

THE SVMMME OF THE FIRST
BOOKE OF CÆSARS COMMENTARIES;
WITH OBSERVATIONS VPON THE
same, discovering the excellencie of
Cæsars Militia.

THE ARGVMENT.

IN this first booke, are contained the specialities of two great warres, begun and ended both in a Summer: the first, between Cæsar & the Heluetij; the second, between him & Ariouistus, king of the Germans. The history of the Heluetians, may be reduced to three principall heads: vnder the first, are the reasons that moued the Heluetians to entertaine so desperate an expedition, & the preparation which they made for the same. The second, containeth their defeat by Cæsar: and the third, their returne into their Country. That of Ariouistus, diuideth it selfe into two parts: the first giueth the causes that induced Cæsar to vndertake that war: the second, intreateth of the war it selfe, and particularly describeth Ariouistus ouerthrow.

Switchers.

CHAP. I.

Gallia described: the Heluetians dislike their natiue seate, and propound to themselues larger territories in the Continent of Gallia. Orgetorix feedeth this humour, for his owne advantage.



GALLIA is all diuided into three parts; vwhereof the Belges do inhabite one, the Aquitanes another, & those which they call Celtes, & we, Galles, a third: all these do differ each from other in maners, language, & in lawes. The riuer Garun doth separate the Galles from the Aquitans, and Marne & Seine doe bound them from the Belges: of these the Belges are most warlike; as furthest off the ciuilitie & politure of the Trouince, & lesse frequēted with Merchāts, or acquainted with such things as are by thē imported to effeminate mens minds: as likewise being syted next to the Germans beyond the Rhene, with whō they haue continuall wars. For which cause also the Heluetians

*Matrona.
Sequana.*

B.

doe

doe excell the rest of the Galles in deeds of Armes, being in daily conflicts with the Germanes, for defence of their owne territories, or by inuading theirs. The part inhabited by the Galles, beginneth at the riuer Rhone, and is bounded with Garun, the Ocean, and the confines of the Belges; and reaching also to the Rhene, as a Line from the Sequans & Heluetians, it stretcheth northward. The Belges take their beginning at the extreame confines of Gallia, and inhabit the Country which lieth along the lower part of the Rhene, trindling to the North, and to the East. Aquitania spreadeth it self between the riuer Garun & the Pyrenean hills, and butteth vpon the Spanish Ocean, between the West and the North.

Amongst the Heluetians, Orgetorix did far exceed all others, both for noble discent and store of treasure: & when M. Messala and M. Piso were Consuls, being stirred up with the desire of a kingdom, he mooued the Nobilitie to a commotion; perswading the State to goe out of their confines with their whole pouer: as an easie matter for them, that excelled all other in valour & prowess, to seize vpon the Empire of all Gallia. To which he did the rather perswade the, for that the Heluetians were on euery side shut up, by the strength & nature of the place wherein they dwelt; on the one side, with the depth and breadth of the riuer Rhene, which diuideth their Country frō the Germanes; on the other side, with the high ridge of the hill Iura, which runneth between them & the Sequans: & on the third part, they were flanked with the lake Lemanus, & the riuer Rhone, parting their territories from our Prouince.

Hence it happened, that being thus straightened, they could not easily enlarge themselves, or make war vpon the bordering Countries: and thereupon, beeing men wholly bent to Armes and war, were much grieued, as hauing too little elbow-roume for their multitude of people, and the renowne they had got of their valor; their whole country cōtaining but 211 miles in length, & 180 in breadth. Spurred on with these inducements, and mooued specially with the authority of Orgetorix, they resolued to make prouision of such things as were requisite for their expedition; bought great number of Carres, and horses, for cariages; sowed much tillage, that they might haue plentie of Corne in their iourney; made peace and amity with the confining Countries. For the persfiting and supply of which things, they tooke 2 yeers to be sufficient; and in the third, enacted their setting forward by a solemne Law, assigning Orgetorix to giue order for that which remained.

Curandum vicinis populis ut pax inter vicinos populos colatur.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



HE that will examine this expedition of the Heluetians, by the transmigrations and fittings of other Nations, shall find some vnexampld particularities in the course of their proceeding: for, first it hath neuer beene heard, that any people vterly abandoned that Country which Nature or prouidence had allotted the, vnless they were driuen thervnto by a generall calamity, as the infection of the aire, the cruelty & oppression of a neighbor nation, as were the Sueuians, who thought it great honor to suffer no man to border vpon their confines; or

some


Some other vniuersall, which made the place inhabitable, and the people willing to vndertake a voluntarie exile. But oftentimes we read, that when the inhabitants of a Countrey were so multiplied, that the place was ouer-charged with multitudes of ofspring; and like a poore father, had more children then it was able to sustaine, the abounding surplus was sent out to seek new fortunes in forraine Countries, and to possesse themselues of a resting seate; which might recompence the wants of their natiue Country, with a plentiful reuenue of necessary supplements. And in this sort, wee read that Rome sent out many Colonies into diuers parts of her Empire. And in this manner the ancient Galles disburdened themselues of their superfluitie, and sent them into Asia. The Gothes came from the Ilands of the Baltick sea, & in Sulla his time, swarmed ouer Germanie: besides many other Nations, whose transmigrations are particularly described by Lazius. But amongst all these, we find none that so forsooke their Country, but there remained some behind to inhabit the same; from whence, as from a fountaine, succeeding ages might deriue the streame of that ouer-flowing multitude, and by them take notice of the causes, which moued them vnto it. For, their manner was in all such expeditions, and sending out of Colonies, to diuide themselues into two or three parts, equall both in equalitie and number: for, after they had parted their common people into euen companies, they diuided their Nobility with as great equalitie as they could, among the former partitions: & then casting lots, that part which went out to seeke new aduentures, left their lands & possessions to the rest that remained at home; and so by industrie, they supplied that defect which continuance of time had drawne vpon them. And this was the meanes, which the first inhabitants of the earth found out after the flood, to people the vnhabited places, and to keepe off the inconueniences of scarcitie and famine.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



HE that would prognosticate by the course of these seuerall proceedings, whether of the two betokened better successe, hath greater reason to foretell happinesse to these which I last spake of, then to the Heluetians; vnlesse their valour were the greater, and quitted all difficulties which hatred and enuie would cast vpon them: for, an action which sauoureth of necessitie (which was alwaies vnderstood in sending out a Colonie) hath a more plausible passport amongst men, then that which proceedeth from a proud voluntarie motion. For, as men can bee content to tolerate the one, if it concerne not their particular; so on the other side, they count it gaine to punish pride with shame, and to oppose themselues against the other.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

rgetorix, thirsting after princely dignitie, discovereth the humour of vaine-glorie. For, not contented with the substance of honour, being already of greatest power amongst the Heluetians, & ordering the affaires of the State by his owne direction, thought it nothing without the marks and title of dignitie, vnto which the inconueniences of Maiestie are annexed: not considering that the best honor, sitteth not alwaies in imperiall thrones, nor weareth the Diadems of Princes; but oftentimes resteth it selfe in meaner places, and shineth better with obscurer titles.

For prooffe whereof, to omit antiquitie, take the familie of the Medices in Florence, and particularlie, Cosimo and Lorenzo, whose vertue raised them to that height of honour, that they were nothing inferiour to the greatest Potentates of their time, being themselves but priuate Gentlemen in that State, and bearing their proper names as their greatest titles. But howsoeuer; the opportunitie of changing their soile, was well obserued by Orgetorix, as the fittest meanes to attempt an innouation: but the successe depended much vpon the fortunate proceeding of their expedition.

For, as a multitude of that nature, can bee content to attribute a great part of their happinesse, wherein euery man thinketh himselfe particularly interested, to an eminent Leader; & in that vniuersall extasie of ioy, will easilie admit an alteration of their State: so, if the issue be in any respect vnfortunate, no man will acknowledge himselfe faultie; but, euery one desiring to discharge his passion vpon some object, a chiefe director is likeliest to be the mark, at which the darts of their discontent will be throwne; and then he will find it hard to effect what he intendeth.

CHAP. II.

Orgetorix practices are discovered: his death. The Heluetians continue the resolution of their expedition, and prepare themselves accordingly.

Cæsar.



Orgetorix, thereupon, undertook imploiment to the adioyning States; and first perswaded Casticus, the sonne of Catamanalides, a Sequan (whose father had for many yeeres raigned in that place, and was by the Senate and people of Rome, stiled with the title of a Friend) to possesse himselfe of the Signiorie of that State which his Father formerly inioyed: and in like manner, dealt with Dumnorix the Heduan, Diuitiacus brother (who at that time was the onely man of that Prouince, & verie well beloued of the

the Commons) to indeavour the like there; and withall, gaue him his daughter in marriage: shewing them by liuely reasons, that it was an easie matter to effect their designes; for that he being sure of the soueraigntie of his State, there was no doubt but the Heluetians would doe much throughout all Gallia, and so made no questian to settle them in those kingdoms, with his power and forces. Drawne on with these inducements, they gaue faith and oath each to other, hoping with the support of the soueraigntie of three mightie Nations, to possesse themselues of all Gallia.

This thing beeing discovered, the Heluetians (according to their customes) caused Orgetorix to answer the matter in Durance: whose punishment upon the Attaint, was to be burned aliuē. Against the day of triall, Orgetorix had got together all his Family, to the number of ten thousand men, besides diuers followers, and others far indebted, which were many; by whose meanes hee escaped a iudiciall hearing. The people, there upon, being much incensed, agreed, the Magistrate should execute their lawes with force of Armes, and to that end, should raise the Country: but in the meane time, Orgetorix was found dead, not without suspicion (as was conceiued) that he himselfe was guilty thereof.

Notwithstanding his death, the Heluetians did pursue their former designe of leauing their Countrey: and when they thought themselues readie prepared, they set fire on all their Townes (which were in number 12) together with foure hundred Villages, besides priuate houses, and burnt likewise all the Corne, saue that they caried with them; that al hope of retorne being taken away, they might be the readier to vndergoe all hazards: And commaunded that euery man should carie so much Meale with him, as would serue for three Months.

Moreouer also, they perswaded the Rauraci, the Tulingi and Latobrigi, their neighbour borderers, that putting on the same resolution, they would set fire on all their habitations, and goe along with them. And likewise tooke vnto them the Boij, which had dwelt beyond the Rheine, but were now seated in the Territories of the Norici, and had taken the capitall towne of that Countrey. There were onely two waies which gaue them passage out of their Countrey: the one through the Sequans, very narrow and difficult, betweene the Hill Iura, & the Riuer Rhone, by which a single Cart could scarce passe; and had a high hill hanging ouer, that a small force might easily hinder them. The other, was through our Prouince, farre easier and readier; forasmuch as the riuer Rhone, running betweene the Heluetians and the * Allobroges (who were lately brought in obedience to the people of Rome) did giue passage in diuers places by Foordes.

* Sauiens.

The vtmost towne belonging to the Allobroges, that bordereth vpon the Heluetians, is Geneua; wherevnto adioyne a bridge leading to the Heluetians; who doubted not but to perswade the Allobroges (that seemed as yet to carry no great affection to the people of Rome) or at least, to force them to giue them passage. Things beeing now ready for their iourney, they assigned a day when all should meete together vpon the banks of Rhone: which day was the first of the Calends of Aprill, in the Consulship of Lu. Piso, and A. Gabinius.

OBSERVATION.

*The omission
in the Helue-
tian expedi-
tion.*



S these prouisoes were all requisite; so one thing was omitted, which might haue furthered their good fortune more then any thing thought of: which was, to haue concealed by all meanes the time of their departure. For, all the beasts of the wood must needs stand at gaze, when such Lions roused themselues out of their dennes; and be then very watchfull of their safetie when they knew the instant of time, when some of their spoiles must needs bee offered to appease their furie. Or at the least, it behoued them so to haue dealt by hostages and treatie, that such as were likeliest, and best able to crosse their designements, might haue been no hinderance of their proceedings: considering there were but two waies out of their Countrey by which they might goe; the one narrow and difficult, betweene the hill Iura and the riuer Rhone, by the Countrey of the Sequani: the other through Prouence, far easier and shorter, but not to be taken but by the permission of the Romaines. But how-so-euer; their error was, that after two yeeres prouision to goe, and hauing made an exterminating decree which inioyned them to goe, when they came to the point, they knew not what way to goe.

CHAP. III.

Cæsar denieth the Heluetians passage through the
*Romane Prouince: he fortifieth the passage
betweene the hill Iura, and the
lake of Geneva.*

Cæsar.

** Roche.*



S soone as Cæsar was aduertised, that their purpose vvvas to passe thorough our Prouince, he hasted to leaue the * Cittie, & posting by great iourneys into the further Gallia, he came to Geneva. And inrolling great forces throughout all the Prouince, for that there was but one legion in those parts, he brake downe the bridge at Geneva.

The Heluetians, hauing intelligence of Cæsars arriuall, they sent diuers of the best of their Nobility, Embassadours vnto him, whereof Numenius & Veredoctius were the chiefe; to give him notice, that they had a purpose to passe peaceably through the Prouince, hauing no other way to goe: & therein to pray his suffe-
rance and permission.

Cæsar, well remembering how Lu. Cassius the Consull was slaine, his Armie beaten, and the souldiers put vnder the yoke, did not hold it conuenient to grant their request. Neither did hee thinke that men so ill affected, could forbear to offer wrongs & insolencies, if leaue were giuen them as was required. Howbeit, for the better gaining of time, and getting such forces together as were caused

to

to be inrolled, he answered the Commissioners that he would take a time of deliberation; and to that end, willed them to returne againe by the Ides of Aprill. And, in the meane time, with that legion he had ready, and the souldiers that came out of the Prouince, he made a ditch, and a vvall of sixteene foot in height, from the lake Lemanus, which runneth into the Rhone, to the hill Iura, that diuideth the Sequans from the Heluetians, beeing in length nineteene miles; and disposed guarizons and fortresses along the worke, the better to impeach them, if happely they went about to breake out by force.

At the day appointed, when the Embassadours returned, for a resolution, he utterly denied to giue any leaue to passe through the Prouince; hauing neither custome nor president from the people of Rome, to varrant him in that kind. And if they should endeauour it by force of Armes, he would oppugne them.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His manner of prolonging of time, to renforce the troupes or get some other aduantage, as it was then of great vse to Cæsar, and hath oftentimes been practised to good purpose; so doth it discouer to a circumspect enemy, by the directions in the meane time (which cannot easily be shadowed) the drift of that delay; and so inuiteth him vwith greater courage, to take the opportunitie of that present aduantage; especially if tract of time may strengthen the one, and not further the other: which is easily discerned by the circumstances of the action.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He request of the Heluetians seemed to deserue a facile answer; being in effect no more then Nature had giuen to the riuier Rhone: which was to passe through the Prouince, with as much speed & as little hurt as they could: But Cæsar, locking further into the matter, and comparing things already past, with occurrences that were to follow after, found the maieltie of the Romane Empire to be interessed in the answer; beeing either to maintaine her greatnes, by resisting her enemies, or to degenerate from ancient vertue, by gratifying such as sought her ruine: which in matter of State, are things of great consequence. And further, hee knew it to be an vnwise course, to suffer an enemy to haue meanes of doing hurt; considering that the nature of man is alwaies prone to loade him with further wrongs whom hee hath once iniuried: not but that he could peradventure be content to end the quarrell vpon that aduantage; but fearing the other, whom he wronged, to expect but an opportunitie of reuenge, he gets what aduantage he can before hand, and so ceaseth not, vntill he haue added a bloody end to an iniurious beginning.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



Concerning this marvellous fortification, between the hill & the lake, how seruiceable such works were vnto him in all his wars; in what sort, and in how small a time they were made; I will deferre the treatise of them vntill I come to the height of Alesia, where he gaue some ground of that hyperbolicall speech: *An me deleto, non animaduvertebatis decem habere lectas quidem legiones populum Romanum, quæ non solum vobis obsistere sed etiam cælum diruere possent?*

CHAP. IIII.

The Heluetians, failing to passe the Rhone, take the way through the Countrey of the Sequani. Cæsar hasteth into Italie, and there inrolleth more legions: and returning, ouer-throweth part of them at the riuer Arar.

Cæsar.



He Heluetians, frustrated of their former hope, went about, some with boats coupled together, others with Flats (where of they made great store) the rest, by foords and places where the Riuer was shallowe, sometimes in the day, and oftentimes in the night, to breake out: but beeing beaten back by the helpe of the fortification, and the concourse of souldiers, and multitude of weapens, they desisted from that attempt.

There was onely another way left, through the Sequans, which they could not take, by reason of the narrownesse therof, but by the fauour of the Countrey. And forasmuch, as of themselues they were able to preuaile little therein, they sent Messengers to Dumnorix the Heduan, that by his mediation, they might obtaine so much of the Sequans. Dumnorix, what through fauour and bountious cariage, was of great power in his Countrey, much affecting the Heluetians, by reason of his mariage with Orgetorix daughter: & drawne on with a desire of a kingdome, gaue his mind to new proiects; labouring to gratifie many States, to tie them the rather to fauour his courses. And there-upon, vndertaking the businesse, got the Sequans to giue the Heluetians leaue to passe through their Confines; giuing each other Pledges, that the Sequans should not interrupt the Heluetians in their iourney: nor they, offer any iniury to the Countrey.

It was told Cæsar, that the Heluetians were determined to passe through the Territories of the Sequans and Heduans, on the confines of the Santons, who are not farre from the borders of the Tholesans, a people of the Prouince: which if they did, he foresaw how dangerous it would be, to haue a warlike Nation, and such as were enemies to the people of Rome, to come so neere them; and to haue the aduantage of an open and plentious Countrey.

For

For which causes, he left T. Labienus a Legat, to commaund those works, and he himselfe made great iourneys to get into Italy; where he inrolled two legions, and tooke 3 more out of their wintering Camps, neer about Aquileia: and with these five legions, went the next way ouer the Alps, into the further Gallia. Where, by the way, the Centrons, Garocles, and Caturiges, taking aduantage of the open ground, did seek to keep the Army from passage: but, being beaten and put off by many skirmages, they came in seauen daies from Ocellum, a towne in the furthest parts of the neerer Prouince, into the confines of the Vocontij, a people of the further Prouince: from whence he led them into the territories of the Allobroges; and so vnto the Sabusians, that are the first beyond the Rhene, bordering vpon the Prouince.

By that time, the Heluetians had caried their forces through the straights, and frontiers of the Sequans, into the Dominions of the Heduanes, and began to forage & pillage their Country. Who, finding themselues vnable to make resistance, sent Messengers to Caesar, to require aide; shewing their deserts to be such from time to time of the people of Rome, that might challenge a greater respect, then to haue their Country spoiled, their children led into captivity, their townes assaulted and taken, as it were in the sight of the Romaine Army. At the same instant likewise, the Ambarri, that had dependancy & alliance with the Heduanes, aduertised Caesar, that their Country was vtterly wasted, and they scarce able to keep the Enemy from entering their townes. In like manner also, the Allobroges, that had farmes and possessions beyond the Rhone, fled directly to Caesar, complayning that there was nothing left them but the soile of their Country.

With which aduertisements, Caesar was somooued, that he thought it not conuenient to linger further, or expect vntill the fortunes of their Allies were all vusted, and that the Heluetians were come vnto the Zantones. The *riuer Arar, that runneth through the confines of the Heduanes and Sequans, into the Rhone, passeth away with such a stilness, that by view of the eye, it can hardly be discerned which vway the vwater taketh. This riuer did the Heluetians passe ouer, by Flotes, & bridges of boats. When Caesar vvas aduertised by his Discoverers, that three parts of their forces were already past the vwater, and that the fourth was left behind on this side the riuer; about the third watch of the night he vvent out of the Camp with three legions, and surprising that part which was not as yet gotte ouer the riuer, slew a great part of them: the rest fled into the next vwoods.

* Soane.

Zurricke.

This part vvas the Tigurine Canton: and the Heluetians beeing all parted into foure diuisions, this Canton alone, in the memory of our fathers, slew L. Cassius the Consull, and put his Army vnder the Yoke. So, whether it were by chaunce, or the prouidence of the Gods, that part of the Heluetian State, which gaue so great a blowe to the Romaine people, was the first that did penance for the same. Wherin, Caesar tooke reuenge, not onely of the publique, but of his particular loss; forasmuch as the Tigurines, had in that battell, with Cassius, slaine L. Piso, the Grandfather of L. Piso, his father in law.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His defeat beeing chiefly a seruice of execution, vpon such as were taken at a dangerous disaduantage, which men call vnaware, containeth these two aduises. First, not to neglect that aduantage which Sertorius by the haire of his horse taile hath prooued to be very important; that beginning with a part, it is a matter of no difficultie to ouercome the whole. Secondly, it may serue for a caueat, so to transport an Armie ouer a water, where the enemy is within a reasonable march, that no part may be so seuered from the bodie of the Armie, that aduantage may thereby be taken to cut them off altogether, and separate them from themselues. The safest and most honourable way, to transport an Armie ouer a riuier, is by a bridge, placing at each end sufficient troopes of horse and foot, to defend the Armie from suddaine assaults, as they passe over the water; and thus went Cæsar over the Rhene into Germanie, two seuerall times.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.




The man-
ner of their
watch.

Concerning the circumstance of time, when Cæsar went out of his Campe, which is noted to be in the third watch, we must vnderstand, that the Romans diuided the whole night into 4 watches, euery watch containing three houres: and these watches were distinguished by seuerall notes and sound of Cornets or Trumpets; that by the distinction and diuersitie thereof, it might easily be knowne what watch was sounded. The charge and office of sounding the watches, belonged to the chiefeest Centurion of a legion, whom they called Primipilus, or Primus Centurio; at whose pauilion the Trumpetters attended, to be directed by his houre-glasse.

The first watch began alwaies at sunne-setting, and continued three houres (I vnderstand such houres as the night contained, beeing diuided into twelue: for, the Romaines diuided their night as well as their day into twelue equall spaces, which they called houres): the second watch continued vntill midnight; and then the third watch began, & contained likewise three houres; the fourth was equall to the rest, and continued vntill sunne-rising. So that by this phrase *de tertia vigilia*, we vnderstand, that Cæsar went out of his Campe in the third watch; which was after midnight: and so we must conceiue of the rest of the watches, as often as we shall find them mentioned in historie.

CHAP. V.

*Cæsar passeth ouer the riuer Arar: his horsemen
incountred with the Heluetians, and were
put to the worse.*



After this ouerthrowe, he caused a bridge to be made ouer the riuer Arar, and caried ouer his Army, to pursue the rest of the Heluetian forces. The Heluetians, much daunted at his suddaine comming, that had gotte ouer the riuer in one day, which they could scarce doe in twentie, sent Embassadours vnto him, of whom Dinico was chiefe, that commaunded the Heluetians in the warre against Cassius: who dealt with Cæsar to this effect; That if the people of Rome would make peace with the Heluetians, they would go into any part which Cæsar should appoint them: but, if otherwise he would prosecute warre, that he should remember the ouerthrowe which the people of Rome receiued by their valour; and not to attribute it to their owne woorth, that they had surprized at vnawares a part of their Army, when such as had passed the riuer could not come to succour them. They had learned of their fore-fathers, to contend rather by valour, then by craft and deuices; and therefore, let him beware, that the place vvherein they now vvere, did not get a Name, or carie the marke to all future ages, of an eminent calamity to the people of Rome, & of the vtter destruction of his Army.

To this, Cæsar answered; That he made the lesse doubt of the successe of these busineses, in that he vuell remembred and knew those things, which the Heluetian Commissioners had related: and was so much the rather grieved thereat, because it happened without any cause or desert of the people of Rome; who, if he were guiltie of any wrong done vnto them, it vvere a matter of no difficultie to beware of their practices: but therein was his errour, that he could thinke of nothing which he had committed, that might cause him to feare: neither could he feare without occasion. And, if he would let passe former insolencies, could hee forget those late & fresh iniuries? in that they had attempted to pass through the Prouince by force of Armes, sacked and pillaged the Heduanes, Ambars, & Allobrogians? that did so insolently vaunt of their victorie, admiring that these iniuries were suffered so long time to rest vnreuedged; came all in the end to one passe. For, the immortal Gods vvere wont sometimes to giue happinesse and long impunitie to men; that by the greater alteration of things, the punishment should be the more grievous for their offences. Howbeit, if they vwould giue Hostages for the performance of those things which were to be agreed vpon, and satisfie the Heduanes and Allobrogians, together with their Allies, for the iniuries they had done vnto them, he would be content to make peace with them.

Dinico replied, that they were taught by their Ancestors, to take Hostages, rather then to giue them, whereof the people of Rome were witnesses: and there-

upon

Cæsar.

upon departed. The next day they remooued the Campe, and the like did Cæsar, sending all his horse before, to the number of foure thousand (which he had raised in the Pronince, and drawne from the Heduans, & there Associates) to vnderstand which way the Enemy tooke: vwho, prosecuting the reare-ward ouerhotly, were forced to vndertake the Heluetian Cavalry, in a place of disaduantage; and thereby lost some few of their Company.

The Enemy, made proud with that encounter, hauing with five hundred horse beaten so great a multitude, did afterwards make head vwith more assurance; and sometimes stuck not to sally out of the Reareward, and assault our Partie. Cæsar kept backe his men from fighting; and held it enough for the present, to keepe the Enemy from spoiling and harrying the Country: and went on for fifteen daies together, in such manner, as there were but five or sixe miles between the first troopes of our Armie, and the Rearward of theirs.

OBSERVATION.




His example of the Heluetians, may leesson a Commaunder, not to waxe insolent vpon euery ouer-throwe which the encinie taketh, but duely to weigh the true causes of a victorie gotten, or an ouer-throwe taken; that apprehending the right current of the action, he may neither vaunt of a blind victorie, nor be dismaied at a casuall mishap.

And heerein, let a heedfull warinesse so moderate the sequells of victorie in a triumphing spirit, that the care and ieaiousie to keep still that sweet sound- ing fame on foote, may as farre surpasse the industrie which he first vsed to obtaine it, as the continuance of happinesse doth exceede the beginning of good fortunes. For, such is the nature of our soule, that although from her insancie, euen to the manhood of her age, she neuer found want of that which shee lusted after: yet when shee meeteth with a counterbuffe to check her appetite, and restraine her affections from their satisfaction; shee is as much troubled in that want, as if shee had neuer received any contentment at all: for, our will to euerie obiect which it seeketh after, begetteth alwaies a new appetite: which is not satisfied with a former quittance; but either seeketh present paiment, or returneth discontentment vnto the mind.

And, as our soule is of an euerlasting beeing, and cannot thinke of an end, to her beginning; so shee seeketh a perpetuall continuance of such things which shee lusterh after: which hee that meaneth to hold Fortune his friend, will endeuour to maintaine.



THE BATTEL WHICH CÆSAR HAD



WITH THE HELVETIANS.





CHAP. VI.

Cæsar sendeth to get the aduantage of a hill, and so to giue the Heluetians battell: but was put off by false intelligence. The opportunitic beeing lost, hee intendeth prouision of Corne.



*N*the meane time, Cæsar pressed the Heduanes from day to day to bring in Corne, according to their promise: for, by reason of the cold temperature of Gallia, which lieth to the Northward, it happened not onely that the Corne was farre frō beeing ripe; but also, that there was scarce forrage for the horses. And, the prouisions which were brought along the riuer Arar, stood him in small steed at that time, forasmuch as the Heluetians had tooke their iourney cleane from the Riuer, and that he would by no meanes forsake them.

Cæsar.

The Heduanes, putting it off from one day to another, gaue out still it was vpon comming. But, when Cæsar found the matter so long delaied, & that the day of meting out Corne to the souldiers was at hand, calling before him the chiefest Princes of the Heduanes, of whom he had great numbers in his Campe, and amongst them, Dinitiacus and Liscus, vho for that time were the soueraigne Magistrates (which they call Vergobret, being yeerely created, & hauing power of life & death) he did greatly blame them, that he was not supplied with Corne from them, the Enemy beeing so neere, and in so needfull a time, that it could neither be bought for money, nor had out of the fields: especially, when for their sake, and at their request, he had vnderooke that vuarre. Whereat hee was the rather griened, because he found himselfe forsaken of them.

At length, Liscus, mooued vwith Cæsar's speech, discovered (which before hee had kept secret) that there were some of great authority amongst the Commons, and could doe more being priuate persons, then they could do being Magistrates. These, by sedicious and bad speeches, did deser the people from bringing Corne: sbewing it better for them, sith they could not attaine to the Empire of Gallia, to vndergoe the soueraigntie of the Galles, then the Romaines: for, they were not to doubt, but if the Romaines vanquished the Heluetians, they would bereaue the Heduanes of their libertie, with the rest of all Gallia. By these men are our deliberations and counsells, or vwhatsoever else is done in the Campe, made knowne to the Enemy: neither were they able to keepe them in obedience; but knew well withall, what danger hee fell into, by acquainting Cæsar vwith these things; which was the cause he had kept them from him so long.

Cæsar, perceiued that Dammorix, Dinitiacus brother, was shot at by this speech

of *Liscus*: but, forasmuch as hee would not haue those things handled in the presence of so manie, hee speedilie brake off the Councell, and retaining *Liscus*, asked priuatly after those things which he had deliuered in the Assembly; wherunto he spake more freely and boldly then before. And inquiring secretlie of others, he found it to be true, that *Dumnorix* was of great courage, and singularly faouered for his liberalitie of the Common people: Desirous of nouelties and changes, and for many yeeres, had kept at a lowe rate, the Taxes and Impositions of the *Heduians*, forasmuch as no man durst cōtradiēt what he would haue done. By which courses, he had increased his priuate estate, and got great meanes to be liberall: for, a great number of horsemen, did onely liue vpon his entertainement, and vvere continually about him, beeing not onely powerfull at home, but abroad also, amongst diuers of the neighbour States. And for this cause, had married his Mother to a great Richman, and of a Noble house, in the Country of the *Bituriges*; himselfe had tooke a wife of the *Heluetians*, had matched his sifter by his Mother, and others of his kinne, into other States. For that affinity, hee faouered and wished well to the *Heluetians*: and on the other side, hated the *Romaines*, and specially *Cæsar*, of all others; for that by their comming into *Gallia*, his power was weakened, and *Dinitiacus* his brother restored to his auncient honour and dignitie. If any miscasualtie happened to the *Romaines*, his hope was to obtaine the Principalltie by the fauour of the *Heluetians*: where-as the soueraigntie of the *Romaines*, made him not onely despaire of the kingdome, but also of the fauour, or what other thing soeuer he now inioyed. And *Cæsar* had found out by inquirie, that the beginning of the flight, when the Cavalrie was routed, came from *Dumnorix*, and his horsemen: for, hee commaunded those troopes which the *Heduians* had sent to aide *Cæsar*, and out of that disorder, the rest of the Cavalrie tooke a fright.

Which things beeing discovered, forasmuch as these suspicions were scconded with matters of certaintie, in that hee had brought the *Heluetians* through the confines of the *Sequans*, had caused hostages to be giuen on either side, and done all those things, not onely without varrant from the State, but without acquainting them there-with. And lastly, in that he was accused by the Magistrate of the *Heduians*, hee thought it cause sufficient for him to punish him, or to commaund the State to doe iustice vpon him. One thing there was which might seem to oppugne all this; the singular affection of *Dinitiacus*, his brother, to the people of *Rome*; the great loue he bare particularly to *Cæsar*; his loyaltie, iustice & temperancie: and therefore he feared, least his punishment might any way alienate or offend *Dinitiacus* sincere affection. And therefore, before hee did anie thing, hee called *Dinitiacus*, and putting aside the ordinarie Interpreters, hee spake to him by *M. Valerius Procillus*, one of the principall men of the Prouince of *Gallia*, his familiar friend, and whom hee specially trusted in matters of importance, and tooke notice vwhat *Dumnorix* had uttered in his presence, at a Councell of the *Galles*, shewing also vwhat informations hee had priuatly receiued concerning him: and therefore, by way of aduice, desired, that without any offence to him, either hee himselfe might call him in question, or the State take some course in the same.

*Dimitiacus, embracing Caesar, with many teares besought him, not to take a-
nie seuerer course vvith his brother; hee knew vvell that all those things vvore
true, neither was there any man more grieued thereat then himselfe. For, wher-
as he had credit and reputation, both at home and amongst other States of Gal-
lia, and his brother beeing of small power by reason of his youth, was by his aide
and assistance, growne into fauour and authoritie, hee vsed those meanes as an
aduantage, not onely to weaken his authoritie, but to bring him to ruine: And
yet neuer thelesse, he found himselfe ouer-ruled through brotherly affection, and
the opinion of the common people. And if Caesar should take any strict account
of these offences, there was no man but vvould thinke, it vvvas done vvith his
priuitie, considering the place he held in his fauour; vvherevpon, vvould conse-
quently follow, on his behalfe, a generall alienation, and distaste of all Gallia.*

*As hee vttered these things, with many other vvords, accompanied vvith
teares, Caesar, taking his right hand, comforted him, and desired him to intreat
no further: for, such vvvas the respect he had vnto him, that for his sake, and at
his request, he forgaued both the iniurie done to the Common-wealth, and the dis-
pleasure which he had instly conceiued for the same. And therupon, called Dum-
norix before him, and in the presence of his brother, shewed him wherein he had
deserued much blame and reproofe; told him vvhat he had vnderstood, & vvhat
the State complained on; aduised him to auoide all occasions of mislike for the
future; that which vvvas past, hee had forgien him, at Dinitiacus his brothers
intreatie. Howbeit, he set espialls vpon him, to obserue his courses, that he might
be informed vvhat he did, and vvith vvhom he conuersed.*

*The same day, vnderstanding by the Discouersers, that the Encmie was lod-
ged vnder a Hill, about eight miles from his Campe, he sent some to take a viewe
of the Hill, and of the ascent from about the same. Which was found, and accor-
dingly reported vnto him to be very easie. In the third vvatch of the night, hee
sent avvay T. Labienus the Legat, vvith two legions, and those Guides that
knew the vvay; commaunding him to possesse himselfe of the toppes of that Hill.
Himselfe, about the fourth vvatch, marched on after the Enemy, the same way
they had gone, sending all his horsmen before.*

*P. Causidius, that was held for a great souldier, first, in the Army of L. Sylla,
and afterwards vvith M. Crassus, was sent before, vvith the Discouersers. At
the breaking of the day, vvhen Labienus had gotte the toppes of the hill, and him-
selfe vvvas come vvithin a mile and a halfe of the Heluetian Campe, vvithout any
notice to the Enemy, either of his or Labienus approach (as vvvas afterwards
found by the Captiues) Causidius came runnning as fast as his horse could
driue, and told him, that the Hill vvwhich Labienus should haue taken, vvvas
held by the Galles; vvwhich hee perceiued plainelie by the Armes and Ensignes of
the Heluetians. Wherevpon, Caesar drew his forces to the next Hill, and imbat-
teled the Armie.*

*Labienus (according to the directions hee had from Caesar, not to fight, vn-
lesse hee saw his forces neere the Enemies Campe, that they might both at the
same time assault them from diuers parts at once) vvhen he had tooke the Hill,
kept his men from battell, expecting our Armie.*

At length, when it was farre in the day, Caesar understood by the Discoverers, that the Hill was possessed by his Party; as also, that the enemy was dislodged, & that Causidius was so astonished with feare, that he reported to haue seene that which he saw not. The same day, he followed the Enemy, at the distance hee had formerly vsed, and incamped himselfe three miles from them. The day following, forasmuch as the Army was to be paid in Corne within two daies next after, & that he was but eighteene miles distant from Bibract, a great and opulent City of the Heduan, hee turned aside from the Heluetians, and made towards Bibract.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He getting of this hill, as a place of aduantage, was maruelous important to the happy successe of the battell: for, the aduantage of the place is not onely noted as an especiall cause of easie victorie, throughout this historie; but in all their warres, from the very cradle of their Empire, it cleared their Armies frō all difficulties, to what extremities soeuer they were put. The first reason may bee in regard of their Darts & Slings, and especially their Piles; which being a heavy deadly weapon, could not any way bee so auailable, beeing cast countermont or in a plaine leuell, as when the de- iuitie and downefall of a swelling banke, did naturally second their violent impression. Neither can the shock at handy-blowes bee any thing so furious (which was a point of great respect in their battels) when the souldiers spent their strength in franchising the iniurie of a rising Mountaine, as when the place by a naturall inclination did further their course.

And to conclude, if the battell succeeded not according to their desire, the fauour of the place afforded them meanes of a strong retreat, in the highest part whereof, they had commonly their Camps well fenced, and fortified against all chaunces. If it be demaunded, whether the vpper ground be of like vse, in regard of our weapons: I answer, that in a skirmish of shotte, I take the aduantage to lie in the lower ground rather then on the hill; for, the pieces being hastily charged, as commonly they are after the first volley, if the bullet chance to lie loose, when the nose of the peece is lower then the breech, it must needes flie at randome, and be altogether vneffectuall: but when the nose shall be raised vpperward to the side of a hill, the bullet beeing rammed in with his owne waight, shall flie with greater certaintie and furie; considering the nature of the powder to be such, that the more it is stopt and shut in, the more it seeketh to enlarge his roome, and breaketh forth with greater violence and fury.

Concerning other weapons, I take the vpper ground in the shocke and incounter, to be aduantageous, as well for the sword as the pike, and would deserue as great respect, if the controuersie were decided by these weapons, as sildome times it is.

Places of aduantage in the Romaine warres.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

BY Causidius his demeanour, we see that verified which Physitions affirme, that Nothing will sooner carrie our iudgement out of her proper seate, then the passion of feare: and that amongst souldiers themselves, whom custome hath made familiarlie acquainted with horror and death, it is able to turne a flock of sheepe into a squadron of Corselets, & a few canes or Osiers, into Pikes and Lanciers. Which may serue to aduise a discreet Generall, not easily to credit a relation of that nature, when a man of reputation, in so perfit a discipline, and so experienced in the seruice of three famous Chieffes, was so surpris'd with feare, that hee could not discern his friends from his enemies: but I will speake more of this passion, in the war with Ariouistus.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

IN euery relation throughout the whole course of this historie, the first words are commonly these, *Refrumentaria comparata*; as the foundation & strength of euery expedition, without which no man can manage a war, according to the true maximes and rules of the Art Military, but must be forced to relieue that inconuenience, with the losse of many other aduantages of great consequence. Which gaue occasion to Gaspard de Coligni, that famous Admirall of France, amongst other Oracles of truth, wherwith his mind was maruellously enriched, often to vse this saying; that He that wil shape that beast (meaning war) must beginne with the belly. And this rule was diligently obserued by Cæsar, who best knew how to express the true portraiture of that beast, in due proportion & liuely resemblance.

*Their maner
of victualling*

The order of the Romans was, at the day of measuring, to giue corne to euery particular souldier, for a certain time, which was comonly defined by circumstances: and by the measure which was giuen thē, they knew the day of the next payment; for, euery footman receiued after the rate of a bushell a weeke, which was thought sufficient for him and his seruant: for, if they had paid thē their whole stipend in money, it might haue beene wasted in vnecessary expenses: but by this meanes they were sure of prouision for the time determined; & the sequell of the war, was prouidently cared for by the Generall.

The Corne being deliuered out, was husbanded, ground with hand-milles, which they caried alwaies with them, & made into hasty cakes, dainty enough for a souldiers mouth, by no other but themselves and their seruants. Neither could they sell it or exchange it for bread; for, Salust reckoneth this vp amongst other dishonours of the discipline corrupted, that the souldiers sold away their corne, which was giuen thē by the Treasurer, & bought their bread by the day. And this maner of prouision had many speciall comodities, which are not incident to our custome of victualling: for it is impossible, that victualers

should follow an Armie vpon a seruice, in the Enemies Countrey, twentie or thirtie daies together, with sufficient prouision for an Armie: And by that meanes, the Generall cannot attend aduantages & fittest opportunities, which in tract of time are often offered; but is forced either to hazard the whole, vpon vnequall tearmes, or to found an vnwilling retireit.

And whereas the Victualers are for the most part voluntarie, respecting nothing but their gaine; and the souldiers on the other side, carelesse of the morrow, and prodigall of the present in that turbulent mar-market, where the seller hath an eye onely to his particular, & the buyer respecteth neither the publique good, nor his priuate commoditie, there is nothing to be looked for, but famine and confusion: Where-as the Romains, by their manner of prouision, imposed the generall care of the publique good vpon the chiefe Commaunder, whose dutie it was to prouide store of Corne for his Armie; and the particular care vpon euery priuate souldier, whom it especially concerned to see, that the allowance which the Common-weale had in plentifull manner giuen him, for his maintenance, might not bee watted through negligence or prodigalitie: which excellent order, the nature of our victuals will no way admit. Their Prouinces, & the next confederate States, furnished their Armies continually with Corne; as it appeareth by this place, that for prouision of graine, he depended altogether vpon the Hedui: and, when they were in the Enemies Countrey, in the time of haruest, the souldiers went out to reape and gather Corne, and deliuered it threshed and cleansed to the Treasurer, that it might be kept vntill the day of payment.

But, to leaue this frugall and prouident manner of prouision, as vnpossible to be imitated by this age, let vs returne to our historie, and see how the Heluetians were ledde, by a probable error, to their last ouerthrowe.

CHAP. VII.

The Heluetians follow after Cæsar, and ouertake
the Rereward. He imbattaileth his legions vpon the
side of a hill: and giueth order for
the Battaile.

Cæsar.



Hereof the Enemy beeing aduertised, by certaine fugitiues of the troope of horse, commaunded by L. Emilius, presently; whether it vwere that they thought the Romaines did turne away for feare (and the rather, for-that the day before, hauing the aduantage of the vpper ground, they refused to fight) or whether they thought to cut them off from prouision of Corne, they altered their purpose, and turning back againe, beganne to attack our men in the Reare. Which Cæsar perceiuing, hee drew his forces to the next hill, and sent the Cavalrie to sustaine the

the charge of the Enemy: and in the meane time, in the midst of the hill, made a triple battell, of foure legions of old souldiers; and vpon the highest ridge thereof, he placed the two legions which he had lately inrolled in the hither Gallia, together with the associate forces; filling the whole front of the hill with men, and stowing the cariages in one place: which he commaunded to be fenced & guarded by those that were in the vppermost battalions.

The Heluetians, on the other side, conuaied their cariages and impediments into one place; and hauing beaten back Cæsars horsemen, with a thick-thronged Squadron, they put themselues into a Phalanx, & so pressed vnder the first battell of the Romaine legions.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



Concerning the true sense of this triple battell, which Cæsar made vpon the side of the hill, I vnderstand it according to the ancient custome of the Romaines; who in the infancie of their Militarie discipline, diuided their Armie into three sorts of souldiers, *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarij*: for, I omit the *Velites*, as no part of their standing battels; and of these they made three seuerall battels, from front to back. In the first battell were the *Hastati*, and they possessed the whole front of the Armie, and were called *Acies prima*. Behind these, in a convenient distance, stood the *Principes*, in like sort and order disposed, and were called *Acies secunda*: and lastly, in a like correspondent distance, were the *Triarij* imbattelled, and made *Aciem tertiam*.

Their legion consisted of tenne Companies, which they called cohorts, and euerie cohort consisted of three small Companies, which they named *Manipuli*: a maniple of the *Hastati*, a maniple of the *Principes*, and another of the *Triarij*, as I will more particularly set downe in the second booke. And as these three kinds of souldiers were separated by distance of place from front to backe: so was euerie battell diuided into his maniples; and these were diuided by little allies and waies, one from another, which were vsed to this purpose: The *Hastati*, beeing in front, did euer begin the battell: & if they found themselves too weake to repell the enemy, or were happely forced to a retireit, they drew themselves through these allies or distances, which were in the second battell, betweene the maniples of the *Principes*, into the space which was betweene the *Principes* and the *Triarij*; and there they rested themselves, whil'st the Princes tooke their place, and charged the Enemy. Or otherwise, if the Commaunders found it needfull, they sild vp those distances of the *Principes*: and so, vnited with them into one body, they charged the enemy all in grosse; and then, if they preuailed not, they retired into the spaces between the *Triarij*, and so they gaue the last assault, all the three bodies being ioyned all into one.

Now, if we examine by the current of the history, whether Cæsar obserued the same order and diuisions in his warres, we shal find little or no alteration at all: for, first, this *triplex Acies* heere mentioned, was no other thing but the diuisi-

The manner
of their im-
battelling.

By *triplex*
Acies.

diuision of the *Hastati*, *Principes* and *Triarij*, according to the manner of the first institution. And least any man should dreame of that ordinary diuision, which is likewise threefold, the two cornets and the battell, and in that sense he might say to haue made *triplicem Aciem*, let him vnderstand, that the circumstances of the diuision haue no coherence with that diuision: for, in that hee saith of the Heluetians, *successerunt Aciem primam*, pressed neere the first battell or Vanguard, hee maketh it cleare that the Armie was diuided into a triple battell from front to backe: for, otherwise, hee would haue said, *successerint dextrum aut sinistrum cornu, aut mediam Aciem*: for so were the partes of that diuision tearmed. Againe, in the retrait which the Heluetians made to the hill, when he saith that the first and second battell followed close vpon the enemy, and the third opposed it selfe against the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, & stood readie at the foote of the hill, to charge the legions in the flanke and on the back; It is manifest, that no other diuision can so fitly be applied to this circumstance, as that from front to back.

But that place in the first of the Ciuill warres taketh away all scruple of con-
trouersie, where he vseth the verie same tearmes of *prima*, *secunda*, and *tertia Acies*: for, beeing to incampe himselfe neere vnto Afranius, and feareing least his souldiers should be interrupted in their work, he caused the first and second battell to stand in Armes, & keepe their distance, to the end they might shroud & couer the third battell (which was imploied in making a ditch behind them) from the view of the enemy; and this kind of imbattelling, Cæsar obserued in most of his fights: by which it appeareth, that he vseth the very same order and discipline for imbattailing, as was instituted by the old Romaines.

Concerning the auncient names of *Hastati*, *Principes*, and *Triarij*, which Ramus in his Militia Iulij Cæsaris, vrgeth to be omitted throughout the whole historie, I grant they are sildome vsed in these Commentaries, in the sense of their first institution: for, the *Hastati*, when the discipline was first erected, were the youngest and poorest of the legionarie souldiers. The *Principes*, were the lustie and able bodied men: and the *Triarij* the eldest, and best experienced. But in Cæsar's Campe, there was little or no difference either of valour or yeeres, betweene the *Hastati*, *Principes* or *Triarij*; which hee nameth, *Prima*, *Secunda*, and *Tertia Acies*: and therefore, were neuer tearmed by those names, in respect of that difference.

Notwithstanding, in regard of order and degrees of discipline, that vertue might be rewarded with honour, and that time might challenge the priuiledge of a more worthy place, the said distinctions and tearmes were religiously obserued: for, in the battell with Petreius at Herda in Spaine, hee mentioneth the death of Q. Fulginius, *ex primo Hastato legionis quarta decima*: and in the ouerthrowe at Dyrrachium, he saith, that The Eagle-bearer being grieuouly wounded, commended the safetic of his Ensigne to the horsemen, all the Centurions of the first Cohort beeing slaine, *prater principem Priorem*. And for the *Triarij*, there is no tearme more frequent in Cæsar, then *Primipilus*; which name, by the rules of the ancient discipline, but to the chiefest Centurion of the first maniple of the *Triarij*: whereby it appeareth, that the man-
ples

Lib. 1. de bello
Ciuili.

Lib. 3. de bello
Ciuili.

ples kept the same names in regard of a necessary distinction, although peradventure the *Hastati* were as good souldiers, as either the *Principes* or the *Triarij*.

As touching the spaces betweene the maniples, whereinto the first battaile did retire it selfe if occasion vrged them, I neuer found any mention of them in Cæsar. Excepting once heere in England, where, in a skirmish the Brittaines so vrged the court of guard, which kept watch before the Romaine Camp, that Cæsar sent out two other Cohorts to succour them; who making distance betweene them as they stood, the court of guard retired it selfe in safetie, through that space into the Campe: otherwise, we neuer find that the first battell made any retreat into the allies, between the maniples of the second battell; but when it failed in any part, the second and third went presently to second them: as appeareth in the battell following with Ariouistus and in diuers others.

Concerning the vse of this triple battell, what can be said more then Lipsius hath done? where he laieth open the particular commodities thereof, as farre forth as a speculative iudgement can discern of things so far remote from the vse of this age, which neuer imitateth this triple battell, but onely in a march: for, then commonly they make three companies; a vangard, a battell, and a reeward: but in imbattelling, they draw these three Companies all in front, making two cornets and the battell, without any other troops to second them. But let this suffice concerning Cæsar his manner of imbattelling, and his *triplex Acies*, vntill I come to the second booke; where I will handle more particularly the parts of a legion, and the commoditie of their small battalions.

Lib. 5. de militia Romana

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He Macedonian Phalanx, is described by Polybius, to bee a square battell of Pikemen, consisting of sixteene in flanke, and five hundred in front; the souldiers standing so close together, that the pikes of the first ranke, were extended three foote beyond the front of the battell: the rest, whose pikes were not seruiceable, by reason of their distance from the front, couched them vpon the shoulders of those that stood before them; and so locking them in together in file, pressed forward, to hold vp the sway or giuing backe of the former ranks, and so to make the assault more violent and vnrresistible.

A Phalanx described.

The Grecians were very skilfull in this part of the Art Militarie, which containeth order and disposition in imbattelling: for they maintained publique professors, whom they called *Tactici*, to teach & instruct their youth the practise and Art of all formes conuenient for that purpose. And these *Tactici*, found by experience, that sixteene in flanke, so ordered as they were in a Phalanx, were able to beare any shock, how violent so-euer it charged vpon them: which number of sixteene, they made to consist of foure doubles: as first vnitie maketh no order, for order consisteth in number & pluralitie; but vnitie doubled, maketh two, the least of all orders, and this is the double: which doubled
again,

again, maketh the second order, of foure souldiers in a file, which doubled the third time, maketh eight, and this doubled, maketh 16, which is the fourth doubling from a vnite; and in it they staid, as in an absolute number and square, whose roote is foure the Quadruple, in regard of both the extreames: for euery one of these places, the *Tactici* had severall names, by which they were distinctly knowne. But the particular description requireth a larger discourse, then can be comprehended in these short obseruations. Hee that desireth further knowledge of them, may read Elianus, that liued in the time of Adrian the Emperour: and Arianus in his historie of Alexander the great: with Mauritius, and Leo, Imperator; where he shall haue the diuisions of *Tetraphalangia diphalangia, Phalangia* vnto a vnite, with all the discipline of the Grecians. The chiefeft thing to be obserued, is, that the Grecians, hauing such skil in imbattelling, preferd a Phalanx before all oither formes whatsoeuer; either because the figure in it selfe was very strong: or otherwise, in regard that it fitted best their weapons, which were long pikes and targets. But, whether Cæsar teamed the battell of the Heluetians a Phalanx, in regard of their thicke manner of imbattailing onely, or otherwise, forasmuch as besides the forme, they vsed the naturall weapon of a Phalanx, which was the pike, it remaineth doubtful. Brancario, in his discourses vpon this place, maketh it no cōtrouersie, but that euery souldier caried a pike and a target. The target is particularly named in this historie: but it cannot so easily be gathered by the same, that their offensive weapons were pikes. In the fight at the baggage it is said, that manie of the legionarie souldiers were wounded through the cart-wheeles, with *tragulas* and *materas*, which are commonly interpreted Speares and Iauelins: and I take them to be weapons longer then common darts; but whether they were so long as the Sarissas of the Macedonians, I cannot tell. Howsoeuer; this is certaine, that the Heluetians haue euer been reputed for the true *Phalangitæ*, next vnto the Macedonians; and that in their thicke and close imbattailing, they failed not at this time of the forme of a Phalanx: for, they rooed it so thick with targets, that Cæsar saith they were sore troubled, because manie of their targets were fastened and tied together, with piles darterd through thē. Which argueth, that their Phalanx was very thicke thronged, whatsoeuer their vveapon was.

CHAP. VIII.

Cæsar sendeth away al the horses of ease; exhorteth his men; and beginneth the battell.



Cæsar, to take away all hope of safety by flight, first caused his own & then all the private horses of ease to be caried out of sight; and so vsing some motiues of courage, began the battell. The souldiers casting their Piles, with the aduantage of the hill, did easily breake the Heluetians Phalanx, & then with their swords betook themselves to a furious close.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He ancient Sages found it necessary, to a faithfull and serious execution of such an action, to prepare the minds of their men with words of encouragement, and to take away all scruple out of their conceits, either of the vnlawfulnesse of the cause, or disadvantage against the Enemy: for, if at any time that saying be true, that *Oratio plus potest quam pecunia*, it is here more powerfull and of greater effect. For, a donatiue or liberanca, can but procure a mercenarie in deauour, euer yielding to a better offer, and doe oftentimes breed a suspicion of wrong, euen amongst those that are willingly enriched with them; and so maketh them slack to discharge their seruice with loyaltie: yea, oftentimes of friends to become enemies. But inasmuch as speech discloseth the secrets of the soule, and discouereth the intent and drift of euery action, a few good words laying open the iniurie which is offered to innocencie, how equity is controlled with wrong, and iustice controlled by iniquitie (for, it is necessary that a Cōmander approue his Cause, and settle an opinion of right in the mind of his souldiers, as it is easie to make that seeme probable which so many offer to defend with their bloud; when indeed euery man relieth vpon anothers knowledge, and respecteth nothing lesse the right) a few good words I say, will so stirre vp their minds in the seruentnesse of the cause, that euery man will take himselfe particularly ingaged in the action by the title of Equitie; and the rather, for that it iumpeth with the necessity of their condition. For, men are willing to doe well, when well-dooing agreeth with that they would doe otherwise, the Act may formerly be effected, but the mind neuer approueth it by assent.

And this manner of exhortation or speech of encouragement, was neuer omitted by Cæsar in any conflict mentioned in this historie: but hee still vsed it as a necessary instrument to set vertue on foote, and the onely meanes to stir vp alacritie. Or if it happened that his men were at any time discouraged by disaster or crosse accident, as they were at Getgobia, & at the two ouerthrowes he had at Dyrrachium; he neuer would aduenture to giue battell, vntill he had encouraged them againe, and confirmed their minds in valour and resolution. But this age hath put on so scornfull a humor, that it cannot heare a speech in this key, found it neuer so grauely, without scoffing and derision: and on the other side discontinuance of so necessarie a part, hath bred at length such an *inutilem pudorem* in our chiefe Commanders, that they had rather lose the gaine of a great aduantage, then buy it with words to be deliuered in publike.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



In this Chapter we may further obserue the violence of the Romane pile, which being a heauie deadly weapon, could hardly be frustrated with any resistance, and in that respect was very proper and effectuall against a Phalanx, or any other thicke and close battell, or where-

Speeches of
incourage-
ment before
they gaue
battell.

Lib. 7. de bel-
lo Gallico.

The Romane
Pile descri-
bed.

wherefoeuer else, the stroke was certaine, or could hardly deceiue the aime of the caster: for, in such incounters, it so galled the enemy, that they were neither able to keep their order, nor answere the assault with a resisting counterbuffe. By which it appeareth, that the onely remedie against the Pile was, to make the ranks thinne; allowing to euery souldiour a large podisme or place to stand in, that so the stroke might of it selfe fall without hurt, or by fore-sight bee preuented; as it shall plainly appeare by the sequell of this historie, which I will not omit to note, as the places shal offer themselues to the examination of this discourse.

But as touching the Pile, which is so often mentioned in the Romaine historie, Polybius describeth it in this maner; A Pile, saith he, is a casting weapon, the staffe whereof is almost three cubites long, and it hath *palmarem diametrum*, a hand breadth in thickness. The staues were armed with a head of iron, equall in length to the staffe it selfe: But in that sort, that halfe the head was fastened vp to the middle of the staffe, with plates of iron, like the head of a Halbert: and the other halfe stucke out at the end of the staffe, like a pike, containing a fingers breadth in thickestesse, and so decreasing lesse and lesse, vnto the point, which was barbed. This head was so slender toward the point, that the waight of the staffe would bend it as it stucke, as appeareth in this battell of the Heluetians. This weapon was peculiar to the Romans, and was called *Pilum*, as Varro noteth of *Pilum* a Pestell, *quod Hostes feriret vt pilum*. Lipsius, finding that *Palmarem diametrum*, was too great a thicknesse to be managed by any mans hand, interpreteth it to be foure inches in circuit, if the staffe were either round or square, for they had of both sorts, and so hee maketh it very manageable; but nothing answerable to the description; giuen by Polybius, either in forme or waight.

Lib. 3. de militia Romana

Lib. 5.

Patricius, in his Paralleli; maketh the staffe to haue *palmarem diametrum* in the butte end, but the rest of the staffe he maketh to decrease taper-wise, vnto the head of iron, where it hath the thicknesse of a mans finger; and so it answereth both in forme and waight to a Pestell, as may be seene by the figure, and I take it to bee the meaning of Polybius. Patricius in that place setteth downe foure discommodities of the Pile. First, a furious and hot spirited enemy will easily preuent the darting of the Pile, with a nimble and speedy close: And so wee read, that in the battell which Cæsar had with Ariouistus, the Germanes came so violently vpon them, that the souldiers cast away their piles, and tooke them to their swords. And likewise, in that woorthy battell betweene Caeline and Marcus Perreius, they cast away their piles on either part. The second discommoditie was, that the piles being so heauie, could not be cast anie distance; but were onely seruiceable at hand. Thirdly, they could not bee cast with any aime, or as they say, point blanke. And lastly, the souldiers were to take aduantage of ground backward when they threw them: which might easily disorder their troopes, if they were not very well experienced.

Salust.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.

THe last thing which I obserue in this specialitie, is, that the legionarie souldiers had no other offensive weapon, but one pile or two at the most, and their swords. By which it may be gathered, that all their victories came by buckling at handy-blowes; for, they came alwaies so neere before they cast their pile, that they left themselves no more time then might conueniently serue them to draw their swords: neither would their Armes of defence, which was compleat, besides a large target which they carried on their left arme, suffer them to make any long pursuit, or continued chase, whensoever a light armed enemy did make any speedie retreat; as will more plainly appeare by that which followeth.

CHAP. IX.

The Heluetians, fainting in the battell, retire to a Hill: the Romans follow after, and the battell is continued.

(. . .)

It was a great hinderance to the Galles in their fight, that manie of their Targets were strooke through, and tied together with one fall of a pile: for, so it happened, that it could neither be pulled out by reason of the bowing of the Iron, nor could they use their left hand for the defence of themselves. Whereby it fell out, that many of them (after a wearisome toile) did cast away their targets, and fought naked, and unarmed. At length, fainting with wounds, they began to giue place, and retreated to a Hill a mile off.

Caesar.

The Hill beeing taken, and the Legions following on to driue them fro thence, the Boy and Tulingi, to the number of fificene thousand, beeing in the Reare of the Enemy, to guard the lagge of their Army, setting on our men, as they were in pursuit of the rest, did charge them upon the open side, and beganne to inclose them about: which, the Heluetians, that had got the Hill, perceiuing, beganne againe to fall upon our men, & renewed the battell. The Romaines diuiding themselves, turned their Ensignes two waies; the first and second Armie fought against the Heluetians that returned from the Hill, and the third battell tooke charge of them that stood ready to inclose them about. And heere the fight was doubtfull and furious for a long time; vntill at length they were no longer able to indure the violence of the legionarie souldiers: and so one part betooke themselves as at the first, to the Hill; and the other, to the place where their Carts and baggage were lodged.

D.

And

And hitherto there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe in all this conflict; although the fight continued from the seauenth houre vntill the euening:

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

The Ensignes
of the Ro-
mames.



Concerning the Ensignes of the Romaines; wee are to vnderstand that the chiefest Ensigne of euery Legion, was an Eagle: which alwaies attended vpon the Primipile or chiefe Centurion of the said Legion. The Ensigne of a Maniple was, either a Hand or a Dragon, a Woolte or a Sphinx; as it appeareth (besides the testimonie of historie) by the Columne of Traiane in Rome, wherein the Ensignes are figured, with such purtrairures: so that these Ensignes, resembling the proportions of liuing creatures, had their fore-parts alwaies caried that way which the legions were to march, or where they were to fight. And therefore in this history, by the aspect and carying of the Ensignes, the front of the Armie was commonly noted: as in this place it is said, that the Ensignes of the first and second battell, were caried towards the hill, whither the Heluetians had made their retrait; & the Ensignes of the third battell looked another way, towards the *Boij* and *Tulingi*, which stood on the foote of the hill. By which is signified, how the legions were diuided to resist the brunt of the double encounter.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

The diuision
of their day.



Concerning the time of the day; wee are to vnderstand, that the Romaines vsed not the same diuision of the day as we commonlie doe: for, they diuided their artificiall (which is the space betwene sunne rising and setting) into twelue equall parts, which the Astronomers called vnequall or planetarie houres. The first houre of the day beganne alwaies at sunne rising; the sixt houre was alwaies high noone; and the twelfth houre was sunne setting. And, as the day waxed longer or shorter, so these houres were either greater or lesse: neither did they agree with equall or equinoctiall houres, such as are now vsed, but onely at the *Aequinoctium*: so that by this manner of reckoning, *ab hora septima ad vesperum*, is meant, the battell beganne about one of the clocke, according to our Computation, & continued vntill the euening. The like we must vnderstand, throughout this whole historie, as often as there is mention made of the circumstance of time.

CHAP. X.

The Heluetians continue their fight at the carriages: but at length they left the field, and marched towards Langiers.

(. . .)



*I*N like manner, the fight was kept on foote at the carriages, vntill it was farre in the night; the place beeing fortified with Cartes instead of a Rampier: and the Enemy casting their vveapons from the vpper ground, and vwith darts and laucelins, vnder the vvaggons, and from between the wheeles, did vvound and gall many of our men. After a long conflict, our souldiers tooke their carriages and their Campe: vvherein Orgetorix daughter, and one of his sonnes vvere taken. There vvere saued out of that battell, about one hundred and thirtie thousand persons; vvho marching continually all that night, and making no stay in any place, came the fourth day into the confines of the Lingones: for, by reason of the souldiers hurts, and the buriall of the slaine, wherein there was spent three daies, there vvvas no pursuit made after them.

Caesar.

Langres.

OBSERVATION.

*I*F we consider the nature of the action, and looke into the true cause of their ouerthrow, as faire as the right sense of the historie shall direct our iudgement, wee shall find valour not to be wanting in the Heluetians, but rather superlatiuelly abounding in the Romans. For, that vehement opinion of their valiancie and manhood, which caried them out of the streights of the Country, to seek larger fortunes in other kingdoms, was not so abated with the losse of the fourth part of their Host at the riuer Arar; nor with the terrible furie of those veteran legions: but it yielded this effect, which Cæsar in his estimate of valour thought memorable, that for five houres space or more, there was not one man seene to haue turned his backe. Their maner of imbattailing, had not the Romaines been the enemy, was vnresistable. For, beeing cast into a Phalanx, which in the Plaines of Asia had made Alexander the great and the Macedonians famous, they did as farre surpass any other forme of imbattelling (supposing that the conueniencie of the place did fit that disposition) wherein the strength of the whole is diuided into many particulars, as the violence of a great body exceedeth the force & motion of his parts, when it is diuided into smaller cantons. For, as in a phalanx, many particular souldiers are by a close & cōpact order incorporated into one entire body: so their severall vertues are gathered into one head, & are as parts vnited into one general force; which easily swaloweth vp the ability of many other lesser quan-

quantities, into which a greater strength is equally diuided.

The aduantage of the place which they got by retrait, & the double charge wherewith they ingaged the Romaines, both in front and flank, was able in an indifferent conflict, to haue made Fortune fugitiue, and beare armes on their side: or at the least, so to haue steemed the swelling tide of victorie, which carried the Romaines so violently in the chase, that they might haue beene equall sharers in the honor of the day; had it not followed from an Ocean of valour, whose course could not be hindered with any stops and oppositions, vntill it came to that height, which true valour and vnexampled resolution affected. And yet the height of this courage, could not so allay the heat of the Heluetians furie; but it brake forth into dangerous flames, when it came to the place where their cariages were laid, and cost much bloud and many mens liues before they quitted the place: for, they fought with that spirit and industrie, as though they meant to make triall, whether their fortune would proue no better in the night then it had done in the day.

The ouerthrowe of the Tigurine Canton at the riuer Arar, proceeded rather from want of good directions (which is the lesse to be maruelled at, considering they had no chiefe Commaunder as wee read of) then from any defect of valour: for, the rules of Militarie gouernment, require especiall care in passing ouer a water; for, then especially, an Armie is in greatest danger, when it is disordered and diuided. And therefore the Romaines atchiued this victorie by the horrible vigilancy (as Tully calleth it) of their Cōmāder: who alwaies watched *opportunitates rei bene gerenda*, as necessary and speedy meanes to ouercome in all his warres.

*Periculū semper
ab hostibus gra-
uissimū sustinet
diuisus & inor-
dinatus exerci-
tus.*

CHAP. XI.

Cæsar, after three daies respite, followeth after the
Heluetians: he taketh them to mercy, and
sendeth them backe againe to the
Country.

Cæsar.



Cæsar sent Letters and Messengers to the Lingones, forbidding to supply them, either with Corne, or any other thing; which if they did, hee would esteeme of them as of the Heluetians. Himselfe, after three daies respite, followed after with all his forces. The Heluetians, pressed with the want of all necessarie prouisions, sent Commissioners vnto him, to treat of their reddition. Who, meeting him on the vway, cast themselues at his feete; and with humble vvords and teares, desired Peace. Beeing commaunded to attend in the place they then were, they accordingly obaied. Cæsar, being come vp vnto them, required hostages, together with their Armes and seruants; as also the fugitiues that vvere fledde vnto them.

While

While those things were sought out, and brought, in the night time, six thousand men or thereabouts, of the Canton, called Verbigene, whether moued through feare of being executed, after their Armes were given up, or induced with hope of escaping (as thinking that amongst such a multitude of people, that were there to be rendred, their flight should not be missed, or at least would be concealed) did in the beginning of the night, leaue the Heluetian Camp, & made towards the Rhene, and the confines of the Germaines.

Cæsar, vnderstanding through whose territories they passed, commaunded them to seeke them out, and bring them back againe, if they would be blamelesse in that behalfe: And being brought back, dealt with them as enemies. All the rest, after Hostages, Armes and fugitiues were ginen in, hee receiued to mercie; and commaunded the Heluetians, Tulinges, and Latobriges, to returne into their Country from whence they came. And forasmuch, as hauing lost all their prouision of Corne, there remained nothing at home to satisfie hunger, hee gaue order to the Allobroges to supply them with Corne; and willed the Heluetians to reedifie their Townes and Citties, that they had before destroied & forsaken. Which he did specially for this cause; that the Germaines inhabiting beyond the Rhene, might not be inuited vwith the richnesse of that soile, to seate themselues so neer neighbours to the Prouince of Gallia, and the Allobroges. The Boij, at the mediation of the Heduanes, as knowing them to be men of great valour, were permitted to dwell in their Country; to whom they gaue lands and possessions, and receiued them into the same liberties and immunities, as they themselues inioyed.

In the Heluetian Campe was found a List, or Register, vvrit in Greeke, and brought to Cæsar, containing by pole, the vvhole number that left their Country, how many of them were able to beare Armes: & in like maner, the boies, old men and women, were inrolled apart by themselues. The summary wherof was, that the vvhole number of the Heluetians, amounted to 263 thousand, the Tulinges, to 36 thousand, the Latobriges to 14, the Rauracks to 23, the Boij to 32. Of these there were that bare Armes, 192 thousand. The totall of all, vvere 368 thousand. A view being taken by Cæsars appointment, of those that returned home, there were found 110 thousand.

OBSERVATION.



He directions concerning their rendry & returne, were very found, and of good consequence. For first, in that he comanded them to attend his comming, in the place where they were, hee tooke away all motions of new trouble, which often remoues might haue caused, by the opportunity of some accident which might haue happened: assuring himselfe, that their aboad in that place would increase their miseries, and consequently ripen that desire of peace which they made shew of; cōsidering that the Lingones, in whose territories they were, durst not for feare of Cæsars displeasure, furnish them with any necessaries in that extremitie. Touching the securitie, which the Romaines required, of the loyaltie of such people as they conquered; their maner was to take as hostages, a sufficient number of the men

children of the chiefeft men of that Nation: whose liues depended vpon their Parents fidelitie, and ended with the first fufpicion of their rebellion. Which custome, besides the present good, promised the like or better securitie to the next age; when as those children by conuersation and acquaintance should be so affected to the Romaine Empire, that returning to their own country, their actions might rather tend to the aduancement thereof, then any way be prejudiciall to the same. And, least the loue of libertie and freedome, should preuaile more with them, then that affection which Nature had inioyned them to beare to their children; he did what hee could to take away the meanes and instruments of their rebellion, by causing them to deliuer vp such Armes & weapons as were there present: and so to become sutable to that petition of peace which they had made.

The summe of all is this; he corrected the insolencie of a furious people, and reduced them to a feeling of their owne madnesse. He kept them from sacking the possessions of many thousands, in the continent of Gallia; and sent them backe againe to continue their name and Nation, in the place where they first inhabited; which continueth vnto this day. And thus we see, that there is no humour so head-strong, nor so backt with strength of circumstances, but it may meete with a remedie to qualifie the insolencie thereof, and make it subject to correction and controlement.

CHAP. XII.

The States of Gallia congratulate Cæsars victorie:
*they call a councell, and discouer their inward
 grieffe, concerning Ariouistus and
 his forces.*

Cæsar.

HHe Heluetian warre beeing thus ended, the Princes and chiefe men of all the States of Gallia, came to Cæsar, to congratulate the happinesse of this victorie; insomuch as they vuell understood, that albeit the people of Rome, had by the course of this warre reuenged the iniuries vvhch heere-to-fore they had done vnto them: yet neuerthelessse, the issue thereof did redound no lesse profitable to the peace of Gallia, then to the Romaine Empire; forasmuch as the Heluetians, left their houses and Country, abounding with all plenty and prosperitie, for no other purpose, but to inuade the vvhole Country of Gallia, & to bring it in subiection to themselues; and, chusing out of that large Continent, some fitte, and fruitfull place of habitation, to make the rest of the States their Tributaries: And required further, that with his good leaue they might call a generall assembly at a day prefixed, of all the States of Gallia, forasmuch as they had matters of great importance to be handled, which they desired (with a common consent)

to preferre to his consideration. Which beeing graunted, and the day of meeting appointed, they bound themselves by oath, not to reueale the causes of their assembly, but to such as should be designed by common Councill.

The Parlement beeing broken up, the same Princes returned to Caesar, and desired that they might in secret treat with him, of the safety of themselves, & all the rest: which beeing granted, cast themselves in lamentable manner at his feete, contending with as great earnestness, that those things which they deliuered, might not be reuealed, as they did to haue their petition graunted: forasmuch as they saw, that the discoverie of such declarations as they propounded, would necessarily pull upon them most grieuous afflictions.

Dinitiacus the Heduan, in the name of the rest, deliuered; that Gallia was diuided into two factions: the Hedui were the head of the one, and the Auerni of the other. These two States, contending many yeeres for the principallitie, the Auerni, with the Sequans their Clients, hired the Germanes to take their part; of whom, at first, there passed ouer the Rhene some fiftene thousand: but afterwards, these barbarous people, hauing tasted the plentie & ciuilitie of the Galles, drew ouer many more, that now there were no lesse then one hundred & twentie thousand. With these, the Hedui & their Clients, had once or oftener fought; but the successe sorted to their owne calamitie, & the utter overthrowe of their Nobilitie and Senate: with which losses, they were so broken and decaied, that where-as heeretofore, as well by their owne credit, as by the fauour of the people of Rome, they strooke a great stroake throughout all Gallia, they were now driuen to deliuer the chiefest of their State, as pledges to the Sequans, and to binde themselves by oath, neuer to seeke their release or freedome, nor to implore the aide of the people of Rome, nor to seeke meanes to free themselves from their soueraintie; one's himselfe, of all the Heduans, could not be brought to take that oath, or to giue his children as hostages: for which cause he fled to Rome, and besought helpe of the Senate, beeing no way obliged to the contrary, either by oath or hostages.

But it so fell out, that the victorie became more grieuous to the Sequans then to the Heduans; for that Ariouistus, king of the Germanes, was planted in their territories: and beeing already possess'd of a third part of their Country, which was the best part of all Gallia, did now require the Sequans to forgoe another third part, for that a few months before, there were come vnto him twentie-foure thousand Harudes, to whom lands and possessions were to bee allotted. Whereby it would come to passe within a few yeeres, that all the Galles would be driuen out of their dwellings, and all the Germanes would come ouer the Rhene; for, there was no comparison betweene Gallia and Germanie, either in richnesse of soile or fashion of life.

Concerning Ariouistus, after he had once defeated the Galles in a battell, neer Amagetobrig, he caried himselfe very cruelly, and insolently, requiring the children of all the Nobility for hostages, & shewing strange examples of torture vpon them. If any thing were done, not according to his commaund or desire, hee would easilie shew himselfe to be a barbarous, fierce and hasty man; whose tyrannie they could no longer indure: and vnlesse there were help to be found in Caesar
and

and the people of Rome, all the Gallies must as the Heluetians did, forsake their Countrey, and seeke new houses, and seates of habitation, farre remote from the Germanes, and try their fortunes, what-euer befell them. If these things should happely be discovered to Ariouistus, he would doubtlesse take a seuerer reuenge of all the pledges in his custodie. Cæsar might by his owne authority, or the presence of his Armie, or by the renoune of his late victory, or by the countenance of the people of Rome, keepe the Germanes from transporting any more Colonies into Gallia, and defend it from the iniuries of Ariouistus. This speech being deliuered by Dinitiacus, all that were present, with much weeping besought Cæsar to giue them reliefe.

Cæsar obserued, that onely the Sequans of all the rest, did no such matter, or were so affected as the others were; but with their heads hanging downe, looked mournfully vpon the ground: and wondering at it, asked them the cause thereof. To which they made no reply, but stood silent, with the same countenance of sorow. And hauing oftentimes iterated his demaund, without gaining any word of answer; Dinitiacus the Heduan, replied, that the state of the Sequans, was heerein more miserable and grieuous then the rest; that they of all others, durst not complaine, or implore aide, although it were in secret: as hauing before their eyes the crueltie of Ariouistus being absent, no lesse then if he were present. And the rather, for that other men had safe meanes of flying away: but the Sequans, hauing receiued Ariouistus into their Countrey, and made him Maister of their townes, were necessarily to vndergoe all miseries.

These things being knowne, Cæsar encouraged the Gallies with good words, and promised them to haue a care of that matter, as hauing great hope, that by his meanes and power, Ariouistus should bee forced to offer no further iniuries. And thereupon dismissed the Councill.

OBSERVATIONS.

IN this relation, there are diuers points woorthily recommended to the discretion of such, as are willing to bee directed by other mens misaduentures. As first, into what extremities ambition doth driue her thirsty fauourites, by suppressing the better faculties of the soule, and setting such vnbridled motions on foote, as cary men headlong into most desperate attempts. For, as it had deserued commendation in either faction, so to haue caried their emulation, that by their owne meanes & strength applied to the rule of good gouernment, their authoritie might wholly haue swaied the inclination of the weaker states: so was it most odious in the Sequani, to call in forraigne forces, to satisfie the appetite of their vntempered humor; and in the end, were accordingly rewarded.

Secondly, it appeareth how dangerous a thing it is, to make a stranger a stickler in a quarrell which ciuill dissension hath broched, when the partie that called him in, shall not be as able to refuse his assistance vpon occasion, as he was willing to entertaine it for aduantage. Lastly, the often discontentments of these

these States shew the force of a present euill, which possesseth so vehementlie the powers of the soule, that any other calamitie, either already past, or yet to come, how great soeuer, seemeth tolerable and easie, in regard of that smart which the present grieue inflicteth.

So the Sequani, chose rather to captiuat their libertie to the Barbarisme of a sauage Nation, then to indure the Hedui to take the hand of them. And againe, to make themselues vassalls to the Romans, rather then indure the vsurping crueltie of the Germanes. And finally (as the sequell of the historie will discouer) to hazard the losse of life and Country, then to suffer the taxes & impositions of the Romans: So predominant is the present euill in mens affecti- ons, and so it preuaileth at the seate of our iudgement.

CHAP. XIII.

The reasons that mooued Cæsar to
vndertake this warre.

Any were the inducements which mooued him to take that businesse to hart; As first, that the Heduans, who were oftentimes stiled by the Senate with the title of Bretheren, Cosins and Allies, were in the seruitude and thraldome of the Germanes, and that their hostages were with Ariouistas and the Sequans: which in so great a soueraigntie of the people of Rome, he tooke to be very dishonourable, both to himselfe and the Common-weale; as also, for that hee saw it very dangerous for the Romaine Empire, that the Germanes should accustome, by little and little, to flocke in such multitudes into Gallia. Neither did he thinke he could moderate or restraine such fierce & barbarous people; but, that hauing possessed all the Continent of Gallia, they would, as the Cimbri and Teutons had done before, breake out into the Prouince, and so into Italy: especially the Sequans; beeing diuided from the Prouince but with the riuer Rhone.

These things he thought fitte with all speede to preuent: and the rather, for that Ariouistus was growne to that pride and arrogancie, as was not to be suffered. For vvhich respect, he thought it expedient to send Embassadours vnto him, to appoint some indifferent place for parlee; for that he had to treat vwith him, concerning publique affaires, and some matters that did much import both of them.

Cæsar.

OBSERVATIONS.



May heere take an occasion, to speake somewhat concerning the authoritie of the Roman Generals, which we see to be very large; considering that Cæsar of himselfe, without any further leaue of the Senate & people of Rome (for what may be gathered by this historie)

The authoritie of the Roman Generals.

did

did vndertake a warre of that consequence, and put in ieopardie the Legions, the Prouince, or what other interest the Romans had in Gallia.

Wherein we are to vnderstand, that when the state of Rome did allotte the government of any Prouince to a Proconsull, they did likewise recommend vnto him, the carefull managing of such accidents, as might any way concerne the good of that regiment. For, considering that such causes as may trouble a well ordered government, are as well externall and forraine, as internall, and bred within the bounds of that Empire: it had been to small purpose, to haue giuen him onely authoritie, to maintaine a course of wholesome government at home; and no meanes to take away such oppositions, which forraine accident might set vp against him. And so we see, that Cæsar vnderooke the Heluetian warre, in regard of the safetie of the Prouince: and this againe with Ariouistus, least the Germans should so multiply in Gallia, that the Prouince it selfe might at length bee endangered. Neither had their Generals authoritie onely to vndertake these warres: but the absolute disposition also of the whole course thereof, whether it were to treat, capitulate, compound, or what els they thought conuenient for the aduancement of the Common-weale, did wholly rest vpon their direction; *repub. bene gesta*, being the stile of the warrant for all their actions.

Neither may we thinke, that any subordinate or depending authoritie, can be so powerfull in the course of businesses, as that which absolutely commaundeth without controlement, and proceedeth according to the opportunitie of time and occasion, further then either prescription or limitation can direct it. And therefore, whensoever the Romaine affaires were distressed, and driuen to an exigent, they created a Dictator, that had *regiam potestatem*, such an absolute commaund, that whatsoever power rested either in the Consuls, or in the Tribunes, in the Senate, or in the people, it gaue way to the greatnesse of that Magistrate; that there might bee no let or retracting power to weaken that course, which nothing but an absolute commaund could establish, for the good of the Common-weale. And yet notwithstanding this absolute government, they attributed such power to the course of humane actions, that by the punishment which they inflicted vpon dissolute and vnfortunate Leaders, they seemed to acknowledge, that no man, how circumspect soeuer, could promise more then likelihoods or probabilities of good fortune, as farre foorth as his meanes and industry could atchieue it. For, old M. Fabius, pleading for the life of his gallant sonne, and opposing the rigour of Papyrius the Dictator, with examples of antiquitie, saith: *Populi quidem, penes quem potestas omnium rerum esset, ne iram quidem vnquam atrociorẽ fuisse in eos qui temeritate atque inscitia exercitus amisissent, quã vt pecunia eos multaret: capite antiquis ob rem malè gestam de imperatore nullum ad eam diem esse.* The people, saith he, in whom the soueraigne power of things consisteth, neuer shewed greater displeasure against such, as had lost an Armie, either by rashnesse or vnskilfulnesse, then imposing a fine vpon them: but, to bring the life of a Generall in question for failing in his indeauours, was neuer heard of to that day.

The condition of the inferiour Officers of their Campe, was farre otherwise

in regard of Militarie discipline : for, prescription guided them in all their seruices, and the chiefest part of their duetic was obedience ; although they saw euident reason to the contrarie, and found their directions vnperfect in that behalfe : and therefore Cæsar saith vpon that occasion : *Alia sunt legati partes atque imperatoris : alter omnia agere ad præscriptum, alter liberè ad summam rerum consulere debet.* The office of a Legate or Lieutenant, differeth from that of a Generall : the one doing all things by prescription ; & the other freely deliberating of whatsoeuer may concerne the cause. And this course the Romans held, concerning the authoritie of their Generals.

Lib. 3. de bello Ciuili.

CHAP. XIII.

Ariouistus his answere : a second Embassage,
with the successe thereof.

(. . .)



*T*hat Embassage, Ariouistus answered ; That if his occasions had required Casars assistance, he would haue furthered them with his owne presence : and hee thought it as reasonable, that if it were in his meanes to pleasure the Romans, Casar ought not to thinke much of the like labour. For his owne part, hee durst not come into those parts of Gallia vvhich Casar possessed, vwithout an Armie ; nor could draw an Armie to a head without great trouble & expence. The thing that he most wondered at, was, that the Romaines, or Casar, had to doe in that part of Gallia, vvhich the law of Armes had made his inheritance.

Casar.

Vpon the returne of this answere, Casar framed a second Embassage ; the purport vvhereof was : Forasmuch as he thus requited the honour vvhewith the people of Rome had beautified his best dignity (for, in Casars Consulship, the authoritie of their Empire had vouchsafed to esteeme of him, as a King in his dominions, & as a friend vnto their State) & that hee disdained to admit of a Parlee, concerning the cõmon good ; let him knowe, that these were the things that he required to be performed by him : First, that hee should not suffer any more troopes of Germanes to be transported ouer the Rhene into Gallia. Secondlie, that he should deliuer vp those Hostages which hee had of the Hedvans and Sequans ; & should cease to molest them further vwith war or other iniuries. These things if he did performe, Casar would assure him of a gratefull acceptance on the behalfe of the people of Rome : otherwise, forasmuch as in the Consulships of M. Messala, and L. Piso, the Senate had decreed, That he that should obtaine the gouernment of the Prouince, should as neere as it would stand vwith the good of the Common-veale, indeauour the defence of their Associates and Friends : therefore he would not neglect the iniuries done vnto the Hedvans.

To these Mandates, Ariouistus replied : The law of Armes kept this tenure a-

mongst

mongst all Nations; That a Conquerour might gouerne a subdued people, according as he thought best for his owne safetie. The people of Rome, did not direct the course of their government, by another mans prescript, but by their own arbitrement: and, as he had not directed the Romans, so ought not they to meddle with his proceedings.

The Heduans, hauing tried the fortune of vvarre, vvere by right become his Stipendaries; wherein Cæsar offered great wrong, for that his comming thither, had made their tribute much lesse vnto him then before. Touching their Hostages; his purpose was still to retaine them. Neither would hee make any vniust warre vpon any of their Associates, if they obserued the Articles of agreement, and paid their yeerely tribute: but if they failed in that, the fraternity of the Romaines would come too late to their succour. If Cæsar would needs undertake their quarrell; Hee was to let him knowe, that no man euer contended with Ariouistus, but to his owne destruction. Try when he would, he should find what valour consisted in the Germanes, that for foureteene yeeres space, were neuer couered with other roose then the Heauens.

OBSERVATION.



And thus farre proceeded Cæsar with Ariouistus, in debating the wrongs and grieuances of the Hedui. Wherein appeareth the difference betweene a matter handled according to morall ciuilitie, in tearmes of mildnesse and pleasing accent, and that which is rudely deliuered, & dependeth rather vpon the plainnesse of the project, then suted with words fitte for perswasion. For, that which Ariouistus alleadged, to make good his interest in Gallia, was as consonant to reason, as any thing to the contrary vrged by Cæsar.

But as the Lacedemonian said of one, That hee spake the truth otherwise then it should be spoken: so it may be said of Ariouistus aunswere, that it wanted that sweeting humanitie which giueth credit to veritie it selfe; forasmuch as it proceedeth from a well tempered spirit, wherein no turbulent passion seemeth to cōtroll the force of reason, nor hinder the sentence of true iudgement; but rather, seasoning her conceptions with humilitie, doth couertly complaine of open wrong, and strengthen her assertions with a pleasing deliuerie. And therefore, how great soeuer the controuersie be, that partie which exceedeth not the boundes of modestie, but maketh mildnesse his chiefest aduocate, will so preuaile in any audiorie, that albeit equitie doth disallow her title; yet the manner of his cariage will cleare him from offering wrong, in that he vseth the sequels of innocencie, to proue his interest in that which he demaundeth. But to leaue this circumstance, as onely to be noted, let vs proceed to the vvarre it selfe, which I made the second part of this historie.

CHAP. XV.

The *Treuri* bring newes of one hundred townships of the *Sweui*, that were come to the *Rhene*. *Cæsar* taketh in *Besanson*: his souldiers are surpris'd with an extreame feare of the *Germanes*.



At the same time, as this answer was returned to *Cæsar*, there came likewise Embassadors from the *Heduvans* and *Treures*. The *Heduvans* complained, that the *Harudes*, lately transported into *Gallia*, did depopulate and waste their borders, and that they could not buy their peace of *Ariouistus*, with giuing of Hostages for their allegiance. The *Treures* brought newes of one hundred townships of the *Sweui*, that were come to the riuer *Rhene*, to seeke a passage into *Gallia*, conducted by *Nasua* and *Cimberius*, two brethren. Whereat, *Cæsar* being exceedingly mooued, thought his best meanes of preuention to consist in celeritie, least the difficulty of resisting should growe greater, when those new forces of the *Sweui*, were ioyned with the power which was already with *Ariouistus*. And therefore, hauing provided *Corne*, hee made haste to seeke the *Germanes*. And hauing gone three daies iourney on his way, he had intelligence, that *Ariouistus* with all his forces, was gone to take in *Besanson*, the greatest towne of the *Sequans*; and that hee was three daies iourney on his way already.

Cæsar, knowing how much it imported him to preuent that disadvantage (forasmuch as the Towne abounded with all necessarie prouisions for vvarre, and was so sited, that hee that commaunded it, might prolong the warre at his owne pleasure: being incircled with the riuer *Alduabis*; excepting a small space of sixe hundred foote, which was fortified with an exceeding high Hill, the foote whereof did at each end ioyne vnto the Riuer, and the Hill strengthened with a wall, and so ioyned to the towne) made all the haste hee could to take the towne, and there left a guarixon. And as hee rested there a few daies, to make prouision of *Corne*, and other necessaries, the *Romaines* inquiring of the *Galles* and *Marchants*, concerning the qualitie of the *Germanes*; understood that they were men of a huge stature, of courage inuincible, and of great practise and experience in seates of *Armes*; whereof the *Galles* had oftentimes made triall: For, when they incountered them, they were not able to indure so much as the sternenesse of their countenance, or the fiercenesse of their lookes. The whole Armie conceined such a feare thereat, that all mens minds were wonderfullie appalled. This feare beganne first amongst the *Tribunes* and *Commaunders* of horse, and such others as for friendship sake followed *Cæsar* from *Rome*, & had small or no skill in matter of vvar. These men, faining some one excuse, & some another, of very earnest business, which called thẽ home, desired leaue to depart. Some others, who shame would not suffer to forsake the *Campe*, bewraied the like

Cæsar.

le doux.

passion in their countenances & hauiour: for, hiding themselves in their Tents, they either bewailed their destanie secretly to themselves, or otherwise, with their acquaintance and familiar friends. They lamented the danger they were all like to fall into; so that throughout the vvhole Campe, there was nothing but making and signing of Testaments. And through the talke and fearefulness of these men, the old souldiers and Centurions, and such as had great experience in the Campe, beganne by little and little to apprehend the terrour wher-with the rest were amazed: and those that would seeme to be lesse fearefull, said, they feared not the enemy, but the narrownesse of the waies, & the greatnesse of the woods, that were betweene them and Ariouistus; or otherwise they cast doubts vvhether they might haue prouision of Corne. And many stuck not to tell Casar, that vvhensoeuer he should giue commaundement to march forward, or aduance the Standarts, the souldiers would refuse to doe it.

OBSERVATION.



Herein, for that we find a strange alteration, no way answerable to that courage, which a late gotten victorie doth vsually breed in noble spirits; it shall not bee amisse, a little to insift vpon the qualitie of the accident, and to gather such breefe instructions from their weakenesse, as may best serue to qualifie the amasement of horreur, and mittigate the frensie of so violent a passion. And albeit my ignorance in the works of Nature, cannot promise any such learning, as may discouer the true meanes and secret motions, whereby a fore conceiued feare doth trouble the senses, and astonish the mind; yet sith the history offereth it to our scanning, giue me leaue onely to note the strangeness of the circumstance, and rudely to delineat the purtraiture of a beast oftener seene then wel knowne, vsing the vvwieldie pile for my pensile, and suting my speech to a warlike audiorie. I knowe not how it happeneth, but thus it may happen, that when the senses receiue intelligence of an eminent euill, which may either dispossesse the soule of this earthly mansion, or trouble the quiet wherein shee resteth; the spirits (as it seemeth) by the direction of their soueraigne Mistresse, retire themselves into the inner cabinets and secreter pavillions of the body, where the chiefest part of the soule is most resident: & so they leaue the frontier quarters of her kingdome, naked and vnguarized, the better to strengthen that capitall Cittie of the heart, out of which the life cannot flie, but to the vtter ruine and destruction of the whole bodie. For, feare is not onelic a perturbation of the soule, proceeding from the opinion it hath of some euill to come: but it is also a contraction, and closing vp of the hart, when the blood and the spirits are recalled from the outvard partes, to assilt that place which giueth life and motion to all the rest. In this Chaos and confusion of humours and spirits, when the multiplicite of faculties (which otherwise require an ordinate distinction in their seruice, and by the order of nature, should bee disposed into seuerall instruments, and be dilated throughout the bodie)

body) are thus blended confusedly together, the conceptions of the mind, which presently rise from these aduertisements, are suddenly choaked with the disordered mixture of so many severall properties, and are stifled as it were in the throng, before they can be transported to our iudgement, or examined by reason, for want of that ordinate vniformitie of place which nature requireth in the powers of the mind. And hence proceedeth that amazednesse and astonishment, which so daunteth the harts of men, when they are taken with this passion, that because the soule giueth no counsell, the body can afford no motion, but standeth frozen through the extremitie of the perturbation, benumbed in sense, and forsaken of the spirits. So we read, that Theophilus the Emperour, in an ouerthrowe which he had giuen him by the Hagerans, was strooken with such an excessiue feare, that hee could not betake himselfe to flight (*Adeo paor etiam auxilia formidat*) vntill one of his chiefe Commanders shaking him by the shoulder, as though he were to awake him out of a deep sleep, threatened him with present death, if he would not preuent the ruine of the Empire, by vsing that meanes which was onely left for his safetie.

Againe, if in that turbulent consistory, the spirits chance distinctly to receiue any apprehension proceeding from the forging facultie of the soule, they carie it presently to execution, before it be examined by reason, and follow the action with such vehemencie, that they leaue no place for better aduice and reknowledgement. And this is the cause, that oftentimes through extremitie of feare, to auoid one euill, we run headlong into a worse, and find a greater danger in the meanes wee vse to auoid a lesse; because reason did not first trie the apprehension, before it was deliuered to externall Agents. And so we find in the battell betweene Germanicus and the Almaines, that two grosse troopes of souldiers were driuen into such an extasie of feare, that taking contrarie courses to auoid one and the same danger, they either of them fledde to that place, which the other had quitted: neither could they bee aduised by each others flight, that the places which they sought after, afforded them no remedie.

And, albeit reason be called to counsell, whē a parlee is summoned of composition, yet it beareth so small a sway in the consultation, that the will of it selfe concludeth to betray vertue to dishonour; and so to purchase peace, with the losse of the soules chiefe treasure: which ought euer to bee estimated at a higher rate, then any other happinesse which can betide the mind. For among all the sensible things of this world, there is no creature that hath such a confused feare, or is more amazed therewith, then man is: neither is there any miserie greater, or any bondage more shamefull, seruile, or vile, then this, which maketh men very abiects of all other creatures, to redeeme the euill which the danger threatmeth: and then doth shame follow after so base a part, and aggravate the burthen of the sinne with lothsome disgrace, and penitent discontentment; adding oftentimes Aloes to Wormewood, and making the end grieuouser then the beginning. And thus doth danger breed feare, and feare yieldeth to dishonour, and dishonour bringeth shame, and shame beeing alwaies mingled with wrath & anger, reuengeth it selfe vpon it selfe, & bringeth more perrill then the first danger could threaten.

Whereby it appeareth, that as the affections of the mind are bred one of another: so, on the contrarie part, some are bridled and restrained by others; for, as enuie, hatred, & anger, rise oftentimes of loue, so is ioy lessened with grieffe, enuie with mercie, and feare with shame.

But, forasmuch as all such perturbations, proceede of ignorance and inconsideration, whereby we thinke that the euill is greater then indeede it is; let vs consider what disposition of our iudgement, best moderateth the violent heat of these affections. And first, touching the passages, whereby the soule receiueth her aduertisments, as they are of diuers natures, the chiefeft whereof are the eye and the eare: so are their auisors different in qualitie, and require a severall consideration to be rightlie discerned. The intelligence by the eye, is more certaine then that which commeth by the way of hearing; forasmuch as the eye is a witnesse it selfe of euery action, whereof it taketh notice; neither is it deceiued in her proper object: and therefore, the iudgement is not much troubled, to determine definitiue how great or how small the danger is, when the relations carie alwaies that certaintie. And, albeit the eare in like manner bee not deceiued in her proper object; for it faithfully giueth vp that sense, which sound hath deliuered vnto it: yet, forasmuch as the fantasie hath greater scope to coine her vaine conceptions, in regard of the absence of the action, it is necessarie, that the discoursing facultie, bee called for an assistant, before the iudgement can truly determine: and then it will appeare, that the truth doth not alwaies aunswere the report which is made thereof; inasmuch as diseased spirits, will not stick to dilate or qualifie relations, according to the key wherein they themselues are tuned. And therefore, this first commeth to be considered of in all such violent commotions, by which of these two senses the first intelligence was receiued. But concerning the iudgement it selfe, this is most certaine, that the more it is infected with the corruptions of the flesh, the more violent are the affections of the soule. And againe, the purer the iudgement is, & the higher it is lifted vp from earthly natures, being no further interessed therein, then to hold a resolution of well dooing; the fewer and lighter are the affections, which trouble and molest it: for, then it better discerneth the truth and falsehood, good or euill that is in things.

To redresse this inconuenience, Cæsar betooke himselfe to the fittest & most proper remedie: which was by the authoritie of his speech, to restore reason to her former dignitie, and by discourse, which feare had interrupted in them, to put downe a vsurping passion, which had so troubled the government of the soule; recalling it to the meane of true resolution, which was to moderate audacitie with warinesse, but not to choake valour with beastly cowardice: for, these Oratorie inducing perswasions, were not the least point of their discipline; considering how they framed the inward habite of the mind (beeing the fountaine and beginning of all motion) to giue life and force to those actions, which the seueritie of outward discipline commanded. For, as lawes and constitutions of men, inforce obedience of the bodie: so reason, and perswasions, must winne the soules consent: according to that saying; *Homines duci volunt, non cogi.*

CHAP. XVI.

Cæsar his speech to the Armie, concerning
this feare.

Cæsar being informed of these things, he called a Councell of warre, admitting all the Centurions, of what degrees or orders soeuer, vnto the same: And, beeing thus assembled, he greatly blamed them; First, that any man should be so inquisitive, as to imagine to himselfe, whither, and vpon what seruice they were caried. Concerning Ariouistus, he had in

the time of Cæsars Consulshippe, most earnestly sued for the friendship of the people of Rome: and why then should any man misdeeme, that he should so vnadvisedly goe back from his duetie? For his owne part, he was verily perswaded, that if Ariouistus once knew his demaunds, & vnderstood the reasonable offers that he would make him, he would not easily reiect his friendship, or the fauour of the people of Rome. But if he were so madde, as to make warre vpon them, why should they feare him? or why should they despaire, either of their owne prowesses, or of Cæsars diligence? For, if it came to that point, the enemy that they were to incounter, had beene tried what he could doe twice before; first, in the memorie of their fathers, when the Cimbri and Teutoni were vanquished by Marius, at what time the Army merited no lesse honour then the Generall: and now of late againe, in Italie, at the insurrection of the bondmen; who were not a little furthered through the practice and discipline they had learned of the Romaines. Whereby it might be discerned, how good a thing it is to be constant & resolute; inasmuch, as whom for a time they feared without cause, beeing naked and vnarmed, the same men afterwards (although well armed, and Conquerers withall) they nobly ouercame. And to be short, these were no other Germanes, then those whom the Heluetians had vanquished in diuers conflicts; and not onely in their owne Country, where the Heluetians dwelt themselues, but also euen at home at their own doores: and yet the same Heluetians were not able to make their party good against our Armies.

If any man were moued at the flight and overthrowe of the Galles, vpon inquirie he should find, that being wearied with continuall warres (after that Ariouistus had for many monthes together kept himselfe within his Campe, in a boggie and fenny Country) and despairing of any occasion of battell, he suddenly set vpon them as they were dispersed, and so ouercame them, rather by policie then by force. Which, although it tooke place against sauage and vnskilfull people, yet was not Ariouistus so simple, as to thinke that hee could insnare our Armies with the like subtilties. As for those that fained the cause of their feare, to bee the difficultie of prouision of Corne, and the dangerousnesse of the way, they seemed very arrogant in their conceits, in presuming to direct their Generall, as if he had not knowne what pertained to his dutie. The Sequans and Lingons, had vnderooke that charge; besides that, Corne was almost ripe euery where in the fields: and what the waies were, should shortly be seene.

Where-as it was given out, that the souldiers would not obey his Mandates, nor aduance their Standarts, he little valued it; for, he was well assured, that if an Army refused to be obedient to their Generall, it was either because he was thought to be vnfortunate in his enterprises; or else, for that he was notoriously conuicted of Auarice: but the vvhole course of his life, should witnesse his innocencie; and the ouerthrowe of the Heluetians, his happinesse. And therefore, that which he was minded to haue put off for a longer time, he would now put in execution out of hand; for, the night following, at the fourth watch, hee would dislodge frō thence: that without further delay, he might vnderstand, whether shame, and respect of their dutie, vvhould preuaile more vwith them, then feare or cowardise. And though he wist that no man else would follow him; yet notwithstanding, he would goe with the tenth legion alone, of whom he had no doubt or suspicion, and would take them as a guard to his person. Caesar had chiefly fauoured this legion, and put much trust in them for their valour.

Vpon the making of this speech, the minds of all men were wonderfully changed; for, it bredde in euery one a great alacritie and desire to fight: neither did the tenth legion forget to giue him thanks by their Tribunes, for the good opinion he had of them; assuring him of their readinesse to set forward to the warre. And then likewise, the rest of the legions made meanes, by the Tribunes of the souldiers and Centurions of the first Orders, to giue Caesar satisfaction; protesting, they neither doubted nor feared, nor gaue any censure of the issue of that vvarre, but alwaies left it to the wisdome of the Generall.

Their satisfaction beeing taken, and a view beeing made of the waies by Dinitiacus (whom, of all the Galles, he best trusted) and report being by him made, that in fetching a compasse of fiftie miles, hee might carie his Armie in open and champaine Countries; in the fourth watch of the night, according to his former saying, he set forward.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.

IN the speech it selfe, are presented many specialities, both concerning their discipline and Militarie instructions, which deserue examination; amongst which I note, first, the extraordinarie number admitted to the Councell; *Omnium ordinum ad id concilium adhibitis Centurionibus*: Where-as there were vsually no more admitted to their councell of warre, but the Legates, Questor, Tribunes, and the Centurions of the first Orders; which I vnderstand to be the first *Hastate*, the first *Principes*, and the first *Pilum* of euery legion. And this is manifestly prooued out of the fift Commentarie, where Cicero was besieged by Ambiorix: in which, amongst other, there were two valiant Centurions, Pulpio, and Varenus; betweene whom, there was euery yeere great emulation for place of preferment: *Et iam primis ordinibus appropinquabant*, saith Cæsar, that is, they had passed by degrees, through the lower orders of the legion, and were very neere the dignitie of the first cohort; wherein, as in all the rest, there were three maniples, and in euery maniple, two orders.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He first motiue which he vseth to recall their exiled iudgement, discovered their breach of discipline: for, contrarie to the course of Militarie government, they had presumed not onely to make inquirie, but to giue out, whether, and vpon what seruice they were caried; which in the rigour of Camp-policie, could not passe without due punishment: for, what can more contradict the fortunate successe of an expedition, then to suffer to bee measured with the vulgar conceit? or weighed in the balance of such false iudgments? especially, when those weake Censors are to be Actors, and Executioners of the designe: for, then, euery man will sute the nature of the action according to his owne humour; although his humour be led with blindness, & haue no other direction, then an vncertaine apprehension of profit, or disadvantage.

And in this case, there cannot be a better president then Nature hath prescribed: for, as naturall Agents, whilst they concur to produce a worke of absolute perfection, neither know what they do, nor can discern the things they look vpon; but yield themselues to be guided by a Moderator of infinite knowledge: so ought a multitude to submit their ability to the direction of some wise and prudent Captaine, that beholdeth the action in true honour; and balanceth the losse of many particulars, with the health and safetie of the publique good. For, if euery man should prescribe; who should obey? *Tam nescire quãdam milites, quã scire oportet*, saith Otho in Tacitus, vpon the like disorder: and againe, *Parendo potius quam imperia ducum sciscitando, res militares continentur*. Which proueth, that the greatest vertue which is required in a souldier, is obedience; as a thing wherein the force of all discipline consisteth.

THE THIRD OBSERVATION.



In the reason which he vseth to proue their disparitie of valour, in regard of the Romans, being superiour to the Heluetians, that had oftentimes ouerthrowne the Germans; hee strengtheneth the argument with the aduantage of the place: and saith, that the Heluetians had put them to the worst; not onely where the Heluetians dwelt themselues, but euen in their owne Country, and at home at their owne doores: as though anemie were charged with greater furie in the presence of a mans owne Country and dearest friends, then in a strange & vnknowne land.

This question was handled in the Romaine Senate, by Fabius Maximus, & Scipio, furnamed Africanus, when they sate in councill how to ridde their Country of that subtile Carthaginian, that for sixtene yeeres space, had fretted like a canker the beautie of Italie, wasted the land, and brought it to desolation, sacked their confederates, or alienated them from their dutie, ouerthrowne their Armies, slaine their Consuls, and threatned their imperiall Citie with ruine and destruction. Fabius, vpon the motion to make warre in Africk,

Whether men
haue greater
courage in
their owne or
in a strangers
Country.

frick, thought it agreeable to nature, first to defend that which was their owne, before they attempted other mens possessions: when peace was established in Italy, then let war be set on foote in Africk; and first let them be without feare themselves, before they went about to terrifie others: for, those forces afforded little hope of victorie in another kingdom, that were not able to free their owne Country from so dangerous an enemy. Alcibiades ouerthrew the Athenian Common-weale with the like counsell: and concerning Hanniball, let them be sure of this, that they should find him a forer enemy in his own Country, then in another kingdome.

Scipio, on the other side, caried on with the honour of so glorious an enterprise, wanted neither reasons nor examples to impugne Fabius his authoritie: for, he shewed that Agathocles, the Syracusan king, being a long time afflicted with the Punick warre, auerted the Carthaginean from Cicily, by transporting his forces into Africk: but how powerfull it was to take away feare, by retorting danger vpon the Oppressor, could there bee a presenter example then Hanniball? There was great difference in the nature of the action, betweene the spoile and waste of a strangers Country, and to see their owne native Country wasted with sword and destruction: *Plus animi est inferenti periculum, quam propulsanti.* For, he that inuadeth anothers kingdome, easily discovereth both the aduantage which may be taken against the enemy, and the strength wher-vpon he resteth. And amongst the variable euent of war, many vnexpected occasions arise, which present victorie to him that is ready to take it; and many strange chances so alter the course of things, that no foresight can discern what may happen.

With these, and the like remonstrances, this question of no lesse doubt then importance, was handled by two famous & woorthy Captaines, whose minds (as it seemed) were intangled with such particular affections for the present, as might rather draw them to wrest reason to their owne humour, then to determine in sinceritie of iudgement, vpon what specialities the truth was grounded, in the contrarietie of their positions. But, to leaue other commodities or disadvantages, which are annexed vnto either part, I will onely set down some reasons, to proue how valour and courage may either grow or be abated, by the accidents which rise in a warre of that nature. And first, this cannot be denied, the testimonie of an vnfallible truth being grounded vpon the propertie of mans nature; that as aduantage bringeth hope of victory, and hope conceiuet such spirits as vsually follow, when the thing which is hoped for, is effected; and thereby the courage becommeth hardie and resolute in victorie: so on the other side, disadvantage and danger breed feare, and feare so checketh valour, and controlleth the spirits, that vertue and honour giue place to distrust, and yield vp their interest to such directors, as can afford nothing but diffidencie and irresolution.

Neither can it be denied, but he that setteth vp an enemy in a strange country, and so preuenteth such attempts as might be made vpon his owne territories, hath that aduantage which giueth life vnto action, and steeleth his enterprise with resolution. For, besides the commoditie of leauing when he list, and procee-

proceeding as farre foorth as hee shall find his meanes able to fortunate his attempts; he knoweth that the strife & controuersie is not for his native Country, which he quietly enioyeth, & is reserued at all times to entertaine him, howsoeuer Fortune shall fauour his designes: but, for a Strangers kingdom, which his ambition thirsteth after; wherein, forasmuch as the riches and vvealth of that State, are laid before them, as the recompence of their labour, besides the honour which is archieued thereby, euery mans valour soareth at a high pitch, and their courage is increased, without any trouble or disturbance of the other faculties of the mind. But, when a Prince shall be assaulted in his owne kingdom, and in the sight of his subiects haue his land consumed with ruine and destruction; the danger will so disturbe the powers of the soule, that through the turbulent disorder of the weaker parts, the better faculties will lose their prerogatiue of aduising how the enemy may bee best resisted; when as euerie man shall apprehend the terrour of the danger, and few or none conceiue the true meanes to auoide it.

And albeit the presence of such things as are dearest to his soule, as the pietie and respect of aged parents, the tender affection towards wife and children, are sufficient to raise valour to the highest point of resolution; yet the motines are of such weight, as will rather make them diffident of their owne worth, as vn sufficient to maintaine so great a cause, then hold them in that key which true Honour affecteth: forasmuch as the terrour and feare of so great a danger, will present a greater measure of woes to their mind, then the hope of victorie can afford them ioy.

Hence therefore groweth the difference, between him that seeketh to maintaine that estate which he hath in possession by force of Armes; and an other, that seeketh to increase his meanes by valour. For, the former is presented with the danger of losing all his estate; which affrighteth and troubleth, hauing no other reward propounded vnto him: and the other looketh vpon the aduantage which hee gaineth by ouercomming; which much increaseth his valour, without any losse or disaduantage, if hee chance to bee put to the worst. And therefore, there is alwaies great odds betweene him that hath already lost his goods, and is by that meanes become desperate, hauing nothing further to lose; and another, that yet keepeth his substance, but is in danger to lose it: for, feare will so dismay his mind, that he will rather distrust his owne abilitie, then entertaine a resolution of valour.

To prooue this, wee neede not seeke other examples, then those imperiall Citties, in whose cause this controuersie was first mooued. For, when Hanniball was come into Italie, and had defeated Sempronius the Consull at Trebeas, the Romaines were driuen into such an extasie of terrour, that they believed verily, that the enemy was then comming to assault the Cittie; neither had they any hope or aide in themselues, to keep or defend the same. On the other side, Scipio was no sooner landed in Africk, but there was such a tumult in Carthage, as though the Cittie had bene alreadie taken: neither could the opinion of victorie, which Hanniball by a conquering Arnie in Italie had confirmed for sixteene yeeres together, preuaile in the apprehension of so imminent

ment a danger. And then that which Fabius borrowed of Nature to teach the Romans (that first men ought to defend their owne, before they seeke other mens possessions) was carefully followed by the Carthaginians: for, with all speed they sent for Hanniball out of Italy, to be their Champion against young Scipio. If therefore other things bee correspondent (as there are many other particularities concerning the power and strength of either Nation to be considered) I take it much better for a Prince to inuade an enemy in his own country, then to attend him at home in his owne kingdome.

THE FOVRTH OBSERVATION.



He last circumstance which I note in this speech, was the trust which he reposed in the tenth legion, being in it selfe peradventure as faultie as any other: wherein he shewed great Art and singular Wisdom. For, he that hath once offended, & is both burdened with the guilt of conscience, and vpbraided with the reproache of men, can hardly be perswaded that his fault can be purged with any satisfaction. And although the punishment be remitted, yet the memorie of the fact will neuer be blotted out with any vertuous action; but still remaineth, to cast dishonour vpon the offender, and to accuse him of disloialtie.

And therefore, it oftentimes happeneth, that an errour beeing once rashlie committed, through despaire of remission, admitteth no true penitencie, but either draweth on more grieuous crimes, confirming that of the Poet, *Scelere scelus luendum est*; or maintaineth his errour by wilfull obstinacie: as it is said of the Lion, that beeing found by Hunters in a Caue, will rather die in the place then quit it, for shame that he was found in so base a place of refuge; and therefore his properie is thus expressed, *ingrediendo cacus, exenndo protervus*. This did Cæsar wisely preuent, by clearing the tenth legion of that, which he accused the rest of the Armie; which made them the more earnest to answer his expectation, inasmuch as they were witnesses to themselves of a common errour: and the other legions, enuying at their fortune, resolved to shew as great alacritie in the sequell of the warre, and to deserue more then the iudgement of the Emperour had imputed to their fellowes.

CHAP. XVII.

The treatie betweene Cæsar and
Arionistus.

Cæsar.



He seauenth day, as hee continued on his march, his Espialls brought him word, that Arionistus with all his forces, was within twentie foure miles of that place: who as soone as he understood of Cæsars comming, sent Embassadors vnto him; Declaring that forasmuch as hee was come some-what neerer, and that he might doe it without danger, he was content

tent to admit of a parlee. Caesar refused not the offer; thinking now to find him reasonable, in that he offered of his owne accord, vwhat he had formerly denied at Casars request: and thereby was in good hope, that vnderstanding vwhat was required, he would in the end, consider of the many fauours he had received frō the people of Rome, and desist from such wilful courses.

The fift day following was appointed for the Treatie. In the meane time, there passed often Messages reciprocally betweene them. Ariouistus required, that Caesar would not bring any footmen to the parlee, for-that hee feared to be circumuented by treacherie; and therefore thought fitte, that either partie should come onely with their Cavalrie: otherwise he vvould not giue meeting.

Caesar, not vvilling to put off the Treatie for any such cause, nor yet daring to put himselfe in trust to the French horse, thought it most conuenient to leaue the French Riders behind him; and to set the souldiers of the tenth legion (whom he best trusted) vpon their horses: that if he stood in need, he might haue a faithfull guard of his friends about him. Wherevpon, one of the souldiers said prettily, that Caesar had doone more for them then he had promised; for, hee had said before, he would make the tenth legion as a guard to his person, and now he had inrolled them all for horsemen.

There vvwas a great and open Plaine, and in the midst thereof a rising Mount, vvwhich was almost in the mid-way, betweene both the Campes: and thither, according to the agreement, they came to parlee. The legion vvwhich Caesar had brought vvith him on horsebacke, hee placed two hundred pases from the said Mount: and likewise the horsemen of Ariouistus, stood in the same distance. Ariouistus requested, they might talke on horseback, and bring each of them tenne persons to the conference. At their meeting, Caesar beganne his speech vvith a commemoration of the fauours and benefites the Senate had done vnto him; in that hee vvwas by their authoritie, intituled by the name of a King and a Friend: & ther vpon, had receiued great gifts. Which fauour fell but vnto a few; and was by the Romaines giuen onely to men of great desert: Whereas hee, vvithout anie occasion of acesse vnto them, or other iust cause on his behalfe, had obtained those honours, through his curtesie, and the bountie of the Senate.

Hee shewed him further, vwhat ancient and reasonable causes of amitie, tied them so firme to the Heduan: What Decrees & orders of Senate, had oftentimes been made in their fauour and behoofe: That from all antiquity, the Heduan had held the principalitie of Gallia; and that, long before they vvwere in amitie vvith the Romaines. The people of Rome had alwaies this custome, not onelie to indeauour that their Allies and Confederates should not lose any thing of their proper; but also, that they might increase in dignitie and reputation: and therefore, vvho could indure to see that forced from them, vvwhich they quietly possessed, vvhen they entered league vvith the Romaines?

In like manner, he required the performance of such things, vvwhich he had formerly giuen in charge to his Embassadours; that hee should not make vvarre, either vpon the Heduan, or their Associates. That he should restore their hostages: and if hee could not returne any part of the Germanes backe againe ouer the Rbene, yet he should forbear to bring any more into that Country.

Ariouistus

Ariouſtus made little anſwere to Cæſars demaunds, but ſpake much of his owne vertues and valour; That he was come ouer the Rhene, not out of his owne deſire, but at the mediation and intreatie of the Gallies; that hee had not left his houſe and kindred but with great hope of high rewards; the poſſeſſions hee had in Gallia, were giuen him by themſelues; their hoſtages were voluntarily deliuered vnto him; he tooke tribute by the law of Armes, which was ſuch, as Conquerours might lay vpon the vanquiſhed; he made no war vpon the Gallies, but the Gallies made warre vpon him: All the States of Gallia came to fight againſt him, and had put themſelues into the field; whoſe forces were in one battell all diſperſed and ouerthrowne. If they were deſirous to make another triall, he was ready to vndertake them: but if they would haue peace, it were an iniury to retract that tribute, which of their owne accord they had paid vntill that time. He expected that the Amitie of the people of Rome, ſhould be rather an honor and a ſafety, then a loſſe vnto him, and that he had ſought it to that end: but if by their meanes, the tribute due vnto him ſhould be retracted, hee would as willingly reſuſe their friendſhip as he had deſired it. In that hee had brought ſo many Germans into Gallia, it was rather for his own defence, then of any purpoſe to ſubdue the Country; as might appeare, by that he had not come thither but vpon intreatie, & ſet no war on foot but for his own defence. He was ſeated in Gallia before the Romaines came thither; neither had the people of Rome before that time, carried their Army beyond the bounds of their Prouince: and therefore he knew not what he meant to intrude himſelfe into his poſſeſſions. This was his Prouince of Gallia, as that was ours: and as it was not lawfull for him to commaund in our quarters; ſo it was not fitting, that they ſhould diſturb his gouernment.

In that hee alleadged, the Hedvans were by decree of Senate adopted into the amitie of the people of Rome, he was not ſo barbarous, or vnacquainted with the courſe of things, as to be ignorant, that in the laſt warre of the Allobroges, they were ayding and aſſiſting to the Romaines: and in the quarrell the Hedvans had with the Sequans, the Romans were in like manner aſſiſting vnto them. Wherevpon he had good occaſion to ſuſpect, that Cæſar, vnder pretence of league & amity, kept his Army in Gallia for his ruine and deſtruction: and that if hee did not depart and withdraw his Army out of thoſe Countries, hee would no longer take him for a friend, but for an enemy. And if his fortune were to ſlay him, hee ſhould performe a very acceptable ſeruiſe to many noble & cheefe men of Rome: as he had well vnderſtood by Letters and Meſſengers he had receiued from them, whoſe fauour and amity hee ſhould purchaſe, by taking away his life. But if hee would depart, and leaue him the free poſſeſſion of Gallia, hee would gratifie him with great rewards: and what war ſo euer hee deſired to be vndertaken, ſhould be gone through withall, without his perill or charge.

Many things were ſpoken by Cæſar, to ſhew why he could not deſiſt from that courſe; for, neither was it his uſe, nor the cuſtome of the people of Rome, to forſake their wel-deſeruing Associates: neither could he think, that Gallia did rather belong to Ariouſtus then the Romans. The Aruerns and Rutenes, were in due courſe of war ſubdued by Q. Fabius Maximus: who the people of Rome had pardoned, and not reduced to a Prouince, or made them ſtipendaries. And if anti-

tiquitie were looked into, the people of Rome had good claime to that Countrey: but, forasmuch as the intention and will of the Senate was, they should remaine a free people, they were suffered to be governed by their owne lawes, and left unto themselves, notwithstanding any former conquest by force of Armes.

Whilst these things were treated of in parlee, it was told Caesar, that Ariouistus horsemen did approach neerer to the Mount, and that accosting our men, they assaulted them with stones and other weapons: whereupon he brake off, and tooke himselfe to his Party, commaunding them not to cast a weapon at the enemy. For, albeit hee well perceiued, hee might without perill of that elect legion, giue battell to his Cavalry; yet he thought fit to refraine, least it should be said, he had intrapped them with a parlee, contrary to faith made, and agreement. After it was reported amongst the vulgar souldiours, how arrogantly Ariouistus had caried himselfe in the treaty; forbidding the Romaines to frequent any part of Gallia, and that their Cavalry had assaulted our men, and that thereupon the parlee brake off: the Army was possessed with a greater alacrity and desire to fight, then before. Two daies after, Ariouistus sent Messengers to Caesar, signifying, that he desired to treat with him, concerning those things which were left unperfit, & theropō willed him to appoint another day of meeting; or if he liked not that, to send some unto him with authority, to cōclude of such things as should be found expedient. Caesar was unwilling to giue any further meeting; & the rather, for that the day before, the Germanes could not be restrained from violence, & force of Armes: Neither did hee think hee might safely expose the person of any of his followers, to the inhumanity of such barbarous people; and therefore thought it fittest, to send unto him M. Valerius Procillus, the sonne of C. Valerius Caburius, a vertuous yong mā, & wel bred, whose father was made free of Rome by C. Valer. Flaccus: which he did, the rather in regard of his singular integrity, & his perfectnes in the French tongue, which Ariouistus through long continuance had learned; & that the Germans had no cause of offence against him. And with him he sent M. Titius, that was familiarly acquainted with Ariouistus; with instruction to heare what was said, and to make report thereof to Caesar. Whom, as soone as Ariouistus saw come into his Campe, hee cried out in the presence of his Army; demaunding wherfore they came thither? and whether they were not sent as Spies? And as they were about to make answer, hee cutte them off, and commaunded them to be put in Irons.

The same day he remooued his Campe, and lodged himselfe vnder a hill, sixe miles from Caesar. The next day, he brought his forces along by Casars Campe, and incamped himselfe two miles beyond him; of purpose to cut off all such corne and conuoies, as should be sent to the Romaines by the Heduans and Sequans. From that day forward, by the space of five daies together, Caesar imbattelled his men before his Campe; to the intent, that if Ariouistus had a mind to giue battell, hee might doe it when he would. But Ariouistus all this while, kept his Armie within his Campe, and daillie sent out his horsemen to skirmish with the Romaines.

This was the maner of fighting which the Germans had practiced: there were 6000 horsemen, & as many strong and nimble footmen, whom the horsemen had

selected out of the vvhole host, euery man one for his safeguard: these they had alwaies at hand vwith them in battell, and vnto these they resorted for succour. If the horsemen vvere ouer-charged, these euer stept in to helpe them. If any one vvere wounded or vnhorsed, they came about him, & succoured him. If the matter required either to aduenture forward, or to retire speedily back againe, their swiftnesse vvas such (through continuall exercise) that hanging on the horse-mane by the one hand, they would runne as fast as the horses.

OBSERVATION.

*Footmen inter-
mingled amongst
horsemen.*

IT may seeme strange vnto the souldiours of our time, that the footmen should be mingled pell mell amongst the horsemen, without hurt and disadvantage to themselues; so vnlikely it is, that they should either succour the horsmen in any danger, or annoy the enemy: and therefore some haue imagined, that these footmen in the incounter, cast themselues into one bodie, and so charging the enemy, assisted the horsemen. But the circumstances of this place, and of others which I will alleage to this purpose, plainly euince that these footmen were mingled indifferentlie amongst the horsemen, to assist euery particular man, as his fortune and occasion required: and therefore, the choise of these footemen, was permitted to the horsemen, in whose seruice they were to be imploied; that euery man might take his friend, in whom he reposed greatest confidence. When they were ouercharged, these stept in to helpe them; if any man were wounded, or vnhorsed, he had his footman ready to assist him: and when they were to goe vpon any speedy seruice, or suddainly to retire vpon aduantage, they staid themselues vpon the mane of the horses, with one hand, & so ran as fast as the horsemen could go. Which seruices, they could not possibly haue performed, without confusion & disorder, if the footemen had not seuerally attended vpon the, according to the affection specified in their particular election.

The principall vse of these footmen of the Germanes, consisted in the aide of their owne horsemen vpon any necessitie, not so much regarding their seruice vpon the enemy, as the assitance of their horsemen. But the Romans had long before practiced the same Arte, to a more effectuall purpose; namely, as a principall remedy not onely to resist, but to defeat far greater troopes of horse, then the enemy was able to oppose against them. Whereof the most ancient memorie which historie mentioneth, is recorded by Liuius, in the second Punnick warre, at the siege of Capua, vnder the regiment of Quintus Fuluius the Consull: where it is said, that in all their conflicts, as the Romaine legions returned with the better; so their caualrie was alwaies put to the worst: & therefore they inuented this meanes, to make that good by Arte, which was wanting in force.

Out of the whole army were taken the choifest young men, both for strength and agilitie, and to them were giuen litle round bucklers, and 7 darts apeece in stead of their other weapons; these souldiers practiced to ride behind the horsemen,

men, and speedily to light from the horses at a watch-word giuen, and so to charge the Enemy on foote. And when by exercise they were made so expert, that the nouelty of the inuention no whit affrighted them, the Romaine horsemen went forth to incounter with the enemy, euery man carying his foot souldiour behind him; who at the encounter suddainly alighting, charged vpon the enemy with such a furie, that they followed them in slaughter to the gates of Capua. And hence, saith Liuius, grew the first institution of the Velites: which euer after that time were inrolled with the legions. The author of this stratagem, is said to be one Q. Nauius, a Centurion, and was honourable rewarded by Fuluius the Consull, for the same.

Salust, in the historie of Iugurth, saith, that Marius mingled the Velites with the Cavalrie of the associates, *vt quacunq; inuaderent equitatus hostium propulsarent*. The like practice was vsed by Cæsar, as appeareth in the 3 book of the Ciuil war; sauing that in stead of the Velites, he mingled with his horsemen, 400 of the lustiest of his legionarie souldiers, to resist the cavalrie of Pompey, while the rest of his Armie passed ouer the riuer Genulum, after the ouerthrow he had at Dyrrachium: *qui tantum profecere*, saith the text; *Vt equestri pralio commisso, pellerent omnes, complures interficerent, ipsique incolumes ad agmen se reciperent*. Many other places might bee recited: but these are sufficient to proue, that the greatest Captaines of auncient times, strengthened their cavalrie with footmen dispersed amongst them. The Romaine horsemen, saith Polibi-
 us, at the first, caried but a weake limber pole, or staffe, & a little round buckler; but afterwards, they vsed the furniture of the Grecians: which Iosephus affirmeth to be a strong launce or staffe, and three or foure darts in a quiuer, with a buckler, and a long sword by their right side. The vse of their launce was most effectuell when they charged in troope, pouldron to pouldron; and that manner of fight afforded no meanes to intermingle foot-men: but when they vsed their dartes, euery man got what aduantage of ground hee could, as our Car-
 bines for the most part do, & so the foot-men might haue place among them: or otherwise, for so good an aduantage, they would easily make place for the foot-men to serue among them. But, howsoeuer it was, it appeareth by this circumstance, how little the Romaines feared troopes of horse, considering that the best meanes to defeat their horse, was by their foote companies. But to make it more plaine, of many examples I will onely alleage two; the one out of Liuius, to proue that the Romaine horsemen were not comparable for seruice to foot-men: the other out of Hirtius, to shew the same effect against strangers, and Numidian horsemen.

In the Consulships of L. Valerius, and Marcus Horatius, Valerius, hauing fortunately ouerthrowne the Equi and the Volsci, Horatius proceeded with as great courage in the warre against the Sabines; wherein it happened, that in the day of battell, the Sabines referued two thousand of their men to giue a fresh assault vpon the left Cornet of the Romaines, as they were in conflict: vvhich tooke such effect, that the legionarie foote-men of that Cornet were forced to retreat. Vvhich the Romaine horsemen (beeing in number six hundred) perceiuing, and not being able with their horse to make head against the

Lib. 6.

Lib. 3. de excid.

Lib. 3.

De bello Africano.


enemy; they presently forlooke their horses, and made halte to make good the place on foote; wherein they caried themselues so valiantly, that in a moment of time they gaue the like aduantage to their footemen, against the Sabines; and then betooke theselues againe to their horses, to pursue the enemy in chase as they fled. For the second point; the Numidians, as Cæsar witnesseth, were the best horsemen that euer he met with, and vsed the same Arte as the Germanes did, mingling among them light-armed footemen. An Ambuscado of these Numidians charging the legions vpon a suddaine, the historie saith, that *primo impetu legionis Equitatus & leuis armatura hostium, nullo negotio, loco pulsa & deiecta est de colle.* And, as they sometimes retired, and sometimes charged vpon the rereward of the Armie, according to the maner of the Numidian fight; the historie saith, *Cæsariani interim, non amplius tres aut quatuor milites veterani si se conuertissent & pila viribus contorta in Numidas infestos coniecissent, amplius duorum millium ad vnum terga vertebant.* So that to free himselfe of this inconuenience, he tooke his horsemen out of the rereward, and placed his legions there, *ita vim hostium per legionarium militem comodius sustinebat.* And euer as he marched, he caused 300 souldiers of euery legion to be free and without burthen, that they might bee ready vpon all occasions, *Quos in Equitatum Labieni immisit. Tum Labienus, conuersis equis, signorum conspectu perterritus turpissime contendit fugere, multis eius occisis, compluribus vulneratis, milites legionarij ad sua se recipiunt signa, atque iter inceptum ire cœperunt.* I alleage the very words of the history, to take away all suspicion of falsifying, or wretling any thing to an affected opinion. If any man will looke into the reason of this disparitie, he shall find it to be chiefly the worke of the Romaine pile (an vnresistable weapon) and the terrour of horsemen; especially, when they were cast with the aduantage of the place, & fell so thick, that there was no meanes to auoide them.

But to make it plaine, that any light armed footmen could better make head against a troope of horse, then the Caultie of their owne partie, although they beare but the same weapons: Let vs consider how nimble and ready they were that fought on foote, either to take an aduantage, or to shunne and auoide anie danger; casting their darts with far greater strength and more certaintie, then the horsemen could doe. For, as the force of all the engines of old time, as the *Balista, Catapultæ* and *Tolenones*, proceedeth from that stabilitie and resting Center, which nature affordeth, as the onely strength and life of the engine: so what force soeuer a man maketh, must principally proceede from that firmnesse and stay, which Nature, by the earth, or some other vnmoueable rest, giueth to the body, from whence it taketh more or lesse strength, according to the violence which it performeth: as hee that listeth vp a waight from the ground, by so much treadeth heauier vpon the earth, by how much the thing is heauier then his body. The footmen therefore, hauing a surer stay to counterpoise their forced motion, then the horsemen had, cast their darts with greater violence, and consequently with more certaintie.

CHAP. XVIII.

Cæsar preuenteth Ariouistus of his purpose, by making two Campes.

Cæsar.



When Cæsar perceiued that Ariouistus meant nothing lesse then to fight, but kept himselfe within his Camp: least per-adventure he should intercept the Sequans, & others of his Associates, as they came with conuoies of Corne to the Romaines, beyond that place wherein the Germanes aboad; about six hundred pases from their Camp, he chose a ground meet to incamp in: and marching thither in three battells, commaunded two of them to stand ready in Armes, and the third to fortifie the Campe. Ariouistus sent sixteene thousand foote, and all his horse, to interrupt the souldiers, and hinder the intrenchment. Notwithstanding, Cæsar, as he had before determined, caused two battells to withstand the enemy, and the third to goe through with the worke: which beeing ended, he left there two legions, & part of the associate forces, and led the other foure legions backe againe into the greater Campe.

The next day, Cæsar, according to his custome, brought his whole power out of both his Campes; and marching a little from the greater Campe, hee put his men in array, and profered battell to the enemy: but perceiuing that Ariouistus would not stirre out of his trenches; about noone, hee conuaied his Armie into their seuerall Campes. Then at length, Ariouistus sent part of his forces to assault the lesser Campe. The incounter continued very sharp on both parts, vntill the euening; and at sunne-setting, after many wounds giuen and taken, Ariouistus conuaied his Army againe into their Campe. And as Cæsar made inquirie of the Captiues, what the reason was that Ariouistus refused battell, hee found this to be the cause. The Germanes had a custome, that the women should by casting of Lots, and Southsaying, declare whether it were for their behoofe to fight or no: and that they found by their Arte, the Germanes could not get the victorie, if they fought before the new Moone.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



First, we may obserue what especiall importance, this manner of incamping carried in that absolute discipline which the Romans obserued, and by which they conquered so many Nations: for, besides the safetie which it afforded their owne troops, it serued for a hold well fenced and manned, or as it were a strong fortified towne in any part of the field, where they saw aduantage: and as oft as they thought it expedient, either to fortifie themselues, or impeach the enemy, by cutting off his passages, hindering his attempts, blocking vp his Campe, besides many other aduantages, all auerring the saying of Domitius Corbulo: *dolabra vincendū esse hostē:*

a thing long time neglected, but of late happily renewed, by the Commaunders of such forces as serue the States, in the vnited Prouinces of Belgia: whom time and practice of the warres hath taught to entertaine the vse of the spade, & to hold it in as great reputation as any weapons whatsoever, which may be thought worthy executioners of the deeds of Armes.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.

IN the second place wee may obserue, that there was no Nation so barbarous (for, I vnderstand the Germaines to bee as barbarous, in regard of the motions of religion, as any knowne Nation of that time, being in a Climate so neere the North, that it afforded no contemplation at all) that could not make vse in their greatestt affaires, of that superstition to which their mind was naturally inthralled; and forge prophesies and diuinations, as well to stir vp, as to moderate the irregular motions of a multitude, according as they might best serue to aduantage their proceedings. Neither did Cæsar let slippe the occasion of making vse of this their religion: for, vnderstanding by their prisoners, that their diuinations forbade them to fight before the new Moone, he vsed all the meanes he could to prouoke them to battell; that their religious opinion of mischieuing, might preiudice their resolution to returne Conquerers. Which may serue to prooue, that a superstitious people are subiect to many inconueniences, which industry or Fortune may discouer to their ouerthrowe.

It is recorded, that Columbus, being Generall of some forces, which Ferdinando king of Castile sent to discouer the West Indies, and suffering great penurie for want of victuals in the Ile of Iamaica: after that hee had obserued how the Ilanders worshipped the Moone, and hauing knowledge of an Eclipse that was shortly after to happen; hee told the inhabitants, that vnlesse they would furnish him with such necessaries as he wanted for the time, the vvrath of their God should quickly appeare towards them, by changing his bright shining face into obscuritie and darknesse: which was no sooner happened, but the poore Indians, strooken with a superstitious feare of that which the course of nature required, kept nothing backe that might assist their enemies, to depopulate and ouer-runne their owne Country.

CHAP. XIX.

Cæsar seeketh meanes to giue them battell,
and the Germans dispose themselues
thereunto.



He next day, Cæsar left a sufficient Guarizon in each of his Campes; and, forasmuch as the number of his legionarie souldiers was small, in respect of the multitude of the Germanes, hee placed all the Auxiliarie troopes for a shew, before the lesser Camp: and putting his legions in a triple battell, he marched towards the Camp of Ariouistus. And then at length, were the Germanes constrained to bring out their power, setting euerie Tribe and people by themselues, in like distance and order of battell (as, the Harudes, Marcomans, Triboces, Vangiones, Nemetes, Sedusians and Sweuians) and ironing their whole Army with Cartes and eariage, that there might be no hope at all left to save any man by flight. And in these they placed their women, that they by their out-stretched hands and teares, moouing pittie, might implore the souldiers, as they descended by course to the battell, not to deliuer them into the bondage and thraldome of the Romaines.

Cæsar.

Cæsar, assigned to euery legion a Legat and a Questor, that euery man might haue an eye-witnesse of his valour: and he himselfe, began the battell with the right Cornet, forasmuch as he perceiued that part of Ariouistus Armie to be the weakest.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



He Romaines, euen from the infancie of their state, were euer zealous admirers of true honour, and alwaies desired to behold with the eye, to what measure of vertue euery man had attained; that the tongue with greater feruencie of spirit, might found out the celebration of *Macte virtute*; which imported more honour then any wealth that could be heaped vpon them. Neither was this the least part of their wisdom; considering that the most pretious things that are, lose much much of their worth, if they be not suted with other correspondent natures, whose sympathy addeth much more excellencie then is discerned, when they appeare by themselues without such assistance. For, how small is the beautie which Nature hath giuen to the eye-pleasing Diamond, when it is not adorned with an artificiall forme? or what perfection can the forme giue, without a foile to strengthen it? or what good is in either of them, if the light doe not illuminate it? or what auaille all these, where there wanteth an eye to admire it, a iudgement to value it, and an hart to imbrace it? Such a vnion hath Nature imprtnted in the diuer-

fitie

fitie of creatures concurring to perfection, and especially in morall actions, in whose cariage there is a far greater exactnesse of correspondencie required to approue them honorable, then was requisite to make the iewel beautifull. And this did Cæsar in all his battels; amongst the rest, that at Alesia is particularlie noted in this manner, *Quod in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur, neque rectè aut turpiter factum celari poterat, utrosque & laudis cupiditas & timor ignominie ad virtutem excitabat.* And when Liuiè would expresse how valiantly an action was caried, hee saith no more but *in conspectu imperatoris res gerebatur*: which is as much to say, that forasmuch as the Romaines were diligent obseruers of euery mans worth, rewarding vertue with honour, and cowardice with reproch; euery man bent his whole indeauour to deserue the good opinion of his Generall, by discharging that dutie which he owed to the Commonwealth, with all loyaltie and faithfulness of spirit.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



He Romaines had foure formes of the front of their battell: the first was called *Acies recta*, when neither the corners nor the battell was aduanced one before another, but were all caried in a right line, and made a straight front; and this was their most vsuall manner of im-

battailing.

The second forme of the front was called *obliqua*, when as one of the corners was aduanced neerer vnto the enemy then the rest, to beginne the battell: and this was commonly as Vegetius noteth, the right corner: for the right corner of an Army had great aduantage against the left of the enemies, in regard of their vveapons and furniture. But Cæsar did it in this place, because he perceiued that the enemy was weakest in that part; following a maxime of great authoritie, that the weakest part of an enemy, is in the beginning to be charged with the strength of an Armie: for, so fauourable are mens iudgements to that which is already happened, that the sequell of every action, dependeth for the most part vpon the beginning. *Dimidiū facti qui bene capit habet*, saith a Poet: and not without great reason, so forcible continually is the beginning, and so connexed to the sequell by the nature of a precedent cause, that the end must needs erre from the common course, when it doth not participate of that qualitie which was in the beginning. Neither can there be any good end without a good beginning: for, although the beginning be oftentimes disastrous & vn-luckie, and the end fortunate and happy, yet before it came to that end, there was a fortunate beginning: for, the bad beginning, was not the beginning of a good, but of an euill end. And therefore, that his men might foresee a happy end in a good beginning, it behooued him with the best of his Army to assault the weakest part of the enemy.

The third forme of the front, is called *Sinuata*, when both the corners are aduanced forward, and the battell standeth backward off from the enemy, after the fashion of a halfe moone. Scipio vsed it in Spaine, hauing obserued some daies

daies before, that the enemy continually so disposed of the battell, that his best souldiers were alwaies in the midst; and therefore Scipio put all his old souldiours in the cornets, and brought them out first to charge vpon the weakest part of the enemy, that those might decide the controuerlie, before the other that were in the midst could come to fight.

The last forme is called *gibbosa*, or *gibbera Acies*; when the battell is aduanced, and the two cornets lag behind. This forme did Haniball vse in the battell of Cannas; but with this Art, that hee strengthened his two cornets with the best of his souldiers, and placed his weakest in the midst, that the Romaines following the retreat of the battell, which was easily repeld, might bee inclosed on each side with the two cornets.

CHAP. XX.

The Battell betweene Cæsar and Ariouistus.



He signe of the battell being there vpon giuen, our men charged vpon the enemy very fiercely; and they on the other side, returned so speedy a counterbuffe, that the legions had no time to cast their pikes, and in that regard, made haste to betake themselues to their swords: But the Germanes, according to their manner, putting themselues into a Phalanx, receiued the force of their swords. In the battell, there were many legionary souldiours seene to leape vpon the Phalanx, and to pull vp with their hands, the targets that couered it, and so to wound and kill those that were underneath: and so the left Cornet of the enemy was ouerthrowne and put to flight.

Now, while the right Cornet was thus busied, the left Cornet was ouercharged with an vnequall multitude of the Germanes: which young Crassus the Generall of the horse no sooner perceiued (hauing more scope and libertie then any of the Commanders that vvere in the battell) hee sent tertiam Aciem, the third battell, to reskew and aide their fellowes that were in danger; by meanes whereof, the fight vvas renewed, and all the enemy was put to flight, and neuer looked backe, vntill they came to the Rhene, which was about five miles from the plate where they fought. Where, some few of them saued themselues by swimming: others found some boate, and so escaped. Ariouistus, lighting vpon a little Barke tied to the shore, recouered the other side, & so saued himselfe: the rest, were all slaine by the horsemen. Ariouistus had two wiues: one a Sweitian, whom he brought with him from home; and the other, of Noronberge, the sister of King Voccion, sent vnto him by her brother into Gallia, and married there: both these perished in that fight. His two daughters likewise being there, one was slaine, and the other taken.

As Cæsar pursued the Germane horsemen, it was his chaunce to light vpon Valerius Procillus, as he was drawne vp and downe by his Keepers, bound in three chaines: which accident, was as gratefull to him as the victorie it selfe; beeing

Cæsar.

so fortunate to recover his familiar friend, and a man of sort in the Prouince, whom the barbarous enemy (contrary to the law of Nations) had cast in prison. Neither would Fortune by the losse of him, abate any thing of so great pleasure and contentment: for, he reported, that in his owne presence, they had three severall times cast lots, whether he should be burned alive; and still escaped by the fortune of the lots: And M. Titius was found in like manner, and brought vnto him. The fame of this battell being caried beyond the Rhene, the Sweuians that were come to the banks of Rhene, returned home againe: whom the inhabitants neere vpon that riuer pursued, finding them terrified and distracted, and slew a great number of them.

Cæsar, hauing thus ended two great vvarres in one Sommer, hee brought his Armie into their wintering Campes, some-what sooner then the time of the yeere required: and leauing Labienus to commaund them, himselfe returned into the hither Gallia, to keepe Courts and publique Diets.

THE FIRST OBSERVATION.



His Phalanx, here mentioned, can hardly be proued to be the right Macedonian Phalanx; but wee are rather to vnderstand it to bee so tearmed, by reason of the close and compact imbattailing, rather then in any other respect: and it resembled much a *testudo*, as I said of the Heluetian Phalanx. Secondly, I obserue, that Cæsar kept the old rule concerning their discipline in fight: for, although the name of *Triaries* be not mentioned in his historie; yet he omitted not the substance: which was, to haue *primam, secundam, & tertiam Aciem*; and that *prima Acies* should beginne the battell, and the second should come fresh and asist them: or peradventure if the enemy were many and strong, the first and second battell were ioyned together, and so charged vpon the enemy with greater furie and violence; but at all aduentures, the third battell was euer in *subsidio*, as they tearmed it, to succour any part that should be ouercharged: which was a thing of much consequence, and of great wisdom. For, if wee either respect the encouragement of the souldiours, or the casualtie of Fortune, what could bee more added to their discipline in this behalfe, then to haue a second and a third succour, to giue strength to the fainting weakenesse of their men, and to repaire the disadvantage which any accident should cast vpon them? or if their valour were equally ballanced, and victorie stood doubtfull which of the two parties she should honour, these alwaies stept in, beeing fresh, against wearie & overlaboured spirits, and so drew victorie in despite of casualtie, vnto themselves.

THE SECOND OBSERVATION.



Concerning vse of lottes, it shall not be amisse to looke into the nature of them; beeing in former times so generall, that there was no Nation, ciuill or barbarous, but were directed in their greatest affaires, by the sentence of lots. As wee may not refuse for an vndoubted

The vse of
lots.

doubted truth, that which Salomon saith in the 16 of Prouerbs; The lottes are cast into the lap, but the direction thereof belongeth to the Lord: through the knowledge whereof, Iosua was directed to take Achan, the Mariners Ionas, & the Apostles to consecrate Matthias; So, whether the heathen and barbarous people, whose blindness in the way of truth, could direct them no further then to senselesse superstition, & put them in mind of a dutie which they owed; but could not tell them what it was, nor how to be performed: whether these, I say, were perswaded that there was any supernaturall power in their lotteries, which directed the action to the decree of destinie, & as the Gods would haue it, it remaineth doubtfull.

Aristotle, the wisest of the heathen, concerning things naturall, nameth that euent casuall, or proceeding from Fortune, of which the reason of man could assigne no cause, or (as he saith) which hath no cause. So that whatsoeuer happened in any action, besides the intent of the agent and workman, was tearmed an effect of Fortune, or chance of hab-nab: For, all other effects, which depended vpon a certaintie and definite cause, were necessarily produced; and therefore could not be casuall, or subiect to the inconstancie of chance. And because many and sundry such chances daily happened, which like *terra filij* had no Father, and could not be warranted as lawfull children, either to nature, or to reason, by the appearance of an efficient cause, they reduced them all to the power of Fortune; as the principall efficient and soueraigne Motor, of all such v unexpected euent: that is, they made nothing else the Gouvernesse, and directresse of many things. Which afterward grew to such credit amongst men, that it surpassed in dignity all naturall causes, and was deified with celestial honour, as the Poet saith; *Nos te facimus Fortuna deam cœloque locamus*. By the prouidence of this blind Goddesse, which held her Deitie by the tenure of mens ignorance, were all casuall actions directed, and especially lots; the euent whereof, depended onely vpon her pleasure and decree: neither could their direction be assigned to any other power; for, then their nature had been altered from chance to certaintie, and the euent could not haue beene called *Sors*, but must haue been reputed in the order of necessarie effects, whereof discourse of reason acknowledgeth a certaine foregoing cause. Whereby we see vpon how weake an axletree, the greatest motions of the godlesse world were turned, hauing irregularitie and vncertaintie, for the *intelligentia*, that governed their reuolutions. All heerein all sorts of men (although in diuers respects) rested as well contented, as if an Oracle had spoken vnto them, and reuealed the mysteries of fatall destinie.

Rome directed the maine course of her government, by the fortune of this mocke destinie: For, although their Consuls & Tribunes were elected by the people, who pleased their owne fancie with the free choice of their Commanders, and suted their obedience with a well liking authoritie: yet the publique affaires, which each Consull was seuerally to manage, was shared out by lots. For, if an enemy were entered into their confines, to depopulate and waste their territories, the lots assigned this Consull for the government of the City; and the other to commaund the legions, and to manage the war.

If forces were to be sent into diuers Prouinces, & against seuerall enemies, neither the Senate nor the people could giue to either Consull his taske: but their peculiar charges were authorised by lottes. If any extraordinary action were to be done in the Cittie, as the dedication of a Temple, the sanctifying of the Capitoll after a pollution, *Sors omnia versat*, did all in all. And yet (notwithstanding the weake foundation of this practise in their Theologie and deepest diuinity) we may not thinke but these skilfull Architects of that absolute government, wherein vertue ioyned with true wisdom, to make an vnexampl'd patterne: we may not thinke, I say, but they foresaw the manifold danger, which in the course of common actions could no otherway be prevented, but by the vse of lots. For, when things are equally leueled between diuers objects, and runne with indifferencie to equall stations, there must be some controlling power, to draw the current towards one Coast, and to appropriate it vnto one chanell, that the order of Nature bee not inuersed, nor a well established government disturbed: So the state of Rome, casting many things with equall charge vpon her two soueraigne Magistrates, which could not be performed but by one of them; what better meanes could there be inuented, to interesse the one in that office, and to discharge the other, then to appoint an Arbitr, whose decree exceeded humane reason? Of which, it could not bee said why it was so, but that it was so: for, if the wisdom of the Senate had been called to counsell, or the voices of the people calculated to determine of the matter; it might easily haue burst out into ciuill discord, considering the often contentions betwene the Senate and the people, the factions of Clients, and the constant mutabilitie of euerie mans private affections necessarily inclining vnto one, although their wor:h were equall, & by true reason indiscernable; which might haue made the one proud of that which peradventure he had not, and cast the other lower then would haue well beleeued his vertues: and therefore to cut off these, with many other inconueniences, they inuented lots; vvhich without either reason or will, might decide such controuersies.

By this it appeareth, how little the ancient Law-makers respected the ground and reason of an ordinance, so the commoditie were great, and the vse important to the good of the State: for, as they saw the thing it selfe to be casuall, so they saw that casuall things are sometimes more necessarie, then demonstratiue conclusions: neither ought the nature, and speculatiue consideration of Lawes and Statutes, belong to the common people: but the execution and obedience thereof, maketh the Common-weale flourish. And thus endeth the first Commentarie of Cæsar his warre in Gallia.

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