiſting of 16. rankes in depth, or thickneſſe; the exceſſe of which number of ranks aboue fiue. For as much as they cannot commodiouſly couch their pikes, without the diſturbance of the former, the points of them not being long inough to enlarge themſelues beyond the formoſt ranks, they grow vtterly vnprofitable, & cannot man by man, make any impreſſion, or aſſault: but ſerue only, by laying their pikes vpon the ſhoulders of thoſe which ſtand before them, to ſuſtaine and hold vp the ſwaies and giuing backe of the former rankes, which ſtand before them to this end, that the front may ſtand firme and ſure; and with the thickeneſſe of their pikes they doe repell all thoſe darts, which paſſing ouer the heads of thoſe that ſtand before, would annoy thoſe rankes which are more backward.

And farther by mouing forward, with the force of their bodies, they doe ſo preſſe vpon the former, that they doe make a moſt violent impreſſion. For it is impoſſible that the formoſt rankes ſhould giue back.

This therefore being the generall and particular diſpoſition of the phalanx: we muſt now ſpeake on the contrarie part, touching the properties & differences, as well of the Arms, as of the whole diſpoſition of the Roman battell. For euery Roman ſoldier for himſelfe, and his weapon, is allowed three foot to ſtand in, and in the incounter, are moued man, by man, euery one couering himſelfe with his target; and mutually moouing whenſoeuer there is occaſion offered.

But

But those which vse their swords, do fight in a more thin and distinct order; so that it is manifest, that they haue three foot more allowed them to stand in both from shoulder to shoulder, and from backe to beily, that they may vse their weapons with the better commodity. And hence it commeth to pass, that one Roman souldier taketh vp as much ground, as two of those which are to encounter him of the Macedonian Phalanx: so that one Roman is as it were to oppose himselfe against ten pikes, which pikes the saide one souldier can neyther by any agility come to offend, or else at handy blowes otherwise annoy: And those which are behinde him, are not only vnable to repell their force, but also with conueniency to vse their owne weapons. Whereby it may easily be gathered, that it is impossible, that any battaile being assaulted, by the front of a phalanx, should be able to sustaine the violence thereof, if it haue his due and proper composition.

What then is the cause that the Romans doe ouercome, and that those that doe vse the phalanx are voyde of the hope of victory? Euen from hence, that the Roman Armies haue infinite commodities, both of places, and of times, to fight in. But the phalanx hath only one time, one place, and one kinde, whereto it may profitably apply it selfe: so that if it were of necessitie; that their enemy should incounter them at that instant, especially with their whole forces, it were questionlesse not only, not without danger, but in all probability likelie; that the phalanx should euer carry away the better. But if that may bee auoided, which is easily done: shall not that disposition then, be vtterly vnprofitable, and free from all terror? And it is farther euident, that the phalanx must necessarily haue plaine and champion places, without any hinderances, or impediments; as ditches, vneuen places, vallies, little hils and riuers: for all these may hinder and disioine it. And it is almost impossible to haue a Plain of the capacity of 20. *stadia*, much lesse more, where there shall bee found none of these impediments. But suppose there bee found such places, as are proper for the phalanx: If the Enemy refuse to come vnto them, and in the mean time, spoile, and sack the Cities, and country round about; what commodity, or profit shall arise by any Army so ordered? for, if it remaine in such places, as hath been before spoken of; it can neither reliene their friends, nor preserue themselues. For the conuoies which they expect from their friends; are easily cut off by the Enemy, whiles they remain in those open places.

And if it happen at any time, that they leaue them vpon any enterprise, they are then exposed to the Enemy. But suppose, that the Roman Army should find the phalanx in such places, yet would it not aduenture it self in gross at one instant; but would by little and little retire it selfe: as doth plainly appeare by their vsuall practice. For there must not be a coniecture of these things by my words only, but especially by that which they do. For they doe not so equally frame their battell, that they doe assault the Enemy altogether, making as it were but one front: but part make a stand, and part charge the Enemie, that if at any time the Palanx doe presse them, that come to assault them and bee repelled; the force of their order is dissolued. For whether they pursue those that retire, or fly from those that doo assault them, these doe disioyne themselues

themselues from part of their Army; by which meanes there is a gap opened to their Enemies, standing and attending their opportunity: so that now they neede nor anie more to charge them in the front, where the force of the phalanx consisteth; but to assault where the breach is made, both behinde, and vpon the sides. But if at any time the Romane Army may keepe his due proprietie, and disposition, the phalanx by the disaduantage of the place, being not able to do the like: doth it not then manifestly demonstrate the difference to be great betweene the goodnesse of their disposition, and the disposition of the phalanx?

To this may be added the necessities imposed vpō an Army: which is, to march through places of all natures, to encamp themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege, & to be besieged; and also contrary to expectation sometimes to come in view of the Enemie. For, all these occasions necessarily accōpany an Army; and oftentimes are the especiall causes of victory, to which the Macedonian phalanx is no way fit, or conuenient: forasmuch, as neither in their generall order, nor in their particular disposition, without a conuenient place, they are able to effect any thing of moment: but the Roman Army is apt for al these purposes. For, euerie souldiour amongst them, being once armed and ready to fight, refuseth no place, time nor occasion; keeping alwaies the same order, whether he fight togither with the whole body of the Army, or particularly by himselfe, man, to man.

And hence it happeneth, that as the commodity of their disposition is aduantageous: so the end doth answere the expectation.

These things I thought to speak of at large, because manie of the Grecians are of an opinion, that the Macedonians are not to be ouercome. And againe, many wondered, how the Macedonian phalanx should be put to the worse by the Roman Army, considering the nature of their weapons.

Thus farre goeth Polybius, in comparing the weapons and imbattailing of the Romans, with the vse of Arms amongst the Macedonians: wherein we see the Pike truly and exactly ordered, according as the wise Grecians could best proportion it with that forme of battell, which might giue most aduantage to the vse thereof: so that if our squadrons of Pikes iumpe not with the perfect manner of a phalanx, (as wee see they doe not) they fall so much short of that strength, which the wisedome of the Grecians and the experience of other nations, imputed vnto it. But suppose we could allowe it that disposition, in the course of our warres, which the nature of the weapon doth require; yet forasmuch as by the authority of Polybius, the sayd manner of imbattailing is tyed to such dangerous circumstances of one time, one place, and one kind of fight: I hold it not so profitable a weapon, as the practice of our times doth seem to make it, especially in woddy countries, such as Ireland is; where the vse is cut off by such inconueniences, as are noted to hinder the managing thereof. And doubtless, if our commanders did but consider of the incongruity of the Pike and Ireland, they would not proportion so great a number of them in euery companie, as there is; for, commonly half the companie are Pikes, which is as much to saie in the practice of our wars, that halfe the Army hath neither

offensiue

offensiue nor defensiue weapons, but onely against a troupe of horse. For, they sildome or neuer come to the push of pike, with the foote companies, where they may charge and offend the enemie: and for defence, if the enemie thinke it not safe to buckle with them at hand, but maketh more aduantage, to play vpon them afarre off with shotte; it affordeth small safety to shake a long pike at them, and stand faire in the meane time, to entertaine a volley of shot, with the body of their battailion. As I make no question, but the pike in some seruices is profitable, as behind a rampier, or at a breach; so I assure my self, there are weapons, if they were put to triall, that would counteruaile the pike, euen in those seruices, wherein it is thought most profitable.

Concerning the Target, we see it take the hand, in the iudgement of Polybius, of all other weapons whatsoeuer, as well in regard of the diuers and sundry sorts of imbattailing, as the qualitie of the place wheresoeuer: for, their vse was as effectuall in small bodies and centuries, as in grosse troupes and great companies; in thinne and spacious imbattelling, as in thick thronged Testudines.

Neither could the nature of the place make thē vnseruiceable; for, whether it were plaine or couert, leuell or vnequall, narrow or large, if there were anie commodity to fight, the target was as necessarie to defend, as the sword to offend: besides the conueniencie, which accompanieth the target in any necessitie imposed vpon an Armie, whether it be to march through places of all natures, to make a fast march, or a speedy retraite, to incamp themselues, to possesse places of aduantage, to besiege and to be besieged, as Polybius saith, with many other occasions which necessarily accomhanie an Armie. The vse of this weapon hath been to much neglected in these later ages, but may be happilie renued againe in our Nation, if the industry of such as haue laboured to present it vnto these times, in the best fashion, shall find any fauour in the opinion of our Commaunders. Concerning which Target, I must needes say this much, that the light target will prooue the target of seruice, whensoeuer they shall happen to be put in execution: for, those which are made proofe, are so heauie and vnwieldie (although it be somewhat qualified with such helps as are annexed to the vse thereof) that they ouercharge a man, with an vnsupportable burthen, and hinder his agilitie and execution in fight, with a waight disproportionable to his strength. For, our offensiue weapons, as namely, the Hargebusiers, and Musketires, are stronger in the offensiue part, then any armes of defence, which may be made manageable & fit for seruice. Neither did the Romans regard the proofe of their target further, then was thought fit for the readie vse of them in time of battaile, as it appeareth in manie places, both in the Ciuill vwars, and in these Commentaries: for, a Romaine Pile hath oftentimes darted through the Target, and the bodie of the man that bare it, and fastened thē both to the ground: which is more then a Musket can well do; for the bullet commonly resteth in the bodie. And although it may be said, that this was not common, but rather the effect of an extraordinary arme; yet it seruetb to proue, that their targets were not prose to their offensiue weapons, when they were well deliuered, & with good direction. For, I make no doubt, but in their

battailes there were oftentimes some hinderances, which would not suffer so violent an effect, as this which I speake off: for, in a volley of shotte, wee must not thinke, that all the bullets flie with the same force, & fall with the like hurt; but as Armour of good proofe, will hardly hold out some of them; so slender Armes, and of no proofe, will make good resistance against others. And, to conclude, in a battell or incounter at hand, a man shall meet with more occasions, suting the nature and commoditie of this light Target, then such as wil aduantage the heauie Target of proofe, or counteruaile the surplus of waight, which it carieth with it.

Some men will vrge, that there is vse of this Target of proofe, in some places and in some seruices: which I deny not to those, that desire to be secured from the extreamitie of peril. But this falleth out in some places, & in some particular seruices; and hindereth not, but that the vniuersall benefit of this weapon consisteth in the multitude of light Targetiers, who are to manage the most important accasions of a warre.

This much I am further to note, concerning the sword of the Targetires, that according to the practice of the Romaines, it must alwaies hang on the right side; for, carying the Target vpon the left arme, it cannot bee that the sword should hang on the left side, but with great trouble and annoiance. And if any man say, that if it hang on the right side, it must be very short; otherwise, it will neuer be readily drawne out: I say, that the sword of the Targetiers, in regard of the vse of that weapon, ought to be of a very short scantling, when as the Targetier is to commaund the point of his sword within the compasse of his Target, as such as looke into the true vse of this weapon, will easily discouer. But let this suffice, concerning the vse of the Pike and the Target.

CHAP. XI.

The Battell continueth, and in the end *Cæsar ouercommeth.*

Cæsar.

AT the presence of their Generall, the souldiers conceiued some better hopes; and gathering strength and courage againe, when as euery man bestirred himselfe in the sight of the Emperor, the brunt of the enemy was a little staied. Cæsar, perceiuing likewise the seuenth legion, vvhich stood next vnto him, to be sore ouerlaid by the enemy, commanded the Tribunes by little and little, to ioyne the two legions together, and so by ioyning back to back, to make two contrary fronts; & being thus secured one by another from feare of beeing circumuented, they began to make resistance with greater courage. In the mean time, the two legions that were in the rereward to guard the cariages, hearing of the battell, doubled their pase, and vvere descried by the enemy vpon the toppe of the hill. And Titus Labienus, hauing won the Campe of the Neruij, and beholding from the higher

ground

ground what was done on the other side of the riuer, sent the tenth legion to help their fellowes: who, vnderstanding by the horsemen and Lackies that fledde, in what case the matter stood, and in what danger the Campe, the legions, and the Generall was, made all the haste they possibly could. At whose comming, there happened such an alteration and change of things, that euen such as were sunke downe, through extreame griefe of their wounds, or leaned vpon their Targets, beganne againe to fight afresh; and the Pages and the boies, perceiuing the enemy amazed, ranne vpon them vnarmed, not fearing their weapons.

The horsemen also, striuing with extraordinary valour, to wipe away the dishonour of their former flight, thrust themselues in all places before the legionary souldiers. Howbeit, the Enemy in the vtmost perill of their liues, shewed such manhood, that as fast as the formost of the were ouerthrowne, the next in place bestrid their carcasses, and fought vpon their bodies: and these beeing likewise ouerthrowne, and their bodies heaped one vpon another, they that remained, possest themselues of that Mount of dead carcasses, as a place of aduantage, and from thence threw their weapons, and intercepting the piles, returned them againe to the Romans.

By which it may be gathered, that there was great reason to deeme them men of haughtie courage, that durst passe ouer so broad a Riuer, climbe vp such high rocks, & aduenture to fight in a place of such inequalitie. The battell being thus ended, and the Nation and name of the Neruij beeing well neere swallowed vp with destruction, the elder sort, with the women and children, that before the battell, vvere conuaied into Ilands and Bogs; when they heard thereof, sent Embassadours to Caesar, and yielded themselues to his mercy; and in laying open the misery of their State, affirmed, that of six hundred Senatours, they had now left but three; and of sixtie thousand fighting men, there was scarce fiue hundred that were able to beare Armes. Caesar, that his clemencie might appeare to a distressed people, preserued them with great care, granting vnto them the free possession of their townes and country, & straightly commanding their borderers, not to offer them any wrong or iniurie at all.

OBSERVATION.

And thus endeth the relation of that great and dangerous battel, which Ramus complaineth of as a confused narration: much differing from the direct & methodicall file, of his other Commentaries. But if that rule hold good, which learned Rhetoricians haue obserued in their Oratory; that An vnperfect thing, ought not to be told in a perfect maner: then by Ramus leaue, if any such confusion do appeare, it both sauoureth of eloquence, & well suteth the turbulent cariage of the action, wherein order and skill gaue place to Fortune, & prouidence was swallowed vp with peraduenture. For, that which Hirtius saith of the ouerthrow hee gaue to Pharnaces, may as well be said of this; that he got the victorie, *plurimũ adiuuante deorum benignitate, qui cũ omnibus belli casibus interfunt, tum praecipuè ijs quibus nihil ratione potuit administrari.* *Lib. de Militia. Iu. Ca.*

For, so it fell out in this battell, and the danger proceeded from the same cause, that brought him to that push in the battell with Pharnaces: for, he well vnderstood that the Neruij attended his comming on the other side the riuer Sabis: Neither was hee ignorant how to fortifie his Campe in the face of an enemie, without feare or danger, as we haue seene in his warre with Ariouistus; when he marched to the place where hee purposed to incampe himselfe with three battels, and caused two of them to stand ready in Armes to receiue any charge, which the Enemy should offer to giue, that the third battell in the meane time might fortifie the Campe. Which course would easily haue frustrated this stratagem of the Neruij, and made the hazard lesse dangerous: but hee little expected any such resolution, so contrarie to the rules of Militarie discipline, that an enemie should not stick to passe ouer so broad a riuer, to clime vp such steep and high Rocks, to aduenture battell in a place so disaduantageous, and to hazard their fortune vpon such inequalities. And therefore, he little mistrusted any such vnlikely attempt, wherein the enemy had plotted his own ouerthrow, if the legions had beene ready to receiue them.

Which may teach a Generall, that which Cæsar had not yet learned, that a Leader cannot be too secure in his most assured courses, nor too carefull in his best aduised directions; considering that the greatest meanes may easily be preuented, and the safest course weakened with an vnrespected circumstance: so powrefull are weake occurrences in the maine course of the waightiest actions; and so infinite are the waies, whereby either wisedome or fortune may work. Neither did this warne him, to prouide for that which an enemy might doe, how vnlikelie soeuer it might seeme vnto him: as appeareth by that accident in the battell with Pharnaces. Which practice, of attempting a thing against reason and the arte of warre, hath found good successe in our moderne wartes, as appeareth by the French histories: notwithstanding, it is to be handled sparingly, as no way fauouring of circumspect and good direction, forasmuch as *Temeritas non semper felix*, as Fabius the great answered Scipio.

The chiefest helps which the Romaines found, were first the aduantage of the place; whereof I spake in the Heluetian warre. Secondlie, the experience, which the souldiours had got in the former battailes, which much directed them in this turbulent assault; wherin they caried themselues, as men acquainted with such casualties: lastly, the valour and vndanted iudgement of the Generall, which ouerswaied the perill of the battaile, and brought it to so fortunate an end. Wherein we may obserue, that as in a temperate course, when the issue of the battaile rested vpon his directions, hee wholly intended warinesse and circumspection: so in the hazard and perill of good hap, hee confronted extreamitie of danger with extreamitie of valour, and ouer-topt furie, vvith a higher resolution.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

The Aduatici betake themselues to a strong hold, *and are taken by Cæsar.*

THE Aduatici before mentioned, comming with all their power to aide the Neruij, and vnderstanding by the way, of their ouerthrowe, returned home againe; and forsaking all the rest of their Townes, and Castles, conuaied themselues and their wealth into one strong and well fortified towne, which was compassed about with mighty rocks and steepe downefals, sauing in one place of two hundred foote in breadth; vvhere there was an entry by a gentle and easie ascent: which passage they had fortified, vvith a double wall of a large altitude, and had placed mighty great stones & sharp beames vpon the walles, ready for an assault. This people descended from the Cimbri and Teutoni; who, in their iourney into Italie, had left such cariages on this side of the Rhene, as they could not conuenientlie take along with them, in the custodie of these forces: who, after the death of their fellowes, beeing many yeeres disquieted by their neighbours, sometimes inuading other States, and sometimes defending themselues, at length procured a peace, and chose this place to settle themselues in.*

Cæsar.

* *Either Doway or Bosleduke, in Brabant.*

At the first comming of the Romaine Armie, they sallied out of the towne, & made many light skirmishes with them: but after that Cæsar had drawn a rampier about the towne, of twelue foote in height, fifteene miles in compasse, & had fortified it with Castles very thick about the towne, they kept themselues vvithin the wall. And, as they beheld the Vines framed, the Mount raised, & a towre in building afarre off, at first they beganne to laugh at it; and with scoffing speeches from the wall, began to aske, with what hands, & with what strength, especially by men of that stature (for the Romaines were but little men in respect of the Galles) a towre of that huge massie waight shold be brought vnto the walles? But, when they saw it remooued, and approching neere vnto the towne (as men astonished at the strange and vnaccustomed sight therof) they sent Embassadors to Cæsar, to intreat a peace, with this message: They beliueed that the Romaines did not make war, without the speciall assistance of the Gods, that could vvith such facility transport engines of that height, and bring thē to incounter at hand, against the strongest part of their towne: and therefore, they submitted both themselues, & all that they had, to Cæsars mercy; desiring one thing of his meer clemencie, that hee vvould not take away their Armes; forasmuch as all their neighbours were enemies vnto them, and enuied at their valour; neither vvere they able to defend themselues, if they should deliuer vp their Armour: so that they had rather suffer any inconuenience by the people of Rome, then to be butcherly murthered by them, vvhom in former time they had held subiect to their commaund.

To this, Cæsar answered; that he would saue the Citie rather of his owne custome, then for any desert of theirs, so that they yielded before the Ram touched the wall: but no condition of remedy should be accepted, without present deliuerie of their Armes; for, he would doe by them as he had done by the Neruij, and giue commaundement to their neighbours, that they should offer no wrong to such, as had commended their safety to the people of Rome. This answere being returned to the Citty, they seemed contented to doe whatsoeuer he commaunded them: and thereupon, casting a great part of their Armour ouer the wall, into the ditch, insomuch as they fild it almost to the toppe of the rampier; and yet (as afterward was knowne) concealing the third part, they set open the gates, & for that day caried themselues peaceably. Towards night, Cæsar commaunded the gates to be shut, and the souldiours tobe drawne out of the towne. But the Aduatici, hauing consulted together before (forasmuch as they belieued, that vpon their submission, the Romaines would either set no watch at all, or at the least, keepe it verie careleslie) partly vvith such Armour as they had retained, and partly vvith targets, made of barke, or wrought of wicker, which vpon the suddaine they had couered ouer with Leather, about the third watch, where the ascent to our fortifications was easiest, they issued suddainely out of the towne with all their power: but signification thereof being giuen by fires, as Cæsar had commaunded, the Romaines hasted speedily to that place. The Enemy fought verie desperatly, as men in the last hope of their welfare, incountering the Romaines in a place of disaduantage: at length, with the slaughter of foure thousand, the rest were driuen backe into the towne. The next day, vvhen Cæsar came to breake open the gates, and found no man at defence, he sent in the souldiers, and sold all the people and spoile of the towne: the number of persons in the towne, amounted to fiftie three thousand bondslaues.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

Circumuallatio.

IN the surprise, attempted by the Belgæ vpon Bibract, I set down the manner, which both the Galles and the Romaines vsed in their suddaine surprising of a towne: whereof if they failed (the place importing any aduantage in the course of war) they then prepared for the siege, in that manner, as Cæsar hath described in this place. They inuironed the towne about with a ditch and a rampier, and fortified the said rampier, with many Castles and Fortresses, erected in a conuenient distance one from another; and so they kept the towne from any forraine succour or relieſe: & withall, secured themselues from sallies, or other stratagems, which the townsmen might practice against them. And this manner of siege was called *circumuallatio*; the particular description whereof, I referre vnto the historie of Alesia, where I will handle it, according to the particulars there set downe by Cæsar.

In the seuēth Cōmentarie.

THE

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

THe Ram, which Cæsar heere mentioneth, was of greatest note amongst all the Romaine Engines, and held that place which the Canon hath in our warres. Vitruuius doth attribute the inuention thereof to the Carthaginians, who at the taking of Cadiz, wanting a fit instrument to raze and ouerthrowe a Castle, they tooke a long beame or timber tree, and bearing it vpon their armes and shoulders, with the one end thereof, they first brake downe the vppermost ranke of stones: and so descending by degrees, they ouerthrew the whole towre. The Romaines had two sorts of Rams, the one was rude and plaine; the other, artificiall & compound: the first, is that which the Carthaginians vsed at Cadiz, and is purtraited in the column of Traian at Rome.

Aries, or the Ramme.

Cales.

Aries simplex.

The compound Ramme is thus described by Iosephus; A Ramme, saith he, is a mightie great beame, like vnto the mast of a ship, and is strengthened at one end, with a head of iron, fashioned like vnto a Ramme, and thereof it tooke the name. This Ram is hanged by the middest with roapes vnto another beame, which lieth crosse a couple of pillars: and hanging thus equally balanced, it is by force of men thrust forward, and recoiled backward; and so beateth vpon the wall with his iron head: neither is there any towre so strong, or wall so broade, that is able to stand before it.

Aries composita.

The length of this Ram was of a large scantling; for, Plutarch affirmeth, that Anthonie in the Parthian war, had a Ramme foureſcore foote long. And Vitruuius saith, that the length of a Ramme was vsually one hundred and sixe, and sometimes one hundred and twentie; and this length gaue great strength and force to the engine. It was managed at one time with a whole Centurie or order of souldiers: and their forces being spent, they were seconded with another Centurie; and so the ramme plaied continually vpon the wall, without intermission. Iosephus saith, that Titus, at the siege of Ierusalem, had a ramme for euery legion: it was oftentimes couered with a Vine, that the men that managed it might bee in more safetie. It appeareth by this place, that if a towne had continued out vntill the ramme had touched the wall, they could not presume of any acceptation of rendry; forasmuch as by their obstinacie, they had brought in perrill the liues of their enemies, and were subdued by force of Armes, which affordeth such mercie as the Victor pleaseth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe Aduatici, as it seemeth, were not ignorant of the small securitie which one State can giue vnto another, that commendeth their safetie to be protected by it: for, as Architas the Pythagorian saith, A bodie, a familie, and an Armie, are then well gouerned, vvhen they containe within themselues the causes of their safetie; So wee must not looke for anie securitie in a State, when their safetie dependeth vpon a forraine protection.

protection. For, the old saying is, that *Neque murus, neque amicus quisquam teget, quem propria arma non texere.* Although in this case the matter was wel qualified, by the maiestie of the Romaine Empire, and the late victories in the continent of Gallia; whereof the Hedui with their associates, were very gainefull witnesses: but amongst kingdoms, that are better suted with equalitie of strength and authoritie, there is small hope of safetie to be looked for, vnlesse the happy gouernment of both doe mutually depend vpon the safetie of either Nation. For, that which Polybius obserued in Antigonus, king of Macedonia, taketh place for the most part amongst all Princes; that Kings by nature esteeme no man, either as a friend or an enemie, but as the calculation of profit shall find them answerable to their proiects. And contrariwise, it cutteth off many occasions of practices and attempts, when it is knowne that a State is of it selfe able and ready to resist the dessignes of forraine enemies, according to that of Manlius; *Ostendite modo bellum, pacem habebitis: videant vos paratos ad vim, ius ipsi remittent.*

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.

To giue notice of an Alarũ by fire.

THe manner of signifying any motion or attempt by fire, was of great vse in the night season, where the fortification was of so large an extension: for, fire in the night doth appeare far greater then indeede it is; forasmuch as that part of the aire, which is next vnto the fire, as it is illuminated with the light thereof, in a reasonable distance, cannot be discerned from the fire it selfe, and so it seemeth much greater then it is in substance. And contrariwise, in the day time it sheweth lesse then it is; for, the cleare brightnesse of the aire, doth much obscure that light, which proceedeth from a more grosse and materiall body: and therefore their custome was to vse fire in the night, and smoake in the day, suting the transparent middle with a contrarie qualitie; that so it might more manifestly appeare to the beholder.

THE FIFT OBSERVATION.

Lib. 25.

The punishmẽts vvhich the Romans laid vpon a conquered Nation.

AND albeit after the victorie, the Romains inflicted diuers degrees of punishment, according to the malice which they found in an enemie; yet as Flauius Lucanus saith in Liuie, there was no Nation more exorable, nor readier to shew mercie, then the Romains were. The punishments which we find them to haue vsed towards a conquered Nation were these; either they punished them by death, or sold them for bondslaues, *sub corona*, or dismissed them *sub iugum*; or merced them, in taking away their territories; or made them tributarie States.

Of the first we find a manifest example, in the third of these Commentaries; where Cæsar hauing ouerthrowne the Veneti by sea, in as much as they had retained his Embassadours by force, contrarie to the law of Nations, hee put all the Senate to the sword, and sold the rest *sub corona.*

Festus

Festus saith, that an enemie was said to be sold *sub corona*, inasmuch as the captiues stood crowned in the Market-place, where they were sette out to sale: as Cato saith, in his booke *De re militari*, *vt populus sua opera potius ob rem bene gestam coronatus, supplicatum eat; quàm re malè gesta coronatus vaneat.* And Gellius affirmeth the same thing, but addeth also another reason, forasmuch as the souldiers that kept them while they were in selling, incircled them round about, to keep them together; and this round-about-standing, was called *corona*. Festus saith, that oftentimes they vsed a speare; and therefore they were said to be sold *sub hasta*: forasmuch as amongst the Greeks, by the speare or pike, was signified the power of Armes, and maiestie of Empires.

When they dismissed them *sub iugum*, their order was to erect three trees like a paire of gallowes, vnder which they caused all the captiues to passe, as a signe of bondage: for, they had so conquered them by force of Armes, that they laid vpon their neck the yoake of thraldome.

Liuie saith, that Quintius the Dictator, dismissed the *Aequos sub iugum*; & this *iugum* was made of three speares, whereof two were stuck vpright in the ground, and the third was tied ouerthwart them. The souldiers that passed *sub iugum*, were vngirt, and their weapons taken from them, as Festus saith.

Sometimes againe, they tooke away their lands and territories, and either sold it for mony, & brought it into the Treasurie, or diuided the land amongst the Romaine people, or let it out to farme rent: of all which, Liuie hath many pregnant examples.

CHAP. XIII.

Crassus taketh-in all the maritimate Cities that *lie to the Ocean: the legions are caried into* their vwintering Campes.

THE same time Pub. Crassus, whom he had sent with one legion to the maritimate Cities that lay to the Ocean, aduertised him, that all those States had yielded themselues to the people of Rome. The warres beeing thus ended, and all Gallia being settled in peace, there went such a fame of this vvarre among other barbarous people, that from Nations beyond the Rhene there came Embassadours to Caesar, offering both hostages and obedience to whatsoeuer he commaunded them. But Caesar willed them to repaire vnto him againe in the beginning of the next Sommer, forasmuch as he then hasted into Lumbardie, after hee had placed his legions in their wintering Campes. For these things, vpon the sight of Caesars Letters, a generall supplication was proclaimed in Rome for fifteene daies together: which honour before that time had happened to no man. And thus endeth the second Commentarie.

Caesar.

Of this supplicatiõ I will speake in the latter end of the 4. booke.

OBSER-